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INTRODUCTION
It is with great pleasure that we present the seventh edition of ‘Employment in Poland’. The report has been elaborated by 
the Institute for Structural Research on the initiative of Ministry of Labour and Social Policy as a part of the systemic project 
Analysis of processes on the Polish labour market and in the area of social integration in the context of the conducted 
economic policy, commissioned by the Human Resources Development Centre. This edition is devoted to the issue of pov-
erty. Growth of prosperity is not distributed evenly among the Polish citizens, and some of them still cannot satisfy even 
basic needs. The improvement of an overall economic situation reduces risk of poverty in general. However, in case the risk 
occurs, efficient and effective support measures should be provided.
First part of the report defines poverty, and explains the extent of the connection with such phenomena as economic dep-
rivation or social exclusion. It is vital, as the exact criterion of poverty is ambiguous. Having discussed these issues, we 
elaborate on the characteristics of poverty in Poland as compared to those observed in other Member States of the European 
Union, as well as their regional and local dimensions. The key element of this part is to determine the causes of poverty, 
i.e. to what extent poverty results from the features of national and regional economy, and to what extent from individual 
characteristics of people. The topics introduced in this part form background for subsequent parts of the report.
The second part is devoted to the poverty of certain social groups such as elderly, children, unemployed and rural. Conducted 
analyses allow to dispel some of the myths in this matter, as well as to bring out the characteristics that are particularly 
important from the perspective of creating the support instruments for groups that are at risk of poverty. The issue of pov-
erty among children is scrutinised from the intergenerational perspective, and its determinants and possible measures of 
preventing the phenomenon are discussed.
The third part focuses on relations between income inequalities and situation on the labour market. In this part changes 
in distribution of wages in Poland are confronted with the poverty dynamics. They are supplemented with a reflection on 
the impact on poverty exerted by changes in the Polish society, including (but not limited to) those concerning household 
structure or economic activity of women. The phenomenon of so called working poor is also scrutinised here. We determine, 
inter alia, whether the characteristics of household or of work performed are more important causes of in-work poverty. 
We also elaborate on the question if situation of poor households is persistent or low-paid employment enables them to get 
out of poverty.
The fourth part discusses available tools and instruments to fight the poverty. The state of affairs described in first three 
parts allows to take a closer look on efficiency and effectiveness of social policy measures applied in Poland, both tax and 
benefit based. Special attention is drawn to the issue of financial support of families with children as an element of social and 
demographic policy. The key features of this part are simulations of the impact of hypothetical changes in currently function-
ing system on rate of poverty in Poland. The recommendations for public policy constitute the summary of the report.
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Introduction
There is no doubt that the rewards of economic growth have never been distributed across the society evenly. People, who are 
affluent, attain high incomes and possess considerable resources live side by side with those whose financial means are very scarce 
and improvement prospects are uncertain. The poor are also quite diversified themselves: some of them, despite being unable to 
pursue active public life due to their low income, do not have to worry about the satisfaction of their fundamental needs i.e. food, 
sleep and housing, while others are forced to live in grinding poverty. Historically speaking, in the past the poor were doomed to 
rely upon their own resourcefulness only. Only relatively recently their situation has become a subject of concern for democratic 
societies, and implicitly, for the public policies in more developed countries. Nowadays, in times of globalisation, substantial devel-
opmental disparities and uncertain economic prospects, the issue of poverty and the struggle against it have become key concerns 
of the international policies. 
Poverty itself can look differently in various regions of the world. In developing countries it can assume extreme shapes, when 
fulfilment of the basic needs of numerous groups becomes impossible. On the other hand, in industrialised countries such extremi-
ties are rare, and the poor are defined as those whose incomes just fall below predefined below-average levels, despite the fact that 
their material status and living conditions may be incomparably better than of the majority of developing countries citizens. Hence, 
when raising the subject of poverty, we should remember about its definitional complexity. In fact, the main purpose of the present 
Part of this report is to systematise poverty-related definitions and set up a quantitative panorama of this phenomenon in Poland 
with international background. In this context, this Part can be regarded as an introduction to the topics that will be raised later on 
in this paper.
 
This Part begins with the definition of poverty and the circumstances which made it the subject of public and political debates. 
Then, on the basis of extensive literature, we are going to set up a definitional network of the poverty phenomenon, considering 
its interdisciplinary nature and the social policies. We are going to pay particular attention to the nontrivial mutual relations that 
exist between poverty and social exclusion. In part two we are going to present poverty in more quantitative terms. For example, 
to outline the differences between objective and subjective approach to poverty in Poland, take a look at material deprivation, and 
find out to what extent poverty diversifies particular regions of Poland. Based on these analyses, in Part three we discuss the role 
of poverty in the context of the public policy in Poland – indicating which groups should be supported first of all, and how to ensure 
efficiency of such support.
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What Is PovErty?1 
Why do polItIcIans take Interest 1.1 
In poverty?
Improving the status of the poor is regarded as a gener-
ally accepted task of public policies nowadays. However, this 
issue has not always been treated as such. In the past, the poor 
used to obtain support from other individuals, religious congre-
gations and charity organisations, rather than from the state. 
Poverty became the subject of political actions only in the sec-
ond half of the 19th century, when political interest in improving 
conditions of the poor stemmed not only from moral reasons, 
but also from economic and political ones.
From the economic point of view, poverty can be a source 
of the negative externalities for the entire population and econ-
omy. One of them is spreading of contagious diseases, to which 
extremely poor and homeless individuals devoid of the possi-
bilities of maintaining basic hygiene and adequate nourishment, 
are most prone. The incidence of poverty is also relatively high 
among illegal immigrants looking for better living prospects 
in countries of their destination, even at the cost of their per-
sonal freedom, slave labour, or breaking the law – which also 
coincides with higher delinquency, family violence and alcohol 
abuse rates. The poor also relatively more frequently engage 
into precarious jobs in the shadow economy, which imply lower 
occupational safety and hygiene standards, and higher envi-
ronmental pollution, due to relatively primitive manufacturing 
technologies. Reduction of such negative outcomes a priori may 
be more problematic and costly, than the struggle against pov-
erty including a wide array of public interventions targeted at 
the poor. Moreover, if poverty in any individual country affects 
living/economic conditions at international level, the interna-
tional community may exert high pressure upon all countries 
failing to take precautions against poverty (Risse, 2003). 
Counteracting poverty may also stem from certain moral 
premises. This conviction is reflected, first of all, in the philoso-
phy of the Catholic Church and the related doctrines of Europe-
an Christian-democratic and liberal parties. According to Papal 
Encyclicals, such as e.g. Rerum Novarum (1891), Quadragesimo 
Anno (1931) and Centesimus Annus (1991), the state is obliged 
to: show solidarity with its citizens, struggle against inequalities 
caused by capitalism, and protect the society against its adverse 
effects, e.g. by ensuring stable employment, fair working condi-
tions, necessary vacation or minimum wages. All the three En-
cyclicals also point out to the subsidiary function of the state 
towards its citizens and micro-communities. The Papal Encyc-
licals, and the conviction that excessive social disparities and 
incidence of extreme poverty, adversely affect the quality of life 
of the society (Burguignon, 2004) in the 1940s -1950s inspired 
the German ordoliberals to formulate their concept of social 
market economy, which shortly afterwards became a leading 
European political doctrine, accepted by the majority of parties. 
Nowadays, extreme poverty and substantial social stratifica-
tion are regarded as unacceptable in the majority of developed 
countries (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990) and considered as an ex-
ample of market failure, which should be counteracted by the 
state (Acocella, 1998).
Apart from its economic and moral aspects, the public 
interest in poverty also stems from pragmatism. The gradual 
democratisation of political processes which took place in the 
Western Europe between mid 19th and mid 20th centuries led to 
extension of the eligible voters group with the classes which had 
previously been excluded from participation due to their gen-
der (women), social background (peasants, workers) or material 
status (the poor). These processes encouraged politicians to pay 
more attention to the economic interests of such groups, which 
facilitated the incorporation into the political mainstream of 
the ideas that had been so far reserved to revolutionary leftish 
movements i.e. social justice, equality and solidarity, with their 
simultaneous and radical transformation. As a consequence, at 
the end of the 19th century in Germany, and at the beginning 
of the 20th century in Great Britain, the first social protection 
systems were established. They first used to be targeted at 
preventing poverty among senior people, and then, also among 
other social groups. The Great Depression of the 1930s, which 
facilitated introducing the first social support systems that pro-
vided unemployment benefits and intervention works (such 
as e.g. the US Social Security Act of 1935) in several developed 
countries was a powerful impulse for extending the coverage of 
national protection of individuals at risk of poverty. However, all 
such supporting instruments became more widespread in the 
more developed part of the world only during post-war period, 
when the social market economy concept was formulated and 
incorporated into political doctrines. 
An internationally recognised document confirming the 
importance of ensuring basic social protection was the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations 
in 1948. Among others, the Declaration stated that: (Article 23): 
“Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable re-
muneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence 
worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by 
other means of social protection”, and: (Article 25): “Everyone 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and 
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in cir-
cumstances beyond his control”. Implicitly, the UN signatories 
confirmed that the international community should take effort 
in order to ensure that all people, regardless of their nationality 
and residence, were provided with certain minimum standards 
of living and social protection. Despite the fact that this idea has 
not been effectively implemented so far, the UN takes steps in 
order to ensure observance of such minimum standards even in 
the poorest countries of the world, by implementing the Millen-
nium Development Goals (cf. Box I.1). 
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1  The selected objectives have shorter timelines and can be verified.
box
i.1 Poverty in the millennium development goals and europe 2020 strategy
Millennium development Goals are the eight goals established and adopted by international community in 2000 which are targeted at the 
improvement of living standards and developmental potential in 189 signatory states of the agreement (including Poland) and assume:
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger (i.e. the priority objective) 1. > halve the proportion of people (1) living on less than 1 USD 
a day and (2) suffering from hunger,
achieve universal primary education 2. > ensure that children everywhere can complete a full course of primary schooling, girls and 
boys,
promote gender equality and empower women 3. > eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005, and at 
all levels by 2015,
reduce child mortality 4. > reduce by two-thirds the under-five mortality ratio,
improve maternal health 5. > reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio,
combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 6. > have halted and begun to reverse (1) the spread of HIV/AIDS, (2) incidence of 
malaria and other major diseases,
ensure environmental sustainability 7. > 4 detailed targets,
develop a global partnership for development 8. > 6 detailed targets
Implementation of these objectives on a global scale is supposed to enable creating of such conditions that would respect the basic hu-
man needs and rights including e.g. freedom from hunger, access to education, healthcare or housing. In order to achieve these conditions, 
coherent cooperation among partners is needed. Thanks to the poverty statistics conducted in developing countries and their systematic 
surveillance, monitoring of fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals is possible both at global and national levels, in particular tak-
ing into consideration the poorest countries.
The fulfilment of the global priority objective is still possible; however, if no visible economic growth takes place, it will happen only in 
certain regions i.e. apart from industrialised countries, mainly in the Eastern Asia – both in terms of poverty and hunger. Achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals in some parts of the world will still not be possible for many years to come, especially in Sub-Saharan 
Africa where 51% of the population live on less than USD 1.25 a day, and also to the Southern Asia – where such ratio amounts to 39%, as 
compared to the South-Eastern Europe where the problem applies to less than 1% of population. In Poland, the extreme poverty defined as 
living on less than USD 1 a day is marginal and refers to ca. 0.1% of the population. In this respect, Poland does not differ much from other 
industrialised countries. Hence, similarly to other developed countries, in-depth studies of the poverty phenomenon in Poland mostly take 
into account the relative poverty indictors, which are independent from the actual USD amount of daily income.
TABLE I. 1. IMPLEMENTATION Of THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN POLAND
1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2009
proportion of individuals living on less than USD 1 (PPP) a day in the total population 4.2 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
poverty gap (%) 1.6 0.3 0 0 0 0 0
proportion of the poorest 20% in the national income (%) 6.5 8.2 7.9 7.6 7.3 7.6 7.7
Source: own elaboration based on UN Stat data.
The same idea - i.e. focusing on relative poverty – has inspired the definition of europe 2020 strategy objectives. In order to achieve such 
level of development that would promote social inclusion within the EU i.e. giving the poor an opportunity to participate of in economic/
social life, the number of individual at risk of poverty or social exclusion should be reduced by 20 million (ca. 25%) until 2020. At the same 
time, Member States also specified their individual goals which collectively only slightly exceeded 10 million1 i.e. half of the EU target. 
Moreover, each Member State could independently decide whether the poverty reduction should be considered in the context of the en-
tire population, or selected groups only. In Denmark, for instance, the issues of poverty and exclusion of households with low labour supply 
were emphasised, while Germany focused on the long-term unemployed, Sweden – on the long-term medical leaves, and the UK empha-
sised the situation of children. Poland intends to reduce the number of its poor by 1.5 million, which objective is comparable, in terms of 
absolute numbers, to Spanish (by 1.4-1.5 million) and Italian ones (2.2 million), considering the respective numbers of citizens. 
The achievement of individual poverty reduction objectives is supported by the National Reform Programmes, the European Platform against 
Poverty and Social Exclusion, and by the recently introduced Social Investment Package. In financial framework 2014-2020 each EU Member 
State was obliged to include a document presenting the list of actions aimed at poverty risk reduction.
Source: own elaboration based on UN, 2010 and EC, 2010.
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What do We have In MInd When 1.2 
talkInG about poverty?
Over the past two centuries understanding of poverty in the 
social sciences has evolved substantially: from a purely economic 
notion, to a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing various 
spheres of social life. At the beginning, it mostly used to denote 
such situations when someone’s income did not allow him/her at-
taining a specific living standard. The monetary approach, which 
was introduced by Booth and Rowntree, was used mostly at the 
turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (Laderchi et al., 2003). As time 
went by, the literature dealing with the subject started defining 
poverty as an inability to satisfy one’s basic needs such as hous-
ing or nourishment, due to the scarcity of resources (Townsend, 
1954). This approach is still used in the field of development eco-
nomics which deals with low-income regions the world. 
In the 1980s, thanks to Amartya Sen (1980), this approach 
was modified – poverty was no longer interpreted just as mere 
inability to satisfy one’s basic needs, but as a lack of resources 
resulting lack of such capability. In this context, resources are not 
needed because of their particular traits, but because of their 
ability to satisfy one’s core needs. E.g. a bicycle is not acquired 
because of its market value, or aesthetic appeal, but because of 
its ability to improve one’s mobility. Such needs may evolve in 
time or space. Although some time ago, providing for certain 
fundamental needs such as food or housing used to be enough, 
nowadays more sublime needs, e.g. related to participation in 
community life have become relatively more important. This 
approach stems from the co-participation concept, according 
to which the lack of resources leads to non-fulfilment of certain 
community priorities and requirements, and thus, limits possibil-
ity of one’s active participation in community life.
The first insights into non-financial poverty aspects date 
back to the end of the 18th century, when Adam Smith named 
those resources which allowed an individual to feel publicly 
confident (i.e. unembarrassed). Their type depended on the 
socioeconomic context and surroundings. In other words, the 
indicators of the minimum material status allowing one to feel 
publicly adequate are changeable. Whereas in Adam Smith’s 
times, such status indicators were linen shirts and leather shoes, 
nowadays such functions are performed by material and finan-
cial resources allowing for fulfilment of one’s needs in the field 
of economy, culture, entertainment, sports, healthcare, politics 
or science. At the same time, treating poverty as a multidimen-
sional phenomenon is consistent with our perceptions, which 
are reflected in the contemporary public debate which focuses 
upon the differences that occur between the poor and the oth-
ers i.e. difficulties in supporting one’s children and educating 
them, inability to satisfy one’s housing needs, lack of access to 
cultural resources, limited participation in the public life, etc.
Analysing poverty as an inability to fulfil one’s basic needs, 
or limited participation in the social life is constrained by the 
fact that research methodology lags behind theoretical con-
cepts. The major methodological concern is related to measur-
ing needs, priorities, possibilities and functions (whose short-
ages would be most visible among the poor) that represent the 
values appreciated by the society. Reviews of available litera-
ture made in order to identify alternative indicators of the qual-
ity of life and socially-appreciated values (cf. Alkire, 2007) have 
shown that such studies are mostly qualitative and spatially con-
strained. For instance, a survey conducted in Rajasthan (India), 
has resulted in identifying 32 conditions that must be fulfilled 
in order to recognise the quality of life as good, at least in the 
Indian context (UNFPA).2 The spatially constrained character of 
2  cf. Kakwani i Silber (rev.), 2008.
income
basic needs
capability
lack of revenue 
enabling attainment of 
a specific level of utility
impossibility of 
satifaction of the basic 
needs, which are 
similar for all 
individuals
impossibility of 
satisfaction of certain 
needs typical of 
specific surroundings 
co-participation
non-satisfaction of 
needs, non-fulfilment 
of priorities and 
requirements that are 
relevant for active 
participation in life of  
a given community 
diagram I.1. |  Evolution of the definition of poverty
Source: own elaboration.
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such analyses results in low comparability of studies conducted 
at various times and places, which makes multidimensional and 
comparative qualitative analyses of poverty difficult – both at 
international, and national levels, from a certain time perspec-
tive. As a consequence, poverty defined in terms of possibilities 
and co-participation, and the multidimensional phenomenon of 
social exclusion rest within the domain of sociological studies, 
rather than economic or statistical analyses which investigate 
entire societies or economies. Although the findings of such 
qualitative studies may have considerable educational value, it 
is difficult to assess the scale, temporal evolution and spatial dif-
ferentiation of detailed characteristics of poverty and social ex-
clusion in course of such research. In fact, conducting such anal-
yses is impossible even in case of small numbers of indicators.
Somewhat different limitations can be observed if the ba-
sic needs methodology is used to investigate the population of 
the poor. As a matter of fact, this approach enables specifica-
tion of a limited number of measurable poverty indicators only. 
However, the choice of such indicators can be questioned as 
being arbitrary, since weights ascribed to specific measures can 
considerably affect the results. At the same time, multiplicity of 
the possible basket of goods and life strategies aimed at satisfy-
ing one’s hunger or housing needs is problematic. Furthermore, 
mainly in the context of nutrition, we should take into account 
different geographical, climate, and socio-demographic condi-
tions of specific countries, or different activity patterns. The 
consumption patterns of the poor, although less often analysed 
in the context of explicit poverty studies, can be a valuable piece 
of information in case of material deprivation. The limitations 
related to specific methods have been listed in Table I.2.
There are several arguments in favour of the income-
based quantitative analyses of poverty, despite their limita-
tions i.e. unbiased character and transparency of measures, 
inter-temporal and inter-spatial comparability, and low costs of 
data collection/processing. However, information about one’s 
income, expenditure or household wealth is regarded as sensi-
tive – such data tend to be disclosed reluctantly, they are often 
underrated, and their exact classification is difficult and labour-
intensive – both in terms of their structuring, and supplemen-
tation. The characteristics of the poverty datasets have been 
presented in Box I.3.
In the course of the Household Budget Survey (HBS), 
apart from information about incomes of specific household 
members, the household expenditure data is collected. Based 
on such data, we can associate poverty with an extremely low 
consumption level. The Central Statistical Office of Poland 
(GUS) which defined the poverty threshold as 50% of the mean 
of equivalised disposable expenditure used the expenditure-
based approach. Meanwhile, Eurostat takes advantage of the 
income-based definition in determining the poverty threshold 
as 60% of the median of equivalised disposable income (cf. Box 
I.2). Moreover, Eurostat uses the income approach, by referring 
to the total income attained by respondents in the past year, in-
stead of taking into account selected months, such as it happens 
in case of HBS. The co-occurrence of both these definitions in 
public surveys may prompt some questions regarding the con-
sequences of using each of them in general studies of the phe-
nomenon, its sectoral, spatial structure and temporal changes.
The core poverty indicators in Poland calculated based 
on both these definitions are quite comparable, at the very first 
glance, but difference in poverty ratios calculated in accord-
ance with expenditure-based and income-based methods has 
considerably decreased over the past ten years. Besides, the 
poverty rate dynamics is similar, regardless of the measure-
ment method (Figure I.1). Apart from that, there are no sub-
stantial differences between these two approaches as regards 
the gender, education and residence-related structuring of 
the poor. The same applies to the poverty structures based on 
table I. 2 |  Definitions of poverty – methodological limitations
dimension / method income-based basic needs possibilities co-participation
reflection of reality - +/- + +
limited number of components + +/- - -
additivity of particular components + - - -
independence from cultural factors + - - -
inter-spatial comparability +/- - +/- -
inter-temporal comparability + + +/- +/-
precise definitions + +/- - -
data availability + +/- - -
data reliability +/- + ? ?
low costs of analyses + +/- - -
economic policy recommendations + + +/- +/-
Source: own elaboration.
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the main sources of income (Figure I.2). However, in this case, 
the expenditure-based measure may show a somewhat higher 
share of employees and retirees, and a lower share of farmers 
and retirees in the population of the poor, as compared to the 
income-based method. The overall structural similarity does 
not mean, however, that the same households will be always 
classified as poor according to both expenditure- and income-
based criteria. In 2011, half of individuals classified as poor ac-
cording to income-based criteria, could not be classed as such, 
pursuant to the expenditure-based approach. This could have 
been attributed to non-synchronised exposure of households 
to both poverty types, assuming that income-based poverty 
leads expenditure-based one. 
In fact, the difference between income and spending is the 
amount of savings. Households with high savings may be per-
ceived as poor according to the expenditure-based approach. 
On the other hand, a household deprived of its source of in-
come can temporarily maintain its spending level by using its 
savings. Another drawback of the expenditure-based approach 
is the fact that loan repayments are not categorised as expendi-
ture (cf. GUS, 2011). Loans instalments, especially including 
mortgage credit, may constitute a large proportion of house-
hold spending, especially in case of labour-income households. 
As spending data, at the same time, include housing rents, in 
accordance with GUS’s definition, the poor do not include ten-
ants, but those who cut down on their consumption in order 
to repay mortgage loans. According to HBS, in 2008 the ratio 
of households which had mortgage loans amounted to ca. 5% 
of households, which was comparable to that of agricultural 
households. In accordance with the Polish Bank Association’s 
(ZBP) estimates the number of active mortgage loans in 2012 
was 1.7 million, which, assuming that 1 loan is linked to 1 house-
hold, includes 12% of all households in Poland.
box
i.2 a mean or median value?
The fundamental role in the poverty analyses presented in this report is performed by a median value which is, obviously, different from 
mean value. While the mean value enables us to calculate an average value of a variable in a specific population, the median identifies 
the value of such variable ascribed to a population member positioned right in the middle of an increasing sequence. for instance, in the 
sequence of students who have been arranged according to their height, the median height will be the height of the student who is neither 
shorter, nor higher than half of his colleagues. The height of the median student does not have to be the same as the mean height of all 
students (cf. figure I.1).
DIAGRAM I. 2. A MEAN VS. MEDIAN VALUE – AN ExAMPLE
In case of the median value the values of variables that have been ascribed to specific individuals are not relevant, provided that all such 
individuals have been arranged in an increasing sequence i.e. each preceding individual is representing a lower value than the next one. 
This makes the median value insensitive to the presence of single individuals whose variable values would be outliers. for instance, the 
presence of a narrow group of billionaires whose high monthly income substantially increases the mean value, would lead to an impression 
that the income of a randomly selected worker may be higher than it is, and the scale of poverty is rather small. However, in case of the 
median value the situation looks differently: what matters is the variable value ascribed to an individual who has been positioned right in 
the middle of an increasing sequence. 
Other analogous measures used throughout the present report include e.g.
quartiles – dividing the sample into 4 equal parts by cutting off 25%, 50% and 75% of the sample,• 
quintiles – dividing the sample into 5 equal parts (20%, 40%, 60%, 80%),• 
deciles – dividing the sample into 10 equal parts (10%, 20%,…, 80%, 90%),• 
percentiles – dividing the sample into 100 equal parts (1%, 2%,…,98%, 99%).• 
Source: own elaboration.
median value mean value
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These observations seem to be confirmed by the dynam-
ics of equivalised incomes and expenditure in 1998-2011 (cf. 
Figure I.3).3 While in 1998-2005 these datasets used to be 
similar, since 2005 a growing gap between incomes and ex-
penditure could be observed. This corresponds to the growing 
household indebtedness reported at that time, even though the 
3  A modified OECD equivalence scale has been applied. It ascribes weight 1 
to the first adult, 0.5 to the next adult and 0.3 to a child (i.e. an individual aged 14 or 
younger).
value of mortgage loans declared in HBS is lower than the one 
presented in the reports of the Polish Bank Association (ZBP, 
2012). For these reasons, the income-based approach provides 
a better view on poverty dynamics over the past few years. As 
the dynamics of equivalent household expenditure collapsed 
in 2005, analysing of poverty changes in accordance with the 
expenditure-based approach may be erroneous. 
Figure I. 1 |  Poverty risk in accordance with 
expenditure-based and revenue-based approaches; 
1998-2011
Figure I. 2 |  Structure of the poor by main source of 
household income; 2011
Note: modified equivalence scale has been applied.
Source: own calculations based on HBS data.
Source: own calculations based on HBS data.
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Figure I. 3 |  Dynamics of the median equivalised 
income and expenditure; 1998-2010 (1998=100)
Figure I. 4 |  Seasonality of income among 
agricultural and non-agricultural households in 
Poland; 1998-2011 (each January=100)
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data. Source: own elaboration based on HBS data (1998-2011).
Note: each year monthly income was compared to income in January, and then 
the monthly differences were averaged in the years 1998-2011.
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In case of income, an important factor affecting interpre-
tation of results is the seasonality of farming income, which is 
subject to major fluctuations over a calendar year. The lowest 
values can be reported in spring, when the farming income 
drops down and the spending substantially increases (e.g. pur-
chase of fertilisers) (Figure I.4). 4 Following the summer harvest, 
the farming income successively increases during autumn and 
winter seasons. In the years 1998-2011, the farming income 
in the last quarter of the year used to be higher than in the re-
maining quarters. The highest income in the 4th quarter was 
due to the fact that the farming expenditure in such period de-
4  According to HBS the farming income constitutes a difference between the 
farming revenue and expenditure.
creased, and was accompanied by the revenues from sale of the 
annual harvests. In the period following 2004, income attained 
in December were by 62% higher than in January, whereas in 
the years 1998-2003 this ratio amounted to 25% on average. 
This could have been attributable to disbursements of farm-
ing subsidies. Moreover, an increase in consumption of edible 
crops in households during winter, which is taken into account 
in income calculations, may also contribute to income growth. 
As a consequence, in case of the income-based approach, agri-
cultural households which are investigated in spring are more 
likely to be classified as poor, as compared to those investigated 
in winter. 
box
i.3 characteristics of the poverty datasets – dilemmas and solutions
The poverty analysis allows us to assess which proportion of the society is unable to satisfy their fundamental needs (absolute approach), 
or can satisfy them to a lesser extent than others (relative approach). In order to determine the quantitative threshold separating the poor 
from others, household income/expenditure data are used. On a long-term basis, both these indicators should be equal – since consump-
tion may not be permanently financed by credits or loans. 
The studies of households and their status have been based upon the following 2 data sources: the european union statistics on Income 
and living conditions (eu-sIlc), and the Household Budget Survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office of Poland (Gus),
eu-sIlc•  is an annual survey focusing upon the properly documented household income. An unarguable strength of this study is its 
scale – it is conducted in all EU Member States, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey and provides detailed datasets. 
Thanks to data harmonisation, conducting of cross-sectional and dynamic comparative analyses is possible.
HBS (Household Budget Survey) • is conducted monthly and takes into account both declared household income and expenditure. 
Although the use of monthly income data provides information detailed enough for annual calculations, the method still has its 
drawbacks i.e. the monthly income data are seasonally biased and have higher variability than the annual ones, and the lack of 
income in a given month may result in classifying the household as poor even though – in view of its annual income or possessions 
– it should not be classified as such. 
The collation of these two sources allows us to create a comprehensive qualitative panorama of poverty in Poland. 
The groups in case of which obtaining of the data that accurately reflect the status quo is most difficult include:
Farmers• , as their income is correlated with the vegetation cycle, expenditure classes which are not present in other sectors, 
and the fact that certain data gathered in an agricultural household can be ambiguous. The specificity of Polish farming is well 
reflected in the HBS methodology. What is important, in case of both data sources the distributions of equivalised income do not 
substantially differ in the section that is relevant in the context of poverty studies.
retirees,•  who due to their lower consumption have lower expenditures, which may lead to ineligible classification of them as 
poor. 
The self-employed• , due to irregularity and substantial fluctuations of their monthly income – in fact, their income levels usually 
range beyond the poverty threshold.
Studying of HBS and EU-SILC data will allow us to conduct a comprehensive analysis of poverty in Poland, by reducing the existing meth-
odological constraints. The income-based approach will prevail in our further analyses, due to the simplicity of measures, limited number 
of resources and resource management and its international comparability (Haughton, Khandker, 2009). The study takes into account 
purchases of certain durables which (regardless of one’s affinity with the poor) are related to specific consumption patterns. 
Thanks to availability of the household income (HBS and EU-SILC) and expenditure data (HBS) pertaining to Poland, we can define poverty 
either based on household income, or its expenditure. However, both these indicators have their drawbacks: the monthly farming income 
is subject to seasonal changes, and the expenditure may sometimes be a reflection of unique preferences of a given household. Moreover, 
the definition of expenditure used by GUS in the context of HBS survey does not take into account loans instalments, e.g. by virtue of 
mortgage loans, which may, in some cases, account for a substantial proportion of household expenditure. In case of the income-based 
approach, agricultural households are more likely to be classified as poor, while in case of the expenditure-based approach the same ap-
plies to retirees’ households. The dynamics of household expenditure after 2005 tends to be visibly detached from income indicators. The 
HBS methodology does not report any substantial changes of definitions during that period. The household income data obtained in the 
course of HBS was consistent with EU-SILC data, especially in case of the households whose income was below the median level. Use of 
HBS income indicators for the purpose of poverty analyses will allow us to analyse various social policy scenarios (cf. Part IV of the Report) 
and conduct comparative cross-country studies. The limitations that both these measures have should be kept in mind in the course of 
interpretation of the research results.
Source: own elaboration.
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Farming income is major, although not the only one, 
source of income for agricultural households. It accounts for 
ca. 50% of all household income (2008). Other types, such as 
wages/salaries or retirement benefits, reduce the income sea-
sonality in the agricultural households (Figure I. 4). Hence, the 
disposable income dynamics in case of agricultural households, 
including alternative income sources, is comparable to that of 
other households. 
Despite its problematic seasonality, the distribution of 
farming income based on annual and monthly data does not 
show much differences in case of lowest income percentiles. 
Figure I.5 contains a comparison of cumulative distribution 
of equivalised income in agricultural households, based on 
monthly HBS and annual EU-SILC data. A visible difference 
can be seen for upper income groups, which may be ascribed 
to periodically increasing farming revenue which are taken 
into account by HBS. However, among lowest income groups 
which are exposed to poverty, the distributions are compara-
ble. Moreover, according to HBS, income distribution in case of 
the poorest people (i.e. farmers and others) is consistent with 
EU-SILC data (Figure I.6). The income data obtained in course 
of the Social Diagnosis substantially differ from those derived 
from the other two sources.
Use of income-based approach allows us to gain informa-
tion about the characteristics of poverty. First of all, it allows us 
to determine how many individuals, and in which groups, do not 
attain enough income to have their fundamental needs satisfied. 
This method is labelled as an absolute poverty approach since 
it takes into account the value of the basket of goods which cor-
responds to a certain minimum consumption, regardless of the 
actual concentration of income in the society. In other words, 
this approach is insensitive to the diversification of income in 
case of households representing subsequent income percen-
tiles, including median households, and the most affluent ones. 
The poverty survey conducted in accordance with the abso-
lute approach would allow us to describe the situation of the 
most destitute individuals, without comparing them to more 
affluent ones. The definition of the absolute poverty has been 
used, among others, by the UN in the context of the Millennium 
Development Goals (i.e. USD 1 a day threshold applying to the 
poorest individuals globally), and by the Polish Institute of La-
bour and Social Studies in determining the so-called subsistence 
minimum level, which has been described in more detail below. 
The use of income data in determining the poverty thresh-
old also allows for conducting poverty analyses in reference 
to the total income distribution in the society. In such case we 
are dealing with relative poverty. The income attained by an 
average or median member of a given society can be regarded 
as a reference point in determining the poverty threshold. A 
member of a society who does not attain a given proportion of 
the mean or median income is regarded as poor. The most fre-
quently used thresholds are equivalent to 60% of the median 
of equivalised disposable income (Eurostat) or to 50% of the 
equivalent average spending (GUS).
The structures of both poverty lines (i.e. absolute and 
relative) are independent – i.e. those who are regarded as poor 
keeping with relative approach do not have to be regarded 
as such, according to the absolute one (although this relation 
does not apply in the opposite direction – due to the fact that 
absolute poverty threshold is below the relative one). As a con-
sequence, an increase in the relative poverty ratio, with the ab-
solute ratio staying unchanged, results from faster growth of 
income attained by a median or mean individual, as compared 
to less affluent persons, rather than from the impoverishment 
Figure I. 5 | cumulative distribution of the 
equivalised income in agricultural households; 2007
Figure I. 6 | cumulative distribution of the 
equivalised income and equivalent expenditure by 
sources; 2007
Note: cumulative distribution data have been presented for year 2007 due to availability of HBS, The Social Diagnosis and EU-SILC data. The negative agricultural income has 
been substituted by zero.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS, The Social Diagnosis and EU-SILC.
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of the society in general, as it would appear. Therefore, we 
should always pay attention to the type of indicator that has 
been used, and to the poverty threshold, since interpretations 
of both measures are different. 
It should be noted that neither absolute, nor relative indi-
cators measure impacts that the growing affluence of the whole 
society has upon the poverty ratio. This correlation can be in-
vestigated by means of quasi-absolute poverty (i.e. poverty an-
chored at a fixed moment in time) indicators, where the reference 
box
i.4 the equivalence scale
Depending on their size and structure, households may require different types of goods and services. The needs that are typical of single-
person household differ from those which are indigenous to large families, or pensioner households. In particular, proportions of fixed 
expenditure in the basket of goods differ according to household types, and demand for specific goods: such as schoolbooks or medicines 
may appear. In order to define how a demographic composition of a given household would affect its maintenance costs the following two 
methods are used i.e. basket of goods which reflect average demand in different types of households, and the so-called equivalence scales 
are created. The first method is used relatively seldom, since the number of combinations reflecting the possible household structures 
is high, and the remaining results are unstructured. A less complicated and more universal indicator called the equivalence scale is used 
more frequently. It determines to what extent an income of a given household should change in order to achieve the consumption level of 
a reference household (Łukasiewicz, Koszela, Orłowski, 2006).
The purpose of this method is to obtain an abstract measure representing the expenditure of the first person in the household, serving 
as a reference for expenditures of subsequent members of that household (the so-called numéraire). Depending on age (or other socio-
demographic features), different weights are ascribed to adults and children, thus creating equivalence scales. In this way, all household 
models can be described in a logically structured manner. 
Equivalence scales include normative (based on average maintenance costs in an expanding household, assessed by an expert), empirical 
(econometric estimations taking into account consumption needs depending on socio-demographic features) and subjective scales (based 
upon survey results) (Panek et al., 1999). There is a wide array of equivalence scales (only Buhmann et al., (1988) specify 35 of them) and 
it has not been univocally resolved which one reflects the changing household consumption patterns most accurately. OECD normative 
scales (initially Oxford scale, currently modified) are most commonly used – e.g. by Eurostat – just like root scales. 
The following example illustrates why the right choice of an equivalence scale is so important. When the scope of an analysis is a single-
person household (1+0), each equivalence scale will yield identical results (figure I.7). However, the appearance of subsequent adults and 
children is associated with differing levels of increase in the maintenance costs, depending on the scale used. A household consisting of 
1 adult and 2 children (1+2) will be assessed according to the modified OECD scale, root scale and Oxford scale as 1.60, 1.73 and 2.00, 
respectively. The difference amounts to 0.4 of the equivalent unit, depending on the scale used. In case of a household consisting 2 adults 
and 2 children the difference increases to 0.7 (root scale: 2.00, Oxford scale: 2.70).
fIGURE I. 7. SIzE Of A HOUSEHOLD AND THE EqUIVALENCE SCALE 
Note: the first constituent denotes number of adults in a given household, and the second one – number of children.
Source: own elaboration.
The choice of an equivalence scale results from adopting technical assumptions concerning an impact of a household size upon consump-
tion patterns, and the assessment of differentiation of demand for goods and services according to socio-demographic features, and sub-
stantially affects the study results, and to a somewhat lesser extent, also descriptions thereof (Burniaux et al., 1998; Łukasiewicz, Koszela, 
Orłowski, 2006). Whereas OECD equivalence scales ascribe fixed proportions of a consumption level determined for the first adult house-
hold member to each subsequent adult and child (respectively 0.7 and 0.5 in case of Oxford scale, and 0.5 and 0.3 in case of the modified 
scale), the remaining scales are insensitive to socio-demographic parameters. It is assumed that high increases in equivalent household 
size, accompanied by increasing numbers of individuals are typical of less prosperous and less developed economies, which can be at-
tributed to a relatively high proportion of the fixed costs (especially food) in the basket of goods (the so-called Engel’s law; cf. zimmerman, 
1932; Haughton, Khandker, 2009). This change is illustrated by the transfer from OECD Oxford scale to the modified one.
Source: own elaboration.
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point is the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the basket of goods 
at a specific moment in the past. This indicator assumes that the 
expectations regarding minimum living standards are constant, 
and enables us to verify how economic growth contributes to 
the elimination of poverty. On practical level, the relevant as-
pect is the choice of inflation adjustment method of the basket 
of goods upon which all calculations are based. However, situa-
tion of the poor would be better reflected by a basket of goods 
that corresponds to their actual consumption profile i.e. includ-
ing housing rents and costs of food, provided that the observed 
price dynamics exceeds the inflation rate (corresponding to an 
extended basket of goods including e.g. garments or cultural 
goods and services, whose proportion in the actual consump-
tion of the poorest households is lower than in the whole soci-
ety (cf. Box I.4)). 
Sometimes this classification is supplemented by other 
indicators. The policy definition of poverty (Sen, 1983) takes 
into account such income level which the society feels obliged 
to deliver to all its members, and is equivalent to absolute pov-
erty threshold. Its alternatives include social and subsistence 
minimum, calculated annually by the Institute of Labour and 
Social Studies (IPiSS). The first of these indicators describes 
the minimum level of needs, taking into account both biologi-
cal (housing, food, hygiene, clothing), and social ones (transpor-
tation, culture, leisure), whereas the second one denotes the 
minimum level of consumption of goods and services that must 
be attained in order to avoid emaciation (Kurowski, 2002). Both 
minimum values have been specified for seven different house-
hold classes and for five personal classes (i.e. female worker, 
male worker, older child, younger child, and retiree). 
Of particular educational interest is the subjective pover-
ty, which is defined in course of social surveys in terms of such 
disposable income that is regarded by a respondent as a mini-
mum necessary to make ends meet or perceived as inadequate, 
insufficient, hardly sufficient, good or very good etc. in a specific 
period of time (Kapteyn et al., 1988). Unlike the objective cate-
gory, this approach will allow us to find out what income house-
holds perceive as enabling them to participate in social life at 
the level comparable to that observed in the past.
Sometimes equivalence scales are abandoned in favour of 
basket of goods ascribable to households characterised by dif-
ferent socio-economic structures. In such a way, the basket of 
goods used by the Institute of Labour and Social Studies (IPiSS) 
are created. Such baskets, after being monetized, are used for 
the purpose of determining the social/ subsistence minimum. 
However, this method has its major shortcomings. First of all, 
the analysis of effective equivalence scales in the years 1994-
2011 used to change in case of both indicators, thus limiting 
their inter-temporal comparability. During the analysed period, 
the weight ascribed to a younger child increased from 0.6 to 0.9 
and that ascribed to an older child from 0.7 to 0.9. Secondly, dif-
ferent ratios used to be ascribed to the first vs. subsequent chil-
dren in the household. Thirdly, the equivalence levels adopted 
by ILSS notably differ from those used in other universally used 
scales, which, in the light of above conclusions, makes the com-
parison of results obtained in Poland and other countries more 
difficult. Finally, the definitions of households only apply to ca. 
30% of the existing household types, which severely reduces 
the efficiency of social and subsistence minimum methods in 
describing the overall poverty phenomenon in Poland. 
Poverty analyses are typically accompanied by social in-
equality descriptions. This allows for making approximate de-
scriptions and comparisons of households situated in the upper 
and lower sections of the income distribution – by investigating 
affluence differences between the poorest and the richest pop-
ulation groups, and their mutual relations. This kind of informa-
tion is provided by the income share of the poorest decile5 or 
by comparing it with the most affluent decile (D9/D1).6 Inter-
national comparisons and dynamic inequality analysis provide 
us with valuable knowledge about income concentration in the 
society and indicate the extent of inclusiveness of economic 
growth i.e. by assessing whether its beneficiaries mostly include 
affluent persons, the middle class or the poorest members of 
the society. In this case, the most frequently exploited inequal-
ity measure is the Gini coefficient (cf. Box I.4). Its popularity 
can be attributed, first of all, to simplicity of its interpretations 
– income concentration index ranges between 0-1, and the 
so-called Lorenz curve allows for its graphical representation. 
However, such simplicity has got its shortcomings – as opposed 
to the more complex Theil index,7 Gini coefficient cannot be de-
composed across different subgroups or voivodeships. 
The very distinction between the poor and the others may 
misleadingly imply that there is a gap between such groups. In 
fact, there is none, and poverty is a heterogeneous phenome-
non (The World Bank, 2005). Whereas some of the poor do not 
dispose even of any traceable income, and their daily existence 
is constantly threatened, the standard of living in case of other 
poor does not differ much from that observable in medium-
income households, being substantially above the subsistence 
minimum. Besides, poor households also differ in terms of per-
sistency of their situations. For some, poverty is a transitional 
state, for others, a constant one. Hence, limiting the analysis to 
only such measures that assess the poverty scale and its ex-
tent would be an oversimplification. Such a description would 
be suggestive due to its simplicity and ease of interpretation, 
but, at the same time, it would not provide us with certain im-
portant information about the nature of poverty, hence, serving 
as an insufficient background for public policy recommenda-
tions. Therefore, a study on the poverty extent should be sup-
plemented by an analysis of its profoundness and persistency 
(cf. Table I.3). 
5  similarly: percentile, quartile, etc. (cf. Box I.2)
6  Similar calculations can be made to assess property or consumption shares.
7  Theil index ( , where – size of population, –variable value 
for ith individual ,  – population’s average) constitutes, similarly to Gini coefficient, 
the measure of changes of the variable in the population. However, it fulfils a higher 
number of statistically relevant axioms (transfer sensitivity, sub-populational 
consistence and decomposition ability), at the cost of complex and non-intuitive 
interpretations. for these reasons, Theil index is used much more frequently in 
research analyses, while Gini coefficient, which has been recommended e.g. by the 
UN Industrial Development Organisation, is used for popularisation purposes. 
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box
i.5 gini coefficient – an example of a relative measure
Gini coefficient is the most popular indicator that is used for measuring the income concentration in the society. It enables also measur-
ing the wealth or consumption concentration. At the same time, it takes into account the size of the surveyed population and incomes 
(i.e. property, consumption, etc.) of subsequent individuals as compared to the average:
where: 𝑖 is an order number of observation which ranges from 1 to n,   – value of ith observation (observations are provided in an increas-
ing sequence),  – average of observations and  – number of observations. The values of the ratio fall between the ranges [0.1], and the 
lower it is, the more even is the income distribution. In extreme cases, when the ratio equals to 0, the values of income attained by specific 
individuals are equal, and if it amounts to 1 - all income is ascribed to a single individual. Due to its structure, a relative high income concen-
tration corresponds to a relatively low value of the ratio. We should keep in mind, however, that quantitative indicators used to describe 
inequalities should conform to a number of different criteria (Haughton, Khandker, 2009):
men independence – doubling of income attained by all individuals would not affect the value of the ratio ,• 
population size independence – if it changed - • ceteris paribus – the ratio would still remain the same,
symmetry – the interchange of incomes between individuals would not affect the ratio,• 
Pigou-Dalton transfer sensitivity – the transfer from the affluent to the poor would result in the ratio reduction.• 
Such conditions are fulfilled by Gini coefficient. However, this measure is devoid of other desirable qualities such as e.g. statistical testability, 
i.e. the possibility of testing importance of index changes in time, and decomposability. As a consequence, even though Gini coefficient provides 
a suggestive and publicly recognisable outlook on the income concentration in the society, in order to conduct in-depth inequality studies, ad-
ditional measures such as e.g. changes of income in the upper and lower section of the income distribution, or Theil index, must be used.
In 2010 the value of Gini coefficient in the EU used to fall within the range of 0.24 – 0.37 and its spatial distribution was comparable to that 
of the relative poverty ratio. The highest revenue concentration was reported in the Baltic States, Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria and Anglo-
Saxon countries – where its ratio exceeded 0.33. The lowest values of Gini coefficient i.e. below 0.25 were observed in Slovenia, Sweden, 
Hungary and Czech Republic. In 2010 the income distribution in Poland used to slightly exceed the EU-27 average (0.311 vs. 0.305), but, as 
compared to 2005 (Gini 0.36) a visible decrease in the level of income inequalities was observed. 
Gini coefficient is used for the purpose of comparison of income dispersions, not only at a national, but also international level, in order 
to report substantially higher differences. As a matter of fact, over the past two centuries the global income inequalities have been dy-
namically growing – while in 1820 the coefficient value was 0.50, in 1980 it exceeded 0.65, which should be ascribed to an unbalanced 
economic development of the first, Second and the Third World.2 In later years the coefficient stabilised on that level. The inequality levels 
in the developing countries are higher than in case of the developed ones. The highest dispersion can be observed in Southern Africa and 
South America, where the coefficient value exceeds 0.50 (e.g. Brazil, Columbia, Bolivia, zambia, Central African Republic), or even 0.60 
(e.g. Botswana, RSA, Namibia). 
Source: own elaboration.
Note: data concerning Ireland – 2010.
Source: own calculations based on EU-SILC data.
Source: own calculations based on the World Bank’s data.
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8 This means that due to heterogeneous economic development the income diversification between different group of countries (i.e. The first, Second and the Third World) has 
increased, although it does not necessarily have to reflect a growing diversification within specific countries.
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However, if an individual who has fallen into poverty cannot get 
out of it for months or years, its negative personal and social 
consequences (e.g. being dependent on welfare tools, difficul-
ties in returning to employment) are aggravating. The simplest 
measure used to determine the persistency of poverty is the av-
erage number of years spent in poverty. However, this measure 
falls to identify the direction and scale of movements between 
the poor and the remaining part of the society. Such informa-
tion is provided by transformation matrixes, which describe 
the structure of changes within a specific period. Meanwhile, 
mobility index defines the prevailing direction of movements, 
and Shorrocks index enables us to identify the proportion of 
individuals who have left / accessed the poverty zone within the 
studied period.
the poor vs. the socIally excluded?1.3 
Such notions as: poverty, material deprivation and social 
exclusion are commonly used to describe a single phenome-
non i.e. living below a standard that is regarded as fair within 
specific surroundings. Poverty within households can lead to 
an increase in the level of material deprivation, while dete-
rioration in the quality of interactions with the surroundings 
can result in social exclusion of individuals and their relatives. 
The poverty profoundness is a feature specifying how 
profound is poverty measured by means of the income gap i.e. 
difference between the income obtained by the poor, and the 
one marking the poverty threshold. The poverty gap index has 
also got its additional interpretation: it allows us to determine 
the value of transfer that would effectively reduce poverty (The 
World Bank, 2005). Nonetheless, its structure does not fully 
reflect the income differences existing among the poor: bear-
ing in mind that this group includes both those who fall below 
the threshold only insignificantly, and those who live under the 
subsistence minimum level. In the latter case, budgetary con-
straints are stricter. As a result, the satisfaction of one’s basic 
needs is severely limited. A measure which takes this aspect 
into account is the poverty severity index, which has been 
structured in such a way as to emphasize those individuals who 
lean out the most from the poverty threshold. The measures 
that take into consideration, at the same time, the scale, pro-
foundness and the diversity of the phenomenon are Sen, Kak-
wani and Sen-Shorrocks-Thon indices. The latest one can be 
decomposed in order to identify to what extent the index level 
changes are due to the changing poverty scale, profoundness 
and diversity changes. 
Persistency of poverty is yet another question. If pov-
erty is only temporary, it seems to be relatively unthreatening. 
table I. 3 | Inequality and poverty indexes
aspect index interpretation
inequalities
proportion of the poorest decile in the 
income 
What is the share of the poorest 10% of the population in the overall population income?
income differentiation S90/S10 How many times do the incomes attained by the most affluent exceed those which are attained by the poorest?
Gini coefficient How strong are inequalities in society?
Theil index How strong are social inequalities, and which subpopulations they are attributable to?
scope
absolute poverty rate What is the share of the poor in society, based on current living standards?
quasi-absolute poverty rate What is the share of the poor in society based on past living standards? 
relative poverty rate (fGT(0)) What is the share of the poor in society?
subjective poverty rate What is the share of individuals who are considered as poor? 
profoundness
income gap indicator (fGT(1)) What is the extent of poverty in case of the poor?
poverty severity index How severe is poverty (assuming that a large poverty gap is stronger than a small one)?
Gini index in poor populations How strong are inequalities among the poor?
persistency
years of poverty How long do the poor remain poor?
transformation matrix between poverty 
and non-poverty What proportions of individuals have left/entered the poverty zone, or remained poor?
Shorrocks index What proportions of individuals have left/entered the poverty zone over examined period?
mobility index Which direction of transfers (in or out of poverty zone) is more frequent and by how much?
Watts index -
scope and 
inequalities fTG (2) index The function of poverty scope and inequalities among the poor 
scope and 
profoundness
Sen index
The function of poverty scope, its profoundness, and inequality of distribution among the poorSen-Shorrocks-Thon index
Kakwani index
Source: own elaboration.
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Hence, linking the notions of poverty and exclusion is intuitively 
justified. Another argument supporting this approach focuses 
upon the multidimensional character of the phenomenon of 
poverty, including its interdisciplinary nature, and the fact that 
its comprehensive analysis can only be achieved by means of 
combining economic, social and political sciences. On the other 
hand, identification of poverty with social exclusion and material 
deprivation in various contexts, mostly in case of social journal-
ism, makes the public debate disorganised in terms of semantics 
(Broda-Wysocki, 2012). Therefore, before proceeding to the 
next part of the analysis, it would be useful to have the relations 
between such notions systematised. 
Material deprivation, which can be interpreted as a per-
sistent shortage of specific goods and services, is one of the 
most easily observable results of poverty. Although scientific 
publications dealing with this issue do not pay much attention to 
definitions, the operationalisation of the phenomenon of depri-
vation appears to pose much greater challenge than the possi-
ble obscurity of its interpretations. In fact, material deprivation 
9 Poland: equivalent to the monthly value of last year’s monthly poverty 
threshold (PLN 400-500).
can apply to a very extensive array of goods and services which 
could serve as a demarcation line, separating materially de-
prived households from the remaining ones i.e.
durable goods (e.g. radio and TV equipment, household • 
appliances, telephones, cars),
housing standards,• 
consumption standards,• 
financial liabilities and savings.• 
However, the above list should be regarded as open, and 
the set of indicators used to assess deprivation should be gen-
erally determined by means of an expert method. The choice 
criterion would typically be their adequate empirical correlation 
with poverty (or with an average material status, being regarded 
as a point of reference) and their impacts upon participation in 
the selected areas of public life (in other words: high probability 
of social exclusion caused by material deprivation in a specific 
field). In practice, the most frequently used data sources on ma-
terial deprivation include EU-SILC (for 31 EU countries) and 
the Social Diagnosis (for Poland). These sources provide diver-
sified information enabling assessment of a number of potential 
table I. 4 | Material deprivation aspects used in eu-sIlc and the social diagnosis
category eu-sIlc social diagnosis
arrears arrears on mortgage or rent payments• 
debts incurred to cover everyday consumer needs• 
debts incurred to repay earlier debts• 
debts incurred to make regular payments• 
other types of indebtedness• 
overdue payments for the dwelling (rent),repayment of • 
the home loan, gas or electricity bills
lack of capability 
to afford 
adequate living 
standard
afford a meal with meat, fish e.g. every two days• 
keep home adequately warm• 
afford paying one week annual holiday • 
face unexpected expenses • 9
purchase of a sufficient amount of food items (vegetables, • 
fruit, meat, dairy products, etc.)
a holiday trip for children, adults, all family members, due • 
to the scarcity of resources 
household can afford the cheapest food and clothing, but • 
not to pay the rent 
lack of durable 
goods due to 
financial reasons
colour TV• 
car• 
washing machine• 
telephone• 
automatic washing-machine, dishwasher, microwave • 
oven, LCD or plasma TV set, paid satellite or cable TV, 
DVD player, home cinema set, summer house, desktop PC, 
portable computer, e-book reader, passenger car, Internet 
access from home, landline phone, motorboat or sailboat, 
garden plot
housing 
conditions
leaking roof, dampness or rot • 
lack of bath/shower • 
lack of flushing toilet• 
congested apartment• 
lack of a bathroom equipped with bath/shower • 
lack of flushing toilet• 
sense of congestion• 
housing / living 
environment
excessive noise• 
pollution or grime• 
crime, violence• 
problematic neighbour relations• 
sense of being in dangerous environment • 
financial burden
difficulty in making both ends meet• 
financial burden of total housing costs• 
financial burden of repayment of debts from hire • 
purchases or loans 
regular income of household does not allow to satisfy its • 
basic needs
household can afford the cheapest food and clothing, but • 
have no money to pay the rent 
household can afford the cheapest food, clothing and the • 
housing fees, but have no money to repay the loan
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat and Social Diagnosis.
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deprivation aspects, as well as of their inter-spatial and inter-
temporal analysis (relatively long time series). For these rea-
sons, the comparison of data gathered in course of subsequent 
study waves is a comprehensive source of information about 
the changes of the phenomenon. Table I.4 contains the list of 
aspects of material deprivation.
Drawing conclusions from the analysis of material depri-
vation indicators should be a cautious process. First of all, we 
should keep in mind that data comparisons are reasonable only 
between countries whose levels of development are compara-
ble, and which belong to similar cultural area. Deprivation in-
dicators illustrate priorities of the consumption of goods and 
services. Some goods that are regarded as indispensable in 
certain parts of the world can be deemed as useless in others, 
hence their non-acquisition does not have to result from budg-
etary constraints only. Secondly, even in case of the optimum 
choice of indicators for a given country, deprivation studies 
should not only be focused upon the scale of absence of cer-
tain goods. The persistency of such status quo in the context of 
growing affluence of the society is equally important. Thirdly, 
one should keep in mind that deprivation is typically defined as 
a lack of specific goods although, in reality, it is more frequently 
reflected by a substandard quality of the purchased goods, or 
their longer durability. Finally, deprivation studies are based 
on respondents’ declarations, which can be imprecise. Due to 
these reasons, the seemingly attractive material deprivation 
indicators should rather be treated as deprivation risk meas-
ures, which provide valuable knowledge about the extent and 
seriousness of consequences of persistent poverty, which, how-
ever, can sometimes be imprecise. 
The differentiation between the poor and the socially ex-
cluded remains much more complex. The poor do not have to be 
excluded, and the socially excluded do not necessarily have to 
be poor, although both these phenomena frequently coincide. 
Intuitively, the socially excluded are those individuals who have 
been excluded from certain public spheres, and thus, are unable 
to fully participate in the public life. However, as for today, no 
mutual consent has been reached regarding new definitions, 
and their final classification (cf. Box I.5). 
box
i.6 social exclusion
The category of social exclusion is more extensive than poverty, but at the same time, it has not been precisely defined in the literature. 
The term itself has been derived from Townsend’s definition of the relative deprivation, which applied to the living standard below which 
performing certain social roles, engagement into social life and customary conducts that are regarded as typical of, and valuable for mem-
bership in a given society. Since such multidimensional approach incorporates both material and social aspects, it offers a good reflection 
of the contemporary perceptions of social exclusion – however, it fails to address the problem of nonexistence of an uniform definition of 
such phenomenon. As a consequence, the convictions about redundancy of homogenisation or harmonisation of alternative definitions 
are becoming more and more widespread. 
The social exclusion debates take into account the following 3 common aspects: (1) engagement in social life, (2) access to resources and 
institutions and (3) social rights and implementation thereof; and in some cases, also on the question of poverty and material deprivation 
(Szarfenberg, 2006). However, by far, no ultimate consent has been reached in the literature as regards the actual reasons and constitu-
tional features of social exclusions. In particular, it has not yet been settled and agreed whether social exclusion (Czapiński, 2009):
should rather be defined as a limitation (refusal) of rights, or as a self-isolation,• 
denotes total withdrawal from relevant aspects of the social life, or participation in involuntary forms thereof • 
is due to certain temporarily and spatially constant factors, or rather to cultural and civilisational factors indigenous to given • 
surroundings,
is a macro-social or individual phenomenon.• 
As a result of the lack of consensus, social exclusion is a very capacious term, and in view of the heterogeneity of approaches, instead of cat-
egorising single definitions, classification of definitional clusters appears to be more practicable. Golinowska and Broda-Wysocki (2005) 
have identified 5 such definitional clusters:
definitions juxtaposing social exclusion against average and socially accepted customary social situations (Moisio, Estivilla),• 
definitions focusing on persistency and dynamics of the social exclusion process,• 
definitions focusing on the correlations between excluded vs. excluding individuals, more or less conscious interactions between • 
various subjects which are mostly attributable to their competing for resources (Room, Atkinson & Hills),
definitions focusing on the participation phenomenon – indicating that being part of the society sometimes does not imply • 
participation in civic life, due to certain discriminatory processes (Burchardt, Le Grand, Piachaud), 
definitions which link the issue of social exclusion with the lack of social capital (Putnam). • 
The definitions which have been developed for research purposes usually tend to be more abstract that those coined for social policy ap-
plications – the latter ones more frequently combine the status quo with the possible public interventions. However, irrespectively of the 
actual precision of the social exclusion definition it is regarded as a multidimensional phenomenon, revealing itself in economic, political 
and cultural contexts, and a cumulative one – the risk of exclusion depends on the number of risk factors. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
univocally determine whether social exclusion is a state or process or rather an outcome thereof. A progressing exclusion may result in 
breaking of the bonds with one’s close and more distant surroundings, and reversal of its consequences may require much effort.
Source: own elaboration based on Czapiński (2009), Broda-Wysocki (2012) and Szarfenberg (2006).
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Due to the absence of a uniform definition of social exclu-
sion, this phenomenon is difficult to assess. One of the chal-
lenges is measuring the composition of various determining and 
resulting factors: economic, demographic, social, psychological, 
health-related, residential, etc. At the same time, the most fre-
quently applied quantification methods include an analysis of 
selected symptoms and creation of summary indexes of social 
exclusion. In light of definitional obstacles and multidimensional-
ity of the phenomenon, both these methods only provide a par-
tial solution to the measuring problem (Broda-Wysocki, 2012). 
Use of the former method would impose, from the start, 
some limitations as regards the number of exclusion indica-
tors/aspects, thus challenging an assumption about the cumu-
lative character of social exclusion risk factors. Furthermore, 
the analysis of exclusion symptoms/correlates calls for an 
expert choice of the domineering phenomenon which will be 
subject to further statistical breakdowns. A good example is 
provided by e.g. Laeken indicators, focusing on poverty, eco-
nomic activity, education and health (cf. Box I.6). Extending the 
list of social exclusion measures, and setting up a summary in-
dex is also regarded as a suboptimal method – the cumulative 
character of the phenomenon does not allow for adding up 
specific measures, due to their mutual relations. Furthermore, 
the final outcomes will always be burdened by the weights 
ascribed by researchers to specific measures, and statistical 
objectification methods substantially reduce transparency of 
a specific index. 
Laeken indicators, which can be used for monitoring the poverty 
phenomenon internationally, do not allow for conducting more de-
tailed analyses of the exclusion phenomenon either in Poland or oth-
er EU Member States, nor for precise assessments of the public pol-
icy undertakings aimed at boosting social integration and inclusion. 
box
i.7 laeken indicators 
Laeken indicators include a set of 18 statistical indicators established at the European Council in Laeken (Belgium) in 2001. They allow for 
standardisation of the knowledge sources regarding social cohesion in the EU Member States, including, in particular, poverty and social 
exclusion, as well as inter-temporal/ inter-spatial comparisons of the core indicators of such phenomena. Laeken indicators have been 
divided into the following four subject categories: poverty, labour market, education and health and two groups: primary vs. secondary 
indicators. Depending on their actual needs, specific countries have been given an opportunity of including their own, most relevant auxil-
iary indicators, on the list. Currently, apart from their informative function, Laeken indicators help the European Commission and national 
government to trace the progress of the social integration strategy implementation in specific Member States (Golinowska, 2012).
TABLE I. 5. LAEKEN INDICATORS
category basic indicators additional indicators
poverty
1a At-risk-of poverty rate by age and gender 11 Dispersion around the at-risk-of-poverty threshold
1b At-risk-of poverty rate by most frequent activity and gender 12 At-risk-of-poverty rate anchored in a given year
1c At-risk-of-poverty rate by household type 13 At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers, by sex
1d At-risk-of-poverty rate by tenure status 14 Inequality of income distribution – Gini coefficient
1e At-risk-of-poverty threshold (illustrative value) 15 At-persistent-risk-of-poverty rate by sex (50% median)
2 Inequality of income distribution S80/S20 quintile share ratio
3 At-persistent-risk-of-poverty rate by gender (60% median)
4 Relative income gap among low-icome households
labour 
market
5 Regional cohesion (dispersion of regional employment rates) 16 Share of long run unemployed, by sex
6 Unemployment rate in the long run, by sex 17 Long run unemployment (24 months and over), by sex
7 Persons living in jobless households
education 8 Early school leavers not in education or training, by sex 18 People with low rate of educational attainment, by sex
health
9 Life expectancy at birth, by sex
Self-defined health status by income quintile, by sex
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat.
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table I. 6 | social exclusion factors
social exclusion aspect social exclusion factor
economic
labour market
Professional inactivity due to despondence or inability to find a job 
Frequent job losses
Long-term unemployment
Working part-time due to the lack of full-time job opportunities 
Income instability
Illegal sources of income*
monetary poverty
Monetary poverty
Difficulties in meeting everyday needs
Loans taken out in order to provide for everyday consumer needs and/or regular payments
Debt rollover 
Usurer-type loans
Lack of a bank account
material deprivation
Malnutrition due to financial constraints (vegetables, meat, dairy products)
Lack of durable goods due to financial reasons 
digital –
Non-use of computers (in any circumstances) 
No Internet access due to lack of appropriate equipment 
No Internet access due to lack of sufficient skills to use the Internet
No Internet access due to excessive cost of access
No Internet access due to convictions/lack of such needs
Internet access; speed < 144 kb/s
social  
(in a strict sense)
competences 
Low level of own education
Low level of parental education
No professional qualifications updated/acquired
culture and leisure
Non-participation in cultural events – cinemas, theatres, museums 
Non-participation in culture – books
Non-practicing in sports
public life
Inability to deal with administrative matters 
Distrust in public institutions
Non-participation in community life
Feeling discriminated due to ethnical or other differences
degeneracy
Breaking the law
homelessness*
demographic –
Old age
Being a child in multi-child family
Single parenthood
health-related
physical disorders
Disability
Decrepitude
Serious illness over the past year
mental disorders Depression
psychological
degeneracy 
Addictions – alcohol or drug abuse
Suicidal thoughts
safety net
Sense of isolation
Strained family relationships
Feeling unloved 
The size of safety net: family, friends, acquaintances
Unwillingness to engage into new friendships
inertia 
Lack of energy
Lack of the sense of life
housing
regional dimension
Living in rural areas 
Large distance from major cities
place of residence
Households sharing same apartment / living space
Overcrowded place of residence
Inadequate technical condition of apartment 
Coal-fired furnace heating at home
surroundings
Bad surroundings (crime, drug abuse, hooliganism)
Serious conflicts with neighbours
Note: factors which have not been identified by the Social Diagnosis have been marked by an asterisk (*).
Source: own elaboration based on Social Diagnosis 2011 survey.
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Sources of such knowledge can be EU-SILC data, and in case of Po-
land, HBS and the Social Diagnosis. The first of these studies com-
bines poverty and material deprivation with such issues as: (1) la-
bour market situation of a given individual – e.g. regarding the risk 
of labour market dualism, (2) education in the context of basic exis-
tential and labour market competences, (3) (subjective and objec-
tive) health, (4) housing standard (5) access to information (mostly 
via the Internet). HBS provides information about the structure 
of household expenditure and income, thus enables identification 
of the goods that are affordable / unaffordable, and what are the 
consumption priorities in a given household. Meanwhile, the Social 
Diagnosis survey contains questions regarding access to various 
spheres of life, allowing easy identification of those in which the 
exclusion risk occurs.
Other reasons for social exclusion, apart from poverty, may 
include e.g. gender, age or disability, as well as certain socioeco-
nomic or socio-cultural factors, or even individuals’ informed 
choices. In the EU documents only, references to the exclusion 
phenomenon can be found in over 50 different contexts (Peace, 
2001). The classification criteria in case of exclusion correlates 
are particularly complex and their choice depends on actual 
research objectives and adopted analytic perspective. The au-
thors of UNDP Report (2006) have identified four criteria of 
classification of the exclusion determinants, which have been 
recognised representative in the relevant literature (cf. Frieske, 
1999; Lepianka, 2002; Marks-Bielska, 2003):
nature of an excluding factor (e.g. biological, • 
economical, random),
position in the causal sequence leading to exclusion • 
chain i.e. type of impact upon the risk of exclusion (e.g. 
normative, structural),
combination of factors with the areas of exclusion • 
(labour market, goods and services market and social 
marginalisation),
level of the factor’s independence from an individual. • 
The list of social exclusion factors (correlates) has been 
presented in Table I.6. A natural point of reference is its eco-
nomic aspect, manifested by an inability of a long-term and ad-
equately rewarded participation in the labour market, poverty 
and correlated deprivation, but, instinctively, social exclusion 
can be linked to much more aspects: demographic, health-re-
lated and psychological (pertaining to an individual’s health and 
condition in a broad sense, and potentially affecting his/her in-
teractions with the surroundings) as well as housing, social and 
digital ones (defining the level of the social participation and 
participation potential). 
The co-occurrence of poverty assisted by material depri-
vation on the one hand, and social exclusion on the other, does 
not preclude that there must be come causal relationships be-
tween these two phenomena. Apparently, we can talk about 
two independent processes.
In the first case, individuals who attain insufficient income 
are incapable of participating in selected spheres of social 
life due to material constraints. Non-participation in certain 
spheres reduces the access to other ones, and crossing a cer-
tain critical point leads to the real social exclusion. Such process 
is particularly visible in developed societies characterised by a 
wide range of social participation options, many of which are 
strongly interconnected. A good example is a situation when an 
unemployed individual loses his/her source of income, and after 
diagram I. 3 | Poverty and material deprivation vs. social exclusion 
Source: own elaboration.
social
exclusion
poverty
material
deprivation
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some time, is forced to use his/her savings, ask family members 
for help, or even sell his/her own property. The lack of resourc-
es makes searching for a job and further participation in social 
life more difficult, thus aggravating the sense of social isolation. 
In addition, someone who has been forced to rely on her rela-
tives’ support, may eventually break up or severely loosen his/
her relations with other family members and start to take ad-
vantage of limited institutional support provided the state. Such 
withdrawal from social relations may, in turn, deepen the sense 
of solitude and make finding a new job even more difficult, thus 
reinforcing one’s poverty status and persistency of his/her so-
cial exclusion.
In the second causal sequence which combines social 
exclusion with its root causes we are dealing with individuals 
whose exclusion could be attributed to any factors other than 
socioeconomic ones – even though they are not poor, they face 
difficulties in participating in some, or even all spheres of the so-
cial life. Finding themselves in existentially risky situations (such 
as long-term illness or disability) without any support from their 
safety net i.e. relatives, friends, acquaintances or the state, they 
are exposed to quick impoverishment, which may further ag-
gravate their social isolation. This scenario can happen in case 
of an illness or an unfortunate accident happening to an immi-
grant whose chances of taking advantage of welfare support 
are slim. If part of health services is not free, and an individual is 
detached from his/her relatives and friends, s/he may become 
unable to settle his/her liability and finally fall into poverty or 
become homeless. Another example can refer to ex-convicts 
who, facing the lack of social acceptance and their own inabil-
ity to cope with reality out of prison, may find getting a job and 
material stability without breaking the law particularly difficult, 
which additionally increases the risk of their impoverishment 
and subsequent delinquency. 
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Who Is Poor and Who 2 
Is ExcludEd?
Where the poverty threshold 2.1 
Is sItuated?
Classifications of poverty and social exclusion presented 
in Part 1 may apparently imply that specific statistical analyses 
of the poverty phenomenon only differ in details. In fact, even 
minor methodological changes can have substantial effect upon 
the reported poverty level and ratio of the poor, just like the use 
of different data sources. However, if we combine individual 
methods of determining the poverty threshold with the concep-
tual and interpretational network presented in Part 1, based on 
the data concerning the years 1994-2011, we will be able to 
establish a number of stylised facts (regularities) typical of the 
major trends concerning the poverty risk in Poland observable 
over the past dozen or so years. 
fact #1: income attained by non-poor individuals makes 
them capable of basic participation in the social life
Among alternative definitions of poverty threshold in Po-
land, its unchangeably highest level has been demarcated by 
the social minimum specified by the Institute of Labour and So-
cial Studies (ILSS). In 2011 it was above PLN 983, and nearly 
7.8 million of people (ca. 19.3% of all population) did not attain 
such income per capita. Still at the beginning of the 2000s, 
nearly twice as many i.e. four out of ten Poles were situated 
below such poverty line. It should be observed than in 2010, 
the values of the social minimum (absolute measure) and 60% 
of the median of equivalised disposable income became equal. 
The gap between these two measures used to be similarly nar-
row in the first half of the 1990s, yet it visibly grew later on due 
to the rising unemployment rate. Only after improvement of 
the economic situation in 2004 (cf. Fact #2), due to the grow-
ing employment rate and wages in Poland, the gap between the 
relative poverty threshold regarded as 60% of the median in-
come and the absolute poverty one, marked by the social mini-
mum, decreased. Today, in accordance with both measures, 
17-19% of the population may be regarded as poor (levels may 
slightly differ, due to the use of different equivalence scales). 
This equalisation shows that a (relatively) non-poor house-
hold may afford to acquire a basket of goods corresponding to 
the social minimum taking into account, apart from biological 
needs, also social ones, related to culture or leisure. Hence, 
the risk of social exclusion in case of this group, due to material 
causes, is low. 
fact #2: dynamic economic growth and the drop in 
unemployment after 2004 substantially contributed to 
reduction of the poverty rate
In years 1999-2003 Poland experienced the so-called 
second wave of economic restructuring which resulted in a 
substantial and long-term deterioration of the labour market 
situation (cf. Employment in Poland 2007 – Security on a flexible 
labour market). Rapid economic growth reported in 2004-2009 
contributed to a marked decrease in the poverty risk ratio. 
Shares of individuals living below the subsistence level upon 
both equivalence scales dropped down by 45%, and by a half 
– in case of those living below the social minimum. If we refer 
back to the poverty threshold of 1998, we can observe that 
over the next 14 years the proportion of the poor in the soci-
ety fell down by 60%. Such changes should be perceived as a 
side effect of the affluence growth in Poland and improvement 
of the labour market situation. However, greater prosperity is 
not the only source of decrease of the poverty rate in Poland. 
On a long-term basis (since 1994) all poverty indicators have 
been showing a visible downward trend. Even in the period of 
an economic slowdown, numbers of people at risk of poverty 
and poverty rates remained lower than at the beginning of the 
1990s, regardless of the definition.
fact #3: freezing the statutory poverty threshold 
decreased its importance as a social policy instrument 
The lowest poverty threshold is marked by the subsist-
ence level. In 2011 this value only slightly exceeded PLN 500. 
Depending on the equivalence scale used, 2.8% (OECD) or 
7.9% (ILSS) of Poles (from 1 to 3 million) used to live below such 
threshold. Such a marked difference can be attributed to differ-
ent treatment of costs related to the presence of an older child 
in household by OECD and ILSS. In years 2004-2011, substan-
tial decrease in poverty rate defined by the statutory threshold 
was observed. The proportion of Poles whose income fell be-
low that level dropped down by ca. three-fourths (from 17% to 
4%), which could be largely attributed to sustaining of the fixed 
income threshold ensuring 5 year (2007-2011) continuity of 
monetary transfers at the level of PLN 477, after it has been 
raised by only PLN 18 over the previous 5 years (2002-2006) 
(from PLN 459 in 2002 to PLN 465 in 2006), while the average 
earnings at that increased by over PLN 1260 in total. Freezing 
the thresholds led to a visible decrease in the welfare support 
level, which in turn resulted in a decreasing rate of the statuto-
rily poor. Currently, the statutory eligibility threshold to welfare 
support is situated slightly below the value of the minimum sub-
sistence basket. 
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Regardless of the statutory poverty thresholds, house-
holds themselves try to identify such income level that would 
guarantee fulfilment of their basic needs. Such amount is con-
sidered as a subjective poverty threshold. 
Its formulation depends on a number of regularities. First 
of all, we can observe a strong connection existing between the 
current living standard and the subjective poverty threshold. 
The relatively more affluent respondents (i.e. those who attain 
higher relative incomes) also declare a higher value of minimum 
income needed to cover their basic costs, thus positioning their 
subjective poverty threshold higher. In 2011, such minimum 
income was defined as PLN 650 by the 5th percentile of house-
holds, while in case of the median household this amount was 
twice as high (PLN 1286), and in the 90th percentile it amounted 
to PLN 2000. In the context of poverty analyses this means that 
from the 5th percentile households’ point of view, the presence 
of each adult person (except for the head of a household) in a 
household corresponds to the cost increase by ca. PLN 325, and 
by PLN 195 in case of a child.10 In the median household, similar 
calculations would yield the amounts of ca. PLN 640 and PLN 
390, respectively, and in the 90th percentile – PLN 1000 and 
PLN 600. Relations between declarations made by the poorest 
and most affluent proportions of households remain constant, 
regardless of the moment in the business cycle. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that households tend to expand systematically 
10  According to the modified equivalence scale; according to Oxford scale such 
amounts would be equal to PLN 455 and PLN 325, respectively.
Figure I. 9 | Poverty thresholds in Poland by poverty measures: current prices (left), fixed prices (right); 
1994-2011
Figure I. 10 | The poverty rate in Poland by poverty 
thresholds; 1994-2011
Figure I. 11 | Social poverty rate and economic 
variables; 1994-2011
Note: threshold values applying to single-member households. 
*equivalency scale ILSP, ** equivalency scale OECD
Source: own elaboration. 
Note: threshold values applying to single-member households.
Source: own elaboration based on ILSP and CSO of Poland (GUS) data.
Note: threshold values applying to single-member households. * equivalency scale ILSP; ** equivalency scale OECD.
Source: own elaboration.
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their ranges of needs, and their shopping price levels increase 
together with the income level, and durables tend to depreciate 
relatively fast. 
Secondly, consumer sentiment tends to shift the subjec-
tive poverty threshold upwards across the entire sample – both 
among poor, medium-income and relatively affluent house-
holds. A visible increase in the (absolute) average wage report-
ed in the period 2007-2011 was accompanied by an over-pro-
portional shift of the poverty threshold. Whereas the average 
wage changes by ca. PLN 500 observable in the previous 4-year 
intervals resulted in shifting the poverty threshold in case of a 
median household by ca. PLN 125, the change by ca. PLN 700 
which took place over the past 4 year period resulted in a shift 
by nearly PLN 300.
Although the growth of the equivalised income results in 
elevating the poverty threshold, the poor themselves have dif-
ferent perceptions of the amounts considered as sufficient from 
11 Collective poverty indexes (i.e. Sen, Thon or Kakwani indexes) are sensitive 
to the changes of all aspects of the analysed phenomenon (cf. Table I.3). Hence, if 
improvements are observed in all aspects, as it happened in Poland in the analysed 
Period, we would observe that the intensity of changes of the collective index 
depends on the weights ascribed to particular measures by the formula used.
the point of view of satisfaction of their basic needs. When the 
question about the equivalised income that would allow one to 
no longer consider oneself poor was asked, the answers turned 
out to be highly diversified: the minimum amount was PLN 
800, which was markedly below the social minimum, and the 
maximum one was PLN 2600 which corresponded to ca. 75% 
of the average net monthly wage – which is, apparently, highly 
incompatible with the definition of the income that allows one 
to “make ends meet”. An identification of the 4 income groups 
(i.e. absolutely poor, relatively poor, non-poor and affluent) 
points out to an interesting phenomenon regarding gradation 
of the declarations. The declared subjective poverty threshold 
in case of the first half of the sample of the absolutely poor re-
mains the same as in case of the relatively poor (only inciden-
tally exceeding such level), whereas patterns of declarations 
observable in the second half are similar to those in case of the 
non-poor. Hence, the absolutely poor tend to have high expec-
tations, and their perceptions of the affluence threshold tend 
to be distorted, as compared to those observable in case of the 
relatively poor and non-poor. Such status quo may be attributed 
to a number of factors: severe and persistent poverty may lead 
to considerable material deprivation – hence, in order to exceed 
the poverty threshold, shortages of certain fixed assets must be 
box
i.8 reduction in inequality and poverty rates in Poland vs. eu
The reduction of the poverty rate in Poland and its convergence to the levels reported in other EU Member States has been reflected by 
virtually all indicators which have been described and interpreted in Part 1 (figure I.11). The relatively biggest changes could be observed 
in case of inequality and poverty descriptions in the years 2004-2005, when the period of an economic slowdown of the beginning of the 
2000s ended, and the economic growth visibly accelerated. The subsequent reductions in the poverty rate used to be markedly less in-
tense. However, in the years 2005-2009 income inequalities visibly decreased: the value of Gini coefficient dropped down by one-tenth i.e. 
from 35.6% to 31.4%, while that of Theil index decreased by nearly one-fifth – from 22.9% to 18.5%. The poverty indicators also improved: 
its ratio decreased (by 16.6%), and the level of income attained by poor households began to approximate the poverty threshold (by 37.5% 
on average). As a consequence, the poverty severity ratio also decreased (by 52.7%). All such changes have been reflected in the collective 
breakdowns that illustrate the poverty extent, gap and severity, such as Sen, Thon or Kakwani indexes (reduction by 21-37%, depending 
on the index).11
fIGURE I. 12. INEqUALITy AND POVERTy INDICATORS IN POLAND AND EU-27;  2004-2008
Note: average value for EU-24: EU-27 excluding Bulgaria, Romania and Malta, weighted by share in population.
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC.
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eliminated. Although this situation may also apply to the rela-
tively poor, it affects their declaration patterns to a limited ex-
tent only. The poor may also choose higher-quality goods with 
longer depreciation periods – although in view of their income 
management strategies this type of scenario appears to be un-
likely. Their poor knowledge of the prices and irrationality of 
their economic choices cannot be also ruled out.
does poor Mean destItute?2.2 
Despite an evident dropdown in poverty risk over the past 
decade, the sense of impoverishment remains powerful in Po-
land. In light of findings of the Social Diagnosis 2011, only 15.5% 
of all households declared that their income allowed them to 
live their lives without renunciations (cf. Figure I.14, strategies 
1 & 2) – in such groups nearly all respondents claimed that their 
regular income allowed them to satisfy their daily needs. Ca. 8% 
of households managed to make some savings for the future, 
and another 15% of them admitted that they disposed of cer-
tain accumulated financial resources. The largest group (37.5%) 
were those who claimed that their needs could be satisfied only 
because of their humble lifestyles (cf. Figure I.14, strategy 3). 
The respondents who represented this strategy emphasised 
that purchasing durable goods typically implied cutting down 
on their current consumption, although in contrast to another 
17.7% of the population (cf. Figure I.14, strategy 4) they were not 
forced to save money prior to making any major expenditures. 
However, while among those who were forced to save money 
for major expenditures, the perceived degree of satisfaction of 
their current needs exceeded 70%, in case of the latter group 
such ratio did not exceed 50%. The share of households unable 
to satisfy all their current needs (cf. Figure I.14, strategies 6-9) 
amounted to 15%, and the overall majority of them confirmed 
that satisfaction of such needs was beyond their financial pos-
sibilities. It is noteworthy that this share corresponds to the 
proportion of the relatively poor in Poland. 
When the level of expenditure of a given household con-
sistently exceeds its income (cf. Figure I.15), the first step is limi-
tation of the current needs (88%). Subsequently, Poles ask their 
relatives for help and incur debts in order to finance their con-
sumption (41% in each case). In most cases, such resources are 
allocated for the purchase of durable goods, even though some 
of them allow for covering current consumption costs and fixed 
charges (Figure I.16). Paradoxically, when facing an increase in 
their spending needs, relatively few poor households search for 
additional income through employment (18%), and even every 
tenth of them does not take any actions whatsoever, thus per-
petuating their impoverished status.
 Housing conditions strongly differentiate the living stand-
ards of the poor vs. non-poor. However, their analysis and inter-
pretation is quite complex. This can be attributable, first of all, 
to the differences between detached houses and apartments as 
regards their average residential space, and to the correlations 
between the building’s location/its other attributes and the 
price (and, implicitly, its availability for subsequent income dis-
tribution deciles). According to GUS data, in 2011 the average 
useful floor area in case of Polish household was 73.7 m2 and 
corresponds to ca. 26 m2 per capita which is ca. 18-20 m2 lower 
than in Germany. Empirically, larger per capita areas are typi-
cal of smaller households, but in case of households composed 
of a specific number of persons, the incomes ranging between 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
 
Note: it has been assumed that absolutely poor households are ones whose 
equivalised incomes fall below absolute poverty threshold, and relatively poor ones 
are those whose incomes are in-between absolute and relative thresholds, while the 
non-poor household are those whose income falls between relative threshold and 
the median income, and finally, the affluent household are those whose equivalised 
income exceeds the median value.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Figure I. 13 | The subjective poverty threshold 
according to percentiles of the equivalised income 
distribution; 1999-2011
Table I. 7 | Subjective perceptions of poverty 
threshold among poor and non-poor, 2011
Groups of individuals – divided based on their 
equivalised income 
Absolutely 
poor
Relatively 
poor
non-poor Affluent
subjective 
poverty 
threshold
Minimum 
value
800 800 1200 1600
1000 1000 1400 2000
1300 1200 1500 2000
1500 1500 1800 2500
Median value 1800 1500 2000 2500
In accordance 
with group 
declaration 
pattern 
2000 1800 2000 3000
2000 2000 2500 3000
Maximum 
value
2500 2200 2500 3500
3000 2600 3000 4000
1999
1706.74
2003
2201.47
2007
2691.03
2011
3399.52
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96
average monthly earnings
1999 2003 2007 2011
PLN
percentiles
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limits everyday needs
uses assistance of relatives
obtains loans
household member takes up
additional job
applies for social assistance
spends savings
sells or pawns its property (material goods)
uses the assistance of the Church/Caritas
undertakes additional / other measures
does not take any actions
88%
41%
41%
18%
17%
9%
5%
4%
15%
10%
regular income of household 
does not allow to meet everyday needs
regular income of household 
allows to meet everyday needs
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
purchase of consumer durables
everyday payments
renovation of house or apartment
regular payments
medical treatment
repayment of earlier debts
purchase of house or apartment,
payments to housing cooperative
developing own business
leisure
education
An indicator of the quality of life of the poor more precise 
than the residential area is the standard of apartment/house 
i.e. presence of network utilities, amenities and equipment. Re-
gardless of the fact whether a given household is located in an 
urban or a rural area, core poverty correlates are the same: hot 
running water, toilet and bathroom with a tub or shower (cf. Fig-
ure I.18). They differentiate the poorest households (1st income 
decile) from median ones, both in urban and rural areas, and, ad-
ditionally, the relatively poor (2nd decile) residents of the rural 
the 3rd and the 7th deciles do not diversify average residential 
space per capita. Markedly higher spaces are observable in case 
of the two highest income deciles, while the 8th decile prevails 
among the largest households. Meanwhile, the visibly lowest 
residential area is observable in case of the 1st and the 2nd in-
come deciles i.e. the most impoverished households, which is 
particularly visible in case of those which consist of more than 5 
members (Figure I.17). 
Figure I. 14 | Income management strategies vs. satisfaction of current needs; 2011
Source: own elaboration based on Social Diagnosis 2011 data. 
We can only afford to buy the cheapest food, clothes and pay our 6. 
housing fees, but we are unable to repay our loans 
We can only afford to buy the cheapest food and clothes, but we 7. 
are unable to pay our housing fees
We can only afford to buy the cheapest food, but we cannot afford 8. 
to buy any clothes
We cannot even afford to buy the cheapest food9. 
Explanation:
We have enough money and we save it for future 1. 
We have enough money, we do not have to resign from anything, 2. 
but we do not save it for future 
We try to economise and that is why we have enough resources3. 
We live very humble life to save some money for major expenses4. 
We can only afford to buy the cheapest food, clothes, and pay our 5. 
housing fees, or to repay our loans 
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Figure I. 15 | Survival strategies in case of inability 
to satisfy current needs; 2011
Figure I. 16 | purposes of the incurred loans; 2011
Source: own elaboration based on Social Diagnosis 2011 data. Source: own elaboration based on Social Diagnosis 2011 data.
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areas. Meanwhile, in case of median households such amenities 
are absent in ca. 2-3% and 4-5% of urban and rural households, 
respectively, in case of the poorest households (1st decile), such 
shortages are 4-5 times more frequent and apply to 10-20% of 
all households. Also in case of the relatively poor (2nd income 
decile), the comparable relation would be 2 in urban areas and 
ca. 2-3 in rural ones. The shortage of hot running water and san-
itary facilities are therefore a good poverty indicator. However, 
bearing in mind the fact that the presence of sewage systems 
in most urban areas are nowadays regarded as a standard, they 
less frequently constitute a subject of material deprivation in 
cities, as compared to rural areas. 
The range of material correlates of poverty that indicate 
the most widespread aspects of the relative material depriva-
tion of households is quite extensive. Such indicators include 
Figure I. 17 | Residential space per capita by the equivalised income decile; 2011
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
persons in HH
sq
. m
et
er
s
d1-d2 (mean) d3-d7 (mean) d8 d9 d10
Figure I. 18 | Quality of life in case of poor and median households in cities (left) and rural areas (right); 2011
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Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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e.g. coal-fired furnace heating, moisture and absence of light at 
residential premises. Even though such problems may also oc-
cur in median households, the poor representing the 1st decile 
tend to face them 2.5-5 times more often than median house-
holds. In case of the individuals representing the 2nd decile, the 
values of such indicator decrease to the level 1.5-2 times higher 
as compared to median households. Some housing amenities 
can serve as material status indicators in selected regions only. 
For instance, coal-fired furnace heating is definitely more wide-
spread in rural households, and its presence is less attributable 
to poverty than to the actual place of residence. Similarly, the 
absence of an entry phone – which is rarely ever used in rural 
areas – does not really serve as a poverty indicator. Meanwhile, 
in cities this feature is more widespread and is a good indicator 
of income level and infrastructure quality. By way of compari-
son, poor household are not differentiated from non-poor ones 
by such attributes as the presence of air conditioning systems, 
which are not yet that common in Poland, noise or environmen-
tal pollution (especially in urban areas).
Apart from basic housing amenities, other durable goods 
may also serve as indicators of the poverty-related material 
deprivation. However, we should keep in mind that their ab-
sence may be a matter of individual choice relatively more fre-
quently than the housing standard. Every second Pole admits 
that major purchases, which also include durable goods, consti-
tute a serious financial burden. This remains consistent with an 
observation that only few items, such as a TV set and refrigera-
tor, are regarded as standard equipment in case of Polish house-
holds. An overall majority of households are also equipped with 
a vacuum cleaner, automatic washing machine and at least one 
mobile phone. Therefore, these cannot serve as good indicators 
of material standing of specific households. The same applies to 
the goods that are rarely present in Polish households, regard-
less of their income level, which include e.g. home cinema or air 
conditioning systems referred to above. 
In case of many durable goods a visible interrelation be-
tween their consumption level and an equivalent household 
income level can be observed. Such characteristics are observ-
able in case of e.g. a PC with the Internet access, passenger car 
(where the difference between the 75th and the 5th percentile 
exceeds 40%), satellite or cable TV equipment (30%), or a dish-
washer (20%). Atypical consumption patterns are observable in 
case of a bicycle: while in poorer households it is regarded as 
a mean of transport, in the more affluent one it has a leisure-
related function. 
The presence of a PC with Internet access is strongly cor-
related with household income level, and the majority of Inter-
net users take advantage of a broadband connection. A diver-
sifying factor is the necessity of purchase of hardware (fixed 
cost) and systematic payments of Internet access fees (variable 
costs). On the other hand, a relatively smaller proportion of 
households equipped with PCs with the Internet access may 
be, at least partially, attributable to the relatively less developed 
network infrastructure in the poorer regions of Poland. It can 
be also assumed that there exists an opposite relationship i.e. 
digitally-literate households with Internet access are typically 
capable of attaining higher incomes. Irrespectively of the strong 
correlation that exists between the level of income vs. presence 
of a PC with Internet access, the diversification between spe-
cific household groups is, in this respect, relatively substantial 
– only 40% of the poor have such type of equipment, as com-
pared to 95% in case of the most affluent individuals. Such a 
regularity is not observed for another communication medium 
i.e. mobile phone. Different types of operator agreements pro-
vide households with optimum access possibilities regardless 
of their equivalised income levels: the proportion of households 
where mobiles phones are present does not fall below 77%, and 
attains 90-95% in most groups.
Figure I. 19 | Material deprivation in selected 
percentiles of the sample; 2011.
Figure I. 20 | pc ownership and the Internet access 
in households according to percentiles of equivalent 
income, 2011 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data. Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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It should be kept in mind, however, that the very pres-
ence/absence of specific goods in a household should not serve 
as a sufficient measure of its material deprivation. Since some 
households may, due to financial constraints, be devoid of cer-
tain practically relevant goods, others may, for the same reason, 
dispose of the goods that are obsolete and extremely outworn. 
At the same time, we should remember that obsolete appli-
ances are more expensive to maintain, and more susceptible to 
breakdowns, which additionally decreases their quality of use. 
The frequency of exchange of durable goods depends not only 
on the equivalised income level of a given household, but also 
on its type i.e. its obsolescence, unit purchase price and the level 
of substitutability with other household objects. For example, 
in case of the poorer half of the society 7% and 15% of house-
holds respectively possess younger than 2-year, and 2-5 year 
old refrigerators. This factor is not less relevant than in case of 
the more affluent half, where the respective proportions are ca. 
10% and 21%. A refrigerator is, in fact, an example of an appli-
ance whose usability period is quite long. In case of PCs, which 
are characterised by relatively short life cycles, the situation is 
different: in the poorer half of all households, 10% and 20% of 
all households have PCs younger than 2 years, and 2-5 years 
old, respectively. The respective proportions observable in the 
more affluent half are 20% and 30%, with a strong upward trend 
observable at the most affluent end of the sample. It should be 
emphasised that half of the poor households does not dispose 
of any PC equipment. Therefore, this type of goods strongly dis-
tinguishes this group from relatively more affluent households. 
A similar tendency is observable in case of cars which are 
present only in a minority of poor households. Purchases of 
cars, which involve very substantial costs as compared to the 
average equivalised income, happen rarely. The possession of 
cars younger than 5 years is seldom – in 2011, their incidence 
in the first half of the sample did not exceed 3.5% on average. 
Meanwhile, improvement of one’s material status still remains a 
powerful stimulus for exchanging one’s car for a newer one. 
Decrease in material deprivation of the poor households 
over the past years can be attributed, on one hand, to the im-
provement of the material status of Poles overall, and on the 
other hand, to the popularisation and decreasing prices of 
multimedia and household appliances. While in 2001, only 
one-tenth and one-sixth of all 5th percentile and 25th percentile 
households, respectively, possessed a mobile phone, current 
proportions of such households exceed 80%. A similar situa-
tion can be reported in case of the previously discussed PCs 
with Internet access, or cable/satellite TV equipment. In 2001, 
PCs with Internet access used to be totally inaccessible for the 
poorer households (1.0% and 2.5%, in case of 5th and 25th per-
centile, respectively), yet by the year 2006 their incidence vis-
ibly increased (to 6.4% and 15.0%, respectively). However, only 
currently we are observing their popularisation (2011: 38.5% 
and 49.8%). In case of cable/satellite TV equipment, we can see 
the growing saturation of households with this kind of equip-
ment (an increase from 27.2% to 48.8% in p5 and from 41.2% 
to 62.6% in p25 in the years 2001-2011). Some changes can be 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Figure I. 21 | Households’ assets by age and by percentiles of income distribution; 2011
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observed even in a shorter 5-year perspective: a DVD player 
or a digital camera, whose purchases still constitute a consid-
erable item in the budgets of the poorest households have be-
come much more common (from ca. 20% to 40% in both sample 
sections in case of a DVD player, and from 5.7% to 29.2% in 
p5 and from 7.8% to 36.3% in p25). Meanwhile, certain goods 
are becoming obsolete: hi-fi audio systems are becoming less 
and less frequent in households – both less and more affluent 
households do not acquire any new such equipment, or replace 
old one. 
Apart from new technologies, the availability of household 
appliances making life more convenient, such as e.g. automatic 
washing machine, microwave oven or (to a smaller extent) dish-
washer, improves systematically. Over the years 2001-2011, 
an automatic washing machine has become a must-have even 
in the poorest households (p5: from 41.4% to 74.1%, p25: from 
63.0% to 86.7%), most likely, due to depreciation of old equip-
ment, absence of non-automatic washing machines at stores, 
and convenience it provides. Also a microwave oven is no longer 
regarded as an equipment for ‘the chosen ones’ (p5: from 9.5% 
to 34.2%, p25: from 14.7% to 47.0%). Apparently, goods whose 
unit prices are lower tend to spread faster and more easily e.g. 
a microwave ovens are more popular than dishwashers. The lat-
ter is still regarded as a prestigious and costly appliance. How-
ever, its popularity grows even among the poor i.e. in 2011 its 
possession was reported in every 10th household in the 25th 
income percentile. 
Figure I. 23 | own income assessment; 1999-2011 Figure I. 24 | Poverty and social isolation in social 
cohesion studies; 2011
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Figure I. 22 | Household equipment, by income percentiles; 2001, 2006, 2011.
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The sense of impoverishment that is experienced by Poles 
despite their objectively improving material status appears to 
stem from the generally recognised point of reference, which in 
case of living standards are the West European countries, rath-
er than the domestic situation in Poland ten or twenty years 
ago. In terms of accumulation of durables, Polish households 
tend to gradually converge to West European ones. However, 
this phenomenon has not yet contributed to the change of self-
identification patterns, since Poles still perceive themselves as 
a society whose members need to make sacrifice in order to im-
prove their living standards. This does not imply, however, that 
respondents do not notice any improvements of their mate-
rial status. Yet, they perceive such improvements as demanding 
much effort.
If we place the actual income of a given respondent into his/
her self-defined income category,12 instead of asking him/her 
about its monetary calculations which can be underestimated, 
we will observe that the perceived status of the overall majority 
of households is either good or very good. In years 1999-2011 
the proportion of households whose income was perceived as 
poor or insufficient visibly decreased (from 18% to 9%), so did 
the proportion of households on the poverty threshold (from 
21 to 14%). At the same time, however, the share of households 
with very high declared income levels nearly doubled (from 17 
to 31%). Even though the economic slowdown which has been 
recently reported in Europe has decelerated this positive ten-
dency, Polish households are convinced of a visible improve-
ment of their income-related situation on a long-term basis. 
Based on the social cohesion survey conducted by GUS, pov-
erty (if existing) only rarely leads to social isolation. Over two-
thirds (67.8%) of Polish citizens are not at risk of poverty or 
social isolation. 4.9 % of respondents are regarded as non-poor, 
but isolated, and the co-occurrence of both these phenomena 
(with varying intensity) applied to 4% of the population. 
12  extremely low, insufficient, barely sufficient, good, very good.
Global and local aspects oF 2.3 
poverty
The prevailing approach in case of the EU poverty analyses 
is a relative one, based on the poverty threshold constituting 
60% of median of the equivalised income.13 According to this 
approach, in 2011 ca. 85 million individuals were at risk of pov-
erty (16.9% of the EU-27 population). In the last studied year 
this proportion slightly increased, as compared to a relatively 
stable level of 16.3-16.5% that had been observed in the years 
2005-2010. However, if we look at individual countries, the di-
versification scale is tremendous: in Czech Republic, poverty 
seems to be just an incident, and relatively non-acute, while in 
case of Latvia it is virtually a mass issue, with definitely unfavour-
able parameters. In order to simplify our study, we have divided 
particular EU Member States into 5 clusters differing in terms 
of poverty intensity, severity and profoundness i.e. the leaders, 
the effective, the average, the stragglers and the weaklings.
The leaders in counteracting poverty, apart from low pov-
erty rate (i.e. 8.5-11.5%) display also a number of other favour-
able features such as low poverty gap and severity. Besides, 
they do not show substantial internal diversification, which is 
particularly visible in case of Czech Republic whose welfare 
policy maintains the poverty risk ratio, in its all dimensions, at a 
stable low level. The effective countries have comparable gap, 
severity and inequality levels, with the poverty rates (12-14%) 
systematically higher as compared to the leader. This group 
includes, among others, Scandinavian countries. Among them, 
insignificantly less favourable severity and diversification sta-
tistics can be observed in case of Sweden – however, these lev-
els still fall below the EU-27 average. The average differ from 
the leaders and the effective only in terms of the poverty ratio 
which is close to the EU average (15-16%). The country that 
seems to somewhat lag behind in this relatively homogenous 
group is Germany. Considerably less favourable situations are 
13  Absolute measures are not used due to substantial per capita income 
differences, and inadequacy of measures across specific countries.
Source: own elaboration.
Figure I. 25 | Poverty clusters in EU-27; 2008
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faced by the poor in the countries categorised as the stragglers 
and the weaklings. The stragglers include such countries whose 
income statistics unfavourably stand out from the EU average: 
the poverty ratio amounts to 17-20%, and the average income 
attained by the poor falls much more below the threshold, as 
compared to the three previous groups. This increases the se-
verity of poverty, and leads to a higher diversification among 
the poor themselves. This country group is relatively capacious 
and includes the Great Britain, South European countries, and 
a number of NMS, including Poland. It should be in empha-
sised that Poland, which has been categorised as the straggler, 
in terms of its poverty rate and inclusiveness of the welfare 
policy system considerably lags behind not only Scandinavian 
countries, but also some Central European countries, such as 
Slovakia, Czech Republic or Hungary. The last country cluster 
includes the weaklings, who face systemic difficulties in coun-
teracting poverty: the poor are numerous (over 20% or 25% in 
case of Latvia), which is reflected in very high poverty gap and 
severity levels, visibly lagging behind even from the poorest 
straggler country i.e. Spain. Besides, visible mutual differences 
can also be observed among the weaklings themselves. 
We should keep in mind that the poverty rate measured 
in specific EU Member States is not a crude indicator. It takes 
into account the entire range of social transfers distributed by 
various public institutions, such as: pensions, unemployment 
benefits, family allowances or welfare support (except for ben-
efits in kind). Without taking into account such redistribution 
of resources, poverty ratio would include half of all population. 
Meanwhile, a properly targeted set of social benefits allows for 
cutting down on the poverty rate by over 70%, as it happened 
in Czech Republic or Hungary. At the same time, inefficient ac-
tions contribute to reducing the poverty rate by less than a half 
– like in case of Bulgaria. In Poland, transfer system is character-
ised by an average (in the context of the entire EU) efficiency in 
counteracting poverty and reduces its rate by 60%. The factors 
that distinguish the leaders, the efficient and the average clus-
ters from the stragglers and the weaklings, who cope with such 
issues much worse, are efficiently operating systems of social 
transfers, and implicitly, substantial reduction of the poverty 
rate. This conclusion appears to be particularly relevant, since 
despite economic instabilities observable over the past few 
years, the social policy development and efficiency trends have 
remained constant.
Although at present Poland is a representative of the 
stragglers cluster, if the downward tendency that has been ob-
served over the past decade in case of the poverty rate contin-
ues, there is a chance that in the coming years it will join the 
average group. Such an improvement would occur earlier, if the 
social policy system in Poland followed Czech, Hungarian or 
Slovakian patterns in order to improve its efficiency and target-
ing of benefits. This issue is going to be discussed in more detail 
in further parts of the present report.
Despite the fact that poverty severity in Poland is rather 
medium (close to the European average), Poles show a strong 
tendency for overestimation in this area. In 2010 when relative 
poverty ratio in Poland amounted to 17%, nearly every two out 
of five Poles would agree with a statement that this problem ap-
plies to over 30% of all population. As compared to other EU 
Member States, the poverty overestimation scale is substantial 
Map I. 2 | Poverty clusters in EU-27; 2008 Figure I. 26 | Reduction of poverty risk rate with 
welfare transfers (including pensions) in EU-27; 2010
Source: own elaboration. Note: 1. Data concerning Ireland – 2009. 2. Tag colours correspond to the clusters 
mentioned above.
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC data.
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– higher than in Lithuania or Latvia (despite objectively less 
favourable situations of those countries), but smaller than in 
Romania, Bulgaria or Hungary. This tendency can be partly as-
cribed to the persistent nature of poverty. Historically speak-
ing, Poles used to be accustomed to their limited resources and 
a sense of deprivation. Over the past decade, of topmost impor-
tance was the tough period between 2001 and 2004, and the 
repercussions of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 also 
affected the perceptions of poverty. In the countries where the 
poverty rate has remained at a stable low level (like in the ma-
jority of the EU-15, excluding South European countries), the 
proportion of declarations regarding the high poverty rate is 
insignificant. A different phenomenon can be observed in case 
of NMS, where convictions about high poverty rates are much 
more widespread. The issues concerning the poverty risk and 
its persistency have been discussed in Part 3 of the report 
The average value of relative poverty rate in a given coun-
try does not take into account the internal differences existing 
between specific regions, which can even be higher that conti-
nental differences. In this context, the most frequently quoted 
example is Italy: the differences between the affluent North and 
the poor South are, in fact, reflected in poverty indicators: in 2009, 
the poverty rate in the provinces of Bolzano, Trento or Emilia-
Romagna (all of them bordering with Austria) did not exceed 
8.3%, while in Sicily it amounted to 38.3%. A comparably high 
diversification can be reported in Spain (Community of Navarre 
7.3%, Estremadura – 38.2%), and only slightly lower in Romania 
(Bucharest-Ilfov development region – 3.1%, south-western 
region bordering with Serbia – 30.7%). Smaller diversifications 
are typical of countries reporting higher GDP per capita i.e. Ger-
many, France (with the differences ranging from 13.9 to 8.1%, 
respectively) and countries with small geographical areas. 
Figure I. 27 | Poverty rate estimates in Poland and 
EU-27; 2010
Figure I. 28 | Actual vs. perceived poverty rates in 
EU-27; 2010
Source: own elaboration based on Eurobarometer data, 2010. Source: own elaboration based on Eurobarometer data, 2010.
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Figure I. 29 | Poverty risk ratio differences in EU-27 at NUTS-2 level; 2009
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Source: own elaboration based on HBS and CSO of Poland (GUS) data. Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
The rate of diversification across the Polish regions (18.3 
p.p.) is moderate, as compared to countries with similar geo-
graphical size, even though the distribution of poverty is similar 
to that which is typical of poorer and more diversified EU-27 
Member States. The highest relative poverty rate can be ob-
served in the Świętokrzyskie voivodeship (25.7%). More than 
one out of every five residents of Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Pod-
laskie, Lubelskie, Podkarpackie and Wielkopolskie voivodeships 
are at risk of poverty. However, if we looked at the absolute pov-
erty rates, our findings would be somewhat different:: in 2011 
every tenth resident of Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Lubelskie, Pod-
laskie and Pomorskie voivodeships remained poor. The poverty, 
both absolute and relative one, most rarely affects the residents 
of Lubuskie, Mazowieckie, Opolskie and Śląskie voivodeships. 
The disparities between the perceived impoverishment 
and the status quo can be also observed on a regional level. Near-
ly all presented regions of Poland range above 45o line, which 
implies that the subjective poverty ratio exceeds the objective 
one. Moreover, in case of the majority of the poor, the dispar-
ity (manifested as the divergence from the line) remains very 
conspicuous, and such phenomenon equally applies to those re-
gions were the number of the poor is relatively low (e.g. Śląskie, 
Dolnośląskie), and to those characterised by more extensive 
poverty (Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Łódzkie). The exceptions to the 
rule are Podkarpackie and Świętokrzyskie (where the subjective 
poverty rates are slightly lower than those resulting from objec-
tive indicators). Meanwhile, declarations provided by the resi-
dents of Lubelskie and Podlaskie regions are relatively consist-
ent with the actual rates. It should be observed that such data 
confirm the findings obtained in the course of Eurobarometer 
survey, where the declared poverty rates amounted to 20-25%, 
or sometimes even to 25-30%. The subjective measures are 
rather disconnected with the status quo, which is manifested by 
the low correlation between both these measures.
The poverty rates are strongly correlated with the level of 
urbanisation. In cities, the poverty ratio is visibly lower than in 
rural areas. Moreover, the bigger the city, the lower the poverty 
rate. While in cities with more than 100 thousand inhabitants 
the poor accounted for 7.2% of all population, in towns having 
20-100 thousand inhabitants this ratio amounted to 11.2%, 
and in those inhabited by less than 20 thousand – 14.6%. Mean-
while, in the countryside the proportion of the poor exceeded 
24.6%. However, diversifications between the least and the 
most poverty-threatened regions are substantial: they range 
from a half of, to the double of average calculated in a given resi-
dence area category: in major cities they range from 3.6 % to 
11.9%, in medium-sized ones from 7.1% to 17.3%, and in small 
ones from 6.6% to 22.4%. In the countryside, the scale of re-
gional diversification is the most substantial and ranges from 
13.1% to 36%. By controlling the place of residence class it can 
be easily observed that there are no voivodeships that would be 
visibly less threatened by poverty, which could be reflected in 
low poverty rates in all classes. For example, the Podkarpackie 
region, which lags behind other Polish regions in terms of cities 
having over 100 thousand and less than 20 thousand inhabit-
ants, has relatively lowest poverty rates in towns having 20-
100 thousand, and is located in the half of the scale in case of 
rural areas. 
The poverty scale may also be visualised by means of the 
relative poverty threshold – the lower it is, the lower is the me-
dian equivalised income, and, implicitly, the poverty threshold. 
For example, in 2010 in Warsaw the poverty threshold was de-
fined at the level of PLN 1660, while in rural areas of the Lublin 
Province, such indicator amounted to PLN 660. In cities hav-
ing over 100K inhabitants, the declared thresholds generally 
exceeded PLN 1000 (again, in major cities the declared living 
standards were higher), while in the countryside they remained 
lower than PLN 900.
Figure I. 30 | Absolute and relative poverty rates in 
poland across different provinces (voivodeships); 2011
Figure I. 31 | Poverty perceptions in different 
provinces (voivodeships); 2011
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The presence of major cities substantially affects the scale 
of poverty. This happens mainly due to the diversification of local 
economic structures and competitiveness of wages, which lead 
to a higher professional mobility of residents of the neighbour-
ing regions. The definitely most powerful stimulus is provided 
by Warsaw, whose relative poverty ratio amounts to 2.6%, as 
compared to 10.6% across the entire province. If we excluded 
Warsaw from the statistics of the Mazowieckie voivodeship, 
the poverty rate in that region would increase to 16.5%. In case 
of cities having over 500K inhabitants, very positive impacts 
can be observed in the areas surrounding Cracow. Meanwhile, 
in the group of cities with 200-500K inhabitants such regional 
effects can be observed in case of Gdańsk, Gdynia, Białystok, 
Lublin, Bydgoszcz and Toruń. Wrocław and Łódź have substan-
tially smaller impact on their surroundings, and in the Silesian 
Province, due to its specificity, there are virtually no differences 
between poverty rates observed in the major cities and those 
reported in their surroundings. 
Poverty analyses conducted on regional levels can be sup-
plemented with local perspectives. A better availability of data 
at the voivodeship level is accompanied with limited information 
concerning intraregional diversification of the phenomenon, 
which is substantial. Whereas in 2011 the poverty variabil-
ity coefficient14 across regions amounted to 26%, its value in-
creased to 46% in case of poviats, and 69% in case of gminas. 
The visible increase in the ratio which can be observed along 
with narrowing down of the perspective is the first symptom 
of the fact that intraregional variability has more impact upon 
the shaping and perceptions of the poverty phenomenon, that 
cross-regional one. 
This conclusion also helps us to answer questions as re-
gards to what extent poverty depends on a type of socioeco-
nomic surroundings, and how strong such correlations are. In 
view of the high number of poviats (379), it would be helpful to 
use a cluster analysis enabling grouping of districts in accord-
ance with their characteristic features, and comparing specific 
clusters thus created (the baseline set) with clusters that would 
have been created if a poverty scale indicator was added to the 
list of variables (the extended set). This would make us more 
likely to assess to what extent poverty can be related to: (1) lo-
cal economic structure and (2) demographic structure of the 
local population. 
14  The indicator has been approximated by the proportion of household 
members taking advantage of the local welfare support in the overall population.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Figure I. 32 | Relative poverty rate according to residence class; 2011
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The basic set of economic determinants includes the fol-
lowing variables:
unemployment rate•  –the first approximation of paid 
employment possibilities,
share of agricultural farms below 5 ha in specific • 
poviats – an approximation of the urbanisation level 
and farming productivity,
gross average monthly remuneration•  – an approx- 
imation of the productivity of the local economy and 
household affluence,
No. of enterprises registered in REGON per 10 • 
thousand inhabitants – an approximation of the 
economic activity of residents,
No. of registered cars per 1 thousand inhabitants•  – 
an estimation of the income and wealth of residents 
(presence of a fixed cost and regular variable costs).
The basic set of demographic determinants has included:
young-age and old-age dependency ratio•  – in order 
to identify the scale of burden placed upon people at 
productive age,
feminisation ratio•  – in light of the diversified economic 
activity among women/men, 
female and male life expectancy• 15 – as an estimation 
of the quality of life and economic activity prospects.
It should be emphasised that since the variables included 
in both sets remain correlated to some degree, each of them 
provides additional information about cluster characteristics. 
In both cases, the extended sets of variables have been supple-
mented by the poverty ratio assessed on the basis of the pro-
portion of household members taking advantage of the local 
15  sub-regional level statistics
welfare support in the overall population. It is the most precise 
statistical approximation of the poverty phenomenon at the po-
viat level, which reflects income poverty correlates. 
economic structure of the population vs. poverty indicators 
The analysis of economic clusters has allowed us to distin-
guish the following 4 groups of districts: well-rewarded, entre-
preneurial, average and unemployment-threatened. 
A group that is the least numerous, but visibly stands out 
from the others are the well-rewarded. It includes 9 districts 
where labour market situation is definitely more favourable 
than in the remaining ones i.e. Warsaw and Pruszków district, 
selected mining districts (Katowice, Jaworzno, Jastrzębie-
Zdrój, Lubin, Łęczna, Bełchatów) and Płock (crude oil process-
ing). In such districts the average monthly remuneration ex-
ceeds PLN 5 thousand (ca. 40% above the national average), 
and the average unemployment rate amounts to ca. 8.6% (3.7% 
in Warsaw). The high fragmentation of agricultural farms is 
coupled with their relatively low share (the role of farming in 
the local economies is marginal). At the same time, the good 
economic standing of these regions encourages people to es-
tablish their own businesses, which is reflected in high level of 
entrepreneurism. 
The second relatively small group are the entrepreneur-
ial. The 33 districts comprising such cluster are townships and 
their immediate surroundings, taking advantage of such neigh-
bourhood. As compared to the remaining groups, the venture-
some have similar characteristics as the well-rewarded i.e. high 
economic activity ratio (1337 business entities per each 10 
Note: 1. only direct impacts have been considered. 2. The analysis includes cities with more than 200 thousand inhabitants, apart from Radom whose impacts decrease due to 
the neighbourhood of Warsaw. Cities with over 500 thousand inhabitant have been marked with an asterisk*.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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The third group comprises the average i.e. such districts 
which approximate the national average in all statistical di-
mensions. The cluster includes 136 districts. It is mainly com-
posed of the districts which serve as a more distant backup 
of major cities, and cities having smaller effects on their sur-
roundings than e.g. Warsaw or other major cities representing 
Map I. 3 | Determinants of poverty – economic clusters
thousand of residents) and relatively low unemployment rates 
(9.3%), at visibly lower average remuneration levels. Due to the 
on-going urbanisation and suburbanisation processes, farming 
business does not play any relevant role in such regions.
16 In case of economic and demographic clusters: unweighted average
table I. 8 | economic clusters - selected characteristics
Variable/cluster type well-rewarded entrepreneurial average risk of unemployment poland 
16
the clusters based on the basic list of variables 
number of districts 9 33 136 201 379
Unemployment rate (%) 8.6 9.3 14.7 17.4 15.5
Agriculture (%) 81 79 71 61 67
remunerations (pln) 5059 3678 3157 2812 3065
entrepreneurship
(no. of business entities per 10 thousand 
inhabitants)
1065 1337 944 730 868
cars 
(passenger cars per 1 thousand of inhabitants)
490 477 467 472 471
The clusters based on the extended list of variables, including the poverty rate
number of districts 10 46 147 176 379
Unemployment rate (%) 8.3 9.6 15.4 17.5 15.5
Agriculture (%) 81 79 69 61 67
remunerations (pln) 4986 3595 3090 2796 3065
entrepreneurship
(no. of business entities per 10 thousand 
inhabitants)
1100 1227 929 710 868
cars 
(passenger cars per 1 thousand of inhabitants)
491 473 470 470 471
Poverty rate (%) 5.1 5.5 8.8 11.4 9.5
Source: own elaboration.
Economic structure
basic set
At risk of unemployment
Average
Entrepreneurial
Well-rewarded
(201)
(136)
(33)
(9)
Economic structure
extended set
At risk of unemployment
Average
Entrepreneurial
Well-rewarded
(176)
(147)
(46)
(10)
Source: own elaboration based on LDB CSO of Poland (BDL GUS) data.
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the venturesome cluster. The districts located in the Western 
Poland, near the German border, are insignificantly more fre-
quently categorised as the average, mostly due to large role of 
business services in these regions.
The situation of the unemployment-threatened appears 
to be visibly less favourable than that of the remaining clus-
ters. The cluster analysis univocally shows that apart from 
the regions mentioned above, in the majority of Polish poviats 
belonging to this group, such situation is unfavourable. The 
proportion of unproductive farming is high, which hinders the 
average remuneration growth. At the same time, the chances 
of finding a non-farming job are limited – hence, the unemploy-
ment rate exceeds the national average. Moreover, the major-
ity of districts have a typically rural character, which does not 
promote local entrepreneurship, especially in view of the low 
development level.
If we supplemented the initial set of economic indica-
tors with the poverty variable (extended set), the changes 
would be only cosmetic, which confirms a strongly economic, 
yet non-deterministic, character of the poverty phenomenon. 
As a consequence, the number of poviats representing the 
unemployment-threatened cluster would decrease. In other 
words, unfavourable local economic structures and structural 
labour market obstacles do not univocally determine the high 
poverty risk, but substantially affect its level. Inclusion of the 
poverty variable shifted 25 districts from the unemployment-
threatened to the average cluster, 11 districts from the aver-
age to the entrepreneurial one, and 1 entrepreneurial poviat to 
the well-rewarded cluster, without exerting substantial impacts 
upon the basic set of variables. 
demographic structure of the population vs. poverty 
A similar procedure has been carried out for demographic 
variables. However, in this case the outcomes have been quite 
different:
The dependency ratio’s' direction and intensity allows • 
us to distinguish the cluster of districts that are ageing, 
where – apart from the high ratio of senior people – are 
characterised by a considerable level of feminisation 
and a relatively high male life expectancy. This type of 
demographic characteristics applies to a narrow group 
of townships.
High share of women vs. than of men, at relatively • 
unfavourable life expectancy statistics in case of both 
genders, is typical of the cluster of feminised districts. 
The feminised districts are frequently located in the 
surroundings of major cities, and their employment 
opportunities are related to the public services sector.
The situation of the cluster of • masculinised districts 
is different: in this group we can observe a higher 
dependency ratio concerning the young, than the 
elderly, and a relatively high proportion of men, as 
compared to that of women. This group is relatively 
large and comprises regions located in the northern 
and eastern parts of Poland.
The • average cluster in which all demographical 
statistics correspond to the national averages. An 
accumulation of the average districts can be observed 
in the south-eastern part of Poland. 
Inclusion of the district’s poverty rate into the set of de-
mographic variables (the extended set) leads to, in contrast to 
clusters based on economic variables, substantial modifications 
of the demographic structure map. As a result of re-clustering 
process, over 40% units have changed their classifications. 
Source: own elaboration based on LDB CSO of Poland (BDL GUS) data.
Map I. 4 | Determinants of poverty – demographic clusters
demographic structure
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feminisation
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masculinisation
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Feminised districts, which are often highly urbanised, migrate 
into the group of ageing (the major cities), while masculinised 
ones become average ones. Such scale of changes also affects 
the characteristics of the modified clusters - whereas in case 
of masculinised districts, the narrowing down of such group 
reinforces their characteristics, the remaining clusters tend to 
approximate the national average. However, such modifications 
do not result in increasing of the internal homogeneity of clus-
ters, but it is just the opposite. This can be attributable to the 
fact that the demographic structure serves as an explanation of 
the poverty phenomenon to a very limited extent. The impacts 
of certain accompanying correlations are much more likely for 
example living in a major city is correlated with a low probability 
of poverty, ageing demographic structure and a high feminisa-
tion level. 
The juxtaposition of the results of both cluster analyses 
confirms the findings gathered over the course of the variability 
analysis. The affinity with a given cluster is much less related to 
the situation of a given province, than to the place of residence 
class, which (together with the results of NUTS-2 variability 
analysis and the studies of cities impacts) points out to a higher 
role of intraregional variability of poverty, than cross-regional 
one. In other words, the poverty in individual poviats is attrib-
utable to their socioeconomic characteristics to a much higher 
degree, than to their linkage to a specific region, bearing in mind 
that economic variables affect poverty more substantially than 
demographic ones. Implicitly, in the context of social policy, it 
is difficult to look at the poverty clusters from the spatial per-
spective. Rather, it should be concluded that the accumulation 
of negative phenomena, especially economic ones, can be con-
ducive to poverty, regardless of the region. As a consequence, 
welfare support should not be targeted at specific regions, 
but rather at specific problems encountered in a given locality, 
which may contribute to poverty such as e.g. low productivity 
and high fragmentation of farming, monoculture of rural areas, 
low levels of entrepreneurship, etc.
Who Is at rIsk oF poverty?2.4 
The poverty risk does not apply to everyone with the same 
probability. There are more or less prone socio-demographic 
groups. As a consequence, poverty rates are considerably di-
versified. Our intuitive perceptions of the most poverty-strick-
en social groups are often mistaken, especially if the situation of 
such groups rarely becomes a subject of public debate. 
The group that has been most frequently indicated as pov-
erty-threatened in Eurobarometer & EU-SILC surveys, both 
in Poland, and in the EU, are the unemployed – the declared 
ratio exceeds 55%. High results are also recorded for working 
individuals, who engage in precarious jobs (ca. 30%) and those 
who are poorly skilled/educated – however, in case of the latter 
group the ratio of the perceived poverty risk in Poland is lower 
than in the EU on average. The perception of unemployment 
as a major poverty reason that is widespread among European 
citizens is consistent with statistical data, especially if the pov-
erty rate does not take into account transfers (but that is not 
the only case). As a matter of fact, absence of labour income 
substantially reduces the possibilities of ensuring oneself rela-
tive wealth, as they are, apart from pensions, the only source 
of income which enables transgressing of the relative poverty 
threshold. Therefore, such perceptions are well-grounded. In 
the light of the EU-SILC data, ca. 45% of the unemployed were 
poor. In many cases, having only one member of a household 
table I. 9 | demographic clusters - selected characteristics
variable/cluster ageing
feminisation / 
masculinisation
average masculinised poland
clusters based on basic list of variables
number of districts 30 61 107 181 379
Young people (%) 19 21 22 24 23
Elderly people (%) 29 26 25 23 25
Feminisation ratio (women per 100 men) 113.5 108.4 104.7 101.7 104.6
Male life expectancy (years) 72.8 71.8 72.1 72.1 72.1
Female life expectancy (years) 80.9 80.4 80.6 80.8 80.7
clusters based on extended list of variables
number of districts 47 93 133 106 379
Young people (%) 20 22 24 24 23
Elderly people (%) 28 25 24 23 25
Feminisation ratio (women per 100 men) 112.4 106.0 103.3 101.5 104.6
Male life expectancy (years) 72.4 72.3 72.0 72.0 72.1
Female life expectancy (years) 80.7 80.6 80.7 80.7 80.7
Poverty rate (%) 6.1 6.0 9.5 14.2 9.5
Source: own elaboration based on LDB CSO of Poland (GUS) data.
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adequate protection against poverty. For these reasons, the 
perceived risk of poverty ratio in Poland in case of this group 
exceeds the EU average (the difference of 12 pp). This can be 
attributable to a number of correlated factors such as: low ben-
efit values, the fact that caretaker obligations fulfilled by other 
household members interfere with their regular careers, and 
relatively high costs of institutional caretaker support.
Visibly underestimated social perceptions as compared 
to the actual poverty risk can be observed in the case of young 
adults (especially in Poland), single parents and children. Fami-
lies with children often cope with very high and severe impov-
erishment. Statistically, every third single parent, and more 
than one out of five children are poor. At the same time, while 
the first and the second child (in a household including two 
adults) increases the poverty risk rate only insignificantly, the 
presence of each subsequent child affects such level to a large 
extent. These findings have been confirmed by the perceived 
poverty causes – in Poland, twice as frequently as in the EU, 
one such factors included having many children (24% vs. 12%), 
which is a negative forecaster when growing up in a poor fam-
ily corresponds to worse opportunities (28% vs. 25% in the EU 
overall). Both these issues have been described in detail in Part 
II (i.e. children’s poverty indicators) and Part IV of the Report 
(optimisation of the tax and benefit system in case of families 
with children). 
employed based on a permanent labour contract is enough to 
elevate such household’s income above the poverty threshold. 
However, we should also take into account the more and more 
extensive upon European scale, phenomenon of the so-called 
working poor. The role of employment in the context of poverty 
and the phenomenon of the working poor have been described 
in Part 3 of this report. 
The second highest perceived at-risk-of-poverty ratio has 
been ascribed to elderly people (over 40% of all declarations). 
However, in this case, public opinions are inconsistent with the 
statistics. Empirically, elderly people are, both in Poland and 
across the EU, one of the groups that are less threatened by 
poverty (16.0% in the EU, 14.7% in Poland), which can be as-
cribed to the character of pension payments. An old age pen-
sion may protect an individual against poverty just like a regular 
employment, which is particularly visible in Poland. Obviously, 
it cannot be ruled out that along with the gradual ageing of the 
EU population the level of protection of senior citizens will de-
crease, but it is still difficult to univocally assess the scale of such 
phenomenon. The issue of poverty among senior people has 
been raised in Part II of the Report. As compared to senior peo-
ple, lower affluence chances can be observed among the disa-
bled and chronically ill. In Poland, such individuals, except for 
those who have attained the retirement age, most frequently 
life off their disability/sickness benefits, which do not provide 
Note: 1. The ‘opinions’ category is interpreted as proportion of respondents who 
considered given group as definitely threatened by poverty, while the ‘data’ category 
denotes the poverty threat ratio in given group. 2. Data concerning disabled and 
chronically ill individuals are approximated by data concerning those who obtain 
any sources of income other than wages (mainly pensions). 3. Data concerning 
immigrants in Poland have been viewed as unreliable by Eurostat.
Source: own elaboration based on Eurobarometer and EU-SILC data, 2010.
Source: own elaboration based on Eurobarometer data, 2010.
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Figure I. 34 | At-risk-of-poverty groups – opinions 
vs. reality; 2010
Figure I. 35 | Causes of poverty – opinions; 2010
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The EU citizens’ opinions concerning the causes of pover-
ty have been reflected by the efficiency of the actions that have 
been undertaken so far in order to eliminate poverty among 
children and senior people. The transfers contribute to the re-
duction of poverty rates among the elderly by 10-50% (depend-
ing on a country) and by 10-60% among children. In the coun-
tries representing the leaders and the effective group, such 
transfers tend to be targeted with above average precision in 
both groups. The situation looks differently in case of the strag-
glers and the weaklings. In such countries, the level of interven-
tions aimed at improvement of living standards of children and 
the elderly is below the EU average. Also in this context Poland 
should be categorised as a straggler: limited extent and ineffec-
tiveness of interventions can be observed both in case of eld-
erly people and children. However, in case of children, severity 
of such status quo is higher: the poverty reduction rate due to 
transfers is 27%, as compared to 40.5% (the EU average), while 
in case of elderly people it amounts to 15% (18.9% in the EU).
Relatively low poverty risk tends to be ascribed to groups 
that are rather inactive in the social life such as immigrants, the 
Roma, and, to a lesser extent, also to the mentally disabled. Dif-
ficulties in getting a job (which are frequently due to certain 
educational decisions and strategies) result in limited possibili-
ties of obtaining regular income and above average poverty risk. 
Due to their “invisibility”, the poverty risk among representa-
tives of these groups is perceived as relatively insignificant. Al-
though there are no comprehensive quantitative data concern-
ing the scope of poverty in such groups, the existing statistical 
breakdowns present an exceptionally pessimistic view.17 If such 
outlook is true, this would mean that also in these cases the 
public opinion tends to underestimate the actual exposure of 
members of these groups to poverty and social exclusion. 
17 cf. immigrants: http://www.euro.centre.org/data/1178099907_77304.pdf 
the Roma: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ExTROMA/Resources/roma_in_
expanding_europe.pdf
Mentally disabled people: http://www.prawapacjenta.eu/index.php?pId=2000 
Note: data concerning Ireland – 2009.
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC data.
Figure I. 36 | Poverty reduction rate among children and elderly people; 2010.
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PovErty – a randoM 3 
EvEnt or a dEstIny?
poverty In the publIc polIcy sphere3.1 
The hitherto analyses have proven that the definition of 
poverty is very capacious and its statistical indicators should 
measure a wide range of aspects. In fact, poverty does not only 
apply to such individuals who fail to attain a certain minimum 
income, but also to those whose expenditure differs from the 
standard adopted by a given society. At the same time, however, 
the extent of such difference has not been univocally specified. 
Statistical descriptions of the poverty phenomenon may involve 
a number of snags. For example, it should not be assumed that 
transgressing a certain predefined poverty threshold would au-
tomatically make one stop being poor. Meanwhile, literal treat-
ment of various poverty thresholds seems to authorise such 
interpretations. At the same time, behind abstract statistical 
notions there are certain real-life problems which we can come 
across in our surroundings i.e. malnutrition, underequipped 
apartments, hereditary social exclusion, limited chances for 
successful life or isolation. As a society, we would like to have 
the scale and intensity of such problems minimised, keeping in 
mind certain moral, economic and political factors. Hence, the 
definitions and quantitative analyses based on such definitions 
also enable operationalisation of the issues of poverty and so-
cial exclusion in a manner that is perceived as adequate in view 
of the public policy, not an end itself. In such a way, we expand 
our knowledge about the nature of the phenomenon that we are 
struggling against, the socioeconomic areas to which it applies, 
and of the consequences it brings. On this basis, we are capable 
of designing actions aimed at reducing poverty and alleviating 
its consequences – especially those which are regarded most 
acute in the context of daily functioning, although they may dif-
ficult to capture by means of public statistics.
Public support is most effective for individuals who are 
not successful in life i.e. those who as a consequence of various 
existential obstacles have fallen into poverty, despite making 
attempts to counteract, and relinquish this status quo. There 
are two conclusions that may be derived from this observa-
tion. First of all, social policy should be regarded as a compo-
nent of development policy aimed at economic prosperity in 
a broad sense, because in more robust economies there is a 
lower probability of individual risks such as: unemployment, 
decrease in wages or shadow economy employment. Sec-
ondly, one of social policy priorities should be reduction of the 
poverty threat in everyday situation such as e.g. parenthood, 
old age, unemployment, etc. Such functions are performed by 
the social security system. However, if despite such support, 
the poverty threat is still imminent, certain supporting instru-
ments especially targeted at the poor should be activated. 
Such strategy allows protecting people against poverty and, 
at the same time, promote certain conducts that are desirable 
in view of other state policy objectives (e.g. higher economic 
growth thanks to more common and effective university edu-
cation, higher fertility rates due to increasing the support for 
families with small children, or decrease in the ratio of the 
long-term unemployed as a consequence of effective macr-
oeconomic policies and support in the form of active labour 
market policies and a flexible labour code). This means that the 
poverty prevention systems, apart from welfare transfers tar-
geted at the poor, should also include certain actions promot-
ing general economic prosperity (industrial policy, regulatory 
and institutional reforms, support of innovation and competi-
tiveness), tax instruments promoting employment and pro-
tecting labour income household with many children against 
poverty (allowances, exemptions and lower tax rates) and sup-
port in-kind (active labour market policies, rehabilitation of 
the disabled, etc.). Secondly, the support should be structured 
in such a way as to give a sense of safety within a community, 
and, at the same time, gradate stimuli in a way that does not 
interfere with the activity of individuals or encourage moral 
table I. 10 | the sources of high hdI values in different parts of the world, 2013.
hdI Life expectancy average education (years)
expected 
education (years)
Gross national 
income pc (usd 
ppp, prices 2005)
UE-27 0.865 78.6 10.8 15.8 25672
Including Poland 0.821 76.3 10.0 15.2 17776
south america and the caribbean Isles 0.765 75.5 8.7 13.9 12636
Former soviet republics 0.755 70.7 11.3 13.7 9060
Note: 1. Arithmetic mean has been used. 2. Countries with very high/high HDI values have been included (0.712-1). South America and the Caribbean Isles: Antigua and 
Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Jamaica, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. FRS: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine.
Source: own elaboration based on UNDP data.
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hazard. Ideally, an individual should take all efforts in order to 
change his/her unfavourable circumstances or reduce the risk 
of falling into poverty in advance. In such case, even the small-
est, but well-targeted support will be highly effective. Besides, 
the durability of such support will be greater if a beneficiary 
is provided with a fishing rod instead of a fish, which will also 
minimise the risk of its recurrence. 
Offering either a rod or a fish would involve certain costs. 
For this reason, an argument that sometimes recurs in the pub-
lic discourse points out to positive impacts that the limitation 
of redistribution may have upon the dynamics of the economic 
growth. However, this claim takes into account only part of the 
facts about poverty. Even though without the redistribution of 
income the economic growth could be improved in a short-term, 
the ultimate objective of economic policy, which includes rais-
ing the living standard of the entire society, would be neglected. 
Therefore, focusing upon improvements of economic indicators 
seems to be groundless. Moreover, consenting to the economic 
growth not accompanied by development, would lead to the 
growing polarisation of the society which, on a long-time basis, 
would be neither politically, nor economically desirable. The 
postulate for emphasising the quality of life can be reflected by 
the conviction - which is becoming more and more widespread 
among academic economists - that comparisons between spe-
cific countries should not be done by means of strictly economic 
indicators (e.g. GDP, GDP per capita), but using development 
indexes taking into account living standards (e.g. HDI, OECD 
Better Life Index). These indexes are aimed at reflecting the 
living standard of an average citizen more precisely than clas-
sical indicators, such as GDP. Moreover, multidimensionality of 
economic development indexes allows us to identify the areas 
where quality of life is the lowest, so as to ensure that public 
policy efforts would yield measurable results in the form of a 
real improvement of quality of life.
Note: rank has been specified in brackets.
Source: own elaboration based on UNDP data.
Figure I. 37 | Human Development Index 2013 – leaders vs. EU Member States
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Figure I. 38 | Evolution of HDI levels by poverty cluster – the average value (left) and inter-clusteral 
diversification (right)
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The relatively least complex of all the indexes quoted 
above is the HDI (Human Development Index), which is pub-
lished annually by the UN. Apart from per capita income, it 
takes into account healthcare issues (life expectancy) and ac-
cess to education (average and expected years of schooling). 
Due to its general character, the index enables us to collect 
information concerning large populations in different parts 
of the world, also including the poorly developed countries. 
HDI index allows for tracing down the changes of the global 
socioeconomic development that have occurred over the 
past 30 years. It allows the developing countries to strive to-
wards the achievement of such living standards which were 
attained in Europe or the United States long time ago. As a 
consequence, differences across the EU Member States are 
relatively small and they quickly diminish over time, while the 
most visible differences can be observed for economic as-
pects. However, it needs to be emphasised that income does 
not always contribute to high HDI values, as it happens in case 
of Europe. A relative advantage can be ensured by high life 
expectancy, as it happens in South America and the Caribbean 
Isles, or by long education process (e.g. the Post-Soviet states) 
(cf. Table I.10). 
In terms of HDI, the global leaders are Norway and Aus-
tralia, which attain systematically high ratings due to the co-oc-
currence of high income and other indexed social development 
symptoms i.e. education and life expectancy (Figure I.37). The 
group of countries with the highest HDI values (0.8-1.0) in-
cludes 25 EU Member States, excluding Romania and Bulgaria. 
In 2013 Poland, whose HDI result was 0.821, was rated as 39th 
the global rating, and as 22nd among the EU Member States, 
only overtaking Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Bul-
garia. This result could be largely attributed to the low life ex-
pectancy (as compared to the EU-15), and short education peri-
od (as compared to NMS reporting comparable incomes, where 
pre-schooling education is more widespread). Over the past 
13 years (2000-2012) Poland has made a relatively substan-
tial progress (i.e. the index value has increased by 5.2%), even 
table I. 11 | Specific indicators of OECD Better Life Index
Specific indicators index interpretation
Housing 
Rooms per person Congested place of residence
Housing expenditure Housing cost to disposable household income ratio
Basic facilities Availability of the basic infrastructure enabling maintaining of personal hygiene 
Income 
Household disposable income Material status of the household
Household financial wealth Accumulated resources possessed by the household
Jobs
Employment rate Employed in productive age group
Long-term unemployment rate Unemployed for over 12 months in professionally active group
Personal average remuneration Productivity of work
Job security Employed for less than 6 months among working population
Community Quality of the supportive network People who admit availability of support when difficulty occurs
Education
Educational awards / distinctions Adults who have at completed at least secondary education
Average years in education Period of education
Skills in maths, reading and science Level of competencies after completing obligatory education 
Environment
Air pollution Scale of environmental pollution
Water quality Scale of environmental pollution
Civic engagement
Voter turnout Scale of engagement into political life 
Consultation on rule-making Scale of engagement into legislative processes 
Health
Life expectancy Objective assessment of one’s health
Self-reported health Subjective assessment of one’s health 
Life satisfaction Life Satisfaction Life satisfaction
Safety
Homicide rate Endangerment of life and health
Assault rate Endangerment of life and health
Work-life balance
Employees working over hours Relevant workload
Time devoted to leisure and personal care Recovery time 
Source: own elaboration based on UNDP data.
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though the process of raising of living standards in other NMS 
was faster, which resulted that some countries starting from 
lower levels (i.e. Lithuania, Latvia) caught up with Poland, while 
others who had the same starting point (Estonia) overtook it. 
As time goes by, the EU Member States tend to pay more 
and more attention to development issues, which is manifested 
by the decreasing of the gap from HDI frontier (i.e. the leader’s 
result). However, if we juxtapose HDI values against the pov-
erty clusters described in Part 2, we will notice that there are 
no differences between the leaders, the effective and the av-
erage. At the same time, such values are visibly lower in case 
of the stragglers, and – to even greater extent - among the 
weaklings (Figure I.38, left panel). Besides, the latter group is 
the only whose internal variability increased in the years 2000-
2012 (Figure I.38, right panel). This can imply that the struggle 
against poverty is more likely to be successful in case of those 
countries which exceeded the level of ca. USD 25K per capita 
(PPP). The less affluent countries typically report lower HDI, 
and are their efforts at counteracting poverty and inequalities 
are less effective.
As a synthetic indicator of the socioeconomic develop-
ment HDI is sometimes described as being too simplified, which 
may result in imprecise measurements. Whereas quality of life 
in the developing countries may be evaluated based on life ex-
pectancy or access to education, in more developed countries 
the quality of life indicators include substantially more aspects. 
Therefore, HDI cannot be a fully satisfactory development 
measure in that group. In such a case, certain aspects that are 
less frequently taken into account in case of developing coun-
tries, are gaining importance. They include: environmental pro-
tection, civic engagement or work-life balance. An attempt at 
developing of an index that would describe the quality of life in 
developed countries more accurately has been taken by OECD 
by creating the Better Life Index. (Table I.11)
The quoted results confirm the suspicions regarding the 
quality of life deficits in Poland and identify new areas for im-
provements. Except from safety and education (3rd and 4th 
ranks, respectively), in terms of the remaining measures Poland 
ranges between 20th and 32nd rank among 36 countries partici-
pating in OECD survey. It should be emphasised that certain 
actions aimed at improvement of the quality of life measured by 
means of the Better Life Index, remain within various spheres 
of the social policy. These include: employment, education or 
residence. Others may constitute a grassroot initiative of the 
people themselves e.g. civic engagement, or establishment of 
supportive networks within communities. This means that the 
socio-economic policy, despite its obvious importance, is not the 
only factor that can elevate living standards. At the same time, 
however, in this context, social policy does not have to oppose 
economic policy, but both of them should rather be treated as 
constituents of the broader state development policy, whose 
objectives include: economic competitiveness, better living 
standards and social prosperity of citizens.
What are the poverty reductIon 3.2 
challenGes that poland should 
Face? 
A considerable dropdown in the absolute poverty and 
material deprivation rates which have been observed over the 
last twenty years could be attributable, most of all, to the high 
economic growth. In fact, in the years 1990-2012, the values of 
the GDP per capita in Poland, as well as household remunera-
tion and income more than doubled. Today the living standards 
of the overall majority of Poles are substantially higher than 20 
years ago. Therefore, it can be concluded that the transforma-
tion of the centrally-planned system into the market economy 
enabled Poland to join the group of industrialised countries with 
diversified economic structures. At the same time, however, in 
terms of its affluence, Poland still considerably lags behind the 
Note: 1. The index values range from 1 to 10, where 10 is the maximum value. 2. The analysis includes 36 countries in total.
Source: own elaboration based on OECD data.
Figure I. 39 | oecd better life Index in poland
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most developed countries, finding itself in the so-called middle-
income zone (Bukowski et al. 2012) i.e. the group of countries 
whose income measured based on PPP ranges between ca. 50-
70% of the income reported in the United States, Switzerland 
or Germany. 18 
The economic development, its strength and durability, 
and, implicitly, also the future absolute poverty and material 
deprivation levels, will depend on the shape of the public policy 
in Poland in the nearest decade. The transformational model 
of development which assumed transposing West European 
models, and competing with low labour costs, allowed Poland to 
achieve a stable and high development dynamics in years 1990-
2008. However, looking at the experience of South European 
countries, the purely intuitive model becomes definitely less ef-
fective when the affluence level a given country is equivalent to 
more than ca. 50-60% of that of the United States (Bukowski 
et al. 2012), which Poland should exceed in the present decade. 
18  This definition roughly corresponds to the affluence gap that separates the 
two subsequent generations of the US citizens. In other words, the quality of life in 
Spain (66% of the US GDP per capita) is comparable to that in the US 18-20 years 
ago.
As a matter of fact, after 1980 the relation of labour produc-
tivity and wages reported e.g. in Greece, Spain, Portugal and 
New Zealand to comparable data observable the North Euro-
pean countries or the United States have remained virtually 
unchanged. This means that these countries have fallen into the 
so-called middle-income trap (Bukowski et al. 2012) i.e. such 
status where they have stopped narrowing the gap that sepa-
rates them from the most developed countries, despite the fact 
that living standard differences are still substantial. The loss of 
the development dynamics in South European countries after 
reaching the affluence level corresponding to ca. 1/2-2/3 of the 
one reported in the United States, could be attributed to their 
inability to implement a number of structural reforms aimed at 
transforming of their imitative economic models into new ones 
based on innovation, regulatory and institutional competitive-
ness (Bukowski et al. 2012). At the same time, in terms of its 
economic structure, regulatory quality, innovation, or use of 
labour resources, Poland resembles South European coun-
tries, rather than those of the highly developed North Europe. 
As a consequence, the probability of Poland’s following the 
South European path is relatively high. This threat has been 
table I. 12 | Objective economic trends triggering changes in Poland’s social policy until 2050
technological change ageing migration
What is changed/ 
affected?
changes in industrial structure of • 
economy, closing/ establishing new 
branches, 
substitution of labour with capital, • 
increasing risk of structural • 
unemployment, 
change in wage distribution. • 
changes in structure of working • 
age (mobile/immobile), and post-
working age populations.
emergence of population groups • 
with different demographic, 
economic, social characteristics, 
and different cultural, traditional 
and educational backgrounds, etc.
Why could it be 
regarded as a threat?
lack or low propensity to update/• 
acquire new skills will lead to 
structural unemployment and 
shortages of workforce in certain 
(key) industries
growing number/ proportion • 
of elderly people (without any 
changes in pension system) will 
contribute to higher financial 
burdens related to e.g. institutional 
care.
non-integration of migrants • 
(in economic and social 
dimension) increases risk of their 
marginalisation, also including 
poverty and crime, and increases 
financial burden on social security 
system
Why could it be 
regarded as an 
opportunity?
modernisation of the economy,• 
creating competitive advantage • 
giving unique development 
opportunities,
higher productivity,• 
higher wages,• 
fostering creativity and • 
entrepreneurship.
elderly people have unique • 
competencies and psychophysical 
potential due to their experience. 
estructuring financial support • 
system for elderly people will 
alleviate expected financial burden,
due to ageing of population, • 
workforce shortages are likely to 
occur in non-mechanised sectors 
such as nursing and miscellaneous 
services,
technological changes will • 
intensify brain drain processes. 
Therefore, it is advisable to take 
advantage of the immigrant labour 
competencies. 
How could it be 
turned into a 
success?
preparation for change and • 
anticipating its directions, 
searching for branches that are • 
likely to develop and invest in them, 
providing accurate education in • 
advance,
creating stimuli for flexible • 
education,
improving quality of educational • 
services, 
developing and investing • 
in know-how.
shifting retirement age, • 
adapting pension system to • 
projected burdens,
promoting economic activity in all • 
age groups, including the elderly, 
taking advantage of their • 
competencies, 
creating workplaces addressing • 
the needs of the elderly,
preventing their discrimination • 
promoting positive attitudes • 
towards immigrants, 
abolishing barriers to legal • 
residence and employment, 
taking advantage of the immigrant • 
competencies and their different 
viewpoint.
Source: own elaboration based on Bukowski et al. (2012).
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also noticed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s Strategic Advi-
sors (SA), whose members pointed out to the exhaustion of the 
transformational developmental drives and a high probability 
of occurrence of the so-called developmental drift (SA, 2009) 
i.e. a situation when the public policy will be limited to passive 
responding to current problems, at the same time, neglecting 
structural reforms which would guarantee long-term economic 
and social prosperity.
According to Bukowski et al. (2012), in order to prevent 
Poland from falling into the middle-income trap, reformatory 
efforts must be intensified in the following three domains: (i) 
innovative policies, (ii) labour market and social security poli-
cies and (iii) regulatory and institutional policies. Each of these 
domains can be treated as a separate modernisation challenge 
to be confronted until 2020 and in the subsequent decades. 
An urgent task in the field of innovation consists in doubling of 
the public R&D spending, and offering of tax and institutional 
incentives in order to encourage private sector to invest into 
R&D, and make scientists/researchers improve the quality and 
efficiency of their work and transform it into business practices. 
In case of the labour market Bukowski et al. (2012) and SAT 
(2009) point out to the necessity of continuing reforms lead-
ing to a higher labour supply and improving the operational 
efficiency of labour market institutions. Meanwhile, the major 
public policy task in the regulatory and institutional areas con-
sists in improving effectiveness and friendliness of the revenue 
and justice systems, as well as the quality of legislation, so that 
they stopped to be a barrier to private savings and investments, 
thus improving Poland’s current low rank in the international 
competitiveness ratings. 
It ought to be emphasised that despite the fact that the 
state’s development policy goals do not apply directly to the 
poor, due to their outcomes they indirectly affect the poverty 
rate and profoundness in a given country, and determine the 
possibilities of taking effective policy actions aimed at eliminat-
ing inequalities. It is no surprise that the countries that prevail 
among the industrialised nations which have found themselves 
in the middle income trap are South European countries which 
in terms of counteracting poverty and social exclusion have 
been classified into the stragglers, or at most, the average group 
(cf. Part 2). On the other hand, the countries which thanks to 
their effective economic policies managed to avoid the middle 
income trap nowadays often include the same countries which 
have been categorised, in terms of their social policies, as the 
effective or the leaders in the field of counteracting poverty (cf. 
Part 2). Therefore, ambitious and consistently implemented 
structural reforms aimed at improving innovation and econom-
ic competitiveness, as well as effective use of labour resources 
and assets, apart from contributing to better affluence of the 
middle class members, also facilitate maintaining effective 
table I. 13 | Modernisation challenges in poland until 2015 
modernisation 
challenges
state of play targets
Innovation The virtuous circle cannot be achieved due to • 
insufficient public spending in area of R&D; 
Low innovativeness of enterprises and public • 
institutions , 
Limited reforms of scientific sector result in relatively • 
low level of national innovativeness.
Sources of financing innovation both from public and • 
private sectors,
Innovations enabling to obtain / benefit from • 
international competitive advantages
Labour and social 
security 
Poor economic activity on the labour market can be • 
observed in all age groups i.e. the youngest (15-24), 
prime-age (25-54) and the elderly (55+). 
Effective age of professional inactivation remains • 
considerably below the statutory, 
Low average age and large number of beneficiaries of • 
the pension system
Complex pension system based on general taxation. • 
Enabling reaching such income levels that would allow • 
us to prevent poverty on a micro-scale, and limiting 
costs of social transfers on a macro-scale; 
As a particular challenge in this area should be • 
considered demographic changes and migrations, 
leading to decrease in workforce, with no 
interventions made in order to promote economic 
activity, especially on the labour market ‘margins’ 
(among elderly, the youngest, and among women)
Investment Low value of macro-investments,• 
Public investment effected over last years have been • 
largely funded by the EU subsidies; 
Low propensity to saving (traditionally determined) • 
which is further strengthened by the existing legal and 
institutional solutions.
Its role will remain vital as other resources will • 
be optimised
Regulatory 
environment
Negative assessments of economic regulations mostly • 
due to low quality of legislative procedures and 
instability of law. 
Quality of public services is highly unsatisfactory• 
A horizontal module• 
Creating competitive environment for innovative • 
actions, creation of new work places and promoting 
investment
Source: own elaboration based on Bukowski et al. (2012).
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social policies targeted at counteracting (mostly absolute) pov-
erty and promoting social integration. 
It should be emphasised that making the economic policy 
a part of a bigger agenda of consistent structural reforms is 
nowadays necessitated by the on-going economic, social and 
technological processes (Bukowski et al., 2012). Such process-
es include, first of all, ageing of the population which limits the 
possibility of financing the traditional welfare state by means of 
labour taxation. Secondly, computerisation and mechanisation 
of the constantly growing areas of economy exerts a power-
ful competitive pressure upon the low- and medium-qualified 
workers and the unemployed. Thirdly, the ongoing globalisation 
processes intensify the phenomenon of international migra-
tions. Apart from causing radical changes within the economic 
branch structure, these processes also modify specific branches 
and their operations internally. Firstly, ageing of the population 
leads to changing of the correlations existing between the gen-
erations at productive vs. post-productive age by modifying the 
labour supply structure and making the problem of human re-
sources depreciation over lifetime more topical. Secondly, this 
problem intensifies the financial competition for limited taxa-
tion resources between the pension system and other social 
security components, potentially limiting the resources that 
could be allocated for poverty prevention and development 
policy in the broadest sense. Thirdly, ageing of the population 
coincides with certain globalisation challenges, including inter-
national migrations of people, which can be regarded both as 
an opportunity and threat for the labour market and traditional 
social security systems in developed countries. The opportunity 
would consist in the partial filling of the labour market gap oc-
curring due to certain demographic processes. Meanwhile, the 
risk would be the poor social, cultural and economic integration 
of immigrants, and implicitly, the pressure that they might exert 
upon social security systems of developed countries. Fourthly, 
it can be expected that in the future particularly strong stimuli 
for economic enterprise will be provided by the selected, partic-
ularly innovative, sectors. This phenomenon will be reflected by 
the workforce demand structure in specific professions: some 
of them will gain, or lose their importance. Moreover, due to the 
cumulative character of technological changes, downsizing in 
obsolete branches is going to occur faster than in the past, which 
will result in the growth of structural unemployment among in-
dividuals whose skills are poorly adjusted to the labour market, 
caused by the lack of labour demand. The consequences of this 
status quo may include the growth of the scale and persistence 
of poverty due to the lack of employment prospects.
Technological changes can be anticipated by educating, 
providing opportunities for updating and modifying one’s com-
petencies, and by disseminating knowledge about the chosen 
direction of structural changes. We should keep in mind the 
fact that all such actions have been already commenced in 
some of the EU Member States. According to Eurobarometer 
2010 results, providing trainings and opportunities to gain new 
skills is the second method, after providing employment op-
portunities, of counteracting poverty that would be welcomed 
by the Europeans. Although this approach is still relatively un-
known in Poland, avoiding the consequences of structural un-
employment will soon become one of the key social policy chal-
lenges, which is likely to become more important in a long-term 
perspective than the question of providing the unemployed 
with a minimum income.19 
We can also get ready for the process of ageing of the pop-
ulation, whose symptoms are already visible. The challenge like 
this would call for the fundamental restructuring of the labour 
market policies, pension systems and other areas of the public 
policy, so as to make it more responsive to the “silver economy” 
needs. This means that we will simultaneously need to: (i) adapt 
workplaces, especially in modern economic sectors, to the spe-
cific needs of the elderly in order to foster their economic activ-
ity (ii) get the pension system ready for the challenges related 
to the growing numbers/ratios of the elderly in those surround-
ings which do not attain any demographical benefits from high 
fertility rates, (iii) extend the scope of institutional care in such 
a way as to promote activity in all age groups, especially at the 
margins of the labour market.20 
The third challenge is related to the fact that social and 
economic inclusion of immigrants is strongly correlated to both 
poverty and social exclusion. It is highly probable, that their 
numbers in developed countries will grow, for example due to 
partial filling of the gaps which have occurred as a result of age-
ing of the human resources, and the changing labour demand. 
Nevertheless, the immigrants need to be provided with such 
conditions which will enable them to function as equal mem-
bers of the society, without being anyhow excluded in either 
economic or social terms.21 
19  This topic was introduced in the report Employment in Poland 2009 - 
entrepreneurship for jobs.
20  This issue was the leading theme of the report Employment in Poland 2008 - 
work throughout life.
21  The issue was analysed in the report Employment in Poland 2010 - 
integration and globalisation.
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Summary
Poverty is a socially unacceptable phenomenon, as it confirms that human resources potential on the labour market is not 
fully realised. Furthermore, poverty triggers a number of negative consequences that apply both to specific individuals and groups. 
Besides, it inevitably leads to material deprivation and increases risk of social exclusion i.e. excluding the poor from relevant spheres 
of life and activity. Therefore, the issue of poverty is a major public policy challenge, especially in the area of development policy 
and its components i.e. labour market, social security and welfare policies. However, while at intuitive level poverty along with its 
features, determinants and implications appears to be relatively clear, the literature so far has not provided a single and universally 
recognised definition nor methods of measurement. From macroeconomic perspective it is impossible to draw-up an exact border-
line between poverty and non-poverty.
The uncertainty regarding definition of the term is reflected in statistical data. Depending on applied method, the scale of 
poverty in Poland in the year 2011 ranged from 900 thousand to 8 million individuals, which implies that the phenomenon is not 
marginal. Such considerable difference stems from imprecise definition of poverty borderline. The first value represents people 
living below biological minimum, the latter those below a minimum allowing active participation in social life. In comparison with 
other European countries, Poland is among stragglers, poverty ratio and its profoundness are high while the diversification of the 
poor - substantial. The reasons comprise both lower average income compared to Western Europe and inadequately targeted ac-
tions in social sphere resulting in limited ability to fight poverty. At the same time, the distribution of poverty in Poland is unequal: it 
is concentrated outside metropolises, among the unemployed, multi-child families and young people. The elderly, both pensioners 
and widows, are substantially less prone to impoverishment. It indicates that (i) the labour market channel has a fundamental role 
in limiting risk-of-poverty and (ii) social policy addresses the issue inadequately among some groups.
The economic growth observed over the last decade has contributed to an overall improvement of living standards, also among 
the poor. Years of economic boom (2005-2008) led to reduction in the number of poor people which was reflected in improvements 
of both simple and more complex indices, such as the assessment of own material situation or purchases of durable goods by the 
poorest households. It is worth noting that income level remains an important factor differentiating households, also if reference 
households are the median ones. If future economic growth is at least as inclusive as it was over the last decade, the gap shall not 
spread. It is crucial since limiting material deprivation should be treated as a chance to decrease probability of isolation and social 
exclusion of the poor.
Despite the fact that general self-assessment of material situation is sufficient or good, the sense of material impoverish-
ment among the Polish people is still visible. Poland is still a country characterised by scarcity of both capital and durable goods. 
Nonetheless, its inhabitants aspire to better life standard. This implies that our expectations go beyond our actual capacity. As a 
consequence, substantial disparities between objective and subjective perceptions of poverty can be observed. For many families, 
improving living standards still requires substantial effort and sacrifice. The pace of catching-up with the EU leaders will depend 
on undertaken reforms. They have to compromise goals of economic policy (GDP growth, innovativeness, higher employment and 
lower unemployment rates) with social policy goals (decreasing scope of absolute poverty and income inequality, social reintegra-
tion of the excluded). Their implementation should result not only in improved indices, but also perceived quality of life. One has to 
keep in mind that the nearest future will bring a range of new challenges. Those include: prompt technological advancement which 
might result in structural unemployment, aging of the population (translating into shrinking workforce base) and increased migra-
tions generating tensions previously unknown to homogenous society. All of these require a new approach of social and labour 
market policy since maintaining the current institutional and organisational status is likely to put at risk of poverty also groups that 
so far remained unaffected.
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IntroductIon 
The role of Part II of this Report is to analyse the diversity of poverty in Poland across the socio-economic groups. It is devoted 
to a study of the nature of poverty across groups that are particularly vulnerable and experience poverty differently from other 
groups. We focus on poverty among children and families with many children, the elderly and people at an immobile age, and espe-
cially the unemployed and economically inactive among them. We also discuss the intergenerational transmission of poverty, and 
poverty in rural areas. The purpose of Part II is to present the multi-dimensionality of poverty in Poland, the diversity of its scope 
and persistence across different social groups and the specificity of poverty in each group.
In the first chapter we present the social and demographic aspects of poverty in Poland, using statistical and econometric 
analysis to identify the most affected groups. We carry out a decomposition of changes in the rate of poverty risk in Poland from 
1998 to 2011 to quantify the contribution of changes in poverty risk in particular sub-populations, and the contribution of trans-
formations in the population structure, in particular with regard to labour market status. These decompositions are complemented 
by a microeconomic analysis of interactions between labour market flows, and the entry into and exit from poverty.
The second chapter contains an analysis of the nature of poverty in selected socio-demographic groups. Children constitute 
the first group – under-15 year olds in Poland are particularly vulnerable to poverty, especially in families with three or more chil-
dren. Accordingly, we also examine the poverty of many-children households and their situation in the labour market. Since poverty 
and related adverse events hinder child education, and consequently negatively affect their situation in the labour market when 
they become adults, the second section of this chapter is dedicated to the relatively poorly surveyed problem of intergenerational 
transmission of poverty in Poland. Then we examine the poverty of people aged over 45 – those at an immobile age (before retire-
ment), and those at post-working age. Due to limited flexibility in the labour market, poverty in the immobile group is particularly 
severe and persistent; whereas those at post-working age enjoy a relatively low risk of poverty. The subject of the final section of 
the second chapter is poverty of the rural population, being twice as high as in urban areas and connected with the specific charac-
ter of Polish agriculture. Part II is closed with a summary.
66
employment in Poland 2011  
Poverty and jobs 
Socio-economic dimensions of poverty in poland2
Socio-demographic 1 
aSpectS of diverSity 
of poverty in poland 
correlates of poverty1.1 
In Part I of this report we show that the incidence of pov-
erty risk and its nature in Poland have evolved over the previ-
ous twenty years. However, the diversity of poverty has not 
only changed over time, but various socio-demographic and 
economic groups have also systematically changed their pov-
erty risk rates. 
Age is the main dimension of diversity in poverty risk – 
the risk of poverty by age differs significantly across European 
countries. Despite the relatively strong correlation between 
poverty risk among children and the 65+ group, in most Euro-
pean countries poverty risk rates are higher among children 
than among adults, including those at a post-working age. In 
2011, the greatest differences were recorded in Hungary, 
Latvia, Slovakia and Romania, and in France, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg, where the rates of relative child poverty 
were more than 10 percentage points (pp) higher than among 
individuals aged 65+. In contrast, in Scandinavian countries, 
the risk of poverty among the elderly was slightly higher 
than among children; importantly, both indicators in those 
countries were lower than the EU average. The situation in 
Cyprus was somewhat different, where a moderate poverty 
risk rate among children was accompanied by a high poverty 
risk rate among the elderly, as well as in Bulgaria where both 
indicators were among the highest in Europe. In 2011, the sit-
uation in Poland was in line with the Europe-wide trend - pov-
erty risk among minors was 30%, whereas in the 65+ group 
it was below 25%. Both rates were slightly higher than the 
EU average. 
The rate of poverty risk among people over retirement 
age (women 60+ and men 65+) in Poland was also relatively 
low. Regardless of the measure of poverty, people at retire-
ment age are at the lowest risk of poverty among the distin-
guished age groups (Figure II.3). Similar conclusions can be 
drawn from statistics based on the main source of income - in 
2011 the proportion of poor among those living on a old age 
pension was only slightly higher (10%) than among workers 
(8%). The risk of poverty was much more common among the 
dependants (23% poverty risk rate in 2011), who accounted 
for nearly half of all at the risk of poverty in Poland. Further-
more, about 60% of individuals in this group were under 16 
years of age.1 In 2011, people aged up to 15 accounted for 
a considerable part (1/5) of all the relative risk of poverty in 
Poland, while those under 24 years constituted almost 1/3 
of them. The poverty risk rate among children (0-15 years) 
and youths (16-24 years), both in relative and absolute 
terms, was higher than in all older groups (25+) (Figure II.3). 
1  Later in the text all persons under the age of 16 years are referred to as 
‘children’.
figure II. 1 | at-risk-of-poverty rate by age in european countries, 2011.
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Despite a significant decline in the child poverty rate in recent 
years, it is undoubtedly one of the most important social is-
sues in Poland.
The immobile group, i.e. women aged from 45 to 59 or 
men aged from 45 to 64, is also at an above-average risk of 
poverty. In previous editions of Employment in Poland we have 
repeatedly pointed out that this group encounters more prob-
lems in the labour market than people aged 25-44, due to dif-
ficulties with updating and acquiring new skills, adapting to 
changing market requirements, and due to the early exit from 
the labour market. Due to their limited flexibility and mobility 
in the labour market, poverty in this group is particularly severe 
(depth of poverty is the highest, reaching 40%) and persistent. 
In contrast to retirees, people whose main source of income is 
a disability pension or other social security benefit are at a high 
risk of poverty (see Figure II.5); those in the immobile group 
are particularly affected.
Although more than 60% of the Polish population live in 
towns and cities, almost 60% of the relatively poor live in rural 
areas. In 2011 one in four rural residents depended on income 
below the threshold of relative poverty; in urban areas this was 
one in ten. This considerable disparity between urban and rural 
areas occurs regardless of age, economic activity and definition 
of poverty. Although many rural residents run their own farms, 
and data about their income in the Household Budget Survey 
may be underestimated, a comparison of poverty measures 
based on income and on consumption (Part I, section 1.2) shows 
that in both approaches the risk of poverty is at a similar level, 
and always higher in rural areas than in cities.
figure II. 2 | structure of the relatively poor by age 
group, 2011.
figure II. 3 | relative, quasi absolute (by 1998 
threshold) and absolute poverty risk rates by age 
group, 2011.
figure II. 4 | structure of the population at risk of 
relative poverty by main source of income, 2011.
figure II. 5 | relative and quasi absolute poverty 
risk rates (by 1998 threshold) by main source of 
income, 2011.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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The above-presented descriptive statistics show the 
most important dimensions that differentiate the extent of 
poverty risk in various socio-demographic groups in Poland. 
However, households at risk of poverty often reveal a combi-
nation of various factors positively correlated with low income 
- low level of education, lack of jobs, several children, and resi-
dence in rural areas. To determine the relative importance of 
these factors and identify the strongest correlates of relative 
poverty risk at the household level, we used a probit model – 
the results allow a more precise identification of those groups 
which require more detailed analysis (the subject of the fol-
lowing chapter).
According to literature on the subject (Geda et al., 2001, 
Mok et al., 2007), taking into account the nature of the House-
hold Budget Survey data and the available variables, our 
econometric model included the following variables: gender 
and education of the head of the household, the main source 
of income, the type of place of residence (by number of in-
habitants), the region (voivodeship) of residence, the number 
of children in the household and the number of household 
members by age group.2 The dependent binary variable was 
being at risk of relative poverty, and the estimation was done 
on a household dataset spanning 1999-2011 (a total of over 
450 thousand observations). The influence of business cycle 
fluctuations and general changes in the poverty level on the 
situation of individual households was included in the stand-
ard way by including dummy variables corresponding to par-
ticular years of the study which controlled for the changes 
over time. The aspect of regional disparities was taken into 
account by including binary variables corresponding to the in-
dividual voivodeships. The estimated results of the model are 
presented in Table II.1.
The model indicates that the risk of poverty is highest 
when the head of the household is aged 45-54 (21% in 2011), 
and for households headed by a person aged 45+, the risk in 
2  A child is defined as a person aged 15 or less.
question gradually decreases, even after taking into account 
other factors that influence the risk of poverty. Slightly higher 
poverty risk affects households headed by women, although 
the differences in comparison to (far more numerous) house-
holds headed by men are not large. When the household 
head is a pensioner, the risk of poverty is not significantly 
different than in households headed by a working person 
(see Figure II.5); even after taking into account other factors 
that influence the risk of poverty, including education. On the 
other hand, even after controlling for these factors, it appears 
that dependence on social benefits and unearned sources of 
income significantly increases the risk of poverty - the likeli-
hood of poverty in households living on benefits was more 
than 20 pp higher than households of employees with the 
same other socio-demographic characteristics. High poverty 
risk among households of persons receiving benefits shows 
that transfer payments reach those with low overall incomes, 
and raises the question about the effect of particular benefits 
on the risk of poverty – the impact of public policy instruments 
on poverty is analysed in Part IV.
From the point of view of the social consequences of 
poverty, the risk of poverty among children, which in practi-
cal terms means low incomes and the risk of poverty among 
families with children, is of particular importance. The results 
show that each additional child in a household increases the 
likelihood of the risk of poverty by an average of 3 pp, and this 
influence is stronger than the case of additional household 
members from older age groups (see Table II.1). Interesting-
ly, although the marginal impact of another child on the risk 
of poverty in households with a working household head in-
creases for each subsequent child (from 2.1 pp in the case of 
the first child to 3.4 pp for the third and fourth child), these 
differences are not large enough to explain the considerable 
difference in the risk of poverty between households with one 
or two children, and those with three or more children. This 
means that the latter group more frequently exhibits other 
characteristics that increase the risk of poverty – a relatively 
figure II. 6 | at-risk-of-poverty rates by place of 
residence, 2011.
figure II. 7 | the rate of relative and quasi absolute 
poverty risk (ref. 1998) by place of residence, 2011.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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figure II. 8 | effect of the number children on the likelihood of being at the risk of poverty, by the type of 
household in poland. 
Note: The Figure shows the average marginal effects on the probability of being at risk of poverty, estimated with the probit model. Marginal effects are calculated for each 
household type. Horizontal lines denote 90% confidence intervals.
Source: Own calculations based on HBS data.
lower level of education,3 or the main source of income from a 
source other than work.
In households where agriculture is the main source of 
income,4 the risk that equivalised income is below the relative 
poverty threshold, increases with the first child much more 
than in employee households. However, in the case of a greater 
number of children this difference decreases (see Figure II.8). 
Benefits received with each subsequent child in agricultural 
households are higher than in employee households (on av-
erage by about PLN 40 ~ EUR 10) and the share of benefits 
associated with having children in the total income of agricul-
tural households with children is higher than among employee 
households (20% vs. 10% in 2011). Nevertheless, in agricul-
tural households, the impact of having children on the risk of 
poverty on average amounts to 5 pp – about twice as high as in 
employee households.
3  Achieving each subsequent level of education statistically significantly 
reduces the likelihood of poverty (see Table II.1
4  Agricultural households are defined as those in which agriculture is the main 
source of income of the household head.
The results confirm that even after taking into account 
differences in education levels and sources of income, rural 
households are at a greater risk of poverty than urban house-
holds. The likelihood of poverty decreases with the number of 
inhabitants in the place of residence. In cities with a population 
of 500 thousand or more, the probability is as much as 10 pp 
lower than rural households with similar other characteris-
tics. Those that are particularly vulnerable live in agricultural 
households (in 2011 they accounted for about 12% of rural 
households), with a probability of poverty 13 pp higher than 
households of people working outside agriculture (with similar 
other characteristics). However, rural poverty is not exclusive to 
farming households - in the households of pensioners and those 
depending on benefits or other sources, the risk of poverty 
was on average even 50% higher than agricultural households 
(in 2011 it reached 60%).
The results indicate the socio-demographic groups 
that require special attention in the analysis of poverty in 
Poland can be distinguished by three main factors, i.e. age, 
economic activity and place of residence. Although in-work 
employee households agricultural households
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poverty is the subject of the Part III of this report, here we 
also need to consider the pattern of economic activity of in-
dividuals and households as it is directly associated with age 
and family responsibilities, especially relating to having chil-
dren. Therefore, the groups that will be scrutinised in this 
table II. 1 | the estimation results of the probit model for poverty risk in poland.
Explanatory variables Average marginal effect Explanatory variables
Average marginal 
effect
sex of the household head (reference: man)  region (ref. Mazowieckie)
woman 0.02*** Dolnośląskie 0.02***
Kujawsko-pomorskie 0.01***
education level of the head of the household 
(ref. secondary education) Lubelskie 0.05***
tertiary education -0.05*** Lubuskie -0.02***
basic vocational 0.07*** Łódzkie 0.02***
lower secondary and below 0.13*** Małopolskie 0.00
Opolskie 0.00*
main sources of income (ref. work) Podkarpackie 0.04***
agriculture 0.13*** Podlaskie 0.03***
pension 0.03*** Pomorskie 0.00
disability pension 0.11*** Śląskie -0.01***
social benefits 0.26*** Świętokrzyskie 0.03***
unearned sources 0.23*** Warmińsko-mazurskie 0.01***
Wielkopolskie -0.01***
number of persons aged 15 and less 0.03*** Zachodniopomorskie 0.00
number of persons aged 16-24 0.03***
number of persons aged 25-34 0.00 year (ref. 1999) 0.02***
number of persons aged 16-24 0.03*** 2000 0.00
number of persons aged 45-54 0.01*** 2001 0.00
number of persons aged 55-64 -0.02*** 2002 0.01**
number of persons aged 65 and more -0.06*** 2003 0.01***
2004 0.02***
population of place of residence (ref. village)  2005 0.01***
500 thousand inhabitants and more -0.10*** 2006 0.02***
200 - 499 thousand inhabitants -0.08*** 2007 0.02***
100 - 199 thousand inhabitants -0.07*** 2008 0.02***
20 - 99 thousand inhabitants -0.06*** 2009 0.04***
below 20 thousand inhabitants -0.04*** 2010 0.05***
2011 0.06***
Constant -1.70***
Number of observations 455483
LR test statistics 73952.8***
Note: the dependent variable - being at risk of relative poverty (0 - not poor, 1 - poor). Marginal effects for the average values  of the explanatory variables represent the impact 
of the incidence of a given characteristic on the likelihood of poverty in the household, for the average (in the sample) levels of other variables. For the variables describing the 
number of people from a given age group living in the household, we also included the square of this number, and the mean marginal impacts present the cumulative effect. 
Asterisk ***, ** and * denote significance determined at the level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Source: Own calculations based on HBS data, 1999-2011.
second chapter are families with many children, persons 
at an immobile age and post-working age, and residents of 
rural areas.
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decomposItIon of changes In 1.2 
poverty rIsk between 1998 and 2011
In the previous section we show that the risk of poverty in 
Poland is diverse with regard to socio-demographic characteris-
tics such as age, sex, education or place of residence, yet is also 
related to economic activity and the main source of income of 
individuals and households. Changes in the population structure 
with regard to socio-demographic factors are usually minor, but 
they can be significant in the latter group of factors – those as-
sociated with business cycle fluctuations and changes in public 
policy. In such cases, a shift in the structure may be relevant to 
changes in total poverty risk rate, even if poverty risk rates in 
each subpopulation change only slightly. When people flow from 
a group at a high risk of poverty (and its share in the population 
decreases) to a group at a low poverty risk rate (and its share of 
the population increases), the total poverty risk rate decreases. 
Similarly, a flow in the opposite direction – from a group at a low 
risk of poverty to a group at a higher risk of poverty – results in an 
increased at-risk-of-poverty rate for the total population. The aim 
of this section is therefore to evaluate quantitatively the extent to 
which changes in total poverty risk in Poland between 1998 and 
2011 has resulted from changes in the population structure (e.g. 
an increase in the share of workers and a decrease in the share of 
unemployed), and to what extent they were caused by changes 
in poverty risk in particular groups, distinguished by their labour 
market status or their main source of income. In order to do so 
we used decompositions described in Box II.1.5
5  Temporal changes in the relative poverty rate may also be influenced by 
changes in the relative poverty threshold, determined based on the distribution of 
income in a given time. Of course this is not the case for absolute and quasi-absolute 
poverty. As the analysis of how changes in the distribution of income influence 
poverty is included in Part III of this report, here we focus on the significance of 
changes in the population structure in terms of labour market participation and 
sources of income. Changes in the relative poverty rate resulting from a change in 
the threshold, together with changes resulting from a change in income in a given 
group, constitute the total contribution of changes in poverty risk in the group to 
the changes in total poverty.
decomposItIon takIng Into 1.2.1 
account labour market status
Decompositions concerning economic activity were car-
ried out at two levels of aggregation: (i) total population and 
(ii) working population. At the first level we distinguished the 
employed, the inactive and the unemployed. Flows from one 
of these states to another are often directly connected with 
changes in the source and level of income. This in turn de-
termines the levels of income of entire households and con-
sequently influences the risk of poverty. Therefore, it could 
be expected that changes in the structure of the population 
at working age in terms of labour market status (structural 
factor) may be a significant factor behind changes in the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate. 
However, we did find that this holds true only in the short 
term, and the role of the structural factor decreases with the 
duration of the analysed period. This is because the scale of net 
flows in the labour market is strongly related to business cycle 
fluctuations, which are short-term. In the long term the signifi-
cance of the business cycle fluctuations decreases and changes 
in poverty rate are to a greater extent caused by changes in the 
level of income, in particular from work. As a result, the impact 
of changes in population structure (with regard to labour mar-
ket status) on the change in overall poverty rate between 1998 
and 2011 was only marginal. 
Despite significant changes in the relative (increase) and 
quasi-absolute (decrease) poverty risk rates between 1998 
and 2011, in both these terms the most crucial factors were 
changes in the poverty risk rate in particular subpopulations, 
especially importantly in two groups - the economically inactive 
and the employed. If the under 15 year olds are included in the 
decomposition as well, then a considerable impact of changes in 
boX
II.1 Decomposition of changes in poverty risk rate between 1998 and2011.
Change (difference) in total poverty rate in the population (p) between a given time (𝐾) and the time of reference (𝑂) can be decomposed 
into the contributions of changes in the structure (𝛧𝑆) - changes in the share of the i-th group in the population, and changes in poverty rate 
in each group. Moreover, the decomposition includes a residual component (𝑅).
Where:
i – the index of a group, the groups are disjointed and together sum up to the total population p
 – the share of the i-th group in the population
– poverty rate in the i-th group
Calculations were based on the Household Budget Survey annual data for the period 1998-2011.
Source: own elaboration.
72
employment in Poland 2011  
Poverty and jobs 
Socio-economic dimensions of poverty in poland2
figure II. 9 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates in the total population, taking into account 
economic activity, 1998-2011.
figure II. 10 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates in the population 15+ years old, taking into 
account economic activity, 1998-2011.
figure II. 11 | decomposition of changes in the 
poverty rates in the population 15+ years old, taking 
into account economic activity, 1998-2004.
figure II. 12 | decomposition of changes in the 
poverty rates in the population 15+ years old, taking 
into account economic activity, 2004-2011.
Source: own calculations based on HBS.
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the child poverty risk on changes in the total poverty risk rate 
is found - the quantitative contribution to change in the total 
poverty rate was comparable to the contribution of changes in 
poverty risk rates among the inactive and employed.
The particular factors, including the structural shifts, 
had a slightly different impact on the dynamics of the poverty 
risk rate during the economic downturn and increasing pov-
erty (1998-2004), and in the period of recovery (2004-2011), 
figure II. 13 | decomposition of changes in the 
poverty risk rates of the 15+ population, taking into 
account economic activity, 1999-2001.
figure II. 14 | decomposition of changes in the 
poverty risk rate of the population 15+ years old 
taking into account economic activity, 2009-2011.
Source: own calculations based on HBS data.
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improving prosperity and declining poverty.6 Between 1998 
and 2004, for each of the poverty measures, changes in pov-
erty risk among the economically inactive and employed were 
jointly responsible for approximately 70% of the total change. 
Structural changes had a moderate but significant impact on the 
dynamics of poverty in that period, in contrast to 2004-2011 
when the structural changes did not have any contribution to 
the dynamics of total poverty. Therefore, apart from the direc-
tion of changes in the poverty rate, it was the scale of impact 
of the structural factors that distinguished these two periods. 
Furthermore, between 1998 and 2004 the contribution of 
particular factors was similar for all measures of poverty, while 
between 2004 and 2011 the decline in poverty and the signifi-
cance of particular factors were different for relative and ab-
solute measures. Although similar to the period 1998-2004, 
changes in poverty risk in particular groups, especially among 
the economically inactive and employed, had a decisive impact 
on change in the total poverty risk rate, the absolute and quasi-
absolute poverty risk rates fell in all groups, and the relative 
6  It does not refer to the relative poverty rate, which between 2004 and 2011 
remained at the same level.
poverty risk rate declined among the employed and increased 
among the unemployed and economically inactive. Therefore, 
the relative poverty risk rate in the total population remained 
almost unchanged.
Limiting the time intervals of analysis to two-year and 
one-year periods shows that in the case of significant business 
cycle fluctuations, labour market flows to a large extent explain 
changes in total poverty risk rate in the short term (see Figures 
II.13-II.14). In contrast to changes in poverty rates for particular 
groups, which reflect the process of impoverishment or enrich-
ment of a given group in absolute or relative terms, the changes 
in the labour market may in some cases reflect the strong re-
sponse of economic agents to macroeconomic disturbances. 
Thus, the deteriorating situation in the labour market, both be-
tween 1999 and 2001 and between 2009 and 2011, resulted 
in an increased number of unemployed and inactive, and there-
fore contributed to an increased poverty rate - in those periods 
the structural factor was the most important factor in changes 
in the total poverty rate.
figure II. 15 | decomposition of changes in in-work 
poverty rates by employment sector, 1998-2011.
figure II. 16 | decomposition of changes in in-work 
poverty rates by employment sector and type of 
contract, 2005-2011.
figure II. 17 | decomposition of changes in in-work 
poverty rates by employment sector, 1998-2004.
figure II. 18 | decomposition of changes in in-work 
poverty rates by employment sector, 2004-2011.
Źródło: obliczenia własne na podstawie danych BBGD.
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The results also show that in the medium term, changes in 
the total poverty risk rate in Poland were significantly influenced 
by changes in the in-work poverty rate. The phenomenon of the 
working-poor is discussed mainly in Part III, but here we decom-
pose changes in the share of the working-poor among the em-
ployed, distinguishing those working in and outside agriculture. 
It turns out (see Figure II.15) that in this case the structural fac-
tor - a decline in employment in agriculture and growing share 
of other sectors of the economy - played an important role over 
the entire period. It can even be argued that with the exten-
sion of the analysed period, the structural factor has played an 
increasingly important role in contrast to the decomposition, 
focusing on total population and flows between employment, 
unemployment and inactivity. The long-term trend of declining 
employment in agriculture and the reallocation of labour from 
the agricultural sector (with a high risk of poverty) to the non-
agricultural sector (where the share of working-poor is much 
lower) significantly reduced the level of in-work poverty and 
overall poverty rates, regardless of the business cycle fluctua-
tions. The flow of workforce from agriculture to other sectors 
was an important factor in the medium-term, lifting the average 
level of prosperity.
Changes in total poverty risk rate were significantly in-
fluenced by changes in poverty risk rates among farmers. De-
spite a significant decline in employment in agriculture over the 
previous several years, farmers are still a relatively numerous 
group, and their poverty risk rate has been several times higher 
than the rate for those working outside agriculture. Therefore, 
changes in the poverty rate in this group have had a significant 
impact on the entire population. Figures II.17-II.18 show that 
between 1998 and 2004, poverty risk rates in agriculture in-
creased for each of the three measures of poverty. Between 
2004 and 2011 it fell for both absolute measures, but rose in 
relative terms. Therefore it may be argued that although since 
2004 the standard of living of agricultural households has im-
proved (poverty dropped in absolute and quasi-absolute terms), 
their distance from the standard of living of non-agricultural 
households has increased.
A more detailed breakdown of those working outside agri-
culture could be done, namely into those employed for an indef-
inite period, for a definite period and those self-employed. Due 
to the limited availability of data it would only be possible for the 
period 2005-2011, when the impact of changes in employment 
structure in terms of the thus defined type of employment was 
small compared to the impact of reallocation from agriculture 
to non-agricultural sectors (Figure II.16). This can be explained 
by the fact that people working outside agriculture are usually 
able to achieve an income that ensures a household has income 
above the poverty threshold. Hence, although the change in the 
type of employment often affects the level of income, it is usu-
ally not related to the entry into or exit from poverty.
decomposItIon takIng Into 1.2.2 
account the source of the 
household Income
The decompositions earlier were focused on labour mar-
ket characteristics. However, poverty usually concerns entire 
households which often include members with different la-
bour market statuses. Individuals may thus become poor or 
exit poverty even if their individual labour market situation 
has not changed. Therefore we carried out a decomposition 
that distinguishes between three categories regarding the 
main source of income - (i) own farm, (ii) employment or self-
employment outside agriculture, and (iii) other sources (in 
practice, mainly social benefits). In this way, each person can 
be assigned a particular source of (main) income, and also each 
household its own (main) source of income – in this decomposi-
tion the change of status will concern all household members, 
including children.
The results of the decomposition by source of income for 
households and individuals, presented in Figures II.19-II.24, 
indicate a key difference between the two approaches. In the 
case of decomposition based on the source of household in-
come, changes in the poverty rates of working households had 
a far greater contribution to the total change in poverty rates 
than changes in the poverty rate of households living on un-
earned sources. In contrast, decomposition based on the par-
ticular source of income shows that the total change in poverty 
rates was mainly determined by changes in the poverty risk rate 
of individuals with unearned sources of income. The structural 
factor significantly lowered the risk of poverty between 1998 
and 2011 (in both approaches and for all measures of poverty), 
but this was entirely due to changes between 2004 and 2008 
– i.e. employment growth and the increased share of individu-
als and households living from paid non-agricultural jobs. The 
contribution of the structural factor was also greater for the 
decomposition based on personal income source. A compari-
son of both decomposition results indicates that changes in 
poverty are significantly influenced by flows between work and 
joblessness by individual persons, even if another person in the 
same household invariably works and paid labour remains the 
main source of household income. About 25% of the changes in 
the poverty risk rate among all people with unearned sources 
of income between 1998 and 2004, and more than 40% be-
tween 2004 and 2011, can be attributed to changes in the 
poverty risk rate of the group of non-working individuals who 
are members of employee households. This shows the signifi-
cance of jobs in avoiding poverty, while also suggesting that in 
some cases it requires more than one person in a household to 
be employed.
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figure II. 19 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates of the population aged 15-64 years, taking 
into account the main source of household income, 
1998-2011.
figure II. 20 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates of the population aged 15-64 years, 
taking into account the main source of individual 
income,1998-2011.
figure II. 21 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates of the population aged 15-64 years, taking 
into account the main source of household income in 
the years, 1998-2004.
figure II. 22 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates of the population aged 15-64 years, taking 
into account the main source of individual income, 
1998-2004.
figure II. 23 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates of the population aged 15-64 years, taking 
into account the main source of household income, 
1998-2004.
figure II. 24 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates of the population aged 15-64 years, taking 
into account the main source of individual income, 
2004-2011.
Source: own calculations based on HBS data.
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The distinction between non-agricultural households 
(i) without a working person, (ii) with one person working out-
side agriculture and (ii) with two or more people working outside 
agriculture,7 leads to the conclusion that a change in employ-
ment structure had a significant impact on the dynamics of pov-
erty risk rate among non-agricultural households (see Figures 
II.25-II.26). The dominant contributor was change in the share 
of individuals living in households where nobody works, with 
significant impact also exerted by changes in the share of people 
living in households with one working person. It was especially 
pronounced between 1998 and 2004, when an increase in the 
share of people living in households with no workers was re-
sponsible for about 55% of the structural factor contribution to 
the change in the poverty risk rate, with the increase in the share 
of people living in households with one worker about 40%.
Between 1998 and 2004, the deteriorating situation in 
the labour market was accompanied by a growing risk of pov-
erty among all types of households, and an increasing share 
of people in households with relatively higher poverty rates 
– especially in households without any or with only one worker. 
The proportion of people living in households with at least two 
workers fell from over 40% to 35%. In 2004-2011 this struc-
tural factor contributed even more to the change in the pov-
erty rate in the population living in non-agricultural households. 
Along the economic recovery, a pronounced change in the 
population structure with regard to households by number of 
workers occured. Between 2004 and 2008 the share of people 
living in households with two or more working members grew 
significantly (up to 47%), and at the same time the proportion 
of working-age population in households without any workers 
fell from 27% to 19%. However, the net change in the propor-
tion of people living in households with one working person 
7  Agricultural households always have at least one working person, so they 
were excluded from this stage of the analysis, especially because employment in 
private farming is mainly subject to long-term changes rather than short-term 
fluctuations.
was marginal (around 3 pp). This may reflect parallel flows from 
households with no workers to the group with one worker, and 
flows from the group with one worker to ‘two or more worker’ 
households, parallel to the total employment growth. At the 
same time, the risk of poverty rate among those living in house-
holds with one worker decreased the most (by more than half in 
relative terms, and by two thirds in quasi-absolute terms). 
poverty dynamIcs vs. 1.2.3 
labour market flows 
– the mIcroeconomIc approach
The importance of labour market flows for the dynamics 
of poverty is confirmed by the estimates based on microdata, 
presented in Table II.2. It shows the total matrix of labour mar-
ket flows in conjunction with inflows to and outflows from rela-
tive poverty in Poland in 2006-2011.8 These flows allow assess-
ment of the extent to which changes in the labour market status 
at an individual level lead to exit or entry into poverty, and to 
what extent the outflow from poverty is associated with getting 
a job (and inflows to poverty with losing a job).
Inflows to employment outside agriculture were very 
important in avoiding and exiting poverty regardless of the ini-
tial labour market status of a person, although the strength of 
this effect was diversified. Finding a job was crucial for exiting 
poverty by the unemployed. In 2006-2011, on average 40% of 
the unemployed at risk of relative poverty got out (55% in the 
case of quasi-absolute poverty) and in half of the cases it was 
associated with finding a job outside agriculture. Roughly one in 
four unemployed ceased to be at risk of poverty without finding 
a job, due to the increased income of the household (incomes 
of other household members). The non-poor unemployed very 
8  Results for quasi-absolute poverty are similar to relative poverty, so they are 
not shown in the table and only the most important differences are mentioned in 
the text.
figure II. 25 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates among individuals aged 15-64 living in 
non-agricultural households, taking into account the 
number of workers in a household, 1998-2004.
figure II. 26 | decomposition of changes in poverty 
risk rates among individuals aged 15-64 living in 
non-agricultural households, taking into account the 
number of workers in the household, 2004-2011.
Source: own calculations based on HBS data.
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rarely became poor after finding a job (i.e. they rarely became 
working-poor). However, among the unemployed at risk of pov-
erty, on average one in ten did not manage to get out of poverty, 
despite finding a job outside agriculture. In addition, among the 
poor unemployed who did not find a job, nearly one in five be-
came inactive. In most cases this meant they remained at risk 
of poverty.
The most persistent poverty was recorded among the 
economically inactive, both at a working and post-working age 
(the results for this group are presented in section 2.3) - almost 
half of the relatively poor inactive persons who had not changed 
their labour market status for a year remained at risk of pov-
erty (for quasi-absolute poverty it was more than 1/3). Among 
the economically inactive at working age, flows to employment 
amounted on average to 10%, and for those who were initially 
not poor, finding a job almost never resulted in entry to poverty. 
Among the inactive poor who undertook employment, seven in 
ten got out of poverty.
More than half of the working-poor outside agriculture 
got out of poverty within a year (2/3 for the quasi-absolute pov-
erty), and in 90% of the cases it was associated with remaining 
employed and the relative improvement in incomes, while only 
3% of those who kept working outside agriculture entered pov-
erty a year later. On the other hand, an average of 13% of the 
working-poor lost their jobs within a year, and in more than half 
of these cases this meant a transition to inactivity (at working 
age) instead of unemployment. Two out of three of those people 
remained poor.
The microeconomic perspective confirms that a reduc-
tion of poverty in Poland considerably depends on relocation 
from agriculture to other sectors of the economy. Flows from 
employment in agriculture to other sectors involved on average 
about 8% of agricultural workers, both those at risk of poverty 
and those with incomes above the poverty threshold (for all 
poverty measures). For most of the agricultural working-poor 
who found a job in another sector, this meant exiting poverty 
(60% of those at relative poverty risk, 80% of those at quasi-
absolute poverty risk). At the same time, agricultural workers 
were at about a 10 pp higher risk of falling into poverty than 
those working in other sectors. It was almost entirely due to the 
higher risk of falling into poverty despite continuous employ-
ment – outside agriculture that risk was very low, and in agricul-
ture it affected 10-15% of the workforce.
table II. 2 | Labour market flows, and inflows to and outflows from relative poverty in Poland, 2006-2011 (%).
Agriculture 
/ above 
poverty
Agriculture 
/ poverty
Working outside 
agriculture 
/ above poverty
Working 
outside 
agriculture 
/ poverty
Unemployed 
/ above 
poverty
Unemployed 
/ poverty
Inactivity in 
working age 
/ above poverty
Inactivity in 
working age  
/ poverty
Agriculture 
/ above poverty 68 15 7 1 1 0 4 1
Agriculture 
/ poverty 35 49 5 3 0 1 2 3
Working outside 
agriculture 
/ above poverty 
1 0 87 3 2 1 4 1
Working 
/ outside poverty 2 2 45 37 1 4 3 4
Unemployed 
/ above poverty 2 0 37 2 30 7 17 3
Unemployed 
/ poverty 2 3 21 11 10 32 6 12
Inactivity in 
working age 
/ above poverty
1 0 10 0 3 1 73 6
Inactivity in 
working age 
/ poverty
1 2 7 3 2 4 29 47
Note: Each line shows the structure of a group that in year t was in a given state (highlighted by the status on the labour market and being at risk of poverty or not), by labour 
market / poverty status in year t +1. Outflows to inactivity at retirement age are excluded, so some percentages do not add up to 1. Calculations based on annual flows, 
averaged over the 2006-2011 period.
Source: own calculations based on HBS data.
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poverty in poland 2 
acroSS the 
Socio-demographic 
Spectrum
This chapter is devoted to analysis of the nature and caus-
es of poverty in selected socio-demographic groups that are 
identified in chapter 1 as particularly significant for the overall 
picture of poverty in Poland. The first of these groups is chil-
dren, or in a broader sense, households with children, especial-
ly those with many children. As the quality of life and social sta-
tus of children are correlated with the socio-economic status 
of their guardians prior to achieving financial independence, 
child poverty may have important long-term effects. Therefore 
in the second subchapter we focus on the intergenerational 
dimension of poverty. Then we look at the population at im-
mobile and post-working age, and finally we focus on poverty 
in rural areas. Bearing in mind the great importance of work-
ing or undertaking employment in avoiding or exiting poverty, 
we analyse the situation in each of the aforementioned groups 
with regard to their interactions with the labour market.
poverty among chIldren 2.1 
and famIlIes wIth many chIldren
From the perspective of social policy, children are often 
seen as a financial burden to adults – they usually do not generate 
income, while the costs of childrearing are high and spread over 
many years (Huston, 1991). In addition, children are particularly 
vulnerable to poverty – their economic status is determined by 
the situation of their guardians, and cannot enter or exit poverty 
separate from the situation of the household (Brooks-Gunn, 
Duncan, 1997). In Poland, since 2004, the child poverty risk 
rate has decreased in all three terms: absolute (from 8% to 3% 
in 2011), quasi-absolute (from 17% to 8.7%) and relative (from 
24% to 21%). However, the poverty risk rate of children in Po-
land is still slightly higher than the European Union average. In 
2011, the relative poverty rate among under-16s was 21.3%, 
compared to 20.3% in the EU. The lowest child poverty risk rates 
in the EU are recorded in Denmark (9.4%), Cyprus (12.0%), 
Finland (12.0%) and Sweden (13.7%), i.e. countries where the 
poverty rate among the total population is relatively low. The 
highest relative child poverty risk rates are reported in Romania 
(32.4%), Bulgaria (28.8%), Spain (26.7%) and Italy (25.9%).
In recent years, the difference in poverty rates between 
children and adults in Poland has shrunk. According to SILC 
data, in 2005-2011 this difference in relative poverty rates in 
Poland fell by 6 pp (down to 4.3 pp) and thus came close to the 
EU average  (4.1 pp). Thus, similar to the entire EU, in 2011 the 
child poverty rate in Poland was a quarter higher than the adult 
poverty rate. Hungary is one of the countries where this dispar-
ity is the highest – the Hungarian child poverty rate is almost 
two times higher than among adults. Although not only post-
communist countries exhibit relatively high child poverty rates, 
by no means is it a rule across Europe; for example, in the Scan-
dinavian countries it is even slightly lower than among adults.
The presence of a child in a household means certain costs. 
In addition to direct spending on the family member, the child's 
figure II. 27 | child poverty rate in poland, 
1994-2011.
figure II. 28 | relative child poverty rate by number 
of children in a household in poland in 2011.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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guardians bear the cost of adjusting their economic activity to 
the situation. Income from work decreases or remains constant, 
and despite the social benefits related to children, the equivalised 
income of the household often decreases. The consequence is 
an increased risk of poverty in households with children. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by a significant difference in the rela-
tive poverty rates of people living in households with dependent 
children and households without children. Between 1994 and 
2011, the rate of relative poverty in households with dependent 
children was on average 2.5 times higher than households with-
out children, and in recent years there has been a slight increase 
in this disparity. The risk of poverty, both in relative and absolute 
terms, increases with the appearance of subsequent children 
in a household. The relative poverty rate among Poles living in 
households with two dependent children is a few percentage 
points higher than among those living in households with one 
child. A similar difference in the poverty risk is observed between 
(i) households with three or four and (ii) those with four or five 
persons aged under 16 years. By far the greatest increase in the 
rate of relative poverty can be observed between households 
with two, and households with three children, among whom the 
poverty risk rate amounted to 33% in 2011.
The above findings confirm the existence of a rela-
tion (signalled by the results of the probit model in the first 
chapter) between the presence of a child in the household 
and the poverty risk of its members. Of course, a significant 
share of households without dependent children are the eld-
erly or young adults, whose incomes and economic activity 
patterns, to some extend due to their age, are slightly differ-
ent from the population at childbearing and childrearing age. 
However, the relation between the poverty risk rate and the 
number of dependent children also emerges within the group 
of households of people at the age typical for starting and 
having a family - consisting of two adults (married or not) in 
which the household head is between 25 and 50 years old. 9 In 
2011, the relative poverty rate among adults in this group of 
households was 11.4%. In households consisting only of a pair 
of adults, merely 4.1% of people were at risk of poverty, while 
among adults in households with children, the rate was more 
than three times higher at 12.1%. In order to assess to what 
degree the observed difference resulted from the presence 
of children in a household, and to what degree from the lower 
earning potential of adults who decided to have children, we 
calculated a hypothetical equivalised household income (i) ex-
cluding the presence of children in the household, and (ii) also 
excluding transfers that are associated with having children. 10 
The results of the simulations are presented in Figure II.29. It 
turns out that if the income of a household with dependent chil-
dren was divided only between the adult couple, the relative 
poverty rate among these households would fall from 12.8% to 
4.5%, and without benefits associated with having children, the 
hypothetical at-risk-of-poverty rate in households with chil-
dren would rise to 5.5%.
9  Of course, there are also children in households with younger and older 
heads of household, but in these age groups people with children are in a minority 
and a lot of young parents remain dependent, also because of their participation in 
education. Therefore, we took into account only those households where the head 
is in the age group typical for rearing dependent children and being economically 
active at the same time.
10  Total household income does not include family benefits, single-parent 
benefits, additions to family benefits, universal child birth benefit, benefits of the 
Alimony Fund and scholarships. However, we included the benefits meant to replace 
labour income during the period of child care (benefit for child care during parental 
leave).
figure II. 29 | relative poverty rate among adults 
in households with the head of household aged 25-50 
years; the household consisting of a couple without 
children, or a couple with children (under-16s), 2011.
figure II. 30 | relative poverty rate among adults 
in households with the head of household aged 
25-50 years, consisting of a couple without children, 
or a couple with children (under-16s), by place 
of residence, 2011.
Note: * equivalised income was calculated excluding the presence of children in the household.
** equivalised income was calculated excluding the presence of children in the household and benefits associated with their presence (family benefits, benefits for single 
parents, additions to family benefits, allowance for the birth of a child, benefits of the Alimony Fund, grants).
Source: own calculations based on HBS data.
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These results suggest that having children significantly 
increases the risk of poverty in households - in two thirds of 
the households which were at risk of poverty (in the analysed 
sample of households headed by individuals aged 25-50), the 
same income would be sufficient to avoid relative poverty if the 
couple did not have children. Although the relative poverty rate 
for households with children after the hypothetical exclusion 
of children was still higher than for couples without children, 
the difference was small (only 1.4 pp). Hence the income po-
tential of couples raising a child (children) may be slightly lower 
than that of couples without children, yet this difference may 
also result from a reduction in labour supply due to various 
parental duties.
In addition, the relation between having children and the 
risk of poverty differs in intensity depending on the place of 
residence. Among urban households, the "exclusion" of chil-
dren and related benefits from a household resulted in a de-
crease in the rate of relative poverty risk to 1/3 of its initial val-
ue, while among rural households it reduced the poverty rate 
by half. Thus it may be concluded that having children in urban 
households is more strongly connected to (relative) poverty 
than in rural households. However, this regularity is related 
to a generally higher rate of poverty in rural Poland. The hy-
pothetical poverty rate of rural households with children, after 
the exclusion of children and related transfers, would be lower 
than the rate for rural households without children. Thus, ru-
ral households with children generally do not differ in terms 
of income from childless rural households, and the two-times 
higher poverty rate results from a greater number of depend-
ent household members.
As mentioned earlier, households with many children 
are more often at risk of poverty than those with one or two 
dependent children. In the analysed subpopulation of house-
holds composed of adults aged 25-50 (typical for starting 
and having a family), the poverty risk rate in households with 
one or two children in 2011 equalled 10%, while in those 
with a greater number of children, 29%. As the children from 
many-children households constitutes 25% of all under-16s 
in Poland, the problem of poverty of these households is all 
the more important. Thus, to understand the nature of their 
poverty and create an adequate public policy, it is crucial to 
examine poverty in households with many children and the 
potential difference from the poverty of households with one 
or two children. To this end, in Figure II.31 we present a sim-
ulation of equivalised income that is analogous to the previ-
ous one, but this time  concerns only households with one or 
two children. Figure II.32 shows a simulation for households 
with three or more children, while assuming that those house-
holds have only two children.11 If households with one or two 
children were obtaining the same incomes (less child-related 
transfers) and had no children, the relative poverty rate would 
be reduced by half. In other words, in half of the households 
with one or two children which are at risk of poverty, this is as-
sociated with their relatively lower income earning potential, 
while the other half is at risk of poverty because the income 
turns out too low to avoid poverty, but only with dependent 
children in the household.
11  Unlike other simulations, for households with at least three children we now 
do not consider the situation of not having children at all, as then the assumption 
of obtaining identical income would be unrealistic. Instead we assume that these 
households now have two children, which is related to the fact that the greatest 
difference in poverty risk is observed between households with two and those with 
three children.
figure II. 31 | the relative poverty rate among 
people in households with a head of household aged 
25-50, consisting of a couple with one or two children 
(aged under 16), 2011.
figure II. 32 | the relative poverty rate among 
people in households with a head of household aged 
25-50, consisting of a couple with at least three 
children (aged under 16), by place or residence, 2011.
Note: ** equivalised income was calculated taking into account the first (oldest) child and the second child, but without the presence of a third and younger children in the 
household. 
*** "simulation" means omitting the presence of children in the household.
Source: Own calculations based on HBS data.
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In comparison, in families with three and more children, 
the proportion of relatively poor persons was 29% (35% in ru-
ral and 25% in urban areas).12 If the income of these households 
with many children was at the disposal of adults and only two 
children, the poverty rate among would fall by 13 pp, to 16% 
(21% in rural and 12% in urban areas). Thus, in about one in 
eight households with at least three children, poverty emerges 
only with the birth of the third and subsequent children. This 
means that if these households had only two children, their in-
comes would be sufficient to avoid poverty. On the other hand, 
one in six households with at least three children would remain 
at risk of poverty even if they had only two children (assuming 
they do not change their labour supply or income). This latter 
12  36% in the entire population, and much greater in rural than in urban areas 
(39% vs. 32%).
group includes more than 50% of all the poor living in house-
holds with at least three children.
At the heart of the differences between (i) households 
which are not at risk of poverty, (ii) those with incomes too low 
to avoid poverty risk while having dependent children, and (iii) 
those that would be at risk of poverty even without any children 
(or having only two if they had three or more), lie the patterns 
of economic activity and sources of income. Figure II.33 shows 
that among households with at most two children, the main dif-
ference between households at risk of poverty and those that 
are not, is in the employment rate (27 pp lower for the former 
in 2011). Interestingly, the employment rate was identical 
in both subgroups of households at risk of poverty, i.e. those 
that would be poor without children and those with sufficient 
figure II. 33 | adults in households headed by 25-50-
year-olds and consisting of a couple with one or two 
children (under 16 years of age), by labour market 
status and simulation results , 2011.
figure II. 34 | adults in households headed by 25-50-
year-olds, consisting of a couple with at least three 
children (under 16 years of age), by labour market 
status and simulation results , 2011.
figure II. 35 | households headed by 25-50-year-
olds, consisting of a couple with one or two children 
(under 16 years of age), by main source of income and 
simulation results , 2011.
figure II. 36 | households headed by 25-50-year-
olds, consisting of a couple with at least three 
children (under 16 years of age), by main source of 
income and simulation results , 2011.
Note: ** equivalised income was calculated taking into account the first (oldest) child and the second child, but without the presence of a third and younger children in the 
household. *** "simulation" means omitting the presence of children in the household.
Source: Own calculations based on HBS data.
56% 56%
83%
19% 14%
3%25% 30%
14%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
In poverty before
and after
the simulation***
In poverty before
and out of poverty
after the simulation ***
Out of poverty
Inactive Unemployed Employed Inactive Unemployed Employed
In poverty before
and after
the simulation***
In poverty before
and out of poverty
after the simulation ***
Out of poverty
53% 57%
72%
14% 12%
3%
33% 31%
25%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Other
Social benefits
Disability pension
Self-employment outside agriculture
Private farm
Hired labour
Other
Social benefits
Disability pension
Self-employment outside agriculture
Private farm
Hired labour
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
In poverty before
and after
the simulation***
In poverty before
and out of poverty
after the simulation ***
Out of poverty
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
In poverty before
and after
the simulation***
In poverty before
and out of poverty
after the simulation ***
Out of poverty
82
employment in Poland 2011  
Poverty and jobs 
Socio-economic dimensions of poverty in poland2
incomes to avoid poverty risk if the household consisted only of 
adults. However, an important difference between them was in 
the structure of the main sources of income (Figure II.35). The 
proportion of households living from hired labour was about 
33 pp higher In households that would not be at risk of poverty 
if they had no children, than among households with incomes 
too low to avoid poverty risk even without children – in the lat-
ter group only about half of the households were living on in-
comes from work. After taking into account self-employment 
outside agriculture, this difference is as high as 40 pp, and the 
households that would not be at risk of poverty if they had no 
dependent children exhibited very a similar structure by main 
income sources to non-poor households with one or two chil-
dren. It can therefore be argued that the distinction between 
households with up to two children both below and above the 
relative poverty line results from a higher proportion of house-
holds with only one working person (and related lower income) 
in households at risk of poverty. Households that would be at 
risk of poverty even without children distinguish themselves 
mainly with the high share (40%) of household depending on 
individual farming, pensions and social benefits (whereas just a 
few percent of households in the other two sub-groups depend 
on such income sources).
Among households with at least three children, the pat-
terns of differences in economic activity and sources of income 
between the three types of households are similar. Non-agri-
cultural employment was the main source of income for 92% of 
households that are not at risk of poverty and for 82% of house-
holds that would not be at risk of poverty while having two 
children. Importantly the employment rate among households 
with incomes above the relative poverty line was about 15 pp 
higher than among those at risk of poverty. Among households 
that would be at risk of poverty even with only two children, 
only 60% depend on non-agricultural employment and 20% 
on pensions and other social benefits. The employment rate in 
that group only slightly exceeds 50%, and one in three adults is 
inactive. A high child poverty risk in Poland is therefore partly 
related to the income gap emerging in some households due to 
having children (in spite of maintaining economic activity com-
parable to non-poor households), and partly to the presence of 
children, often multiple, in households only marginally attached 
to the labour market.
the IntergeneratIonal dImensIon 2.2 
of poverty
Poverty experienced by children and families with many 
children is a particularly acute problem due to the strong cor-
relation between living standards and social status, and the 
socio-economic status of the guardians prior to the financial in-
dependence of the children. This relationship is a consequence 
of limited intergenerational social mobility, i.e. change in the 
position of children in the social strata compared to the posi-
tion occupied by the parents. This refers to changes within all 
aspects of social status, but the risk of poverty is strongly linked 
to the income dimension of this phenomenon. Limited intergen-
erational income mobility among those at risk of poverty leads 
to the transmission of poverty.
The phenomenon of intergenerational transmission of 
poverty in Poland has not been as well examined as in Scandina-
vian countries or the UK. For several decades many European 
countries have been collecting detailed panel data on the socio-
economic situation of their populations. Such datasets enable 
analysis of relations between the financial status of a family and 
a child’s subsequent income. Due to a lack of similar data, it is 
very difficult to come up with an exact diagnosis of the transmis-
sion of income and poverty in Poland.
figure II. 37 | the proportion of relatively poor in 
poland, depending on the duration of experienced 
poverty spells during teenage years (by year of birth).
figure II. 38 | the probability of poverty for a person 
who experienced poverty most of the time during 
teenage years vs. a person who did not experienced 
poverty, in poland, eu-15 and nms7 (by year of birth).
Note: * NMS 7 – countries which joined the EU in 2004 - Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia ( excluding Poland, Cyprus and Malta).
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC 2005.
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II.2 Determinants of the intergenerational transmission of poverty.
Understanding of the mechanism of intergenerational transmission of poverty is crucial in counteracting poverty. Poverty is not transmit-
ted to the next generation as a feature, or state, but as a set of factors that increase the likelihood of poverty in the future (Moore, 2005). 
They are often highly complex and interdependent on one another. Numerous studies have indicated the existence of a number of factors 
that contribute to the occurrence of intergenerational transmission of poverty.
GENETIC FACTORS
Genetic factors, such as inherited personality traits and cognitive abilities are important for intergenerational transmission of income and, 
therefore, for the inheritance of poverty. Intelligence is to some extent inherited. IQ tests conducted in Germany among parents and their 
children show a clear correlation between parents’ IQ and their children's cognitive abilities (Anger & Heinecke, 2008). However, contrary 
to expectations, the inheritance of intelligence contributes little to the intergenerational correlation of income (OECD, 2008). More im-
portantly, inherited personality traits and inclination to certain behaviours are, which are only partly genetically determined.
EDUCATION OF PARENTS
Education is one of the key determinants of wages, living standards and social status. In all European countries there is a clear correlation 
between the level of education of the parents and their children (European Commission, 2008). Intergenerational transfer of education 
can take place on many levels. There are three basic channels of parental influence on the children's educational attainments. Firstly, there 
is a relationship between the abilities of a child and the parents, resulting, inter alia, from their genetic similarity (Juárez, 2011). Secondly, 
appropriate conditions for learning, access to scientific sources and external help are largely dependent on the financial situation of the 
family. The help from the family is often crucial for the ability to study at a university. Thirdly, the fact of having a certain level of education 
by parents and their demands on the children may also influence the child's educational choices (Belley & Lochner, 2007).
HEALTH STATUS
There is a strong correlation between health status and achievements. Even among 7-year-olds health exerts a significant impact on school 
performance (Case, Fertig, & Paxson, 2005). Health in childhood has been shown to influence the future position in the labour market. If 
the income of parents affects the child's health, then the health status may be another channel of intergenerational transmission of pov-
erty (Doyle, Harmon, & Walker, 2005). The financial situation of the family impacts on children's health in two ways (d'Addio, 2007). First, 
parents with high income can afford access to medical services and resources not available in poorer households. In this way, earnings 
directly affect the health status of children. Second, a significant impact on the physical and mental health of children may be influenced 
by factors that correlate with the level of income. These include, inter alia, eating habits, housing, substance abuse and health awareness 
of parents.
NEIGHBOURHOOD
The spatial concentration of poverty and social problems enhances the persistence of poverty (Tarkowska, 2007). In early childhood the 
influence of the neighbourhood has a low impact on intellectual and emotional development (Ellen & Turner, 1997), but increases with age 
and involvement in relationships with people outside the family. The impact of neighbourhood on quality of family life is emphasized in 
many studies (e.g. Edwards & Mromfield, 2010, Ellen & Turner, 1997). There are several planes on which it can influence a child’s develop-
ment. First, the quality of and access to local health care, educational, cultural and social institutions, and transportation, affect the quality 
of family life and a child’s development. Second, the socio-economic characteristics of the neighbourhood have an impact on the behaviour 
of parents towards their children (e.g. the style of parenthood, extent of parental authority and control). Moreover, the social structure and 
relations among residents in the neighbourhood, including children and adolescents, can have a strong influence on a child’s motivation 
and educational choices.
FAMILy STRUCTURE 
Whether a child is being raised by a single parent or a couple is relevant to their development. In general, children raised by single parents 
show poorer academic performance than their peers coming from two-parent families (OECD, 2011). Many studies have also shown the 
negative effects of family instability on the physical and mental health of children (Waldfogel, Craigie, & Brooks-Gunn, 2010). Events such 
as the death of a parent or separation adversely affect the child's development (OECD, 2009). If a family lives in poverty, difficult experi-
ences associated with family  break-up can contribute to the intergenerational transmission of poverty.
GENDER
Women are more affected by poverty and its intergenerational transmission than men (Tarkowska, 2007). Studies conducted in the UK 
between 1974 and 2000 (Blanden & Gibbons, 2006) clearly indicate the negative impact of poverty in childhood on the later standards of 
living, with women at greater risk of poverty persisting after their teenage years.
In addition, intergenerational income mobility may also be conditioned by factors such as ethnicity, household structure, and the age at 
which a child experienced poverty (Jenkins & Siedler, 2007). However, it must be remembered that the impact of a particular factor on the 
transmission of income may also depend on the education system, instruments of public policy, economic development and social norms 
in a given country.
Source: own elaboration.
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According to available data (SILC module 2005), the 
strength of links between the situation of the family and the 
child's subsequent income in Poland is comparable to that ob-
served in other European Union countries (Figure II.38). The 
proportion of those at risk of poverty among people who grew 
up in a family in difficult financial situation is much higher than 
among those who did not experience childhood poverty (Fig-
ure II.37). Moreover, differences in at-risk-of-poverty rate be-
tween such distinguished groups of people in Poland are higher 
for subsequent cohorts born between the 1940 and 1970. 
However, this phenomenon should not be directly understood 
as changes in poverty transmission rates. The differences ob-
served between the subsequent cohorts may result both from 
a change in the severity of this phenomenon over the previous 
few decades and also from an age-related decline in income 
inequalities between people who experienced poverty in child-
hood and those who did not. A similar pattern of increase in the 
relative poverty risk in subsequent cohorts is also observed in 
the EU15 and other EU New Member States, although these 
changes are not as pronounced as in Poland.
Education is one of the main determinants of income. The 
intergenerational transmission of education in Poland looks far 
less favourable against other European countries than income 
mobility. In the EU15, a person born between 1970 and 1979 
to a parent with a higher education level has a 2.7 times higher 
probability of obtaining a higher educational degree than a per-
son whose parents attained only primary education (based on 
SILC data 2005). This disparity seems small compared to the 
differences observed in Poland - for those born between 1970 
and 1979, children of the best educated parents are 8 times 
more likely to obtain higher education than the children of the 
worst educated parents. Importantly, this relation between the 
education of parents and children has been gradually decreas-
ing compared to the subsequent cohorts born between 1950 
and 1970, mainly thanks to an increase (in subsequent cohorts) 
of the proportion of children with higher education among 
poorly educated parents.
The degree to which the status of parents is passed on to 
their children can also be influenced by family structure. People 
who did not grow up with both parents are more vulnerable to 
figure II. 40 | the share of people at risk of poverty 
among individuals brought up in families with 
different parental structures (population aged 25-64).
figure II. 41 | probability of being at risk of poverty 
for a person brought up by single parent in relation to 
both parents (by year of birth).
figure II. 39 | the probability of achieving higher education by a person with a parent with higher education 
to a parent with just primary education, in poland, eu-15 and nms7 * (for mother/father by year of birth).
Note: * NMS 7 – countries which joined the EU in 2004 - Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia (excluding Poland, Cyprus and Malta).
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC 2005.
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poverty in adulthood than those raised by both parents (Figure 
II.40). Poverty in adulthood is most likely for those who did not 
grow up with either of their parents. This applies particularly to 
the poorer EU countries. Among children raised by a single par-
ent, poverty risk is lower for those who lived with two guard-
ians (mother or father and their new partner). Interestingly, in 
Poland, where the relative poverty rate among 25-64 year-olds 
was higher than in the EU15 and NMS7 (SILC 2005), the rela-
tion of probability of poverty of a person brought up by one par-
ent against a person brought up by two parents was lower than 
in the EU-15 and NMS7 (Figure II.41).
poverty at ImmobIle and post-2.3 
workIng age
People at an immobile age, i.e. women aged 45-69 and 
men aged 45-69, reveal distinct characteristics compared to 
the younger working age population.13 They are less prone to 
change their job, profession or to upgrade skills. Due to their 
limited flexibility, any deterioration in the labour market may 
lead them to financial problems. This may be one of the rea-
sons behind a relatively high relative poverty rate (17%) among 
those at an immobile age in Poland. Although this rate is the 
same for the total population in Poland, it is much higher than 
for 25-44 year olds. In comparison, in 2011, only 11% of those 
at a post-working age (60+ women and 65+ men) had an in-
come below the relative poverty threshold. This low rate may 
seem surprising, but as Figure II.41 shows, the relative finan-
cial status of Polish old-age pensioners is quite good compared 
to other EU countries. Nonetheless, the material situation of 
people both at an immobile age and post-working age is more 
stable than among the younger population, while the chance of 
exiting poverty among the 45+ is relatively lower than for those 
aged 25-44. 
13  This group is defined as older than 45 and before retirement age valid until 
2012.
According to SILC data, the poverty risk rate among Poles 
aged 50-64 was slightly higher than the EU average, and lower 
for those aged 65+.14 A relatively low poverty risk rate at post-
working age is not the norm in the EU. In countries such as Den-
mark, Sweden, Belgium and the UK, the poverty rate among the 
elderly (and also children) is relatively high. Poland belongs to 
those countries in which poverty risk usually decreases with 
age (in Poland with the exception of those at an immobile age). A 
similar situation can be observed in all countries of the previous 
Eastern Block (except Bulgaria) and countries such as Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain.
who are the 45+ years old at risk of poverty?
In the last ten years or so, Poland has seen an increase in 
the relative poverty rate among those at immobile and post-
working ages, with a simultaneous stabilisation of poverty rates 
in the other age groups. At the end of the 1990s, the relative 
poverty rate among those at post-working age did not exceed 
8%, and in 2000-2003 it decreased. This was partly related to 
stagnation in the financial situation of the rest of the population 
– between 2001 and 2003 the relative poverty threshold in-
creased by only 3% in nominal terms and remained at the same 
level in real terms. People at post-working age, secured against 
inflation by the indexation of old-age and disability pensions, 
experienced a relative improvement in their financial situation 
against those with income from other sources, especially work. 
However, over the longer period, income from work grew faster 
than incomes from other sources, which resulted in an increase 
in the relative poverty threshold (by 30% in real terms between 
2005 and 2008), so between 1998 and 2011 a significant in-
crease (by 6 pp) in the relative poverty rate among those at an 
immobile age was recorded. Since 2004 the increase in relative 
poverty rate among individuals aged 45+ has been accompa-
nied by a decrease in the share of the poor in quasi-absolute 
14  In the comparison between countries, the immobile group included only 
persons aged 50-64, due to the availability of data in the Eurostat database and the 
fact that with the different retirement ages, a conventional age range results in the 
most reliable comparison.
figure II. 42 | relative poverty rate in selected eu countries, by age group , 2011. 
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC data.
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terms. Therefore, despite the deteriorated financial situation in 
these age groups against the younger population, their finan-
cial condition was improving in absolute terms, although more 
slowly than among those at prime age, who were the first and 
the most efficient to benefit from the improved situation in the 
labour market.
Among the relatively poor at an immobile age, the share of 
working individuals (43%) is much higher than in the total popu-
lation, nevertheless the poverty rate among immobile workers 
is quite low. One of the reasons behind the high poverty risk 
rate in this age group is an almost identical share of economi-
cally inactive (old-age and disability pensioners and others) who 
figure II. 43 | relative and quasi-absolute poverty 
rates at immobile, post-working and prime age 
subpopulations in poland, 1998-2011.
figure II. 44 | relative poverty rate of people at an 
immobile and post-working age by main source of 
income, 2011.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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population at risk of relative poverty, by economic 
activity*, 2011. 
figure II. 46 | structure of the post-working age 
population at risk of relative poverty, by economic 
activity*, 2011.
Note: *categories of old-age and disability pensioners and other inactive persons include only the economically inactive (pensioners who work are included in the working group).
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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exhibit poverty risk rates a few times higher than their working 
peers. The unemployed constitute almost 20% of all individuals 
at risk of poverty at an immobile age. The age of 60 for women 
and 65 for men are the boundaries after which the poverty 
risk significantly decreases and also changes its character. The 
poverty of women and men aged 65+ is a poverty of the eco-
nomically inactive – only 6% of them works. For almost 90% of 
people in this group, the main source of income is an old-age or 
disability pension.
People at an immobile age don’t upgrade their skills or 
change jobs as often as younger people. Fewer than 2% de-
clared participation in lifelong learning (formal and non-formal), 
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which is several times lower than in the population aged 25-64 
years (IBS/CRZL, 2008). The ensuing relatively low labour mar-
ket flexibility is responsible for persistent poverty in this group. 
Inevitably, the probability of exit from relative and quasi-abso-
lute poverty within a year (from the moment of participating 
in the HBS) among persons aged 45+ is lower than in younger 
age groups. The opposite trend can be observed for the prob-
ability of entering poverty, which decreases with age.15 This is 
particularly evident in the group of people at retirement age 
where the vast majority receive a fixed monthly income (pen-
sion) which usually exceeds the relative poverty threshold, and 
even more so in absolute and quasi-absolute terms. Inflows to 
15  Relatively small portions of the observed flows occur close to the poverty 
threshold.
and outflows from poverty are lower than in the younger ages 
and thus the situation of those at immobile and post-working 
ages is more stable than in the younger groups, although pov-
erty is more persistent. This, in turn, is strongly connected with 
labour market status – both among people at working and post-
working ages, the risk of poverty is highest among the economi-
cally inactive and the unemployed, while lowest among non-
agricultural workers (see Figure II.49).
The persistence of poverty increases with age and is prima-
rily associated with lower labour market flows among those aged 
45+ compared to younger people (with the exception, of course, 
of early exits from the labour market at immobile and post-
working ages), in particular with lower inflows to employment. 
figure II. 47 | people at an immobile and retirement 
age, by the main source of income, 2011.
figure II. 48 | probability of exit from and entry into 
relative and quasi-absolute poverty within one year 
from the time of the survey, by age, 2006-2010.
figure II. 49 | probability of exit from and entry into 
poverty within a year from the time of the survey, 
among people at an immobile age by economic 
activity, 2006-2010.
figure II. 50 | probability of exit from and entry into 
poverty within a year from the time of the survey, 
among people in the post-working age by economic 
activity, 2006-2010.
Source: own calculations based on HBS data.
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Secondly, poverty persistence is connected with the fact that 
among the unemployed and economically inactive, the chance 
to get out of poverty after finding a job decreases with age; for 
those aged 25-44 it is 63%, while at a post-working age it is only 
48%. Among the unemployed at working age it strongly depends 
on the sector where they find a job. The inactive and the unem-
ployed who start working in agriculture are much less likely to 
get out of poverty than those who become non-agricultural 
workers. A higher age also decreases the chance of exiting pov-
erty among the working-poor. On the other hand, workers who 
are not at risk of poverty are also increasingly less likely to be-
come working-poor or unemployed with increasing age. The la-
bour market and income status of individuals stabilises over the 
life course – flows from poverty, unemployment and inactivity 
decrease, while opposite inflows to poverty and unemployment 
also decline. Retirement plays a significant role here – most of the 
working-poor (in relative terms) outside agriculture exit poverty 
after retiring and undertake old-age pensions. Among the work-
ing- poor in agriculture, and among the unemployed and the in-
active, this figure is lower at 30%-40% of those retiring.
The financial situation of pensioners
The financial situation of pensioners largely depends on 
the source of the pension. Poverty risk among those obtaining 
agricultural pensions (from the KRUS system) is much greater 
than those receiving non-agricultural pensions. This is the 
main source of the high difference in the poverty rate between 
pensioners living in rural (18%) and urban areas (5%). Despite 
the relatively low risk of poverty in this group, about 8% of 
pensioners do work. In the post-working age group, 6% of dis-
ability pensioners and 17% of early retirees are economically 
active, and over a half of them are employed in services. One 
in three economically active pensioners works in agriculture 
figure II. 51 | people at risk of relative poverty in the reference year, by age and status 
(financial and in the labour market) in the subsequent year, 2006-2010. 
figure II. 52 | people above the relative poverty threshold in the reference year, by age and status 
(financial and in the labour market) in the subsequent year, 2006-2010.
Source: own calculations based on HBS data.
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(at an immobile age this share is 25%, and at a post-working age, 
36%). Some elderly farm owners continue working at a post-
working age despite receiving old-age pensions or other ben-
efits. Moreover, the pensions of farmers are usually lower than 
in the non-agricultural pension system. Economically active 
pensioners outside agriculture usually work as teachers (6.3%), 
medium administrative staff (6.5%), security staff (5.3%), doc-
tors (4.5%) and cleaners (4.4%).
Despite obtaining pensions and working at the same 
time, the relative poverty rate among all working pensioners 
amounts to 7%. It must be emphasised that 92% of all work-
ing and relatively poor pensioners work in agriculture, and the 
rate of poverty among pensioners working outside agriculture 
is lower than 1%. Importantly, the additional income from work 
is necessary in many cases for avoiding poverty – if such income 
from work was excluded from the income of a household with 
a working pensioner, then the poverty rate among working 
pensioners would be 30%. It can therefore be concluded that 
the work of pensioners is largely triggered by their difficult 
financial situation.
poverty In rural areas2.4 
Inhabitants of rural areas constitute nearly 60% of all the 
relatively poor in Poland, even though less than 40% of the 
Polish population live in the countryside. One in four residents in 
rural areas live below the relative poverty threshold, and one in 
twenty are poor in absolute terms. These levels are significantly 
different from those observed in urban areas, where in 2011 
the at-risk-of-poverty rate was 11% in relative terms and 1% in 
absolute terms. The reasons behind this state of affairs can be 
found in differences in the structure of households and the ag-
ricultural specificity of the Polish rural areas. In this subsection 
we present rural poverty in the light of crucial characteristics of 
households, with a focus on the interactions between poverty 
and the agricultural activity of rural households.
rural households 
Differences between rural and urban households are al-
ready visible in their structure. Rural households have a higher 
(by 1) average number of household members and more children, 
which is especially visible in the share of households with 
figure II. 53 | relative poverty rate among 
pensioners, by source of pension , 2011. 
figure II. 54 | pensioners by age group and economic 
activity , 2011. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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figure II. 55 | structure of the population of rural 
and urban households, by number of children, 2011. 
figure II. 56 | structure of rural and urban 
populations, by education level attained, 2011. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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at least 3 children being two times higher than in urban areas. 
Importantly, the higher number of people in rural households is 
not linked to the number of workers in a household as strongly 
as in cities. In rural households, there are more individuals that 
depend on another person – 5 persons per 10 rural households, 
while only 3 per 10 for urban households. All these features 
contribute to a higher poverty risk among rural households.
Moreover, rural households exhibit a lower average level 
of education – the proportion of those with just primary edu-
cation (junior high school and lower) is almost ¾ higher than 
in urban areas. It is also important that the number of people 
who live in rural areas decreases with each subsequent level of 
education. Among those with higher education, only 20% live in 
rural areas.
The characteristic feature of rural poverty is the strong dif-
ference between the types of households, as distinguished by 
the source of income: agricultural (i.e. running or working on a 
private farm being the main source of income), partly agricultural 
(additional income from agriculture) and non-agricultural. Below 
we present the characteristics of non-agricultural households 
and compare them with urban households, and then we move to 
the interactions between private farming and rural poverty. 
figure II. 57 | relative poverty risk rate by main 
source of income and place of residence, 2011.
figure II. 58 | the proportion of members of 
particular household groups in the total number of 
relatively poor in rural areas, 2011. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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figure II. 60 | relative poverty rate among rural 
inhabitants depending on the type of household, 
1998-2011. 
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poverty of non-agricultural rural households
Although the relative poverty rate among inhabitants of 
rural areas was 25% in 2011 (with minor fluctuations between 
1998 and 2011), the poverty rate among rural persons living in 
non-agricultural households was about 5 pp lower every year, 
and similar to the poverty rate in the total population, although 
still significantly higher than in urban areas. In this regard, in-
teractions between non-agricultural households and the labour 
market may be compared to their urban counterparts, and the 
differences that exist reveal the character of rural poverty not 
directly linked to the specificity of agriculture.
Classification by main source of income shows that al-
most half the people living in rural non-agricultural households 
live on income from work outside of agriculture. This figure 
is similar to urban areas, which indicates the potential signifi-
cance of in-work poverty in rural households. Differences do 
appear with regard to social transfers, as in rural areas a greater 
share of those at risk of poverty (and living in non-agricultural 
households) depend on old-age and disability pensions. At the 
same time, the share of relatively poor in rural households who 
depend mainly on social benefits was lower than in the cities. 
However, if social benefits are put into one category with old-
age and disability pensions, then the share of such a category 
is similar in rural and urban areas, although the structure of 
transfers paid to poor households is different – in rural areas, 
poverty in households depending on old-age and disability pen-
sions is much more common.
figure II. 63 | the structure of the population at 
risk of absolute poverty in rural households, by main 
source of household income, 2011.
figure II. 64 | the structure of the population at risk 
of absolute poverty in urban households, by main 
source of household income, 2011. 
figure II. 61 | the structure of the population at risk 
of relative poverty in non-agricultural households, by 
main source of household income, 2011.
figure II. 62 | the structure of population at risk of 
relative poverty in urban households, by main source 
of household income, 2011. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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poverty of agricultural households 
Rural non-agricultural households, despite their consid-
erable number, are not responsible for the scope of poverty 
in rural areas, as the risk of poverty in this group is lower than 
the average for all rural households. It is the (decreasing) group 
of agricultural households that strongly increases the poverty 
rate in rural areas. Persons living in households depending on 
agriculture constitute almost a half of all rural area inhabitants 
who are at risk of poverty. Poverty risk in these households de-
pends largely on the scope of agricultural activity. Among agri-
cultural households that are not at risk of poverty, income from 
agriculture yields about ¾ of the total income, while in relatively 
poor households it is only ½.16 Moreover, there is a negative 
dependence between the poverty risk rate and the acreage of 
16  The issue of income structure in farms is discussed in detail in Part III.
agricultural land owned by the agricultural household, which 
suggests that agricultural activity does not increase the pov-
erty risk if it is conducted on a sufficiently large scale. The data 
of the National Agricultural Census show that between 2002 
and 2010 the average farm acreage increased from 5.76 ha to 
only 6.82 ha. The persistent dispersion of acreage and low-pro-
ductivity of farms enhance differences between the incomes 
of people living in agricultural households (and in consequence 
in all rural households) and the income of urban residents who 
work in non-agricultural sectors, with faster increasing produc-
tivity and wages. The share of the relative poor among the em-
ployed (outside agriculture) in rural areas is three times lower 
than among those depending on agricultural activity, but at the 
same time it is three times higher than the rate of the working-
poor in cities.
figure II. 65 | share of partly agricultural households 
with the main source of income from hired labour 
and old-age and disability pensions in a given 
subpopulation, 2011. 
figure II. 66 | the relative poverty rate in rural 
households in which at least one person works in 
agriculture, by the acreage of arable land.
figure II. 67 | structure of the population of 
agricultural pensioners at risk of relative poverty, by 
main source of income in a household, 2011.
figure II. 68 | structure of the population of 
agricultural pensioners at risk of absolute poverty, by 
main source of income in a household, 2011. 
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Households with income from agriculture as only an addi-
tional source of income form a specific group of rural households. 
They may be named ‘partly agricultural’ as their members are 
only partly involved in agriculture, treating income from farm-
ing as a supplement to their main income from other sources, 
either from tradition or habit. In most cases, these households 
depend mainly on hired work, but if we limit the population of 
interest to only the relatively poor among them, the share of ru-
ral employee household members decreases while the share of 
those depending on old-age and disability pensions increases. 
The share of pensioners and disability benefit recipients in this 
sub-population is even greater if absolute and quasi-absolute 
measures of poverty are used, while the share of employees is 
still smaller than in the case of the relative measure. 
Persons receiving pensions under the agricultural social in-
surance system (KRUS) in most cases live in households where 
the main income comes from old-age pensions. However, there 
are also many who receive a KRUS pension and at the same time 
are members of an agricultural household. It is especially visible 
for absolute poverty, where such persons constitute more than 
45% of agricultural system pensioners at risk of poverty. It shows 
a link between the poverty of farmers and pensioners in rural ar-
eas. Old-age pensions in agricultural households at a high risk of 
poverty are often a form of benefit for all the household mem-
bers. On one hand, low agricultural pensions make it possible for 
some to quit agricultural activity, while on the other hand, even if 
they combine their pension with the agricultural income, the total 
is not enough for all household members to avoid poverty.
In effect, although the relative poverty rate for young and 
working-age inhabitants of rural areas is two times higher than 
in urban areas, at post-working age it is three times (women) 
and four times (men) higher than in cities. This disparity results 
mainly from differences in the level of old-age pensions paid 
from agricultural and non-agricultural systems. One in three 
rural old-age pensioners receive pensions under the agricultur-
al system, on average visibly lower than the pension from the 
non-agricultural system. In urban areas, only 7% of pensioners 
receive a KRUS pension.
There is a strong connection between the widely under-
stood agricultural activity (including agricultural pensions paid 
to former private farm owners and workers) and rural poverty. 
However, the importance of agriculture has evolved in the last 
ten or so years. As late as in 1999, half of rural households had 
at least one person working in agriculture, and for 40% of them 
agricultural labour was the main source of income. According 
to LFS data, the number of people working in agriculture has 
dropped by 40% since the mid 1990s. In effect, currently most 
rural households (74%) are those that do not have anybody 
working in agriculture, and the share of rural households de-
pending mainly on agriculture has dropped to 15%. The decom-
positions and flow estimations presented in Chapter 1 show 
that both in microeconomic and aggregated approaches, the 
outflow from agriculture to other sectors has contributed to a 
decrease in poverty. However, the increase in the share of non-
agricultural households has resulted mainly from the transfor-
mation of households that included a person working in agricul-
ture who was not the head of the household. An analogous flow 
of heads of agricultural households has been much lower.
regional disparities in rural poverty 
The high rural poverty rate is not a rule across the entire 
country. Although in most regions (voivodeships) the rural pov-
erty rate is about two times higher than in urban areas, there 
are some regions where it is relatively low. One example is the 
Silesian (Śląskie) voivodeship where the rural poverty rate was 
14% in 2011, similar to Silesian urban areas (12%). Interestingly, 
figure II. 69 | rural poverty rate and poverty rate in households in which at least one person works 
in agriculture, 2011. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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the Silesian voivodeship is a region with the lowest share of ag-
riculture in employment in Poland (according to LFS data, 2.9% 
in 2011). At the other end, the highest rural poverty risk was 
observed in Lubelskie voivodeship where it was 2.5 times high-
er than in urban areas, and agriculture employs 28% of all work-
ers, more than anywhere else in Poland. However, despite these 
figures, there exists no statistically significant relation between 
the scale of employment in agriculture and rural poverty rates 
across the regions of Poland. 
One of the correlates of rural poverty across Polish regions 
are disparities in the acreage of farms – the greater the disparities 
in a given voivodeship, the lower the risk and depth of rural pov-
erty (Figures II. 70–II.71). However, there exists no correlation 
between the average acreage and the poverty rate in voivode-
ships. Perhaps in Poland, where most agricultural farms have a 
low acreage, the presence of a more varied arable land structure 
with more medium and large farms is accompanied by a higher 
productivity in agriculture and hence lower rural poverty rate.
Moreover, voivodeships with a higher poverty rate in rural 
areas also have a greater depth of poverty (Figure II.72-II.73). 
This indicates a strong interaction between the severity and 
prevalence of rural poverty, and signals an important problem 
for socio-economic policy aimed at the reduction of rural pover-
ty. In areas which are at the greatest risk of poverty, public policy 
needs to address a potentially numerous group of people and 
also compensate for the depth of poverty in individual regions.
figure II. 70 | relative poverty risk rate in rural areas 
vs. the Gini coefficient for the acreage of agricultural 
farms, by voivodeship, 2011. 
figure II. 71 | absolute poverty risk rate vs. the gini 
coefficient for the acreage of agricultural farms, 
by voivodeship, 2011. 
figure II. 72 | rural relative poverty rate vs. average 
income of the relatively poor in rural areas, 2011
figure II. 73 | rural absolute poverty rate 
vs. the average income of the absolutely poor in rural 
areas, 2011. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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summary
The aim of this Part of the Report is to explain the diversity in the incidence and character of poverty in Poland, especially in 
those socio-demographic groups that are most affected by poverty or that due to certain characteristics, such as age, have a limited 
chance to exit poverty on their own. The problem of in-work poverty has been noticed and discussed across Europe, but in Poland 
poverty mainly affects jobless people. The lack of work, and especially dependence on social benefits and unearned sources of in-
come, significantly raises the risk of poverty, and the widening income gap between inactive and working Poles has resulted in the 
increased risk of relative poverty among the economically inactive. Decompositions presented in Chapter 1 show that the changes 
in poverty rates between1998 and 2011 were mostly influenced by changes in poverty risk among the economically inactive, while 
also among workers and children. Within the working population, the structure of the population was the most important factor. A 
slight increase in the risk of relative poverty among the working population (due to an increase in income disparities) was balanced 
by reallocation of the workforce from agriculture to other sectors, which contributed to a decrease in in-work and overall poverty, 
regardless of business cycle fluctuations.
The deterioration in the labour market between 1998 and 2004 was so strong that it increased the risk of absolute and quasi-
absolute poverty, mainly due to a decrease in the employment rate and increase in the risk of poverty among the economically 
inactive. The increased risk of poverty was mainly related to an increased share of households without any workers, and higher 
risk of poverty among single-worker households. Confronted with stagnant wages, labour income of a single person in a household 
was often not enough to avoid poverty risk. These processes were reversed in late 2000s and in 2011 the rates of absolute and 
quasi-absolute poverty risk were distinctly lower than in 1998, for all three groups in the labour market – workers (decrease of 
in-work poverty rate in nearly 50% resulted from the reallocation of workforce from agriculture to other sectors), the unemployed 
and inactive. After 2005, the decrease in poverty risk was mainly caused by the employment growth, but the high wage growth 
also brought about a distinct decrease in absolute and quasi-absolute poverty risk among single-worker households. However, in 
the significant wage growth also caused an increase in relative poverty rate among non-working households, especially in old-age 
pensioner households, and slightly in single-worker households. The importance of employment for avoiding poverty risk is con-
firmed by the flows at the individual level that are analysed in the Chapter 1. Between 2005 and 2011, 57% of people who got out 
of poverty within a year, increasing income above poverty threshold was associated with earnings from paid job (which in 2/3 of 
cases was outside agriculture). 
Between 1994 and 2011 the relative poverty rate in households with children was on average 2.5 times higher than in house-
holds without under-16 year olds, and in recent years this disparity has slightly increased. The greatest disparity, a ten or so percent 
increase in the relative poverty rate, occurs between households with two children and those with three or more. More than 1/3 
of members of households with three persons below 16 years of age are relatively poor. Results presented in Chapter 2 suggest 
that having children greatly increases the risk of poverty among households headed by 25-50 year olds. In 2/3 of such relatively 
poor households, an identical level of income would be enough to avoid relative poverty if the couple had no children and did not re-
ceive any children-related benefits. The main difference between these relatively poor households and households with one or two 
children that are not at risk of poverty, is their slightly lower employment rate and higher proportion of households with only one 
earner. A slightly different situation can be observed among households with three or more children. More than half the relatively 
poor households in this group would be poor even if they had only two children, i.e. their incomes would not be enough to avoid 
poverty, and subsequent children only deepen their relative poverty. Only 60% of households with three or more children depend 
on non-agricultural work (only half the adults in these households have a non-agricultural job), and 20% depend on disability pen-
sions and other social benefits (one in three adults is economically inactive). Both non-poor households with at least three children 
and those that would avoid poverty if they had two children, depend in the vast majority on non-agricultural work, and the employ-
ment rate is decidedly the highest among households not at risk of poverty. This indicates that public policy aiming to prevent child 
poverty should not only utilise transfers that close the gap in equivalised income resulting from having children, but also should try 
to stimulate economic activity, support working parents (in terms of child care) and prevent the long-term exit from labour market 
by parents.
In Poland, the strength of links between the financial situation of a family and the child’s future income is similar to that in the 
EU countries. The share of the relatively poor that were brought up in a family with a difficult financial situation is much higher than 
among those that have not experienced poverty. Low health status, no possibility of further education and the lack of family sup-
port, result in a very difficult situation for such individuals. People who experienced poverty in childhood or adolescence are also 
more likely to become parents early, which deteriorates their already low financial status (Warzywoda-Kruszyńska & Golczyńska-
Grondas, 2010). A low labour market status and no ability to support oneself and one’s children creates a risk of intergenerational 
poverty transmission, a significant challenge for public policy. 
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Looking at the characteristics of incomes of persons who usually do not have small children, i.e. aged 45+, one can notice that 
among those at this immobile age (45-59/64) and after retirement, the financial situation is more stable than among younger indi-
viduals. This has two sides. First, at an immobile age poverty risk is greater than among those aged 25-44, especially if paid work is 
not the main source of income. Second, the chance of exiting poverty is lower, except for reaching retirement age. Contrary to the 
widespread belief that the elderly are at a high risk of poverty, those at a post-working age were at the lowest risk of poverty among 
all the distinguished age groups above 24 years of age. The low relative poverty rate among people aged 65+ is characteristic for 
other post-communist countries. However, working pensioners would often be in a difficult situation if they did not work. In ad-
dition, if a pensioner works and is still relatively poor, then it usually means that they are farmers. Among agricultural pensioners 
(under KRUS), the poverty rate is much higher than among non-agricultural pensioners (under ZUS) and those who receive foreign 
pensions. The fact that the former often still work, usually on their own farm, is not enough to close the gap in income.
As a result, although 60% of the Polish population live in urban areas, almost 60% of the relatively poor live in rural areas. One 
in four rural residents is relatively poor, and about ¼ of them depend on non-agricultural work. Non-agricultural workers in rural 
areas are usually less educated than their counterparts in towns and cities, but are at a lower risk of poverty than those rural inhab-
itants who work in agriculture. A further ¼ of the relatively poor in rural areas live in households that depend mainly on social ben-
efits, among which the share of old-age and disability pensioners (especially those receiving agricultural pensions) is higher than in 
cities. The remaining half of the relatively poor in the country live in households where agricultural work is the main or an additional 
source of income. The risk of poverty in agricultural households depends largely on the scale of agricultural activity, as relatively 
poor households usually are small and have some additional sources of income (benefits, non-agricultural work) which often do not 
suffice to get them out of relative poverty. In the last ten or so years reallocation to other sectors has happened in a large fraction 
of households in which there was a person working in agriculture, has which contributed to an improvement in living conditions in 
these households. However, heads of households have rarely left agriculture and hence the related persistent low productivity in 
agriculture and small acreage of farms. The persistent dispersion of land and low-productivity in agriculture deepens disparities 
between the incomes of those living in agricultural households (and so generally in rural areas) and urban households, where people 
work in non-agricultural sectors where productivity and wages grow faster.
97
employment in Poland 2011 
Poverty and jobs 
Socio-economic dimensions of poverty in poland 2
bibliography
Anger, S., & Heineck, G. (2008), Do Smart Parents Raise Smart 
Children? The Intergenerational Transmission of Cognitive 
Abilities. Nuremberg: Labor and Socio-Economic Research 
Center.
Belley, P., & Lochner, L. (2007), The Changing Role of Family 
Income and Ability in Determining Educational Achievement. 
Toronto: NBER Working Paper No. 13527.
Blanden, J., & Gibbons, S. (2006), The persistence of poverty 
across generations. London: London School of Economics and 
Political Science.
Brooks-Gunn, J., Duncan, G.J. (1997), The Effects of Pov-
erty on Children; The Future of Children and Poverty Vol. 7, 
No. 2; 1997.
Case, A., Fertig, A., & Paxson, C. (2005), The lasting impact of 
childhood health and circumstance. Journal of Health Econom-
ics (24), pp. 365–389.
d’Addio, A. (2007), Intergenerational Transmission of Disad-
vantage: Mobility or Immobility across Generations? A Review 
of the Evidence for OECD Countries. Paris: OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers.
Doyle, O., Harmon, C., & Walker, I. (2005), The Impact of Paren-
tal Income and Education on the Health of their Children. IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 1832.
Edwards, B., & Mromfield, M. (2010), Neighbourhood influ-
ences on young children’s emotional and behavioural problems. 
Family Matters (84), pp. 7-19.
Ellen, I., & Turner, M. (1997), Does neighborhood matter? 
Assessing Recent Evidence. Housing Policy Debate , Vol. 8 (4), 
pp. 833-866.
European Commission (2008), Child Poverty and Well-Being 
in the EU. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities.
Geda, A., Jong, N., Mwabu, G., & Kimenyi, M. (2001), Determi-
nants of poverty in Kenya: a household level analysis. ISS Work-
ing Papers - General Series 1765019095, International Insti-
tute of Social Studies of Erasmus University (ISS), The Hague.
Huston, A.C. (ed.) (1991), Children in poverty. Child develop-
ment and public policy; Cambridge University Press; New 
York, 1991.
Jenkins, S., & Siedler, T. (2007), The Intergenerational Trans-
mission of Poverty in Industrialized Countries. Berlin: 
DIW-Diskussionspapiere.
Juárez, F. (2011), Intergenerational transmission of education - 
Uncovering the mechanisms behind high intergenerational cor-
relations. ECINEQ Working Papers.
Moore, K. (2005), Thinking about youth poverty through the 
lenses of chronic poverty, life-course poverty and intergenera-
tional poverty. Manchester: Chronic Poverty Research Centre.
Mok, T., Can, C., & Sanyal, A. (2007), The determinants of urban 
household poverty in Malaysia. Journal of Social Sciences 3 (4), 
pp. 190-196.
OECD (2009), Doing Better for Children. Paris: OECD 
Publishing.
OECD (2008), Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and 
Poverty in OECD Countries.
OECD (2011), Pisa 2009 at a Glance. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Tarkowska, E. (2007), Oblicza polskiej biedy. Warsaw, Institute 
of Philosophy and Sociology Polish Academy of Sciences.
Waldfogel, J., Craigie, T., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (2010), Fragile 
Families and Child Wellbeing. Fragile Families , Vol. 20 (No. 2), 
pp. 87-112.
Warzywoda-Kruszyńska, W., & Golczyńska-Grondas, A. (2010), 
Wzmocnić szanse i osłabić transmisję biedy wśród mieszkańców 
miast województwa łódzkiego - WZLOT. The final report, Lodz, 
University of Lodz
Jobs
vs. inequality 
and poverty 
3.
Introduction 
Poverty and jobs
Changes In the labour market and InCome InequalIty
labour IntensIty and InCome struCture
low wages and In-work Poverty
Poverty persistence
Poverty sPells
InCome mobIlIty
wage mobIlIty
summary
bibliography
 
1 
1.1
1.2
1.3
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
103
104
104
112
116
128
128
132
140
144
146
Authors:
Maciej Lis
Monika Potoczna
100
employment in Poland 2011  
Poverty and jobs 
Jobs vs. inequality and poverty 3
list of tables / part 3
table iii. 1 Selected indicators of wage dispersion in Poland, 1996-2010 112
table iii. 2 Changes in selected types of income and in activity in the labour market by types of households 
in Poland, 1998-2011
115
table iii. 3 The number of workers by working hours, 1995-2011 (in thousands) 125
table iii. 4 Flows between poverty in the housing and income approach in a panel, 2010-2011 131
table iii. 5 Matrix of flows between the decile groups of equivalised household income distribution, 
2009-2010 (%)
133
table iii. 6 Relative distance of the median household income from the relative and absolute poverty threshold 
by the types of flows, 2002-2011 136
table iii. 7 Flows between poverty in the income and expenditure approach in a panel, 2009-2010 138
table iii. 8 Changes in equivalised expenditure and equivalised income of household flowing into poverty in a 
panel, 2009-2010
138
table iii. 9 Characteristics of the labour market vs. wage mobility in European countries 141
table iii. 10 Probability of flowing into and out of low-paid employment, 1994-2001 (%) 142
list of boxes / part 3
box iii. 1 The importance of income and wage inequality to poverty – methods of decomposition 109
box iii. 2 Definition of a low-paid worker 118
box iii. 3 Working time based on LFS 125
box iii. 4 Persistence of poor housing conditions 131
box iii. 5 Income mobility vs. expenditure mobility in Poland 133
box iii. 6 From rags to riches? 135
box iii. 7 Income poverty vs. consumption smoothing 138
list of figures / part 3
figure iii. 1 Income inequality vs. the risk of poverty, 2011 105
figure iii. 2 Labour market characteristics in the 15-64 age-group and GDP growth rate (year-on-year) in Poland, 
1992-2011
106
figure iii. 3 Median of equivalised income in Poland, 1994-2011 (constant prices of 2010) 107
figure iii. 4 Gini coefficient in Poland, 1994-2011 107
figure iii. 5 The first decile of equivalised income distribution in Poland as the percentage of median, 1994-2011 107
figure iii. 6 The tenth decile of equivalised income distribution in Poland as the percentage of median, 
1994-2011
107
figure iii. 7 Evolution in the density of equivalised income distribution in Poland, 1994-2010 (constant prices 
of 2010)
108
101
employment in Poland 2011 
Poverty and jobs 
Jobs vs. inequality and poverty 3
figure iii. 8
Decomposition of changes in the risk of quasi-absolute poverty (left panel) and the depth of poverty 
(right panel) into components resulting from an increase in equivalised income and change 
in distribution of the equivalised income, 1994-2011 (pp)
110
figure iii. 9
Changes in poverty risk compared to the fixed threshold of 1998, decomposed into changes resulting 
from changes in employment, wages and their stratification (right panel) and total impact of income 
from non-agricultural work (left panel) in Poland, 1998-2010 (pp)
110
figure iii. 10 Selected indicators of wage dispersion in Poland, 1996-2010 111
figure iii. 11 The relative change of percentiles in the distribution of real wages, 1996-2010 111
figure iii. 12 Structure of household income in Poland, 1998-2011 (left panel), and the relative contribution 
of particular components of income to poverty reduction, 2010 (right panel)
113
figure iii. 13 Income structure in poor households (left panel) and non-poor households (right panel) in Poland, 
1998-2010
114
figure iii. 14 Structure of the working-poor in Poland, 2011 116
figure iii. 15 The risk of relative poverty among workers in Poland, 2011 116
figure iii. 16 Total poverty rate and in-work poverty rate in Europe, 2011 117
figure iii. 17 In-work poverty in Europe, 2005-2011 117
figure iii. 18 Dynamics of the gap in the risk of relative and absolute poverty between the total population 
and working individuals in Poland, 1998-2011 (pp)
117
figure iii. 19 The depth of absolute poverty among the working-poor and all poor in Poland, 1998-2011 117
figure iii. 20 Comparison of low-paid work and relative poverty thresholds in Poland, 1998-2011 (in prices 
of 2010)
118
figure iii. 21 Structure of the employed outside agriculture in Poland, 2011 119
figure iii. 22 Distribution of net labour income in Poland, 2011 119
figure iii. 23 The risk of relative poverty and the risk of low-wages among the employed outside agriculture 
in Poland, 2011
120
figure iii. 24 The absolute in-work poverty rates by sex, 1999-2011 120
figure iii. 25 Relative difference between the distribution of wages of men and women in Poland, 2010 120
figure iii. 26 The risk of poverty and low wages by sex in Poland, 2011 120
figure iii. 27 The share of low-paid workers by the age of the worker in poor and non-poor households 121
figure iii. 28 The risk of relative in-work and total poverty by age group in Poland, 2011 121
figure iii. 29 Changes in the employment of individuals aged 55-64 in Poland, 1998-2011 122
figure iii. 30 The effect of education on the probability of being working-poor 122
figure iii. 31 The risk of poverty vs. level of equivalised income by voivodeship in Poland 123
figure iii. 32 The risk of in-work poverty vs. share of low-paid workers by voivodeship in Poland 123
figure iii. 33 In-work poverty in the groups of professions 123
figure iii. 34 In-work poverty by main source of income in a household 123
figure iii. 35 The structure of non-poor households with low-paid workers in Poland, 2011 124
102
employment in Poland 2011  
Poverty and jobs 
Jobs vs. inequality and poverty 3
figure iii. 36 The structure of poor households with low-paid workers in Poland, 2011 124
figure iii. 37 The structure of poor employee households, 2011 124
figure iii. 38 Structure of non-poor employee households, 2011 124
figure iii. 39 Number of hours worked per week under various forms of employment in 1995-2011 125
figure iii. 40 The impact of individuals in a household on the risk of in-work poverty 126
figure iii. 41 Labour intensity in a households vs. risk of poverty in Poland, 2011 126
figure iii. 42 Structure of households by the number of poverty spells in selected European countries, 2005-2008 129
figure iii. 43 The probability of poverty in relation to poverty spells in the past in Poland, against EU-15, 
2005-2008
129
figure iii. 44 Raw and true impact of poverty spells on the likelihood of being poor in the EU countries, 
2005-2008 (pp)
129
figure iii. 45 True persistence of poverty vs. the importance of childhood poverty in selected European countries, 
2004-2008
129
figure iii. 46 Duration of poverty and non-poverty in Poland (years) 130
figure iii. 47 The risk of poverty of housing conditions and quasi-absolute poverty, 1998-2011 131
figure iii. 48 Inflow vs. outflow rates for poverty of housing and quasi-absolute poverty 131
figure iii. 49 The probability of remaining in a given decile of income distribution within a year, 2007 and 2009 133
figure iii. 50 Probability of change in income (left panel) and expenditure (right panel) over a year in various 
income and expenditure deciles, 2009-2010
133
figure iii. 51 Income mobility in Poland and Europe 134
figure iii. 52 The probability of a flow between the highest and the lowest decile of equivalised household income 
distribution within a year (left panel) and three years (right panel), 2005-2008 (%)
135
figure iii. 53 The rates of inflow to and outflow from poverty within a year in the EU countries, 2005-2008 136
figure iii. 54 The importance of inflows and outflows for the change in poverty risk, 2003-2011 (pp) 136
figure iii. 55 Structure of the absolutely poor by status after a year, 2003, 2006 and 2011 136
figure iii. 56 Cumulative distribution of income of selected households before (left panel) and after (right panel) 
the change of status
137
figure iii. 57 Characteristics of the head of household vs. probability of outflow from and inflow to poverty 
within a year
139
figure iii. 58 Household structure vs. inflows into and outflows from poverty 140
figure iii. 59 The probability of change in wage by more than one decile within a year 141
figure iii. 60 The probability of remaining in the same decile in the wage distribution within a year 141
figure iii. 61 Flows between deciles of the wage distribution in Europe, 2004-2008 142
figure iii. 62 Probability of remaining a low-paid worker 143
figure iii. 63 The impact of a low-paid job in the previous period on the probability of a low-paid job 
in the current period
143
103
employment in Poland 2011 
Poverty and jobs 
Jobs vs. inequality and poverty 3
Introduction
This Part is dedicated to the impact of the labour market on income inequality from the perspective of equal opportunities 
and outcomes. While the public policy based on equalising income through transfers from the rich to the poor is relatively simple 
to implement, its efficiency is not obvious. In contrast, increasing the equality of opportunity is much more of a challenge, although 
more reasonable in legislative and efficiency terms. In this Part, we examine equal opportunities defined as the relation between 
the current economic situation and future incomes of households across a period from one to eight years long, and as the impact 
of wealth in childhood on adult income. 
The most important source of household income is work and therefore in this Part we focus on the interaction between the 
labour market and poverty. We begin with setting a hypothesis that the risk of relative poverty is a reflection of income inequality 
and we verify this through examination of differences amongst countries. Then we move on to the analysis of changes in inequality 
in Poland in response to structural and business cycle changes in the labour market after 1994. We show that a real-terms decline 
in absolute poverty in Poland has been mainly due to an increase in income, while the increase in income inequality has been signifi-
cant for the depth of poverty.
Then we deepen our analysis by examining changes in wage inequality, labour intensity and the structure of household income. 
Labour income is the main source of household revenue and we should look for sources of income inequality and poverty in employ-
ment and wage disparities. Therefore we first characterise the structural and cyclical dynamics in labour intensity in poor and non-
poor households, and then quantify in real terms the importance of changes in employment, the level and the diversity of wages on 
poverty dynamics. We note that changes in wage inequality translate only slightly into a reduction in the realm of poverty, for which 
the most significant factor is the average level of employment and labour income.
While an increase in income and shocks affecting the labour market, and their absorption, explain most changes in poverty in 
Poland, low wages alone do not explain the scope of in-work poverty. Therefore, in the second Chapter of this Part we focus on the 
working-poor. The analysis of this phenomenon within an international context leads to the conclusion that the relationship be-
tween income inequality and total work poverty is not obvious. An increase in relative poverty risk among workers, associated with 
a relative improvement in the situation of non-working individuals, leads to a reduction in income inequality at the macroeconomic 
level. As only a small part of the working-poor receive low wages, it is low labour intensity in households that pushes people with 
relatively high wages into poverty. High labour intensity in a household protects low-wage workers from poverty. 
The final analysis of this Part is devoted to persistent poverty, in other words – the issue of equal opportunities. We present 
persistent poverty in Poland in comparison with other European countries. We also examine the significance of poverty spells for 
the situation of individuals and households, as well as the importance of the hysteresis effect. We show that the experience of pov-
erty, even as early as in childhood, is important for the current income situation. While income inequality shows whether a society is 
egalitarian with regard to the outcome of economic activity (i.e. income), the degree of poverty persistence and income mobility are 
indicators of the equality of opportunity. Therefore, in the following step we move to analysis of total income mobility to provide a 
more detailed description of income mobility of the poor. 
We also examine changes in the income of the poor over a year and the impact of these changes on outflows from poverty. 
We observe that in real terms the absolute reduction in poverty is rather due to reduced inflows than greater outflows from pov-
erty. A summary of correlates of the inflow and outflow rates indicates the differences between the risk of persistent and transient 
poverty among households. We analyse in detail the impact of the number of working individuals in a household and their eco-
nomic activity on the risk of falling into poverty, especially persistent poverty. Keeping in mind the distinction between low wages 
and in-work poverty, we present conclusions concerning wage mobility in Poland in comparison with other OECD countries.
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poverty and Jobs 1 
Changes In the labour market and 1.1 
InCome InequalIty 
Moving away from understanding poverty as a subsist-
ence income and instead linking it with the average income in 
society, means that the poverty rate becomes one of the meas-
ures of income inequality, and that the so-defined poor in one 
country may live at the level of well-off people in another (see 
Part I). Therefore we begin this chapter with a presentation of 
theories and empirical results that indicate the connection be-
tween the level of growth, income and income inequality. In an 
analysis of growth in Poland over the last 20 years, we examine 
the importance of income evolution and income inequality for 
the reduction of poverty in real terms. Then we characterise in 
detail the changes that have taken place in the labour market 
in Poland and quantify the impact of changes in employment, 
wages, and their inequality, on the risk of poverty in real terms. 
In an in-depth analysis of interactions between poverty and la-
bour we show the significance of income structure and labour 
intensity for poverty prevalence and we characterise the phe-
nomenon of in-work poverty.
Evaluation of the level of growth in different countries 
should not be limited to purely macroeconomic variables, such 
as economic growth, employment, unemployment and inflation. 
No less important carriers of information on the state of socio-
economic advancement are indicators that measure income in-
equality and social cohesion.
A high concentration of resources in the hands of relative-
ly small elite is generally judged as undesirable (OECD, 2012). 
However, the relation between the level and dynamics of eco-
nomic growth and the inequality of income and property is not 
so obvious on theoretical and empirical grounds. According to 
some authors (Barro, 1999), the relation between inequality 
and level of growth should assume the shape of an inverted U: 
relatively small differences in income in under-developed coun-
tries, maximum inequality in countries experiencing intensive 
industrialisation and again a decrease in income inequality in 
the post-industrial stage. However, this hypothesis has failed to 
provide convincing empirical support. Scientific papers which 
take into account the diverse characteristics of countries in 
different periods when analysing correlations between the 
growth rate and inequality, show that the relation between 
these two is rather negative: a reduction in inequality by one 
standard deviation entails an average increase in the growth 
rate by about 0.5 pp (Benabou, 1996). Theoretical reasons for 
this negative relationship are provided by political economy 
(Persson, Tabellini, 1994), the theory of imperfect capital mar-
kets (Loury, 1981), and institutional economics, which indicate 
the influence of uncertainty over property rights on inequality 
and economic growth (Alesina, Perotti, 1996). 
Political economics explains the differences in economic 
performance and inequality between countries with influ-
ences of various sections of society on the political decision 
making process. Due to the asymmetry of the distribution of 
income, the majority of the electorate always have an income 
below the median income in the economy. According to the 
theory of political economy, in a democratic system, parties 
supporting the redistribution of income from the relatively 
affluent to those less wealthy are always going to be more 
popular. On one hand this leads to a decrease in inequality, 
while on the other hand results in a reduction in the savings 
rate, and thus in the overall level of investment and economic 
development. In this way, the theory shows a negative impact 
of lower inequality on growth, i.e. if this is achieved through 
increased income redistribution by the state. But since no 
strong correlation has been observed between the level of 
inequality in a country and the extent of redistribution, the 
empirical confirmation of this theory on a global scale is rather 
problematic (Benabou, 1996).
The opposite direction of impact of income redistribution 
is implied by the models of imperfect capital markets. Credit 
constraints affect mainly microenterprises and poorer house-
holds, reducing their economic activity and the optimal level 
of investment in the economy. Empirical research shows an 
important link between the availability of credit and the rate 
of investment, which is even more apparent when we include 
the availability of loans to people from the two lowest quantiles 
of the income distribution (Perotti, 1994). Redistribution of in-
come by the state to poorer households could overcome liquid-
ity constraints in some of them, and thus promote the growth 
of investment, and support economic growth at the macroeco-
nomic level.
Predictions about the nature of the relation between ine-
quality and growth are also provided by institutional economics 
which indicates a probable relation between the level of uncer-
tainty concerning the enforcement of ownership rights, and the 
extent of concentration of income and wealth in the society. Ac-
cording to institutional economics, political uncertainty leads to 
lower certainty of business contracts and is higher in less egali-
tarian societies. This is due to the pressure on change in the sys-
tem of redistribution, which one day could deprive the owners 
of some of their goods or property rights (such as dividends). 
In turn, the uncertainty regarding property rights reduces the 
rate of investment and economic growth, at least temporarily. 
Empirical studies seem to confirm these predictions, indicating 
a correlation between the stability of property rights and social 
inequality. On the other hand, evidence of the direct impact of 
the degree of protection of property rights on economic growth 
is rather vague (Benabou, 1996).
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Although in the light of theoretical predictions and em-
pirical evidence the connection between inequality and eco-
nomic growth is not straightforward and not stable over time 
and in an international cross-section (Lundberg, Squire, 1999), 
it does not preclude the existence of policies that are consid-
ered to simultaneously enhance growth and reduce inequality. 
Such policies include the dissemination of public education, 
equalizing legal protection of employment in different types 
of contracts, increased spending on active labour market poli-
cies and the reduction of discriminatory practices in the labour 
market, in particular those concerning women and immigrants 
(OECD, 2012).
It is worth noting that the differences in relative poverty 
rates amongst European countries are almost fully explained 
by income inequality, and that the correlation between the Gini 
coefficient and the poverty risk rate amounts to nearly 0.8 (see 
Figure III.1). This relation is particularly strong in countries with 
low inequality. By contrast, in countries with greater income in-
equality (Gini coefficient above 30), including Poland, the Baltic 
states, southern European countries and the United Kingdom 
(see Part I), the poverty rate is also influenced by factors other 
than income inequality.
Differences in income inequality among countries depend 
mainly on labour income inequality, the level of labour force 
participation and generosity of the social security system. Some 
English speaking countries (United Kingdom, Australia, Cana-
da) are characterised by strong inequality of wages and a large 
share of people working part-time, which leads to both high 
wages and large income disparities among those who work, 
which is only partially reduced by social transfers. At the other 
end of the spectrum are the Scandinavian countries and Swit-
zerland, with much lower labour income inequality and high lev-
els of employment rates. In these countries, transfers are com-
mon but play a smaller role in redistribution. Poland qualifies in 
the group of countries with high inequality, caused mainly by la-
bour income inequality (see Part I). This phenomenon is accom-
panied by low levels of employment, similar to Hungary, Greece 
and Spain. At the same time tax and transfer systems are only 
slightly progressive, leading to a level of inequality and poverty 
close to the OECD average (OECD, 2012).
In the previous two decades, income stratification in OECD 
countries has increased on average by 1.7% per year, mostly in 
English-speaking countries, Nordic countries and Israel (OECD, 
2011). Most frequently this phenomenon is explained by tech-
nological progress that favours those highly skilled (known as 
the skill-biased technological change), and in the short term by 
an increase in income inequality induced by the financial crisis 
of 2008. Workers performing routine jobs are subject to com-
petition from automation resulting in a decreasing demand for 
this type of work, and declining wages of people in the middle of 
wage distribution. On the other hand, the productivity of highly 
Figure III.1 | Income inequality vs. the risk of poverty, 2011.
Note: Gini coefficient for equivalised income.
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
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qualified people is enhanced by computerisation with a simul-
taneous increase in demand for low-skilled work concerning 
tasks not amenable to automation.
These phenomena lead to a relative reduction in wages of 
the semi-skilled, which is observed in international comparisons 
(Author et al., 2006; Goos et al., 2009). Globalisation of markets 
and production also leads to a greater concentration of demand 
for high and low-skilled workers in the international division of 
labour, increasing demand for relatively more skilled workers in 
developed countries and reducing demand for the less-skilled, 
in effect leading to greater inequality (Feenstra, Hanson, 1996). 
In addition, the opening of borders increases competitive pres-
sure on low-productive companies, which additionally contrib-
utes to deterioration in the relative status of people with low-
wage jobs (Helpman et al., 2010). 
In addition to long-term technological change, income dis-
tribution may vary due to events such as economic crises. Cri-
ses usually occur in the aftermath of a bubble burst in selected 
sectors of the economy, such as ICT (dotcom bubble in the early 
2000s) and real estate (the crisis of 2008). A downturn in the 
overheated sector results in a fast and yet profound realloca-
tion of resources to other industries and large scale divestment. 
Inevitably, this leads to the restructuring of employment in the 
shrinking industry and its contractors elsewhere, a temporary 
increase in unemployment and a shift in the structure and level 
of wages in the economy. Previous analyses of the significance 
of macroeconomic disturbances affecting the Polish economy 
after 1990 have focused particularly on identifying the im-
pact of the Russian crisis on the Polish labour market at the 
macroeconomic level (Bukowski et al., 2008; Bukowski et al., 
2013), the evaluation of changes in income inequality (Magda, 
Szydłowski, 2008) and evolution of the wage gap between the 
sexes (Matysiak et al., 2010). In a further part of this Chapter, 
we try to complement these works by focusing on the signifi-
cance of macroeconomic disturbances on income inequality in 
Poland over the last two decades.
Among other things, economic changes after 1990 were 
manifested from deep change in the structure of labour de-
mand. Adjustment of labour supply to the changed structure of 
demand has not been flexible enough to avoid a significant in-
crease in unemployment. Not without significance, especially af-
ter 2008, were inflexible wages, hindering the absorption of de-
mand shocks in the labour market through channels other than 
strong fluctuations in unemployment (Bukowski et al., 2013). 
Gradually, individual sectors were subject to increasing inter-
national competition, especially after 1995, when the integra-
tion process with the European Union stepped up, finalised by a 
full formal integration in May 2004. This additionally intensified 
pressure on the restructuring of the Polish economy, thus en-
hancing the risk of increased inequality and poverty. A particu-
lar turning point was the year 1998, in which Poland and several 
other countries in the region were affected by the Russian cri-
sis. 1 These consequences resulted in a second wave of restruc-
turing, accompanied by significantly increased unemployment, 
and lower employment.
While in most countries in the region, the situation in 
the labour market started to improve as early as 2001, in Po-
land a significant improvement was recorded as late as five 
years later, in 2006 (Ministry of Labour, 2008), accompanied 
by a considerable increase in wage and income inequality 
1  The financial crisis in Russia in 1998 was related to the devaluation of the 
ruble and the suspension of repayment of foreign debt, i.e. a partial bankruptcy of 
the country. This resulted in considerable turmoil in international financial markets, 
affecting mostly the countries of Central and Eastern Europe due to the collapse in 
demand for their goods (cf. Ministry of Labour, 2008).
Figure III.2 | labour market characteristics in the 15-64 age-group and gdP growth rate (year-on-year) 
in Poland, 1992-2011.
Source: own elaboration based on BAEL and OECD data (GDP).
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(Magda, Szydlowski, 2008). The fast growth in GDP and em-
ployment and decrease in unemployment after 2005 was inter-
rupted by the global financial crisis at the end of 2008. Although 
Poland was the only country in Europe to avoid recession, the 
growth of the economy was significantly eroded, and the slow-
down did bring about a relatively small increase in unemploy-
ment. In 2011-2012, the second wave of the crisis in Europe 
affected Poland in a similar way, reinforcing the negative trends 
in the labour market, decreasing real income and keeping the 
employment rate from increasing.
Fluctuations in economic growth, employment and un-
employment have been accompanied by changes in income 
inequality. Over the whole period, the Gini coefficient for Po-
land ranged from 29 to 32. Both cyclical and long-term changes 
do not indicate any clear trend in this respect, locating Poland 
among countries with an average level of inequality in the 
OECD. The figures are consistently lower than in South Amer-
ica, the USA and the countries of southern Europe, where the 
Gini coefficient permanently exceeds 35, but are much higher 
than in Nordic countries, Japan and Korea, where the Gini coef-
ficient is below 25 (Eurostat, OECD).
Economic changes and changes in the scale of income in-
equality between 1994 and 2011 can be divided into four main 
stages: (i) economic expansion until 1998, (ii) 1999-2003 crisis, 
(iii) rapid growth between 2005 and 2008 and (iv) stability be-
tween 2009 and 2011. 
In the first stage, increasing income inequality contrib-
uted to increased poverty. Shortly before the Russian crisis 
(1997-1998), this trend reversed, but in general the Polish econ-
omy was in such a bad need of structural changes for accession to 
the European Union in 2004 that rapid economic growth and the 
parallel increase in income was accompanied by a noticeable in-
crease in inequality. In that period GDP grew primarily due to an 
increase in labour productivity rather than capital accumulation 
or employment growth (see Ministry of Labour, 2008), and the 
employment rate in the group of 15-64 years old was about 53%. 
Because income inequality increased at the same time, it may 
Figure III. 3 | median of equivalised income in 
Poland, 1994-2011 (constant prices of 2010).
Figure III. 4 | Gini coefficient in Poland, 1994-2011.
Figure III. 5 | The first decile of equivalised income 
distribution in Poland as the percentage of median, 
1994-2011.
Figure III. 6 | the tenth decile of equivalised income 
distribution in Poland as the percentage of median, 
1994-2011.
Note: income at constant prices of 2010. Large changes between years prior to 1998 may result from a slightly different methodology of the Household Budget Survey 
and the lower reliability of surveys conducted in that period.
Source: own calculations based on data from the Central Statistical Office, Eurostat and Social Diagnosis reports. 
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be suspected that the changes in the economic structure until 
2004 favoured people with high qualifications at the expense of 
those with lower and middle level skills. Rapid economic growth 
in 1994-1998 was also associated with a relative deterioration in 
the situation of the poorest (first decile of wage distribution) and 
the relative enrichment of the richest (tenth decile). 
As a result of the economic slowdown after the Russian cri-
sis, the relative stabilisation on the labour market was over. Be-
tween 1998 and 2005 the rate of economic growth fell markedly, 
and significantly, the median real income stopped growing. At the 
same time there was a sharp rise in unemployment, up to 21% in 
2002. Social transfers, in particular unemployment benefits, early 
retirement and disability pensions, were generally not sufficient 
to alleviate the consequences of the loss of jobs for incomes, and 
did not prevent a deepening of income inequality. A significant in-
crease in the ratio between the incomes of the tenth decile and 
the median of income distribution, and adequate reduction in 
the relative size of the income of the poorest, indicates that the 
period 1998-2005 favoured mainly those that were relatively 
better-skilled, and initially adversely affecting the least produc-
tive individuals (see Figures III.3-6 ).2
2  Increase in inequality is confirmed by data from both HBS and Social 
Diagnosis.
The economic recovery between 2005 and 2008 result-
ed in a reversal of this negative trend. The increase in demand 
for labour was reflected in an increased employment rate, from 
46% in 2002-2004 to 53% in 2008.3 The rise in employment 
and wages increased household incomes, even among the 
poorest. In contrast to 1994-1998, the median of the income 
growth rate was higher than GDP growth. Between 2005 and 
2008, the median of real equivalised income grew by 8.5% 
a year. Social inequality distinctly decreased - the Gini coef-
ficient fell from almost 32 to 30.7 in 2008, while the income 
of the poorest 10% of households grew from 49% to 52% 
of the median, and the income of the richest 10% of house-
holds decreased from 201% to 196.7% of the median of the 
equivalised income.
The weakening of economic growth between 2008 and 
2011 affected the labour market much less than previously. 
Thanks to the increased supply of labour, the employment rate 
remained at 53%, despite the fact that at the same time the 
unemployment rate increased from 6.7% to 9.7%.4 Real wage 
growth slowed to 2.1% year on year, with simultaneous stabili-
sation of the Gini coefficient and a freezing of the relative status 
3  BAEL data for 15-64 year olds. 
4  BAEL data for 15-64 year olds.
Figure III. 7 | evolution in the density of equivalised income distribution in Poland, 1994-2010 
(constant prices of 2010).
Note: the population size is normalised in all bases against CSO data. Distribution density is estimated using a non-parametric kernel density estimator. Distribution density is 
calculated only for households with a positive income. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS and CSO data.
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of the richest and poorest households. Therefore the slowdown 
in growth resulted in a halting of the trend of reduction in rela-
tive poverty, and the median of household income stopped ris-
ing. On the other hand, the economic downturn did not cause a 
significant increase in income inequality.
These processes are clearly visible in the density distri-
bution of equivalised income. Income distribution is right-
skewed, which means that the average income is higher than 
the median and the mode of the distribution. A decrease in in-
equality should be visible in a shift of the income distribution 
to the right, reduced skewness and flattening of the distribu-
tion. To a small extent this situation occurred between 1994 
and 1997, when a slight decrease in inequality was observed. 
Between 1998 and 2005 the income distribution was slightly 
flattened, which, together with the relative impoverishment of 
the poorest, visible in its shift to the left, resulted in an increase 
of inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. This stands in 
contrast with the subsequent strong changes in the shape and 
position of the income distribution between 2005 and 2008, 
i.e. strong flattening and shift to the right. Hence it was the 
strongest inequality-reducing and pro-poor growth in Poland 
since 1994 (see Figure III.7).
An increase in income translates directly into a reduction 
of absolute poverty (cf. Part I), if this increase spreads evenly 
across the entire society. However this is not the case in rela-
tive poverty measures, as the equal enrichment of a society 
results in a shift of the poverty threshold and the entire distri-
bution moves to the right. The level of income stratification is 
maintained and so the rate of relative poverty does not change. 
Not all changes in the shape of the income distribution have an 
effect on the level of poverty. For example, increasing incomes 
of the wealthiest part of society will not have significance for 
the situation of the poorest and for the depth of absolute pov-
erty. Similarly, a slight increase in the income of those situated 
far below the poverty threshold will not have any significant 
impact on the total poverty level. Changes of this type are 
observed relatively rarely. More frequently we observe an in-
crease in income only in selected social groups, and an imbal-
anced dispersion of the fruits of productivity growth across 
society. Sometimes, these changes benefit the relatively poor 
(as was the case in Poland between 2004 and 2008), and some-
times the wealthier groups (1998-2003). 
boX
III.1 the importance of income and wage inequality to poverty – methods of decomposition 
decomposition of changes in poverty risk by income inequality 
Changes in the risk of poverty and depth of poverty can be decomposed into parts resulting from a change in: average income (A), dis-
tribution (B - measured by the Lorenz curve) and the residual part (C), resulting from the inseparable effect of shifts and changes in the 
distribution:
Where: 𝑍𝑈 – the share of the poor in the population, 𝜇𝑖 – average equivalised income in the period 𝑖, 𝐿1 – distribution of equivalised income 
in the population, represented by the Lorentz curve in period 𝑖. This methodology is used in World Bank studies (Lokshin, Ravallion, 2006). 
To eliminate the impact of changes in the poverty threshold, decomposition uses a poverty threshold using the values  from a selected year 
(i.e. quasi-absolute poverty threshold).
simulation decomposition of changes in poverty by labour income
To assess the impact of changes in employment, wages and income inequality on poverty, the poverty risk may be decomposed into pov-
erty risk arising from changes in: median wage (A), wage inequality (B), the number of those with income from work (C) and a residual 
component, resulting from changes in the other components of income and the interactions between the aforementioned factors. Such 
decomposition may be written as follows:
Where: 𝑍𝑈 – the share of the population in households with equivalised income below the poverty threshold, 𝑚𝑖 – median income from 
non-agricultural activity in the period 𝑖, 𝐷𝑖 – distribution of labour income among non-agricultural workers, represented by the empirical 
cumulative distribution function in the period 𝑖, 𝑧𝑖 – employment rate in the period 𝑖, 𝑃𝐷0 – other incomes during the period 0, R – residual 
component.
This decomposition is carried out as a simulation. Impact of wage levels is evaluated by means of shifting the wage distribution from the 
t0 year, so that the median corresponds to that from year t1 and for the quasi-absolute poverty threshold the difference in the rates of 
poverty is compared. The effect of inequality is estimated by the rescaling of the income distribution in year t0, to correspond to the de-
composition of income in year t1, and a comparison of the risk of poverty in year t0 and the counterfactual situation. The third component 
– employment, consists in ascribing a wage or the loss of wage by an individual in the case of a person in the period t0, so that the employ-
ment rate equals that from period t1. Assigning a wage or the deprivation of wage is simulated using the estimated probability of being 
employed in a given period.
Source: own elaboration.
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To quantify the significance of an increase in income and 
change in distribution to the risk of poverty in Poland in 1994-
2011, we used a methodology developed by the World Bank, 
limiting the analysis to quasi-absolute poverty based on the 
1998 threshold (see Box III.1).5 Then we deepen the analysis 
using the simulation method, enabling distinction between the 
impact of employment, wages and labour income inequality on 
the reduction of poverty in real terms in 1998-2010 (see Box 
III.1). The risk of poverty, using a fixed reference, decreased 
from 23% to 7%, i.e. by 16 pp in 17 years. Most significantly, 
an increase in average income in the economy resulting from 
increased employment and wages. It is worth noting that the 
contribution of increased income inequality was 10 times less 
significant for the change in the quasi-absolute poverty rate 
between 1994 and 2011. A change in the shape of the income 
5  Measured as 60% of equivalised income from 1998, in subsequent years 
corrected with the inflation rate.
distribution was relatively more significant for the changes in 
the depth of poverty. If income inequality had remained at the 
level from 1994, the depth of poverty would have decreased by 
4 pp between 1995 and 2011, i.e. about two times more than 
happened in reality (see Figure III.8). 
The increase in poverty, referred to the fixed level at the 
beginning of the period after the Russian crisis, was mostly 
caused by a decrease in employment, and to a lesser extent by 
an increase in wage inequality. The resultant decrease in labour 
income was partly compensated for by other sources of income, 
especially unemployment benefits, pre-retirement benefits and 
early retirement pensions. Thanks to those, between 1998 
and 2004 poverty increased by 1.7 pp and not by 3.2 pp, as 
would have been directly induced by the decrease in employ-
ment and wages. That period strongly contrasts with the boom 
from 2005-2008 when employment and wages of the relatively 
Figure III. 8 | decomposition of changes in the risk of quasi-absolute poverty (left panel) and the depth 
of poverty (right panel) into components resulting from an increase in equivalised income and change in 
distribution of the equivalised income, 1994-2011 (pp).
Figure III. 9 | Changes in poverty risk compared to the fixed threshold of 1998, decomposed into changes 
resulting from changes in employment, wages and their stratification (right panel) and total impact of income 
from non-agricultural work (left panel) in Poland, 1998-2010 (pp). 
Note: poverty threshold at 60% of the median of equivalised income from 1998, adjusted in the next years with the inflation rate.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS and CSO data.
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low-skilled rose quickly and income inequality decreased. After 
2007 the level of employment stabilised, and a reduction in pov-
erty resulted from the increase in wages and lower inequality. In 
the time of fast growth, the role of income from other sources 
decreased, while between 2004 and 2009 they contributed to 
the increased risk of quasi-absolute poverty (see Figure III.9). 
Analysis of relations between changes in the labour mar-
ket and inequality and poverty is complemented by analysis of 
changes in the wage dispersion. The most reliable data on wage 
dispersion in Poland is provided by the Structure of Earnings 
Survey in October, thanks to the high number of surveyed com-
panies, but it also must be remembered that the survey concerns 
companies hiring more than 9 individuals, which significantly 
limits its macroeconomic representativeness. Nonetheless, 
in comparison with alternative sources of data (LFS, HBS), 
the Survey provides the most complete and the most reliable 
data on remuneration for work. The main indicators that de-
scribe the evolution of distribution after 1996 are presented 
in Figures III.10 and III.11, and in Table III.1. Conclusions from 
their analysis confirm those presented in former sections con-
cerning the distribution of income (covering not wages, but also 
other sources of income, such as pensions, capital income, etc.).
Along with the transition to a market system after 1989, 
wage dispersion started to grow while employment started to 
decrease. However, the increase in inequality was not complet-
ed immediately after the first years of transformation, but lasted 
until 2006, from when we may observe a systematic reduction 
in wage dispersion (see Figure III.10). The decrease in wage ine-
quality began two years after the first increases in employment 
and decreases in income inequality. After the wage inequality 
stabilised between 1996 and 1998, which was associated with 
the balanced increase in wages, the collapse in the labour mar-
ket after the Russian crisis resulted not only in an increase in 
unemployment, but also brought about a relative deterioration 
of the situation of low-paid workers. The ratio of wages in the 
ninth and first decile of the wage distribution increased from 
3.4 to 4.3, indicating an ever greater disparity between the two 
extreme groups in the distribution (see Table III.1). This state 
of affairs was due to both an increase in wages of the best paid 
10% of the population, and the fact that the lowest wages de-
creased in real terms. Most changes in the D9/D1 ratio can be 
attributed to changes in the wage dispersion of people with 
earnings below the median (see Figure III.11).6
This negative trend in wages reversed with the economic 
recovery after 2003, but not before 2006, i.e. three years after 
the beginning of recovery and two years after the decrease in 
income inequality began. In that period the lowest wages grew 
most, which resulted in a significant decrease in wage inequality: 
the Gini coefficient for wages decreased by 0.02. Immediately 
before the global downturn, i.e. in 2006-2008, the increase in 
wages in Poland was spread evenly across all income groups 
(see Figure III.10). In the final stage of the economic recovery, 
the lowest wages started to grow even faster than the high-
est wages (see Figure III.11). That trend was maintained after 
2008, when the GDP growth dynamics in Poland decreased due 
to the global downturn (see Table III.11). A decrease in wage in-
equality was maintained despite a slight increase in income in-
equality since 2009. While increases in employment after 2001 
were faster to occur in smaller companies (10-20 individuals), 
decreases in employment after 2008 were concentrated in the 
largest companies (more than 250 workers). 7
It is worth noting that the qualitative change in income 
of the population was similar in both spells of the slower 
economic growth after 1994, i.e. in the periods 1998-2003 
and 2009-2011. In the latter period, the scale of response of 
wages and other labour market aggregates to the slowdown 
was, however, decidedly lower, as the less favourable condi-
tions after 2009 had a much lower impact on the labour market 
6  From the 8%-high variation in the D9/D1 ratio, 6.3 pp may be attributed to 
variation in the D5/D1 indicator.
7  Based on Structure of Earnings Surveys, 1996-2010.
Figure III. 10 | selected indicators of wage 
dispersion in Poland, 1996-2010. 
Figure III. 11 | the relative change of percentiles in 
the distribution of real wages, 1996-2010
Source: own elaboration based on Structure of Earnings Survey data.
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in Poland than between 1998 and 2003, and the scale of inter-
nal restructuring in companies was smaller. That is why the rela-
tively slight increase in unemployment observed in 2012 raised 
expectations that the global downturn would ultimately have a 
weaker impact on the rise in inequality and poverty risk than ten 
years ago (see Figure III.2).
Despite quantitative differences, the negative situation in 
the labour market must result in a decline in real income of the 
poorest households, in relation to the income of the wealthier 
households. Usually it is the poorest that are most affected by 
worse working conditions and job loss due to the economic 
downturn. Since the character of technological changes induces 
a constant growth in productivity and wages of better qualified 
individuals, the average income do not stop growing even dur-
ing the recession, at the expense of growing income inequality, 
increased poverty risk and its depth.
labour IntensIty and household 1.2 
InCome struCture
In the previous section we showed the changes in income, 
poverty depth and scale of inequality are caused by fluctuations 
in employment, unemployment and wages. Changes in labour 
intensity and in sources of income among poor and non-poor 
households complement the analysis of significance of house-
hold structure for the dynamics of poverty presented in Part II 
of the report. A detailed analysis of sources of income other than 
hired labour shows the extent of their contribution to the reduc-
tion of poverty, casting an additional light on the significance of 
the household structure on the poverty of household members, 
especially in-work poverty. A more detailed examination of la-
bour intensity dynamics and income structure makes it possible 
to track the response of the poor and non-poor households to 
short-term demand shocks in the labour market, and the long-
term structural trends that transform the labour market. 
External shocks have an impact on the labour market 
and in consequence affect the incomes of the population. 
The economic slowdown between 1998 and 2001 and the 
accompanying high inflation, which in 2000 exceeded 10%, 
resulted in a decrease in the real income of households. After 
2001 real income began to grow again, and between 2006 and 
2007 its dynamics exceeded 8%. That strong growth resulted 
mainly from increased income from non-agricultural hired la-
bour and self-employment, the share of which in total income 
increased from 45.6% and 8% in 2005 to 53.7% and 9.8% in 
2011. Except for 2005-2007, when the income from agricul-
tural work began to be strongly influenced by the introduc-
tion of the Common Agricultural Policy in Poland, we observed 
a declining share of agricultural income in the total income of 
households (from 6.9% in 1998 to 4.3% in 2011). 
Loss of income from work during the economic slowdown 
is partly compensated for by social benefits, among which a sig-
nificant role is played by unemployment benefits and early-re-
tirement benefits. The share of these benefits in the income of 
the population increased from 5.9% in 1998 to 8.8% in 2004, to 
fall again to 5.5% in 2009 due to the positive impact of the eco-
nomic recovery between 2003 and 2008. The very mechanism 
of wage indexation of pensions was not sufficient to maintain 
the share of pensions in the income at a stable level of 19-21% 
during the time of the strong increase in employment and wag-
es after 2005. The relative share of benefits in the total income 
was the increase in criteria of granting disability pensions was 
not without significance, which shrank in share in total income 
from 7.6% in 1998 to 2.5% in 2011. In the same period, the total 
share of disability and old-age pensions decreased only by 3 pp, 
from 25% to 22%, where some disability pensions were con-
verted into old-page pensions, and the aging of the population 
increased total inflow to the pension system (see Figure III.12). 
This picture may be complemented by examination of the 
scale of poverty reduction depending on the inclusion of a given 
type of income to household budgets. To this end, we first as-
sume zero incomes from all sources, assuming all households to 
be poor. Then we add the particular types of income to enables 
identification of their relative impact on the decrease in propor-
tion of the poor in the economy. This experiment is repeated 
table III. 1 | selected indicators of wage dispersion in Poland, 1996-2010.
p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10 p75/p25 p75/p50 p50/p25 gini Variance
1996 3.39 1.96 1.72 1.84 1.38 1.33 0.28 0.23
1998 3.38 1.94 1.75 1.86 1.38 1.35 0.29 0.24
1999 3.54 2.00 1.79 1.90 1.40 1.35 0.30 0.26
2001 3.71 2.01 1.85 1.95 1.40 1.39 0.31 0.27
2002 3.98 2.04 1.96 2.04 1.43 1.43 0.32 0.30
2004 4.09 2.07 1.96 2.06 1.44 1.43 0.33 0.31
2006 4.31 2.11 2.04 2.10 1.44 1.45 0.34 0.32
2008 4.12 2.04 2.02 2.05 1.42 1.45 0.33 0.30
2010 3.96 2.01 1.97 2.06 1.42 1.45 0.32 0.29
Source: own elaboration based on the Structure of Earnings Survey.
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many times to allow for every combination and then the results 
are averaged. 8 As a result, we obtain an approximate contribu-
tion of particular types of income to the reduction in poverty, 
both in relative poverty terms (PLN 931 ~ EUR 223 in 2010) and 
the minimum living standards defined by The Institute of Labour 
and Social Studies (PLN 472 ~ EUR 110 in 2010), which we com-
pare with the share of a given income type in the total income. 
The significance of hired labour income in the reduction 
of poverty is not significantly different from the share in total 
income (i.e. 53%). However, there is a distinct disparity be-
tween the contribution of hired labour income to the reduction 
of poverty and the contribution of income from agriculture or 
self-employment. The impact of the two latter types of income 
is distinctly weaker compared to hired-labour income, which 
is related to the fact that agricultural income is on average too 
low to exceed the poverty threshold. At the same time, income 
from self-employment remains an additional revenue in house-
holds whose other sources of income make it possible to exceed 
the poverty threshold. Pensions and social benefits play a very 
important role in the reduction of poverty among the elderly. 
Old-age pensions are high enough to exceed the relative pov-
erty threshold, and disability pensions and other benefits usu-
ally protect against absolute poverty, although not the relative 
poverty threshold (see Figure III.12). 
The poverty of households in Poland results mainly from 
the large number of non-working individuals at working age. 
Poor households have more than a two-times lower inten-
sity of non-agricultural labour and almost a two-times lower 
8  The impact on the reduction of poverty is calculated starting with zero 
income and 100% poverty risk, and then by adding the subsequent types of income 
we observe a decrease in poverty risk. This procedure is then repeated for each 
possible permutation and after averaging, the Shapley’s value is calculated. 
employment rates than non-poor households. In 2011 only 
44% of their income came from work, compared to 64% in non-
poor households. In all types of households, labour intensity 
is from 1/3 to 2/3 lower than in non-poor households, albeit 
in 1998-2011 it increased the most in poor, agricultural and 
old-age pension households, and also non-poor households de-
pending on disability pensions and poor households depending 
on other benefits (See Table III.2). 
In the perspective of 13 years, the increase in non-agricul-
tural labour intensity has been accompanied by both decreas-
ing employment and activity in poor households, regardless of 
the main source of income. Leaving work in agriculture has the 
greatest impact on this phenomenon, but it is more associated 
with an early exit from the labour market than with finding a job 
outside agriculture and occurs mainly among poor households. 
The growing unemployment rate is accompanied by a decrease 
in economic activity in agricultural households, which indicates a 
lack of demand for the work of farmers looking for employment 
elsewhere, and leads to their persistent inactivity. The decrease 
in the number of people in agricultural households, mainly non-
poor, is accompanied by an increase in non-agricultural labour 
intensity in poor agricultural households, resulting from finding 
jobs with wages lower than the agricultural income and not ena-
bling an exit from poverty risk. On the other hand, a decrease in 
the number of non-poor agricultural households is connected 
with the cessation of agricultural activity or receiving a disabil-
ity pension or other benefits. 
At the same time, agricultural income in non-poor agricul-
tural households remain at the stable level, which in combina-
tion with an almost 50% decrease in number of these house-
holds, means a significant per capita increase in agricultural 
Figure III. 12 | structure of household income in Poland, 1998-2011 (left panel), and the relative contribution 
of particular components of income to poverty reduction, 2010 (right panel). 
Note: negative income from agriculture was deemed to be zero, at constant prices of 2008. The scale of poverty reduction by a given type of income was divided by the share 
of a given type of income in total income. 100% means that the contribution to the reduction of poverty of a given type of income is identical to its share in total income.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS and CSO data.
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Figure III. 13 | Income structure in poor households (left panel) and non-poor households (right panel) 
in Poland, 1998-2010.
Note: poverty threshold at the level of 60% of the median of equivalised income, negative income from agriculture was deemed to be 0. Total income is presented in fixed 
prices from 1998.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS and CSO data.
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income. There is a distinct phenomenon of finding jobs outside 
agriculture by the members of agricultural households that are 
not household heads, mainly in poor households. 
Agricultural activity, when carried out on a sufficiently large 
scale, does not lead to poverty and is not a factor that strongly 
drives the members of agricultural households to look for work 
elsewhere. As non-poor agricultural households depend mainly 
on agriculture, in poor households agriculture yields only half 
of the income and does not even have a complementary signifi-
cance for households depending on other sources of income. 
Only in households which depend mainly on disability pensions 
or social benefits have we observed significant increases in in-
come from agricultural labour. 
Large labour reserves exist in poor households, where un-
employment rates are decidedly higher than the non-poor, while 
labour intensity is much lower. Cyclical changes in employment 
affect the poor the most as the variation in the intensity of non-
agricultural labour is two-times lower in poor households than 
the non-poor. The non-poor households are affected by fluc-
tuations of labour demand, but changes in labour supply are ob-
served mainly among households that depend on benefits and 
transfers, and in poor employee households. This is indicated 
by the higher variation of employment rate in non-poor house-
holds and the concentration of variation in labour intensity and 
employment rates in poor households, as well as high fluctua-
tions in economic activity in households depending on benefits. 
Low-skilled workers, with a human capital less adapted to the 
demands of the economy and an ensured minimum income 
from sources other than work, are only employed during a suffi-
ciently high increase in labour demand, while during production 
cuts they are the first to lose their jobs. This greater variation in 
labour intensity in poor households is accompanied by a greater 
variation in their income. This dependence does not include ag-
ricultural households. 
Social benefits (except old-age and disability pensions) 
are a four-times more significant source of income for poor 
households than the non-poor, with this difference increas-
ing. The compensatory and transitional role of benefits means 
something different for these two groups. In non-poor house-
holds, benefits help avoid poverty as they compensate for a 
transient decrease in labour income. Among poor households, 
these benefits are a constant source of income and temporary 
fluctuations in benefits are much less significant. Over the pre-
vious decade, the role of social benefits for working households 
has distinctly decreased, while it has increased for agricultural 
households and those depending on disability pensions. Ben-
efits other than disability or old-age pensions are not sufficient 
to exit from poverty if they are not accompanied by income 
from other sources. 
Differences in the average income per capita between 
employee, agricultural and old-age pensioner households are 
low, with the greatest increase in income observed for em-
ployee and agricultural households. At the current dynamics, 
in a few years employee households will become richer than 
pensioner households. The greatest difference between the 
average income of poor and non-poor households is observed 
for agricultural income, which may result partly from the inac-
curacy of monthly measurement of agricultural income, but 
also confirms the strong diversity in this group of households. 
The lowest difference between poor and non-poor households 
concerns households depending on benefits, among which 
even non-poor households are only a little richer than poor 
pensioner households. Among households that depend mainly 
on transfers, including old-age and disability pensions, a con-
vergence exists, i.e. a faster growth of income of households 
with a lower income. The lowest benefits and disability pen-
sions grow faster than the relatively high old-age pensions, but 
slower than employee income. At the same time, the income of 
poor households grows at a similar rate, regardless of the type 
of household (see Table III.2). 
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table III. 2 | Changes in selected types of income and in activity in the labour market by types of households 
in Poland 1998-2011. 
households by main source of income
all non-agricultural agriculture old-age pension
disability 
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other benefits 
n
o
n
-p
o
o
r
p
o
o
r
n
o
n
-p
o
o
r
p
o
o
r
n
o
n
-p
o
o
r
p
o
o
r
n
o
n
-p
o
o
r
p
o
o
r
n
o
n
-p
o
o
r
p
o
o
r
n
o
n
-p
o
o
r
p
o
o
r
intensity of 
non-agricultural 
labour  9
2011 60% 26% 68% 41% 12% 7% 52% 29% 43% 12% 24% 10%
variation coefficient 4% 9% 3% 5% 20% 24% 3% 29% 7% 24% 27% 22%
relative change 11% 15% 5% -1% 34% 80% 14% 37% 33% 4% 59% 79%
employment 
rate
2011 61% 38% 70% 47% 71% 67% 29% 21% 31% 16% 26% 16%
variation coefficient 4% 6% 3% 4% 2% 2% 8% 9% 10% 10% 30% 20%
relative change 0% -22% 2% -10% -13% -15% 4% -41% 1% -40% 18% -10%
activity rate
2011 65% 55% 74% 62% 74% 71% 34% 44% 37% 32% 39% 55%
wsp. zmienności 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 6% 6% 6% 8% 11% 7%
zmiana względna 2% -11% 3% -5% -10% -11% 8% -19% 4% -22% 8% -5%
unemployment 
rate
2011 7% 31% 6% 24% 4% 6% 15% 53% 15% 48% 34% 71%
variation coefficient 28% 20% 27% 20% 24% 29% 32% 19% 30% 23% 29% 14%
relative change 23% 40% 15% 23% 184% 281% 25% 53% 21% 48% -14% 2%
share of labour 
income 
2011 64% 44% 86% 80% 12% 35% 14% 5% 19% 8% 28% 10%
variation coefficient 4% 4% 1% 2% 20% 25% 15% 24% 22% 22% 34% 29%
relative change 13% 9% 5% 3% 39% 155% 63% 21% 59% 48% 144% 94%
share of 
agricultural 
income 
2011 4% 5% 1% 1% 75% 50% 0% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
variation coefficient 9% 9% 9% 10% 3% 12% 34% 18% 26% 17% 48% 45%
relative change -37% -51% -33% -59% 0% -17% -14% -34% 112% -54% 134% 41%
share of income 
from other 
benefits 
2011 5% 20% 3% 12% 3% 19% 2% 6% 43% 34% 44% 62%
variation coefficient 17% 7% 14% 6% 15% 10% 15% 11% 9% 6% 14% 3%
relative change -12% 4% -25% 7% 54% 55% 22% -13% 66% 44% -19% -15%
real income per 
capita
2011 (Pln) 1315 406 1333 411 1492 335 1347 554 1129 472 725 313
variation coefficient 6% 10% 6% 10% 9% 7% 4% 11% 7% 11% 8% 10%
relative change 49% 40% 53% 38% 56% 43% 38% 33% 46% 38% 64% 35%
number 
2011 (million) 31.4 6.3 21.3 2.8 1.4 0.9 6.6 0.9 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.7
variation coefficient 1% 4% 6% 7% 9% 11% 5% 13% 14% 8% 41% 20%
relative change -4% 10% -2% 13% -45% -28% 18% 106% -49% -21% 15% 24%
Note: all changes are between 1998 and 2011. The coefficient of variation was calculated as the average deviation from the value of the trend line. Other benefits include all 
social benefits other than disability and old-age pensions. Households are grouped by main source of household income. Labour intensity is defined as the ratio of the number 
of persons employed outside agriculture in the household to the number of people aged 15-64 who do not study, unless they combine education with work. Employment, 
activity and unemployment rates are calculated for the age group 15-64.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
9 Labour intensity is calculated as the ratio of the number of individuals 
working outside agriculture weighed by the number of hours worked and the 
number of person potentially working in the household. For individuals working 
full-time the weight is 1, and for not full-time employment it is 0.75 (based on LFS , 
see Box III. 3). The potential workers include all persons aged 15-64 years.
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Total household income is dominated by non-agricultural 
income and the share is both pro-cyclical and systematically 
growing. Hired labour income is more effective in protecting 
against poverty than self-employment and agricultural work. 
A relatively high replacement rate results in the fact that pen-
sions are usually enough to get out of the risk of poverty, and 
combining pensions with work protects against relative pover-
ty. Pensions and other benefits help avoid absolute poverty but 
are often insufficient to exceed the relative poverty threshold. 
The most significant difference between poor and non-
poor households is a two and a half higher labour intensity in 
the non-poor. Although in some households low labour inten-
sity is difficult to overcome due to a disability resulting from 
health status, economic activity in Poland has significant re-
serves which, if released, would increase the income of those 
households and decrease their relative poverty rate. 
To sum up, the level and dispersion of labour income are 
the basic sources of income inequality in Poland. Income from 
work constitutes most of the total household income (70% in 
2010), mainly from hired labour, while agricultural labour and 
self-employment amount to 20% of total income from labour. 
Income from social transfers are less significant both for pros-
perity and income dispersion. The next sources of income in 
terms of level are pensions (16.5%). The share of disability pen-
sions and other social benefits does not exceed 7% of the total 
household income, whereas other sources of income (e.g. pri-
vate transfers, damages and alimony) do not exceed 5%. Non-
poor households differ from poor households mainly in higher 
activity and non-agricultural labour intensity. Poverty is often a 
result of non matching skills or experience of household mem-
bers to the labour demand, and the high unemployment rate 
among the poor. A decrease in employment in agriculture is as-
sociated with an early exit from the labour market by farmers 
more than employing them outside agriculture. Benefits and 
social transfers, except old-age pensions, are a constant source 
of income for poor households, and among non-poor house-
holds they act as cushions to help stabilise real income during 
economic slowdowns.
low wages and In-work PoVerty1.3 
Although work is the main source of income for households, 
even those who work may be at risk of poverty. Accordingly, this 
section is dedicated to the phenomenon of the working-poor, 
a subject of considerable interest to policy-makers since the 
1970s (Pena-Casas, Latta, 2004), and especially significant in 
the context of international trends in the fight against the pov-
erty, i.e. focusing on an increase in employment and quality of 
work (European Commission, 2001). 
Analysis of in-work poverty requires a more detailed defi-
nition of a few issues, including the very term working-poor. 
It must be remembered that poverty is defined at the level 
of a household and not individuals, as the situation of an indi-
vidual depends also on the income of the remaining household 
members. Those who work (workers) are defined as aged 15 
and more years, who during the 7 days prior to the survey per-
formed any paid work or worked but did not perform any tasks 
at the time.10 The working-poor are therefore working mem-
bers of a poor household.
Among the so defined working-poor in Poland, half work 
in agriculture where the risk of poverty is much higher than for 
employees (see Figure III.14). Farmers constitute more than 
12% of those working, and the difference in poverty risk be-
tween them and employees was as much as 30 pp in 2011, which 
translates into a 40% share of farmers among the working-poor 
(see Figure III.14). However, due to the fact that agricultural 
households are the subject of a detailed analysis in Part II, for 
the purposes of this chapter we have excluded farmers from the 
analysis of the working-poor. It is also worth noting that Euro-
stat does not include farmers in the group of working-poor. 
Poland, similar to other post-communist countries, has a 
relatively high risk of in-work poverty. According to EU-SILC 
data, the share of working-poor in the working population 
10  Definition is based on the LFS definition with modifications resulting from 
the construction of the HBS survey. Literature on the subject also uses a Eurostat 
definition according to which a worker has worked for 6 months over the year prior 
to the survey (see Eurostat, 2010 and Hanzl-Weiß, Vidovic, 2010 ). 
Figure III. 14 | structure of the working-poor 
in Poland, 2011. 
Figure III. 15 | the risk of relative poverty among 
workers in Poland, 2011. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data. Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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in this group was 7.9% in 2011 (see Figure III.16). The rate of 
in-work poverty in the new member states (7.2%) is higher than 
in the EU15 (5.5%), which is associated with the relatively high 
level of pensions compared to the average wage in some of the 
countries in the region, including Poland. The lowest rate of in-
work poverty is observed in countries with the high economic 
activity – Denmark and Germany (4%), and the highest rate in 
Latvia and Slovenia (12.3%). In 2005-2011, among the Europe-
an countries the highest decrease in in-work poverty occurred 
in the post-communist countries – Romania, Czech Republic 
and Lithuania, and the highest increase was observed in Austria 
(Figure III.17). 
In all European countries, except Norway, the poverty level 
among the working population is lower than in the total popula-
tion. The difference between the total and in-work poverty rates 
is 11 pp in the EU27. In Poland this gap is 10 pp, but both rates 
are higher than the EU27 average. The differences between the 
total and in-work poverty rate result from the relative level of 
net wages in relation to transfers and social benefits, and the in-
cidence of households without employees. To achieve a very low 
level of total income inequality, the situation of employee house-
holds must not differ significantly from non-employee house-
holds. That is why the lowest levels of total income dispersion 
are observed in countries with high tax and transfer rates which 
decrease the income of workers (PIT) and increase the income 
of those who do not work (old-age and disability pensions, etc).
Figure III. 16 | total poverty rate and in-work 
poverty rate in europe, 2011. 
Figure III. 17 | In-work poverty in europe, 
2005-2011. 
Note: countries are presented in ascending order, by absolute difference between the 
risk of poverty in the total population and the working population. 
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat and EU-SILC data.
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat and EU-SILC data.
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Figure III. 18 | dynamics of the gap in the risk 
of relative and absolute poverty between the total 
population and working individuals in Poland, 
1998-2011 (pp).
Figure III. 19 | the depth of absolute poverty among 
the working-poor and all poor in Poland, 1998-2011
Note: working-poor without farmers.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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In Norway, the in-work poverty rate exceeds the rate in the 
total population. However, this country has the lowest income 
inequality in Europe and has one of the lowest poverty rates 
in the world, thanks to the developed social policy financed by 
the production of oil and gas (Dahl et al. 2005). At a high labour 
market participation rate, the generosity of the social security 
system (especially for those with children), and the relatively 
high level of pensions and high labour income tax rates, the fi-
nancial situation of Norwegian workers and non-workers dif-
fers only slightly. 
Importantly, in European countries with the lowest in-
work poverty rates, total poverty is two to three times higher. 
On one hand there are richer countries with moderate inequal-
ity and generous but active labour market policies (Denmark, 
Germany). On the other hand, there are poorer countries with 
lower indicators of labour market participation, with high levels 
of total inequality and much less developed social security sys-
tems, in which unemployment drives an individual into poverty 
(Bulgaria, Portugal). 
Differences in the risk of total and in-work poverty result 
not only from the model of social policy but also from the struc-
ture of households in those countries (Hanzl-Weiß, Vidovic, 
2010). In countries such as Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Poland 
and the UK, low paid workers usually live in households with 
other workers, and in the total population the risk of poverty 
is high, especially among households without a single work-
ing person. This results in a lower risk of poverty among those 
who work, with a simultaneous high risk of poverty for the 
entire population. 
In Poland, having a job significantly decreases the risk 
of poverty – the risk of relative in-work poverty is almost two 
times lower than for the entire population, and four times lower 
than among the unemployed. However, despite this fact, a sig-
nificant share of workers is still at risk of poverty. In 2011, 7.4% 
of workers lived in poor households (11.1% including farmers) 
and in the total population the share was 16.7%.11 Having a job 
was not enough for all workers to earn enough to purchase a 
basket of goods ensuring existence at an elementary level. 
11  In this chapter, unless stated otherwise, statistical data is based on the HBS 
from 2011. 
boX
III.2 definition of a low-paid worker
A low-paid worker is a person whose monthly income from non-agricultural labour does not exceed 2/3 of the wage median calculated for 
all non-agricultural workers. A lack of data on the precise number of hours worked makes it impossible to define low-paid jobs in terms of 
hourly wages. In 2011 19.5% of workers were deemed to be low-paid. Among them, about 30% (2011) worked part-time, i.e. 10% of all 
paid non-agricultural workers. 
Assuming the same definition of low-paid labour for the data from the Structure of Earnings Survey, a low-paid worker earns less than 
1938 PLN gross (2010), i.e. 1416 PLN net (assuming a 19% tax rate without a tax-free amount). The obtained wage level is higher than in 
the HBS (1136 PLN in 2010). This results from the Structure of Earnings Survey not accounting for companies with less than 10 workers 
and the self-employed, whose wages are lower than in larger companies.
From 1998-2011 the difference between the low-paid labour threshold and poverty threshold according to the HBS increased from 70 to 
230 PLN. In the case of a single-person household, a wage at 2/3 the labour wage median is enough to avoid poverty (Figure III.20). 
FIGURE III. 20. CoMPARISoN oF LoW-PAID WoRk AND RELATIvE PovERTy THRESHoLDS IN PoLAND, 1998-2011 
(IN PRICES oF 2010).
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Source: own elaboration.
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Between 1999 and 2005 about 4% of workers lived in house-
holds with income below the poverty threshold, understood as 
the subsistence minimum. In recent years the situation has im-
proved and has recovered to the level from before the Russian 
crisis in 1998, i.e. 2%.
Both positive and negative changes in the labour market 
are less significant for the financial situation of workers than in 
the total population. The risk of absolute in-work poverty dur-
ing a downturn grows slower than in the total population. In 
1998-2003 the gap between total and in-work absolute pover-
ty increased from 2.5 pp to 4 pp. The improvement in the labour 
market in 2008 translated into a decrease in the gap to 1.5 pp 
(see Figure III.18). A similar trend was observed for the relative 
poverty risk, although here there was an increase in the gap af-
ter 2007 resulting from the increased total poverty risk and the 
steady level of in-work poverty risk.
In-work poverty is less severe than poverty among non-
workers, both in absolute and relative terms. The depth of rela-
tive in-work poverty was 22% in 2011, i.e. 6 pp lower than in 
the entire population and this relation remained stable across 
the entire observed period (see Figure III.18). The situation is 
slightly different when poverty risk is understood as the sub-
sistence minimum. The gap in the depth of absolute poverty 
between the working and non-working population was equal in 
2010, while in 1998 it was as high as 7pp (Figure III.19). This is 
a result of an increase in the share of the inactive 55-65 year 
group in absolutely poor households with workers, from 3.7% 
to 7.8%, and a decrease in the average number of workers in 
those households, from 1.9 to 1.3 between 1998 and 2011. 
Early pensions or disability pensions are lower than labour in-
come and increase the severity of absolute in-work poverty. The 
gap in the depth of absolute and relative poverty is distinctly 
anticyclical. During economic slowdowns, when total absolute 
poverty rates were the highest, the depth of in-work poverty 
was lower than total poverty (Figure III.19).
Intuitively, low wages are the obvious cause of in-work 
poverty. However, as many as 80% of low-paid workers are not 
poor, and almost half of the working-poor have higher-paid jobs 
(see Figure III.21). Not just in Poland but also in most OECD 
countries, low-paid jobs are not necessarily associated with 
poverty (Marlier, 2000; Crettaz, Bonoli, 2010). Low wages 
and poverty are simultaneously observed in only 3% of those 
employed outside agriculture. The fact is that wages received 
by the working-poor are much lower than among non-poor 
workers (Figure III.22). Nonetheless, half of the working-poor 
are higher-paid. In all the deciles of the equivalised income of 
households the share of low-paid employees is higher than the 
poverty risk in the individual deciles of wages (Figure III.23).
A lower level of wages among women is connected with 
their higher risk of low-wages (Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy, 2008). One in four women working outside agriculture 
receives wages below the low-pay threshold, compared to 
only 15% of male workers. This difference is not explained by 
the short-term character of women’s jobs, as the share of low-
paid women and men working part-time are similar – at about 
30%. Such a high share of women among the low-paid work-
ers results from frequent employment in low-paid jobs, such 
as housework and cleaning (85% of those employed there are 
women) (Blau et al., 2012). Moreover, even in the case where 
men and women work in a similar job, they tend to get different 
wages (Francois, 2000).
Women work more frequently in companies, sectors and 
jobs where wages are lower (EC, 2006). Even there they still 
earn less than men, and so are at higher risk of low wages (Min-
istry of Labour, 2008). Among small companies, we also observe 
a relatively high risk of bankruptcies. Only companies with a sig-
nificant competitive edge are capable of increasing their turno-
ver. In consequence, larger companies are more productive and 
offer higher wages than smaller enterprises. Importantly, the 
share of women among workers decreases with the growing 
size of a company. In 2010, 36% of women worked in companies 
Figure III. 21 | structure of the employed outside 
agriculture in Poland, 2011.
Figure III. 22 | distribution of net labour income in 
Poland, 2011. 
4%
16%
3%
77%
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Working poor
Working non-poor
Low-wage treshold
Absolute poverty tresholdPoor in low-wage jobs
Non-poor in higher-wage jobs Non-poor in low-wage jobs
Poor in higher-wage jobs
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data. Note: the graphs present the cumulative distributions of wages.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
120
employment in Poland 2011  
Poverty and jobs 
Jobs vs. inequality and poverty 3
hiring from 10 to 49 workers, whereas for men this share is less 
than 30%. Only in this group of companies is the risk of low 
wages among women lower than among men (33% vs. 38%).12 
In larger companies women have lower-paid positions, work 
part-time more often and are promoted less frequently than 
men (glass ceiling, see OECD, 2006), and hence the risk of low 
wages among women is 1/3 higher than men. 13
The greatest differences, by over 30%, between the wages 
of women and men concern the highest-paid workers, while for 
those with the lowest wages the difference is nearly insignifi-
cant. The higher risk of low wages among women results from 
12  Using the Structure of Earnings Survey, 2010.
13  Low-wage threshold for data in the Structure of Earnings Survey was defined 
as 2/3 of the gross wage median of 1938 PLN in 2010. The threshold calculated for 
the Household Budget Survey in 2010 was lower (1137 PLN), which results from 
the availability of information on net wages and inclusion of data on companies with 
less than 10 workers. 
their relatively higher number among workers with the lowest 
wages. For those earning below the 7th decile, the wage gap be-
tween men and women does not exceed 10%, albeit for work-
ers in the 2nd decile, it is on average about a half lower. Above 
the 7th decile, the difference between the wages of both sexes 
increases rapidly (see Figure III.25). 
The higher risk of low wages among women does not mean 
a higher risk of poverty. On the contrary, poverty affects work-
ing women less frequently than men (see Figure III.26). Nearly 
one in ten working men is poor, whereas among working women 
only one in twenty lives in a household with income below the 
relative poverty threshold. Working women live in households 
with other working individuals more frequently than men. In 
2011, 70% of working women lived in households with other 
working individuals, while for men the share was only 55%. 
Figure III. 23 | the risk of relative poverty and the 
risk of low-wages among the employed outside 
agriculture in Poland, 2011.
Figure III. 24 | the absolute in-work poverty rates by 
sex, 1999-2011.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data. Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Poverty risk by wage decile Low-wage risk by equivalised
household income decile
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
Females Males
Figure III. 25 | relative difference between 
the distribution of wages of men and women 
in Poland, 2010.
Figure III. 26 | the risk of poverty and low wages 
by sex in Poland, 2011.
Note: the graphs show the difference in cumulative distribution of wages among 
men and women.
Source: own elaboration based on SES data.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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Women have the greatest chances of avoiding poverty 
when they live in households in which other adults also work. 
In-work poverty risk for those is only 4%, and importantly the 
income from women’s work is usually not the main income in 
the household. If a woman is a head of household (one in four 
households), then in 80% of cases she is a higher-paid worker. 
Women who are not heads of the household are low-paid work-
ers more frequently than men with an analogous position in the 
household. This translates into a similar risk of poverty among 
working female and male household heads – 8% vs. 9%. In the 
case where they support not only dependent children but also 
dependent adults, the risk of poverty grows to 20% and is 10 pp 
higher than among single mothers. 
While the lower wages of women do not lead to a higher 
risk of poverty compared to men, when we allow for differences 
in the structure of households and labour performed by the 
members, we see the fact of being a woman only slightly increas-
es the risk of poverty. In other words, if we exclude the impact of 
the aforementioned factors on the income of households using 
the probit model, we will see that working women have a 0.3 pp 
higher probability of being poor than men. This corresponds to 
the observed differences in the wages of women and men (see 
Figure III.25). The fact that working and low-paid women are 
better protected against poverty than low-paid men is associ-
ated with factors outside the labour market, especially different 
types of households in both groups. 
Individuals with higher education not only work more 
frequently and have better wages, but also often tend to live 
as couples in the same household. In consequence, low paid 
workers, similar to the poor, are individuals with vocational or 
at most lower secondary school education - in 2011 they con-
stituted about 75% of both these education groups. High edu-
cation protects workers against poverty, given their qualifica-
tions are used at work. A risk of poverty is observed for only one 
in a hundred working individuals with higher education, but in 
the case of work in professions that do not require higher edu-
cation, the risk of poverty grows to 16%. Given the remaining 
traits of individuals and households, workers with higher edu-
cation are at about a 2pp lower probability of being poor than 
those with medium education (Figure III.30). 
Low wages are an important factor that increases the risk 
of poverty among the 35-54 age group, i.e. when they the main 
earners in the household. The lowest risk of poverty is observed 
among workers aged above 55 years, and the highest among 
the youngest workers, aged 15-24 years (see Figure III.28). 
Nonetheless, the young (15-34) and also older (55-64) low-
paid workers are less often poor than workers from the middle 
age groups (see Figure III.27) 14. In the case of young individu-
als, their dependence on parents seems to be the most crucial, 
while among the older workers it is associated with benefits or 
living together with working children. 
The risk of poverty among young workers is much lower 
than the average for the population (11% vs. 22% in 2011), but 
higher than among other workers (see Figure II, 28). 40% of 
young workers are low-paid whereas in the older age groups 
this share is lower, at 17%. The lower human capital of young 
people, associated with the lack of professional experience, re-
sults in lower wages. However, young people live mainly with 
their parents, and only one in five aged below 25 years has own 
household, and usually these are higher-paid employees. That is 
why lower wages are not a poverty risk factor for this age group. 
In the case of young low-skilled workers, experience gained 
during low-paid work may increase their chances for better 
paid work in the future. However, such an experience for the 
high-skilled may be a warning signal for their future potential 
employers (Mosthaf, 2011). Nonetheless, low wages at an early 
age do not entail poverty in the subsequent periods of life. 
14  The youngest group is about 10% of the population working outside 
agriculture and is as numerous as the group of workers aged over 55 years.
Figure III. 27 | the share of low-paid workers, by the 
age of the worker in poor and non-poor households. 
Figure III. 28 | the risk of relative in-work and total 
poverty by age group in Poland, 2011. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data. Source own elaboration based on HBS data.
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In the age group 35-54 low wages are very significant for 
poverty, as the working person at this age is usually the main 
earner in a household. The risk of poverty among low-paid 
workers in this age group is five times higher than for high-
er-paid workers at 22%. Low-paid workers are mainly aged 
35-54 (60%), while one in five low-paid workers is at an immo-
bile age. Those at immobile age have a relatively high poverty 
rate and high persistence of poverty (see Part II). The workers 
aged 35-54, whose wages can be considered low, are often the 
heads of households (about 40% of households are headed by a 
person aged 35-54 years) in which their wage is the main com-
ponent of the household budget, but is not enough to exceed 
the poverty threshold, especially when there are non-workers 
in the household. 
The eldest low-paid workers are rarely poor as they 
combine work with pensions. The low-paid individuals at pre-
retirement age are often the head of the household (30% of 
all households). Despite low wages they are not as much at 
risk of poverty as the low-paid workers aged 35-54, which re-
sults from the combination of income from labour and from 
other sources. One in three low-paid workers at this age is an 
old-age pensioner. Nonetheless, their share among working 
pensioners has been decreasing systematically since 2006 
(Figure III.6). The combination of work, even low-paid, with 
pensions does significantly decrease the risk of poverty. More 
precisely, among low-paid workers who do not depend on an 
old-age pension, the risk of poverty is 22% (2011), while for 
low-paid old-age pensioners it is only 2%. One in four indi-
viduals aged 55-64 works (this share has been systematically 
growing since 2005), and ¾ of these are higher-paid employ-
ees. The low risk of poverty in this group may result from 
the return on human capital, accumulated over the entire 
professional career.
Higher labour intensity significantly helps avoid poverty 
among the working-poor. Among all workers not living in ru-
ral areas, low wages and poverty are found only among 2.5% 
of non-agricultural workers, while in rural areas this share is 
5.5% although rural poverty is not just the domain of agricul-
tural households (see Part II). Given all the characteristics of 
workers, the probability of poverty among the residents of the 
largest cities (more than 500 thousand people) is about 5 pp 
lower than in the country. A high risk of poverty in rural ar-
eas (compared with cities) results from differences in labour 
market characteristics. In cities, especially the larger ones, a 
worker has more alternatives concerning work and the work 
is more frequently better-paid (in 2011 the share of low-paid 
workers in cities with more than 500 thousand people was 
11%, while it was twice as high in villages). A greater chance of 
finding employment in cities is also reflected in the much high-
er intensity of labour in urban households. In cities with more 
than 200 thousand inhabitants, more than half the households 
have a majority of household members working, whereas in 
the country only ¼ of households can boast a similarly high 
labour intensity. 
In-work poverty in Poland is geographically diverse. 
In the Lubelskie region, non-agricultural workers are at the 
highest risk of poverty (12%), while the lowest risk of pov-
erty is observed in the Śląskie, Dolnośląskie and Mazow-
ieckie regions, i.e. regions with the highest GDP per capita 
(CSO, 2009). After factoring out the sectoral and professional 
structure of workers, the lowest risk of poverty is in the Ma-
zowieckie, Lubuskie and Zachodniopomorskie regions. This 
regional diversity is only partly due to differences in median 
equivalised income in employee households (Figure III.31), 
but the stratification of income within individual voivode-
ships is also very significant. In the Pomorskie voivodeship, in 
which the high equivalised income there is accompanied by a 
high probability of being working-poor, the share of low-paid 
Figure III. 29 | Changes in the employment of 
individuals aged 55-64 in Poland, 1998-2011. 
Figure III. 30 | the effect of education on the 
probability of being working-poor. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data. Note: the graph presents the mean marginal effects from the probit model for the 
probability of being poor. Horizontal lines denote 90% confidence intervals.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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workers is similar to the Lubelskie and Podkarpackie voivode-
ships (see Figure III.32). 
The type of work contract is associated with the level of 
wages and is similarly related to the risk of poverty and low 
wages. Both among the working-poor and the low-paid work-
ers about 85% are those hired for an indefinite period, 10% are 
self-employed and 5% work for a definite period. Self-employ-
ment, similar to work for an indefinite period, decreases the risk 
of poverty. In the case of self-employment the risk of poverty is 
similar to work for an indefinite period at 6.5%. The risk of low 
wages in both these groups is about 20%. 
Figure III. 31 | the risk of poverty vs. level of 
equivalised income by voivodeship in Poland. 
Figure III. 32 | the risk of in-work poverty vs. share 
of low-paid workers by voivodeship in Poland 
Note: the graph presents the mean marginal effects from a probit model for the 
probability of being poor in relation to the Mazowieckie voivodeship. Only those 
voivodeships which significantly differ from the Mazowieckie voivodeship are 
shown. 
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Source: own elaboration based on BBGD data.
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Figure III. 33 | In-work poverty in the groups 
of professions. 
Figure III. 34 | In-work poverty by main source 
of income in a household. 
Note: aggregation of job classification based on Whelan et al. (2011). The graph 
presents the mean marginal effects of the probit model for the probability of being 
poor. Horizontal lines denote the 90% confidence intervals.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Note: the graph presents the mean marginal effects of the probit model for the 
probability of being poor. Horizontal lines denote the 90% confidence intervals.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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An especially high risk of poverty can be observed among 
those working for a definite period (38%). They most frequently 
have low-paid jobs and are employed by companies operating 
in less productive sectors. Only 30% of workers with a definite 
period work in jobs requiring high skills, whereas among work-
ers with an indefinite period this share is almost 60%.15 Even if 
we allow for conditions such as the place of work and household 
structure, work for a definite period increases the risk of poverty 
by 2.5 pp compared to work for an indefinite period. This type 
of labour is treated as additional source of income, as only less 
than 1 percent of households are headed by part-time workers. 
In combination with other incomes in a household work for an 
indefinite period improves the chance for avoiding poverty, but 
less than work for a definite period. 
Part-time work does not differentiate the risk of in-work 
poverty, provided the work is higher-paid. The risk of poverty 
among the higher-paid, regardless of the time of work, is only 
4% (more than of the 95% of higher-paid work is full-time), 
whereas among low-paid workers (among these 70% work 
15  Classification of labour according to Whelan et al. (2011).
part-time) part-time work raises the risk of poverty to 24%. 
Part-time workers are at risk of poverty especially when they 
have no possibility of finding another job and the entire house-
hold depends on their wages (Wóycicka, 2010).
Both low-paid workers and the working-poor are mainly 
employed in the private sector. The probability of being poor is 
about 0.5 pp higher than in the public sector, allowing for other 
characteristics. Not taking into account other characteristics, 
this difference is 3 pp. In the private sector, one in five work-
ers is at risk of low wages, whereas in the public sector it is only 
one in ten. The high risk of poverty in the private sector corre-
sponds well to its higher inequality compared to the public sec-
tor (Marcinkowska, 2008). 
Low-paid workers, similar to workers in general, are con-
centrated in the service sector (70% of low-paid workers in 
2011 worked in the service sector), albeit there is not a single 
dominant group among the working-poor. The risk of in-work 
poverty is higher for jobs in the manufacturing industry than in 
the services sector. In the services sector, the risk of poverty is 
Figure III. 35 | the structure of non-poor households 
with low-paid workers in Poland, 2011. 
Figure III. 36 | the structure of poor households 
with low-paid workers in Poland, 2011.
Figure III. 37 | the structure of poor employee 
households, 2011.
Figure III. 38 | structure of non-poor employee 
households, 2011.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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slightly higher for market services than for non-market, but low 
wages are less frequent in this sector. In the case of the manu-
facturing sector, sections are much more diverse in terms of 
poverty. Those working in companies where the main activity 
is construction or the production and supply of electricity, gas 
and water, or waste disposal, are at the greatest risk of poverty 
among those employed in manufacturing. In these industries 
low-paid workers are found often, e.g. one in five working in 
construction earns below the low-wage threshold (HBS, 2011) 
The risk of poverty is strongly dependent on the level of wages 
in particular sectors and indicates a similar dispersion of income 
in those sectors. 
Half of the working-poor perform physical tasks requir-
ing special-skills, such as electricians or miners, although only 
15% in this group are low-paid. They constitute one third of all 
non-agricultural workers. In comparison to workers performing 
manual tasks not requiring any special skills (which in 43% have 
low wages), they have about 4 pp lower risk of in-work poverty 
(see Figure III.33). Chances of avoiding poverty are most en-
hanced by having a non-manual job that requires high qualifica-
tions. This group take 40% of all workers, and the risk of poverty 
in this group is only 1.5%. Nearly a half of the low-paid workers 
(40%) are medium skilled office workers, for which the risk of 
poverty is three times lower than for those performing simple 
manual tasks. Along with development of the economy based 
on knowledge and the further development of information 
technologies, the demand for specialists will continue to grow, 
which may lead to a deepening of poverty among non-skilled 
workers (Gallie, 2000). 
boX
III.3 working time based on lFs.
TABLE III. 3. THE NUMBER oF WoRkERS By WoRkING HoURS, 1995-2011 (IN THoUSANDS).
type of work 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
self-employment 3506 3494 3508 3436 3338 3255 3236 3126 2968
hired 
labour 
full-time 10398 10550 10880 11191 10782 10546 10226 9904 9904
part-time 887 925 789 729 636 724 745 752 745
type of work 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
self-employment 2926 2894 2903 2932 2970 2979 3017 3052
hired 
labour 
full-time 10107 10480 11001 11630 12133 12218 12289 12450
part-time 762 741 662 643 651 629 616 597
Source: own elaboration based on LFS data.
FIGURE III. 39. NUMBER oF HoURS WoRkED PER WEEk UNDER vARIoUS FoRMS oF EMPLoyMENT IN 1995-2011.
Most hired labourers work full-time. In the entire analysed period, the number of hours worked systematically decreases. The self-em-
ployed declare working longer than full-time employees, but their real work time is also decreasing. An opposite trend is observed for 
part-time workers who have worked increasingly longer in recent years. The real number of hours worked is about 25% lower than for 
full-time workers.
Source: own elaboration based on LFS data.
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Figure III. 40 | the impact of individuals 
in a household on the risk of in-work poverty.
Figure III. 41 | labour intensity in a households 
vs. risk of poverty in Poland, 2011. 
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Note: the graph shows the average marginal effects of the probit model for the 
probability of being poor. Horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. In the 
model, the number of people is entered as a continuous variable. Marginal effects 
were calculated only for households which already had at least one person from a 
given group
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Note: very low intensity 0-19%, low: 20-39%, medium: 40-59%, high: 60-79%, 
very high, 80-100%.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Low wages result in in-work poverty of those at middle 
age with just junior high school education or lower or basic 
vocational education, who are often skilled manual workers, 
i.e. mainly those who are the head of the household. Low-paid 
workers often achieve a level above the poverty threshold 
thanks to the labour income and other sources of income of the 
other members of the household, and as many as almost 80% of 
them do not live in a poor household. 
The low-paid avoid poverty thanks to other individuals that 
receive regular income (other hired labourers and pensioners). 
In poor households with low-paid workers the share of individu-
als with a regular income is 31%, while in non-poor households 
this is the share of non-working dependants (i.e. also 31%) 
(Figures III.35-III.36). A high share of agricultural workers in 
households increases the risk of poverty as the income from ag-
riculture, in contrast to wages from hired labour and pensions, 
is irregular and even in combination with low wages often does 
not allow going above the poverty threshold. The workers in the 
most difficult situation are those living in households in which 
their earnings are not combined with any other regular source 
of income. 
The lowest risk of poverty is observed among those work-
ers which live in households where a pension is the main source 
of income. The likelihood of being working-poor in those house-
holds is about 3 pp lower than when the main source of income 
comes from work (Figure III.34). Pensioner households are the 
second most numerous group of households that include work-
ing individuals. An uncertain income, e.g. in agriculture, puts 
workers in agricultural households at a higher risk of poverty 
than if they depended on social benefits. 
In-work poverty is caused by household members who 
do not work and have no income. In poor households with 
working heads of households, the share of children, inactive 
and unemployed exceeds the share of workers (Figure III.37), 
while in analogous non-poor households, workers are in the 
majority (Figure III.38). Each subsequent self-employed in-
dividual increases the chance of staying outside poverty in a 
similar way to a person working for a definite period. Mean-
while, a person employed for a definite period decreases the 
risk of poverty only slightly. An increase in the number of pen-
sioners in a household has only a little lower effect on remain-
ing above in-work poverty than the number of self-employed 
(Figure III.40). 
Each additional worker in a household has a positive im-
pact on the financial situation in the household. Two models of 
labour intensity are dominant in households: either all those 
able to work do actually work, or almost no-one works. In more 
than half of the total households, more than half of those able 
to work do work.16 The risk of poverty decreases significantly 
the moment more than 60% of household individuals work, i.e. 
for example in a household with three adults, two workers are 
enough to avoid poverty. Any further increase in labour inten-
sity increases the household income but is not related to the 
risk of poverty. 
In Poland, in most cases, in-work poverty is not caused 
by low wages but by the lack of income earned by other mem-
bers of the household. If all the working poor in Poland lived 
in a single-person household, 70% of them would cease to 
be poor. Hence the risk of in-work poverty would decrease 
to 2% (2011), deepening the poverty of the non-working 
members of the household. In this sense, the significance of 
a household for in-work poverty is greater in Poland than 
in Germany or the UK at 60%. It is still much lower than in 
Belgium where only 6% of the working-poor would remain 
16  See Table III. 2.
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poor if they did not share their labour income with anybody 
(Strengmann-Kuhn, 2002, ECHP data from 1996). But taking 
into account the low-paid individuals in non-poor households, 
the total impact of the household structure reduces the risk of 
in-work poverty. If all workers had a single-person household, 
the risk of in-work poverty would increase to 8.8% compared 
with 7.4% in 2011.17
To sum up, in-work poverty does not result solely from low 
wages but is the result of low labour intensity in households. The 
greatest risk of poverty is observed for those with low general 
human capital (education) and low specific human capital (years 
worked, associated with age). The presence of other employ-
ees or pensioners protects against the risk of poverty, although 
self-employment only slightly more contributes to the reduc-
tion of poverty than work for a definite period. Work for a defi-
nite period and part-time work have a low significance for the 
reduction of poverty among the working population, even after 
factoring out the fact that such contracts are more often found 
in low-wage sectors and jobs. The stability of employment and 
lower diversity of wages in the public sector results in a lower 
risk of poverty than in the private sector. The regional poverty 
risk diversity is considerable and does not result only from the 
variation of average level of wages and the observed differenc-
es in the production structure and urbanisation levels amongst 
regions. In countries with a low labour market participation and 
labour intensity, the risk of in-work poverty is accompanied by a 
high risk of poverty in the entire population. 
17  Assuming a constant poverty threshold. 
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poverty persistence2 
PoVerty sPells 2.1 
One of the most important dimensions of poverty is its 
persistence. A high rate of poverty is much more widely accept-
ed and incurs lower social costs if poverty spells are short and 
do not lead to permanent deprivation. This section begins with 
the evaluation of the persistence of poverty in Poland compared 
to other European countries.18 As the ability of individuals and 
households to exit poverty is one of the important determinants 
of equal opportunities in society, and not only of the sphere of 
poverty, we also look at total income mobility, again comparing 
the situation in Poland to other countries. In the last section we 
focus on the income mobility of the poor, evaluating differences 
between factors influencing inflows to and outflows from pov-
erty – all those that indirectly determine the persistence of pov-
erty. We pay particular attention to the effect of flexible forms 
of employment.
In most egalitarian leader-countries and effective-coun-
tries in Europe (see Part I of the Report), the share of persist-
ently non-poor (those who during the four years of observation 
have not once fallen below the poverty threshold) exceeds 80%. 
The share of permanently poor (those that during the whole pe-
riod were below the poverty threshold) does not exceed 4%. At 
the other extreme are very diversified countries, such as Luxem-
bourg, Greece and Latvia, where the share of people remaining 
above the poverty threshold is about 60% and the share of per-
sistently poor approaches 10%. Greece and Latvia are relatively 
poor countries with high income inequality. Luxembourg has a 
very high poverty threshold, only second to Norway, and there-
fore much of the poor in Luxembourg would not be poor in other 
European countries, while its system of transfers is not as devel-
oped as in Norway, where the share of persistently poor is low.
Poland, along with other countries classified as the strag-
glers (see Part I of this Report), is characterised by >6% share 
of people who were poor for 4 consecutive years and a <70% 
share of those who were never poor in the same period. De-
spite the fact that the poverty risk in Poland was at 17-20%, in-
come of 30% of population dropped below the relative poverty 
threshold at least once during the four year period (see Figure 
III.42). If the probability of getting out of poverty was the same 
for all the poor and equal to the outflow rate, then for four con-
secutive periods the share of the poor in the entire Polish popu-
lation would be 20%, and the share of the persistently non-poor 
would constitute about 3.5% less. 19 These values  indicate a sig-
nificant although limited diversity of the expected persistence 
of poverty in the population.
18  Poverty persistence in Europe is calculated based on EU-SILC 2009, covering 
income in 2005-2008.
19  Calculated as: P(u
2005
,u
2006
,u
2007
,u
2008
) = UB
2005
*(1-oRSTU)3, where 
P(u
2005
,u
2006
,u
2007
,u
2008
) is the probability of remaining in poverty in 2005-2008,
 
UB
2005
 is the poverty rate in 2005, and oRSTU is an the average rate of outflow from 
poverty in 2005-2008. 
The number of past spells of poverty and the time be-
tween these events strongly differentiate the probability of be-
ing at risk of poverty in the future. Households that have not 
been poor for the previous three years face a 6% risk of going 
below the poverty threshold. Even one spell of poverty in the 
past increases the likelihood of poverty by three times. House-
holds that are currently poor, but in the previous two years had 
not been poor, face a 50% chance of becoming poor in the next 
year. For those households which are poor and at least once 
earlier had been poor, the likelihood of poverty in the next pe-
riod exceeds 70%. This means that despite the relatively high 
outflows from poverty (35%) over a year, a significant share of 
the outflow return to poverty after some time. This is partly due 
to changes in the level of the relative poverty threshold. There-
fore, poverty in Poland is relatively persistent, although the sig-
nificance of a previous experience of poverty to the likelihood of 
poverty in the future is similar to the EU-15 (see Figure III.43).
Temporary loss of income, e.g. resulting from cyclic phe-
nomena in the labour market, is less socially dangerous and less 
frequently requiring permanent assistance than a permanent 
loss of the ability to generate income by a household, e.g. due to 
a loss of health. If finding a job allows leaving that state perma-
nently, then short-term social transfers, including active labour 
market policies may be effective in the reduction of poverty. In 
contrast, long-term poverty to a greater extent contributes to 
deprivation and may lead to dangerous social phenomena.
The importance of poverty spells for the probability of be-
ing poor results from two reasons. Some households have such 
a low capacity to generate income, due to low human and social 
capital, that they either cannot exceed the poverty threshold 
or cross it only temporarily. On the other hand, a poverty spell 
alone may result in discouragement, social stigma or depriva-
tion – states that enhance the persistence of poverty. The dis-
tinction is very important because of the implications for social 
policy. In the former case, transfers are much less effective than 
policies aimed at enhancing the ability to generate income. In 
the latter, temporary financial assistance that allows leaving the 
area of poverty can have lasting effects. In scientific research, 
this distinction is called the heterogeneity of the poor and state 
dependence.
Econometric distinction between heterogeneity, including 
unobserved heterogeneity which is elusive to measure in social 
studies (e.g. level of motivation), and state dependence, is not 
easy and requires observation of the same households over 
several years in a row. A commonly used model is the Heck-
man two-step estimator (1981) and the easier to implement 
and computationally less demanding versions by Wooldridge 
(2005) and Orme (2001). These differently modified dynamic 
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panel random-effect probit models allow incorporation of un-
observable traits, thanks to observations of the same individu-
als over successive periods. Comparisons of these methods, us-
ing EHCP data (Sousonis, 2008) and Monte Carlo experiments 
(Mirinda, 2007), leads to the conclusion that they all give very 
similar results. For the purposes of this report, we used the 
Orme methodology (2001), estimating the poverty persistence 
model for EU-SILC data for 2005-2008. In this way, we received 
‘true’ poverty state dependence in each country, which shows 
how the probability of poverty is influenced by poverty alone in 
the previous period, excluding the impact of the observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity (see Figure III.44). The term of true 
state dependence, sometimes called genuine state dependence, 
was introduced by Heckman (1978).
The true impact (i.e. allowing for the unobserved diversity 
of the poor) of falling into poverty is always lower than the raw 
impact, calculated as the difference in poverty risk in the next 
period between poor and non-poor. The difference between 
true and raw impact strongly differentiates the examined coun-
tries. In some countries, the true persistence of poverty is lower 
than raw persistence by about 30%, e.g. in Cyprus and Latvia, 
Figure III. 42 | structure of households by the 
number of poverty spells in selected european 
countries, 2005-2008.
Figure III. 43 | the probability of poverty in relation 
to poverty spells in the past in Poland, against eu-15, 
2005-2008.
Note: the structure of households only for those who were present in the four successive years of the study. Path of poverty spells denotes the history of poverty (t-3, t-2, t-1), 
i.e. (0,0,1) means that the person has been poor in the most recent period, and was non-poor in the previous two, while (1,1,0) means that the person was non-poor in the 
most recent period, but was poor in the previous two. Charts are complemented by a 95% confidence interval.
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC 2009.
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Figure III. 44 | raw and true impact of poverty spells 
on the likelihood of being poor in the eu countries, 
2005-2008 (pp).
Figure III. 45 | true persistence of poverty 
vs. the importance of childhood poverty in selected 
european countries, 2004-2008.
Note: the raw impact of a poverty spell on remaining in poverty is calculated as the difference in the share of the poor among those who have been poor and non-poor in the 
previous period in a panel sample. The true impact is the difference in average probability of poverty conditioned by the fact of being poor and non-poor in the previous period, 
calculated using the panel probit model according to Orme 2001, separately for each country. 
Long-term persistence is calculated as the difference in poverty risk between persons who reported that in their teenage years their households did not experience financial 
problems, and those who claim that financial problems were constant in their adolescence (two extreme responses on a five-grade scale). The sample is limited to countries in 
which the intergenerational module was performed in 2005. 
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC 2009.
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while in some true persistence is lower by as much as 90%, 
as in the case of the Netherlands and Norway. In Poland, the 
true state dependence is 27 pp compared to raw at 67 pp. This 
means that among the currently poor, the probability of remain-
ing poor in a year is about 67 pp greater compared to the non-
poor, while the poverty spell alone increases the likelihood of 
poverty in the next period by only about 27 pp. The remainder 
(40 pp) can be ascribed to the observed and unobserved char-
acteristics of poor households. In terms of true poverty persist-
ence, Poland is among the laggard countries, such as Portugal, 
Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom, and much weaker 
than Norway, the Netherlands, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden and 
Hungary, where the importance of the poverty spells fluctuate 
around 10 pp. The greatest significance of previous poverty 
spells for the likelihood in the future is recorded in Latvia and 
Cyprus (see Figure III.44).
True persistence of poverty is strongly associated with the 
importance of these spells in childhood (see Part II of this Re-
port) - correlation of these variables at a country level is greater 
than 60%. The significance of the financial problems experienced 
in childhood on the future of individuals is a measure of equal 
opportunities in a given society (see Corak, 2006). Egalitarian 
societies (e.g. the Nordic countries) are characterised by a low 
impact of both poverty spells and the experience of poverty in 
childhood. Some countries with relatively high income inequal-
ity and high risk of poverty (United Kingdom, Estonia, Spain) 
show a considerable persistence of poverty, and a simultane-
ously low impact of childhood poverty. Long period of depend-
ence on parents and strong family ties in Italy, which even re-
sult in the inheritance of jobs ensured in collective agreements 
(Bentolila, Ichino, 1999), translate into the greatest significance 
of childhood poverty in the future compared to other countries, 
with the average true persistence of poverty lower than aver-
age. Despite a significantly lower income inequality and poverty 
risk in the Czech Republic than Poland, both countries are simi-
lar in terms of poverty persistence figures (see Figure III.54).
In Poland, the evaluation of poverty persistence in the me-
dium term is possible thanks to the Social Diagnosis research, 
in which households have been recorded every two years since 
2000. 20 Some of them have already been observed six times in 
11 years. With these data it is possible to estimate the survival 
function for poverty duration and remaining out of poverty 
(see Figure III.46). It shows the relation between the probabil-
ity of remaining in a given state and time spent in the state so 
far. Concerning poverty, this relation can be interpreted as the 
probability of being poor or non-poor, conditional upon the 
timespan in/out of poverty. As for the annual flow, estimated 
on HBS data, less than half of poor households remained abso-
lutely poor over the last two years. In the subsequent waves of 
research the probability of exiting from poverty is similar and so 
less than 3% of the absolutely poor remain in this state for more 
than eight years. Outflow rates for relative poverty are lower 
than for absolute poverty. For the first two years, the probabil-
ity of getting out of poverty is 42%, and in subsequent periods 
it decreases to about 30%. In eight years, 15% of the relatively 
poor will remain poor (see Figure III.46).
20  The exception is the second wave of the Social Diagnosis Survey, which took 
place in 2003, three years after the first one. 
Figure III. 46 | duration of poverty and non-poverty in Poland (years). 
Note: Kaplan–Meier estimator, in the period between 2000 and 2003 surveys were treated as 2-years long.
Source: own elaboration based on Social Diagnosis Survey data, 2000-2011.
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boX
III.4 Persistence of poor housing conditions
The observation of poverty persistence based on income and spending is partly interfered by the irregularity of both these factors. Meet-
ing housing needs seems to be a more stable measure of wealth and permanent income. Therefore, similar to Part I, our analysis will also 
include poverty of housing, which denotes households in which: (1) the floor area is limited or (2) at least one of the basic utilities is missing 
(water supply, flushing toilet, bathroom or running water). Standard floor area in a household was based on rules used in granting a housing 
allowance: 20 m2 for a single-person household, 30 m2 for a double household, 30 m2 + 5 m2 for each subsequent person. 
Note: the real poverty threshold is 60% of the equivalised income median for households in 1998 at current prices. Differences in the length of the series result from the 
quality of panel data from before 2005 at the level of households.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
The risk of poverty of housing has been decreasing systematically since 1998 – from 25% in 1998 to 12% in 2011. The scale of this de-
crease is similar to the quasi-absolute poverty, measured using the threshold from 1998. The decrease in the risk of poverty of housing is 
less subject to business cycle fluctuations than the drop in relative poverty, measured using the threshold from 1998 indexed by inflation 
(Figure III.47). 
In 1998-2011 the size of the population decreased by 3%, whereas the total area of apartments increased by 20%. The greatest increase 
in residential area, measured in square metres per person in a household, was experienced by households from the two lowest income 
deciles. This testifies to the improved housing situation among the poorest in financial terms. The poverty of housing rate decreased mostly 
in the 25-34 age group. Nonetheless, in 2011 about 1% of households had at least one basic utility missing and too little floor area. The 
volume of mortgage loans has increased in recent years: according to the Polish Bank Association, in 2002 the number of active mortgage 
loans was 289 thousand, while ten years later it was as many as 1.7 million. 
Poverty of housing has a much lower scale of flows and a greater persistence than total poverty. The inflow rate is almost three times lower 
than for quasi-absolute poverty, and the outflow rate is as much as five times smaller (see Figure III.48).
TABLE III. 4 | FLoWS BETWEEN PovERTy IN THE HoUSING AND INCoME APPRoACH IN A PANEL, 2010-2011.
status in 2010
status in 2011
poor in both dimensions
income: non-poor
housing: poor
income: poor 
housing: non-poor
non-poor in both 
dimensions
poor in both dimension 51% 42% 2% 4%
income: non-poor
housing: poor 
6% 79% 1% 14%
income: poor 
housing: non-poor
1% 0% 44% 54%
non-poor in both dimensions 0% 1% 3% 96%
population structure in 2011 2% 9% 5% 84%
Note: the values  in rows may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Flows do not include newly formed households.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Poverty of housing and income poverty overlap very little. only one in three of those affected by poverty of housing, and one in five of the 
income poor, are poor in both dimensions. An individual that is poor in these two dimensions at the same time is more than 45% likely to 
exit income poverty, but only a 6% chance to get out of the poverty of housing. At the same time it almost never happens that a person who 
is non-poor in both these dimensions becomes poor in terms of income and housing. In this group, the risk of entering the poverty of hous-
ing is three times lower than for income poverty (see Table III.4).
Source: own elaboration.
FIGURE III. 47. THE RISk oF PovERTy oF HoUSING 
CoNDITIoNS AND qUASI-ABSoLUTE PovERTy, 1998-2011.
FIGURE III. 48. INFLoW vS. oUTFLoW RATES FoR PovERTy 
oF HoUSING AND qUASI-ABSoLUTE PovERTy.
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The likelihood of inflow to absolute poverty is 5% over the 
period of two years, but if after two years a household is still 
non-poor, the chance of inflow to absolute poverty is halved 
and is maintained at this level in the future. Because of this as 
many as 85% of the absolutely non-poor households remain in 
this state for the eight years. However, the chance of remaining 
relatively non-poor in the same period is only 66%. This means 
that one in three non-poor households will fall into relative 
poverty within eight years’ time. Equally importantly, the like-
lihood of being relatively poor remains stable at around 10%, 
regardless of the duration of the non-poverty spell – from zero 
to six years.
In terms of socio-economic characteristics, the chroni-
cally poor do not differ significantly from the temporarily poor. 
As noted in Part II of the Report, the greatest risk of poverty 
is observed for low labour intensity households headed by in-
dividuals with a low level of education, or whose members are 
retirees, as well as agricultural households and households 
with more than one child. The significance of these character-
istics for persistent and temporary poverty is similar. However, 
there are factors that differentiate the temporarily poor from 
the permanently poor. 21 One such variable is the presence of 
an old-age pensioner in a household. The stability of a retire-
ment benefit results in a lower incidence of poverty in a house-
holds headed by a retiree, with a two times stronger effect on 
temporary than permanent poverty. Temporary inflows to and 
outflows from poverty are therefore possible from changes in 
additional income or the household structure. Labour income 
is less certain and higher, which means employment is more im-
portant for persistent than temporary poverty. Each worker in 
a household contributes to a reduction in both persistent and 
temporary poverty, but much more with regard to permanent 
poverty. The risk of losing a job means that even high labour in-
tensity in a household does not completely protect against tem-
porary spells of poverty. However, periods of unemployment 
are usually short enough that the temporary unemployment 
does not lead to chronic poverty.
The Social Diagnosis Survey is a sociological study allow-
ing inclusion of the analysis of social capital. While people in-
volved in the life of the local community are significantly less 
poor, either permanently or temporarily, and a greater number 
of friends does not protect against temporary poverty, it helps 
to exit poverty earlier and therefore contributes significantly 
to the reduction of persistent poverty. This conclusion is con-
sistent with the theory of social capital, according to which 
extensive social networks facilitate looking for a job, and most 
workers are employed on recommendation. It is an important 
component of breaking the information barrier (Granovetter, 
1995). On the other hand, social life can be a luxury that can be 
afforded only by those that are at least non-poor.
21  Based on a comparison of poverty risk logit models based on data from the 
Social Diagnosis Survey data. LThe long-term poor households were observed to be 
poor at least three times poor, and for the temporarily poor, which were observed at 
least three times, and were poor only once.
InCome mobIlIty 2.2 
Persistence of poverty is part of the phenomenon of gen-
eral income mobility. High persistence of poverty is often asso-
ciated with the stability of the other levels of the income lad-
der. Therefore, our analysis of the mobility of the poor will be 
preceded by the characteristics of general mobility. In Poland, 
we observe a U-shaped relationship between the probability of 
staying in the equivalised household income decile and the level 
of income (Figure III.49). The chance to maintain income at the 
previous year’s level did not change significantly from 2002-
2007. Then between 2007 and 2009, i.e. during a period of 
stabilisation in the labour market that occurred after the strong 
employment growth, the probability of remaining in the same 
decile of household with average financial situation increased 
by half. The increase in mobility hardly affected the poorest 
and the richest. Regardless of the year of the study, the prob-
ability of remaining in the same decile of equivalised household 
income distribution was significantly higher for the first and last 
decile – 50% and 64%, respectively. For the other deciles, the 
likelihood of changes in income that do not allow exceeding the 
threshold of the next decile range from 20 to 40% depending 
on the year. 
Income mobility in Poland relates mainly to changes by 
one decile up and down in income distribution - changes of 
this type account for about 50% of flows in each decile, except 
for the extreme deciles (Table III.5). The likelihood of income 
change over a year by more than one decile is about 15% for 
households from the middle of the income distribution. Already 
in the fourth decile the likelihood of deterioration in relative 
position is greater than that of improvement. Flows over more 
than one decile account for more than half of outflows from the 
first decile.
Polish households are characterised by a mobility of in-
come closer to the EU-15 than the NMS7 average, particularly 
with regard to the probability of income change in the perspec-
tive of two or three years (Figure III.51). Among all the analysed 
countries, the distinct majority of flows take place between 
neighbouring deciles. It is most likely that a given household will 
not change its income sufficiently to move to another income 
decile within a year. Analysing the situation of households three 
years after the first test we see a significant difference between 
the mobility of households in the NMS7 vs. Poland and the EU-
15. In the EU15 and Poland the chances of staying in the same 
income group decrease and flows take place largely between 
neighbouring deciles. The opposite situation can be observed 
among households in NMS7 countries, where after three years, 
the chances of household income changing by more than two 
deciles significantly increased. 
Income mobility differs between households. The young-
er the head of the household, the greater the income mobility 
of the household (Shi et al., 2012). This is associated with the 
fact that young people have a higher individual wage mobility 
(Bachmann et al. 2012), although on the other hand, Aristei 
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and Perugini (2012) show a lack of significant dependence be-
tween the age of the head of household and mobility in liberal-
regime countries (UK, Ireland, Iceland). The importance of the 
head of the household for mobility is ambiguous. Some reports 
indicate that households headed by a woman reveal lower mo-
bility (Woolard, Klasen, 2004 – for South Africa). On the other 
hand, Aristei and Perugini (2012) show a greater mobility in Eu-
ropean households headed by a woman. This is not a universal 
conclusion, as for the Baltic states the sex of the head of house-
hold has no importance for mobility.
The high level of human capital allows climbing the income 
ladder. The higher the level of education among household 
members, the higher the mobility (Shit et al., 2012), regardless 
Figure III. 49 | the probability of remaining in a 
given decile of income distribution within a year, 
2007 and 2009.
table III. 5 | Matrix of flows between the decile 
groups of equivalised household income distribution, 
2009-2010 (%).
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data. Note: thresholds in 2010 prices.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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III.5 Income mobility vs. expenditure mobility in Poland
Income and spending are the result of partly independent decisions of a household. The possibility of saving or borrowing means that 
expenses do not directly follow income. Hence, expenditure mobility is different from income mobility.
In the case of households from the middle distribution, a greater variability is observed for expenditure distribution than for income distri-
bution. It is worth noting that the chances of moving up the distribution are similar to the risk of going down, at around 15-20%, for either 
distribution. The main difference between income and spending is observed for the chance of remaining in the same decile group. This prob-
ability for households in the middle of the distribution is lower by about 10 percentage points in expenditure than income distribution.
FIGURE III. 50. PRoBABILITy oF CHANGE IN INCoME (LEFT PANEL) AND ExPENDITURE (RIGHT PANEL) ovER A yEAR IN 
vARIoUS INCoME AND ExPENDITURE DECILES, 2009-2010.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data, 2009-2010.
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of the fact whether we take into account the head of the house-
hold or other members of the household. Higher human capital 
contributes to the increase in productivity and chances of em-
ployment. The greater labour intensity leads to an increase in 
income. Mobility grows fastest with the increased share in em-
ployees hired for an indefinite period of time. A slower growth 
was observed for definite period contracts, and the lowest 
among the self-employed. An increase in the share of unem-
ployed translated into a lower income mobility in a household 
(see Aristei and Perugini, 2012). 
Household income in the initial period is particularly 
important for income mobility. This relation is connected 
with the concepts of absolute convergence and conditional 
Figure III. 51 | Income mobility in Poland and europe.
Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie EU-SILC, 2009.
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convergence. The former refers to the situation where poorer 
households experience higher income growth than the richer 
households. Empirical studies in this type of convergence yield 
mixed results, although this phenomenon has indeed been 
observed in Indonesia, Venezuela and South Africa (Fields, 
2008). In the case of conditional convergence, which involves 
a greater mobility of poor households, but only among similar 
households, research rather confirms the existence of such a 
mechanism – e.g. Aristei and Perugini (2012) for 25 European 
countries, and Fields et al. (2003a) for Indonesia, Spain, Vene-
zuela and South Africa. However, this is not a universal regular-
ity – in 1998-2002 China experienced a divergence of income 
(Yingi et al., 2006).
In conclusion, the relation between mobility and the level 
of income is U-shaped, both in Poland and in other countries. 
People with average incomes are most likely to change their 
relative income position. Most frequently the mobility is be-
tween neighbouring income deciles and changes by more than 
two deciles are rare. Mobility of expenditure is significantly 
lower than the mobility of income. In terms of mobility, Poland 
is more similar to the EU-15 than the countries that joined the 
EU together with Poland (NMS7). This latter group of countries 
is characterised by higher mobility. 
Mobility of the poor is a special case in general income mo-
bility. Mechanisms of entry and exit from poverty are partially 
independent phenomena and outflow and inflow rates hardly 
correlate among countries (see Figure III.51). The Nordic coun-
tries, Slovenia and the Czech Republic are characterised by 
low rates of inflow into poverty (2-5%) and low to moderate 
outflows (20-40%). These are the leaders and effective coun-
tries according to the classification from Part I. Among the rest 
of the countries in these categories (Austria, Hungary, France, 
Belgium), the probability of hitting the poverty threshold is av-
erage (about 6%), but the duration of poverty spells is short, 
associated with an above-average outflow rate (35-50%). Po-
land, along with most laggard states (Estonia, Greece, Portugal, 
Italy, Bulgaria, Latvia) has an above-average inflow rate (6-10%) 
and above-average persistence of poverty at outflow rates of 
30-40%. In the United Kingdom and Spain, the higher risk of 
poverty is influenced both by higher outflow and inflow rates 
(see Figure III.53).
Monthly income data are less reliable than the annual data 
due to accidental and irregular changes of registered income. 
The scale of the reduction of flows to and from relative poverty 
based on annual data (EU-SILC) compared to monthly data 
(HBS) is more important for outflows. Inflows decrease from 
boX
III.6 From rags to riches?
80% of changes in income of households in Poland are not more than two deciles up or down. It is interesting that there are situations when 
the change in income is large enough so that in a year a household moves from the first decile to the top decile in the next year. In the 2009-
2010 year, this meant a change in equivalised household income by at least 2000 PLN (so for a household consisting of two adults and one 
child, total income increased by more than 3600 PLN) (Table III.5). Such cases proved to be very rare. Changes in income from the lowest 
to the two highest deciles were experienced by about 2% of persons from the first decile. Significant declines in income are similarly rare 
over a year. This kind of mobility in Poland is lower than the EU-15 and NMS7 averages.
A significant increase in the chance of fundamental change in income means that these are not only apparent flows associated with the 
uncertainty of surveys. over a three year period, the chances of a significant improvement in the income situation in Poland and the EU-15 
countries doubled, and the risk of its deterioration increased only slightly. However, in the NMS7, the chances of flows of this magnitude 
increased fourfold in three years. The chances for a significant change in income in Poland are relatively low, which is good news for those 
with higher income, but it can lead to a problem of persistent poverty, especially when the history of a household has an impact on its cur-
rent status.
FIGURE III. 52. THE PRoBABILITy oF A FLoW BETWEEN THE HIGHEST AND THE LoWEST DECILE oF EqUIvALISED HoUSEHoLD 
INCoME DISTRIBUTIoN WITHIN A yEAR (LEFT PANEL) AND THREE yEARS (RIGHT PANEL), 2005-2008 (%). 
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC data, 2009.
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8% to 7%, and outflows from 44% to 35%. Spending mobility 
is similar to income mobility. The scale of annual flows deter-
mined on the basis of monthly expenditure is not significantly 
different from that based on income, and amount to 8% and 
42% respectively. 22 During a decline in poverty, outflows grow 
and inflows decrease, but the scale of flows is stable over time 
(see Box III.5).
A reduction in the real (quasi-absolute) poverty thresh-
old usually occurs from a decrease in the number of people 
who become poor, rather than as a result of exits from pov-
erty and reduced poverty persistence. This phenomenon is 
22  Average for the 2005-2008 period, calculated based on the EU-SILC and HBS 
data. 
stronger the lower the poverty threshold (see Figure III.54). 
In the case of absolute poverty, a 74% decrease is accounted 
for by changes in inflows, and in the case of quasi-absolute 
measures, 57%. Poverty reduction results from fewer house-
holds becoming poor, while the situation of the poor improves 
to a lesser extent.
Absolute poverty is a decidedly more temporary phe-
nomenon. Between 2003 and 2011 the rate of outflow from 
absolute poverty fluctuated between 60% and 70% (according 
to the HBS). Hence, about two thirds of people with incomes 
below the subsistence minimum got out of this state within a 
year. However, the changes in income leading to an exit from 
absolute poverty were not enough to avoid relative poverty. 
Figure III. 53 | The rates of inflow to and outflow 
from poverty within a year in the eu countries, 
2005-2008.
Figure III. 54 | The importance of inflows 
and outflows for the change in poverty risk, 
2003-2011 (pp). 
Source: own elaboration based on EU-SILC data, 2009. Note: decomposition is based on the impact of changes in inflow and outflow rates 
on equilibrium poverty defined as: UR=SN/(SO+SN), i.e. poverty which is stable at 
given inflow and outflow rates. The risk of quasi-absolute poverty in 1998 and 2010 
denote the risk of poverty determined based on the relative poverty threshold from 
those years, in real terms for the other years based on the price index.
Source:own elaboration based on HBS data.
AT
BE
BG
CY
CZ
DK
EE
ES
FI
FR
GR
HU IS
IT
LT
LU
LV
NL NO PLPT
SE
SI
UK
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12%
entry
rate
exit
rate
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
Absolute Quasi-absolute 1998 Quasi-absolute 2010
Inflow Outflow Residual
Figure III. 55 | structure of the absolutely poor 
by status after a year, 2003, 2006 and 2011.
table III. 6 | relative distance of the median 
household income from the relative and absolute 
poverty threshold by the types of flows, 2002-2011.
Note: the relative distance is defined as the ratio of the distance between the poverty threshold of the median household in a given group to the poverty threshold. Average 
values for the period 2002-2011. In parentheses are standard deviations between the years, expressed in percentage points.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data, 2002-2011.
Type of flow 
relative poverty absolute poverty
in the first 
period
in the 
second 
period
in the first 
period
in the 
second 
period
inflow to poverty 27%
(1.0)
-15%
(0.8)
103%
(52)
-32%
(9.9)
outflow from 
poverty
-17%
(0.7)
30%
(1.9)
-30%
(7.6)
105%
(52)
remaining 
in poverty 
-26%
(1.3)
-25%
(0.6)
-43%
(11)
-38%
(8.3)
remaining 
outside poverty
93%
(3.7)
94%
(4.7)
207%
(31)
219%
(29)
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The chances that income of an absolutely poor household in-
creases over the relative poverty threshold within a year are 
only 30% (Figure III.54).
The situation of people persistently below the absolute 
poverty threshold changes only slightly under the influence of 
changes in the labour market. The decrease in absolute poverty 
between 2003 and 2011 resulted almost entirely from a de-
crease in inflow rate, while the outflow rate remained relatively 
stable. The share of persons remaining in absolute poverty, 
among the absolutely poor, was about 30% between 2003 and 
2011. Strong growth in income during the economic recovery 
between 2005 and 2008 was associated with an increase in the 
relative poverty threshold. As a result, the absolutely poor found 
it harder to leave the sphere of relative poverty, and although 
the rate of outflow from absolute poverty did not change signifi-
cantly, outflows above the relative poverty threshold were less 
frequent (see Figure III.57).
Inflows to and outflows from poverty concentrate in a 
small band around the poverty threshold. Enrichment lead-
ing to an exit from poverty often is not sufficient to move 
far. An increase in income to a level exceeding the poverty 
threshold by more than 100 PLN (25 EUR) concerned ¾ 
of those leaving poverty risk, but exceeding it by more than 
500 PLN (125 EUR) was possible only for ¼ of them. House-
holds which got out of relative poverty increased their aver-
age equivalised income by about 450 PLN (110 EUR), and out 
of absolute poverty, by about 600 PLN (150 EUR). Similarly, 
the impoverishment of households is associated with falling 
into poverty that is less deep than among households remain-
ing in this state persistently. Falling into relative poverty is 
associated with an average decrease in equivalised house-
hold income by about 400 PLN (100 EUR), while falling into 
absolute poverty is related to a 800 PLN (200 EUR) decline 
(see Table III.6).
The situation of households remaining in relative poverty 
does not change, while the situation of those persistently at risk 
of absolute poverty improves slowly (see Table III.6). The latter 
group includes about one third of all absolutely poor, i.e. less 
than 1% of the Polish population. These are people whose in-
come does not satisfy their basic needs on a regular basis. Social 
assistance programmes find it very difficult to reach this group. 
In addition, it is worth noting that the analysed social surveys 
(HBS, SILC, Social Diagnosis) do not include the homeless be-
cause flats and houses are the main sampling units. 
Some households are classified as poor in terms of income 
due to inaccuracy in measurements, e.g. not taking into account 
temporary delays in getting wages. This seems to be the expla-
nation for the fact that the poorest 10% of households remain-
ing in poverty have a higher income than the poorest 10% of 
households exiting poverty within a year. In the case of inflows 
to and outflows from absolute poverty, income distributions are 
similar to relative poverty (see Figure III.56).
The scale of income mobility of the poor differs very sig-
nificantly between the different types of households. Younger 
households are more likely to flow into poverty, but more fre-
quently than for older households, these are short poverty 
spells. Households headed by <35 years old are the least likely 
to remain in poverty, even though the probability of inflow into 
poverty is quite high. In relation to households of persons aged 
35-44 years, the probability of getting out of poverty in a year 
is about 5-8 pp higher. This is the period of life with more in-
tense family formation and career development in the labour 
market. Households in which the earner is aged 55+ are less 
likely to flow into poverty, but if they become poor, they are 
less likely to leave that state than households headed by a per-
son younger than 35 years. The higher risk of poverty among 
households run by women is due to the greater chance of inflow 
to poverty among such households, but is not reflected in the 
persistence of poverty expressed by the probability of outflow 
(see Figure III.57).
Figure III. 56 | Cumulative distribution of income of selected households before (left panel) and after (right 
panel) the changes of status.
Note: levels in 2011 prices.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data, 2010-2011.
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boX
III.7 Income poverty vs. consumption smoothing
In Part I we describe the differences in the dimensions of poverty: income, expenditure and housing. At this point, we compare the mobility 
of the poor in these dimensions.
In the period 2002-2009 the rate of inflow to relative expenditure poverty was higher than to relative income poverty by about 1 percent-
age point. outflow rates from relative poverty according to both approaches were at the same level, with a significantly higher rate of 
outflow for income distribution in 2006, which corresponds to the beginning of real wage growth during that period.
TABLE III. 7. FLoWS BETWEEN PovERTy IN THE INCoME AND ExPENDITURE APPRoACH IN A PANEL, 2009-2010.
status in 2009
status in 2010
poor in both dimensions
income: non-poor
expenditure: poor
income: poor 
expenditure: non-poor
non-poor in both 
dimensions
poor in both dimensions 50% 13% 17% 21%
income: non-poor
expenditure: poor 13% 33% 5% 48%
income: poor  
expenditure: non-poor 17% 5% 29% 49%
non-poor in both dimensions 2% 5% 4% 89%
Population structure 2010 8% 8% 10% 75%
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Note: the values  in rows may not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
Half of the poor in terms of income and expenditure remain poor in the following period according to both measures (Table III.7). The poor 
in terms of income fall into both dimensions of poverty within a year less frequently than those in expenditure poverty. For both dimen-
sions, about 30% of the poor in one dimension remain poor only in this dimension next year.
According to the permanent income hypothesis, temporary decreases in income should only be slightly reflected in the level of consump-
tion. Experiencing a drop in income, which leads to income poverty, households limit their spending less compared to an income decrease. 
For most households that fell into relative income poverty, spending declines less when compared to income (Table III.8).
The measurement uncertainty of monthly income and expenditure is demonstrated by the fact that spending increased for 30% of house-
holds that entered income poverty. If the household spending falls so that it gets below the expenditure poverty threshold, household in-
come falls less than spending, which may result from an increase in other costs in the household (e.g. repayment of loans). A similar relation 
is observed for outflows from both dimensions of poverty. The correlation between the change in spending and income at a level of 0.3 is 
significantly greater than 0, but much smaller than 1. 23
TABLE III. 8. CHANGES IN EqUIvALISED ExPENDITURE AND EqUIvALISED INCoME oF HoUSEHoLD FLoWING INTo PovERTy 
IN A PANEL, 2009-2010.
Type of inflow
Change in equivalised expenditure Change in equivalised income 
p10 p50 p90 p10 p50 p90
Inflow to income poverty -714 -161 284 -1423 -415 -110
Inflow to expenditure poverty -793 -339 -113 -677 -73 406
Outflow from income poverty -343 139 677 184 528 1865
Outflow from expenditure poverty 129 355 823 -194 172 777
remaining in income poverty -322 11 358 -214 19 306
Remaining in expenditure poverty -167 3 167 -301 30 395
remaining outside income poverty -72 15 771 -560 48 725
Remaining outside expenditure poverty -732 11 782 -635 54 820
Note: p10, p50 and p90 denote the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile. Levels expressed in 2010 prices.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
Source: own elaboration
23 Correlation measured using the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.
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Higher education of the head of the household is associ-
ated with higher economic activity and higher wages, which de-
creases the risk of poverty or the duration of poverty spells. Such 
households have 8 pp chances of outflow from poverty and have 
a 3 pp lower risk of falling into poverty within a year than house-
holds headed by individuals with just secondary education, re-
gardless of sex. Households headed by persons with education 
lower than secondary are particularly exposed to poverty risk, 
and its persistence is similar among persons with just second-
ary, vocational or elementary education (see Figure III.57).
Apart from the traits of the head of the household, inflows 
into and outflows from poverty are influenced by the structure 
of the household. Households with children are at a higher risk 
of poverty and have a lower chance of exit from poverty than 
households with no children and the probabilities are constant 
for subsequent children (see Figure III.58). Similar results are 
obtained in research on poverty in other countries (e.g. Baulch, 
Vu, 2011; Woolard, Klasen, 2004; Hussain, 2002).
The appearance of an unemployed person in a household 
where no unemployed had lived before increases the risk of 
inflow into poverty by 5 pp, while the appearance of a child by 
only 2 pp. Subsequent children, similar to subsequent unem-
ployed, increase the risk of inflow into poverty. The significant 
difference lies in the persistence of poverty. The importance 
of the first and subsequent children in a similar way influences 
poverty persistence, decreasing the likelihood of getting out 
of poverty within a year by 2 pp. Due to the average duration 
of a job search of about 12 months, 24 one unemployed person 
in a household does not significantly decreases the chances of 
leaving poverty within a year. However, the next unemployed 
person extends the expected time of poverty and decreases 
24  Based on LFS data, 2012.
the likelihood of outflow from poverty by about 1 pp. So while 
children symmetrically influence inflows into and outflows 
from poverty (they are permanent changes in the household 
structure), the unemployed increase the probability of inflow 
into poverty, and to a lesser extent influence the persistence 
of poverty. 
The most efficient manner of getting out of poverty by 
a household is hired labour for an indefinite time, both by the 
first and subsequent persons in a household. While the first 
person working for an indefinite period increases the probabil-
ity of outflow from poverty by 18pp, the subsequent person 
increases the probability by a further 11pp. Even one working 
person is enough to protect the household against poverty, and 
even if a household does become poor, then quite quickly it can 
exit poverty. 
Self-employment has practically the same reducing ef-
fect on the likelihood of poverty and the expected duration of 
a poverty spell as hired labour for an indefinite period. In con-
trast, the first and next household member hired for a definite 
period increase the risk of poverty, although decrease the ex-
pected duration of a poverty spell. While persons hired for a 
definite period are at a higher risk of poverty, these are tem-
porary poverty spells and the very fact of working with such 
a contract shortens the expected duration of poverty spell by 
about 7 pp. A subsequent person in a household with the same 
type of contract does not influence the probability of inflow 
into poverty, but shortens the time of a poverty spell almost 
as much as the first person. Employment for a definite period 
is found relatively often in poor households, yet the poverty is 
rarely persistent. 
Figure III. 57 | Characteristics of the head of household vs. probability of outflow from and inflow to poverty 
within a year. 
Note: the graph above shows the average marginal effects obtained from logit models for the probability of outflow from poverty and inflow to poverty. Vertical lines indicate 
90% confidence intervals.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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Poverty in agricultural households is higher than in other 
households and inflows into poverty in this group are also high-
er, at a scale comparable to the impact of workers for a definite 
period and the unemployed. With regard to the expected worth, 
households with one or more farmers are poor for a shorter pe-
riod of time, but the variation of this effect is so high that results 
are statistically insignificant. In the analysis of rural poverty in 
Part II and in the structure of income in Part III, it is shown that 
the measurement of monthly agricultural income is associated 
with the greatest ‘noise’, which results in the ambiguity of pov-
erty persistence in households in which farmers live. So while 
there is a group of small agricultural households with income 
barely sufficient to meet the basic needs of its members, the 
general variation of agricultural income predominates and the 
average poverty persistence in the entire group of agricultural 
households is lower than in other types of households. 
Average old-age pensions are high enough to decidedly 
decrease the risk of poverty, and when a household comprises 
two pensioners then the risk of poverty is almost non-existent. 
When households with one and more pensioners become poor 
anyway, they remain poor for a shorter period of time. These 
results are controlled for the age of the head of household – 
poverty spells in households headed by a person at post-work-
ing age are not shorter, but the presence of a pensioner in the 
household decreases the persistence of poverty. 
Although disability pensions are on average lower than 
old-age pensions, this type of income in a household decreases 
the risk of inflow into poverty by about 1 pp. A second disability 
pension decreases the risk to a lesser degree than the first, but 
is significantly more important for decreasing the persistence 
of poverty, increasing the probability of outflow by 4 pp, i.e. 
similar to a worker for a definite period. 
wage mobIlIty 2.3 
The causes of income mobility arise mainly from wage mo-
bility. Labour market institutions and regulations differ between 
countries and translate into different wage mobility. The classifi-
cation of countries by institutional regimes proposed by Esping-
Andersen (1990), allows an empirical verification of the impor-
tance of institutions on wage mobility. The classification takes 
into account the existence and level of minimum wages, the bur-
den of regulations protecting workers, the share of workers in 
trade unions, and the coverage by collective agreements. There 
are four main types of regimes: continental (Austria, Germany, 
France), Nordic (Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland), southern 
(Portugal, Italy, Spain, Greece) and liberal (UK, Ireland).25 Coun-
tries from the continental group have a higher level of labour 
market regulations than the other groups. The share of union-
ised workers is not high, but a significant part of the employed is 
covered by collective agreements. The Nordic countries have a 
highly unionised workforce and centralised collective bargaining 
which covers all workers. In southern countries the activity of 
trade unions is limited, but the state strongly controls the labour 
market. The liberal group is characterised by low interference by 
the state with the labour market (see Table III.9). 
The diversity of wage mobility in European countries is 
significant. The probability of a change in wage by more than 
one decile in the wage distribution ranges from 10% to 35% 
(Figure III.59). The highest wage mobility is observed in Den-
mark (33% 1999-2000) and the lowest in Portugal (11% 1999-
2000). High wage mobility, above 20% occurred also in the 
Netherlands (24%), Ireland (24%), Italy (24%) and Spain (28%). 
Apart from Portugal, wage mobility lower than 15% is observed 
in Germany and the UK. In the perspective of changes of time, 
Greece experienced a distinct decrease in wage mobility over 
25  The classification of countries based on Pavlopoulos et al. (2010). Data for 
selected countries comes from ECHP, for 1994-2001. 
Figure III. 58 | Household structure vs. inflows into and outflows from poverty.
Note: the graph above shows the average marginal effects for changes in the number of people in the group, depending on whether it is the first or second person from a given 
group in the household, derived from the logit model of inflow into and outflow from poverty. Marginal effects were calculated only for households in which there is at least 
one person from a given group. Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. Inflows and outflows are based on the relative poverty threshold. Disability pensions concern 
only those associated with the inability to work.
Source: own elaboration based on HBS data.
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several years from 1994 falling by 10 pp. Spain and Denmark 
were in a quite different situation with an increase in wage mo-
bility by 5 pp. The ranking of countries in terms of wage mobility 
sees considerable changes during that period of time. 
Wage mobility in liberal countries was lower than the av-
erage, and in southern countries it was above average. In the 
countries of Southern Europe, workers show high wage mobil-
ity, with the exception of Portugal. Moreover, apart from Spain, 
wage mobility in those countries decreased over time. Nordic 
countries had different levels of wage mobility but their com-
mon characteristic is the fact the mobility distinctly grew dur-
ing the studied period. The countries of the continental regime 
have the lowest wage mobility, which partly results from the 
exceptionally low wage mobility in France. These countries had 
a similar decrease in mobility compared to the initial period. 
In countries described as liberal, results are ambiguous. On 
one hand, Ireland has high wage mobility, but the UK does not. 
Wage mobility for these countries fluctuated during the studied 
period, showing no particular trend (see Figure III.59). 
The relation between the extent of regulations and wage 
mobility is not linear. In particular, in liberal countries mobility 
is lower than in countries with stronger regulations. Therefore, 
a low extent of regulations does not directly translate into an 
increase in workers’ chances to change the labour market situa-
tion. Moreover, workers in the southern regime countries have 
higher wage mobility than indicated by the level of regulations. 
Characteristically, the wage mobility in southern regime coun-
tries occurs within the company and not through finding a new 
job. Moreover, the high mobility in southern regime countries 
may result from the high share of the self-employed. Nonethe-
less, the common characteristic of all countries is a U-shaped 
dependence between the level of wages and mobility within the 
wage distribution (Figure III.60).
Wage persistence, measured by the chance of remaining in 
the same wage decile, is a little lower in Poland than the average 
for European countries (Figure III.61). Chances for a change in 
status by one decile up or down are similar across Europe, with 
significant differences occurring for the probability of changes 
in wage by two or more deciles. The likelihood of moving to any 
other wage decile in the wage distribution in Poland is similar to 
that in the southern regime countries (Spain, Portugal and Italy). 
In Poland, the chances of going up the distribution are greater 
than dropping, albeit the flows up the distribution are couples 
with an increase in inequality in the upper deciles (OECD, 2012). 
OECD classifies Poland as a country with a moderate labour in-
come inequality, which translates into a poverty rate and inequal-
ity in household income at an average level for OECD countries.
table III. 9 | Characteristics of the labour market vs. wage mobility in european countries.
Institutional 
regime
Countries labour market characteristics wage mobility 
Liberal Ireland, United kingdom, No state interference and low level of 
protection of workers in the labour market.
High wage mobility.
Southern Spain, Portugal, Italy Low unionisation, high protection of workers. Relatively high wage mobility.
Continental Austria, Germany, France
Significantly regulated labour market. 
High coverage with collective bargaining 
agreements, low unionisation.
Low wage mobility.
Nordic
Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands
High unionisation and coverage by collective 
bargaining agreements coordinated at the 
central level. Strictly regulated labour market.
High wage mobility. In particular, 
higher than in the liberal 
countries.
Source: own elaboration based on Esping-Andersen (1990) and Pavlopoulos et al. (2010).
Figure III. 59 | the probability of change in wage 
by more than one decile within a year. 
Figure III. 60 | the probability of remaining in the 
same decile in the wage distribution within a year. 
Source: own elaboration based on Pavlopoulos et al. (2010).
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The mobility of workers at the lowest wage is a significant 
aspect of general wage mobility, especially in the context of 
poverty. The question of the permanence of low-wage employ-
ment is particularly important. 27 Low-paid labour, especially for 
young workers, may be a chance to gain professional experi-
ence and help find a better-paid job in the future (ESDE, 2011). 
On the other hand, if the low wage is the result of discrimination 
in the labour market (Grimshaw, 2011) and if persistent, then it 
may increase the risk of deprivation. 
Amongst European countries there is a significant di-
versity in terms of the persistence of low-wage employment 
26 The paper by Clark and kanellopoulos (2009) used the data of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) from the period 1994-2001.
27  Low-wage is defined as below 2/3 of the wage median in a given country.
(Table III.10).28 The greatest probability of remaining in a low-
wage job is observed in Ireland, Germany and Portugal – more 
than 60% (Figure III.62). At the same time, Portugal had a rela-
tively high probability of inflow into low-wage jobs and the lowest 
probability of outflow, which indicates low wage mobility among 
those at the lowest wage. A different situation was in Belgium, 
Italy, Denmark and Austria, which are characterised by high 
wage mobility with regard to low wages – with more than a 50% 
chance of outflow from a low-wage job. The probability of chang-
ing job status is highly state-dependent in Portugal, Germany and 
Ireland, while this dependence is low in Belgium, Austria and Italy 
(Figure III.63). The previously described regimes vary greatly in 
terms of permanence of low-wage employment. 
28  Persistence of low-wage employment is defined here as the probability of 
having a low-paid job by those in low-wage employment in the previous period. 
table III. 10 | Probability of flowing into and out of low-paid employment, 1994-2001 (%).
Country
Probability of 
low-paid labour 
Probability of inflow into 
low-paid employment 
Probability of outflow from
 low-paid employment 
austria 8 2 53
belgium 7 3 61
denmark 8 3 51
France 17 5 44
germany 13 4 38
greece 16 6 45
Ireland 19 4 39
Italy 7 3 53
netherlands 10 3 45
Portugal 19 6 35
spain 19 7 49
uk 16 6 45
Source: own elaboration based on Clark, Kanellopoulos (2009).26
Figure III. 61 | Flows between deciles of the wage distribution in europe, 2004-2008.
Source: own elaboration based on ESDE 2011 and EU-SILC, 2009.
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In the US in the period 1986-1991, the probability that 
a low-paid worker would have a low-wage job the following 
year was 58%,29 which is considerably higher than in European 
countries. In comparison, in Denmark the probability was 8%, in 
Germany 26%, and in France 32%. Labour market institutions 
in the U.S. are comparable to those in the UK (Pavlopoulos et al. 
2010). In the UK the probability of remaining in a low-paid job is 
quite high (39%), but still distinctly lower than in the US. 
To sum up, labour market institutions are significant to 
wage mobility, but the dependence is not straightforward. Lib-
eral countries have wage mobility similar to the Nordic coun-
tries, in which labour mobility regulations are much broader. In 
Europe, workers from the bottom of the wage distribution face 
low wage mobility. The only exceptions are in Nordic countries 
(Denmark, the Netherlands and Finland) in which the probabil-
ity of remaining in the same decile within a year is similar for the 
lowest and middle deciles. Institutional regimes do not influ-
ence the persistence of low wages in a straightforward manner. 
In the Netherlands the importance of a low-paid labour spell on 
remaining in a low-paid job is one of the highest in Europe, while 
wage mobility is relatively high. 
29  Based on keese et al. (1998).
Figure III. 62 | Probability of remaining a low-paid 
worker.
Figure III. 63 | the impact of a low-paid job in the 
previous period on the probability of a low-paid job in 
the current period. 
Note: state-dependence was defined as the difference between the probability of a low wage under the conditions of a low wage in the previous period, and a low wage 
following higher-wage labour in the previous period.
Source: own elaboration based on Clark, Kanellopoulos (2009).
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summary
Economic growth in Poland in the period 1994-2011 had a varying impact on income inequality. The years of economic boom 
before the Russian crisis (1998) were characterised by a rapid increase in labour productivity, and real income in poor households 
also and their relative position was stable. The increase in inequality alone translated into increased depth of poverty despite a 
stable rate of relative poverty risk. In the period 1998-2004, average real income stabilised, but at the same time there was a 
significant increase in the scale of inequality and poverty risk. Between 2004 and 2009 a marked improvement in economic condi-
tions resulted in a decrease in unemployment and inequality, improving both the absolute and relative situation of people at risk of 
poverty. The real poverty reduction was a result of growth in real income, and the role of inequality was of secondary importance. 
Despite these changes, stratification of income in Poland is at a stable average European level of 29-32 (Gini coefficient) and does 
not seem to be subject to any steady change.
The poverty of households is mostly due to the low-intensity of non-agricultural labour. Poor matching of skills to the labour 
demand often does not allow members of poor households to find a job, pushing households into poverty. Labour income is by far 
the greater part of non-poor household budgets than in poor households in which benefits and disability pensions are much more 
important. The replacement of disability pensions with old-age pensions after 2005 did not allow the covered poor households 
to exit poverty. Poor agricultural households depend on agricultural incomes less than do non-poor agricultural households, de-
pending more on employment outside agriculture. Income from benefits and transfers are also more important in poor agricultural 
households. Similarly, in poor households with a main income not related to labour, labour incomes are more important for their 
budgets than for the non-poor households in this category. 
Wage inequality in Poland grew until 2006, since when it has revealed a steady decline. The difference in remuneration be-
tween men and women relates mainly to higher wages. Changes in the risk of poverty in Poland over the period 1998-2010 were 
mostly influenced by changes in the employment rate, and since 2005 also by an increase in wages. Despite the counter-cyclical 
character of the Gini coefficient, income inequality has a much lower impact on poverty depth than the employment rate and rising 
wages.
Changes in the labour market explain the vast majority of changes in the risk of poverty. During the downturn, the poverty 
risk was significantly influenced by a decrease in employment and increase in unemployment. During the economic recovery, both 
employment and wage growth similarly contributed to the reduced risk of poverty. This means that an increase in wealth resulting 
from the economic growth in Poland, especially in the period 2005-2008, was largely a pro-poor growth, contributing to the growth 
of employment and wages among the poorest groups in the society also. 
In-work poverty is associated very little with low wages. Labour intensity in households is more important. Young people 
with low incomes often depend on their parents, while the older low-paid workers combine labour with old-age pensions to avoid 
poverty. The poverty rate among Polish non-agricultural workers is slightly higher than in the EU-15 (about 7-8%), although the 
difference between in-work and total poverty risk is similar to other EU-15 countries. The risk of poverty among farmers exceeds 
40% and this group has been the subject of a separate analysis (see Part II). The gap between in-work and total poverty is counter-
cyclical.
Outflows from and inflows into poverty weakly correlate between countries. Poland, similar to other countries with high lev-
els of income inequality and a high risk of poverty, is characterised by relatively high rates of inflow into poverty (6%) and an aver-
age persistence of poverty with outflow rates at 35%. At the same time, the rate of persistent poverty in Poland is higher than the 
European average (about 6%), while a lesser share of people are permanently non-poor (70%). The dependence of poverty risk on 
any previous poverty spells is similar to the EU-15 average.
No exit from poverty within a year significantly reduces the chance of an exit in the future. Similarly, remaining above 
the poverty threshold for a longer period reduces the chance of falling below that limit. The chance of remaining in absolute pov-
erty for more than eight years is almost non-existent, but in the case of relative poverty it exceeds 10%. A more variable income 
(e.g. wage) protects against persistent poverty less than a more stable income (e.g. old-age pension). Similar to labour, high social 
capital allows an early exit from poverty.
The reduction of poverty in Poland in the period 2003-2011 owes much more to decreased inflows into poverty than 
the reduced duration of poverty spells. This regularity is more pronounced for lower poverty thresholds. The probability of entry into 
and exit from poverty are strongly dependent on the depth of poverty. The richer poor have a better chance of becoming non-poor 
and the less wealthy non-poor are at a greater risk of inflow into poverty. Income poverty is a slightly different phenomenon than 
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expenditure poverty or poverty of housing, but persistent poverty among people who are poor in at least two of these dimensions 
is higher than among those poor in only one dimension. Some characteristics of households can at the same time reduce or increase 
the likelihood of becoming poor or the persistence of poverty (higher education, gender, number of employees and retirees, number 
of children), while others can increase the risk of poverty while reducing the persistence (households of young workers with flexible 
forms of employment).
Poverty rates result from labour intensity, and the only long-term effective method against poverty is increasing employment 
and wages. Therefore, the most effective elements of public policy aimed at reducing poverty are active labour market policies 
and creating conditions for economic growth, which in turn result in wage increases. Particular attention should be paid to social 
transfers which may create incentives to exit the labour market. An inadequate incentive structure may result in a decline in labour 
intensity, leading to poverty, and may also increase the tax burden on labour income, which pushes workers into poverty. Policies 
intended to increase individual productivity through human capital accumulation have a very important role. Education and high 
skills are practical protection against poverty if they are tailored to the needs of the labour market. Even high skills for which there 
is no demand in the labour market do not increase the chance of employment or the level of remuneration.
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Introduction
The most substantial trends in the poverty dynamics in Poland with special regard to the changes in poverty among children 
and working people have been presented In Parts 1-3 of the Report. As could be expected, one of the most important factors that 
correlate with poverty rate is having some earnings. However this relationship is more complicated in the case of relative poverty, 
where the poverty threshold depends also on earnings and is thus the function of the level of employment and the amount of 
remuneration.
Part 4 of the Report describes the role of the public policy in limiting the scope of poverty with special regard to the role of the 
tax and benefit system in shaping the households’ incomes and influence of this system on determination of the scope of poverty 
in the population.
Public policy has direct influence on the disposable income of households on one hand through the scope of household income 
taxation, and on the other hand in connection with the generosity of household support system through benefits paid to those 
households. From the point of view of poverty level development and the role of socio-economic policy in limiting this level, the 
scale of progressivity of the tax system and the scope of household support through means-tested benefits are the most important 
factors in this case.
While considering the impact of public policy on the extent of poverty one has to note two essential issues. Firstly, just like 
in the case of changes in earnings, the increase in state generosity for households does not necessarily have to result in the decline 
of the extent of relative poverty. This relates to both tax policy and benefit policy and it is illustrated by the examples presented 
in this part of the Report. This is connected to the fact that changes in household incomes resulting from limiting taxes or increases 
in the amount of benefits may at the same time translate into higher values of the relative poverty threshold, and this in turn may 
lead to the expansion of the extent of poverty instead of its reduction.
The other issue that has to be taken into consideration while analysing the effect of the instruments directly influencing house-
hold incomes is that they may have an indirect impact on the income level, because the changes in government tax and benefit policy 
simultaneously apply to the financial incentives to work (e.g. Bargain and Orsini, 2006; Blundell et al., 2000; Brewer et al., 2006). 
In case of lack of employment what influences those incentives is the amount of benefits, the degree of tax burden on earnings, and 
also the scope of support in the form of tax credits and benefits for working people. The changes in the level and intensity of employ-
ment in reaction to the reforms of tax and benefit policy will result in changes in disposable income, and in consequence, in the scale 
of risk of poverty. Thus, the manner in which they affect household income both directly and indirectly should be taken into account 
in the process of development of the solutions aiming at reducing the poverty.
The analyses presented in the first Chapter of this Part of the Report focus on describing the most important elements of 
the public policy in directly shaping household incomes in Poland and showing their effectiveness in the international context. 
The Chapter points out low level of support for families with children in Poland in comparison with other European Union countries 
as well as relatively high tax burden of low income households in Poland.
The second Chapter focuses on the effects of changes in the tax and benefit policy in Poland in the years 2005-2012 with spe-
cial regard to the policy of financial support of families with children. A number of changes in the tax and benefit system directly in-
fluencing incomes of most of the Polish households, were introduced in the studied period. Public policy concerning the support of 
families with children has distinctively changed through a number of reforms in the family benefits system and by the introduction 
of the child tax credit in the income tax system, which had significant impact on the actual income growth. By means of the Polish 
microsimulation model SIMPL the scale of the changes directly resulting from the reforms introduced in the years 2005-2012 and 
the impact of individual elements of the implemented set of reforms on the changes in the poverty rate have been presented. Direct 
impact of the changes introduced in the years 2005-2010has only minor effect on total relative poverty (increase by 0.1 percent-
age point), but at the same time it is shown to significantly reduce relative poverty among children (by 1.4 pp). Simultaneously 
the quasi-absolute poverty in total has been limited by 1.3 pp and the quasi-absolute poverty among children by 2.6 pp.
In Chapter 3 the potential impact of the number of hypothetical changes in the tax and benefit system on the poverty rate 
has been presented. Special attention has been paid to the effectiveness of family benefits and the tax system in reducing pover-
ty among children and to the impact of the generosity of the system of unemployment benefits on the overall poverty rate. In this 
second case the effect of changes in the system of unemployment benefits has been shown relative to the simulated changes 
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in the level of employment. Chapter 3 is summed up by the analyses of the changes in the family benefits system focused on in-
creasing the financial attractiveness of employment. The analysed solutions have minor direct impact on the poverty rate. How-
ever, taking into consideration the conclusions from international literature on the implications of the tax and benefit system 
for labour market behaviour (Bargain and Orsini, 2006; Blundell et al., 2000), effective reforms directly supporting the poorest 
households should go together with the solutions that have beneficial impact on changes in financial incentives to work.
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effectiveneSS of 1 
poliSh inStrumentS 
aimed at reducing 
poverty
Support SyStem for low Income 1.1 
houSeholdS In poland
The main instruments of financial support for people at risk 
of poverty in Poland include the tax treatment of incomes and 
various financial benefits. As in other countries, these are the main 
tools through which public policy may directly influence the level 
of household incomes, as well as affect the financial attractiveness 
of employment, and thus indirectly influence the extent of poverty. 
Short descriptions of the most important instruments in Poland 
are presented below. Financial benefits include the system of fam-
ily benefits, housing benefits, social assistance benefits and unem-
ployment benefits. The tax burden includes the elements reducing 
the amount of income tax paid and the scale of tax progressivity. 
Further details of the system are described in the in Appendix IV.2.
famIly benefItS1.1.1 
The system of family benefits intended mainly for the fam-
ilies with dependent children, includes: family allowance with 
supplements, care benefits and child birth benefit.
The families whose income is below a specified income eli-
gibility threshold have the right to receive the family allowance 
and its supplements. Since November 2012 income eligibility 
threshold (net value) to qualify for this allowance amounts to 
PLN 539 per capita or PLN 623 if there is a disabled child in the 
family. The amount of the family allowance depends on the age of 
the child for which it was granted (Table IV.B1 in Appendix IV.2.).
Persons entitled to receive the family allowance may also 
claim one or several types of supplements to the allowance, but 
additional requirements specific for the respective supplements 
have to be fulfilled. The supplements are as follows:
One-time child birth grant;• 
Child care supplement granted for the duration of paren-• 
tal leave;
Lone parent supplement;• 
Supplement for large families granted for the third and • 
each subsequent child;
Supplement for education and rehabilitation of a disabled • 
child;
Supplement for starting education outside the place of • 
residence;
One-time supplement for starting the school year.• 
Regardless of the right to the child birth grant, one may 
claim a one-time child birth benefit (a newborn allowance; in 
Poland commonly referred to as becikowe) which amounts to 
PLN 1000 per child, but the income eligibility threshold apply-
ing from January 2013 in the amount of PLN 1922 per capita 
limits the number of families that can receive it. Additional fi-
nancial means in relation to the above can be granted by local 
governments with jurisdiction for the place of residence of the 
child’s parents (from its own funds). 
Another element of the family benefits system are care 
benefits in the form of nursing benefit and nursing allowance, 
which since January 2010 is no longer means-tested. Nursing 
benefit is granted to a disabled child, an adult with a certificate 
of disability or a person aged 75 years and older that does not 
receive the nursing supplement. The nursing allowance may be 
granted to the parents or legal guardians of the child if they are 
not employed or resign from work to provide care for the disa-
bled person requiring special care.
Moreover, the person eligible for private maintenance, en-
forcement of which has been unsuccessful, is entitled to receive 
state aid in the form of benefits from the maintenance fund, if 
he/she does not exceed the income eligibility threshold in the 
amount of PLN 725 per capita and at the same time is under 18 
years of age or 25 if he/she continues education, or without the 
age limit if he/she is disabled.
The amounts of all family benefits for different benefit pe-
riods and their changes in the years 2005-2012 are presented 
in the Table IV.B1 in Appendix IV.2.
the most important changes in the family benefits system 
in the years 2005-2012
The most important modifications of the family benefits 
system in the years 2005-2012 consisted in changing the 
amounts and the system of calculating the family allowance 
(from number of children to their age), and in increasing the 
amounts of nursing allowance and some of the supplements to 
family allowance. Introducing a child birth benefit in 2006 was 
also a fundamental change. Detailed information on changes in 
the family benefits system in the years 2005-2012 is presented 
in Table IV.B2 in Appendix IV.2.
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houSIng benefIt1.1.2 
Housing benefit is a cash benefit aimed at people who are 
not able to cover the dwelling costs, such as: rent, water serv-
ice and heating, by themselves. This benefit is granted when 
income per capita does not exceed 125% of the amount of the 
minimum retirement pension for the given year in a multi-mem-
ber household and 175% in a single-person household. There 
are also additional limitations concerning the apartment living 
area. The amount of the benefit depends among others on the 
amount of money spent on the apartment, its area and house-
hold income per capita. Due largely to the improving household 
income situation there was a significant decrease in both, the 
number and the amount of the benefits granted (Table IV.B3. in 
Appendix IV.2) in the years 2005-2009.
SocIal aSSIStance1.1.3 
In the Social Assistance Act the conditions on the basis of 
which support is granted include but are not limited to: pov-
erty, unemployment, protection of maternity or large families, 
orphanhood, homelessness, chronic disease, disability. Social 
assistance is also granted to the people affected by domestic 
violence, the victims of human trafficking and people affected 
by alcohol or drug abuse, and it may constitute a measure to 
prevent the effects of natural disasters, crisis situations and 
other unexpected accidents. Social assistance may be divided 
into cash and non-cash benefits.1 To receive a cash benefit 
one cannot exceed the income eligibility threshold but there 
are exceptions to this rule and they are defined in Appendix 
IV.2.The threshold is different for persons in single-person 
households and those living with the family (cf. Table IV.B4 in 
Appendix IV.2). The basic allowance as part of the social as-
sistance in cash is the permanent allowance granted to adults 
who are incapable of work because of age or completely inca-
pable of work. Temporary allowance on the other hand may be 
granted to a person in a single-person household or a family, 
for individually specified period of time, for example due to 
disability, long-lasting disease or unemployment. The rules for 
establishing the amounts of the benefits granted and its mini-
mum and maximum values are presented in Appendix IV.2.
As in the case of family benefits, income eligibility thresh-
old and the amounts of social assistance benefits are verified 
every 3 years. In the years 2006-2011 the abovementioned 
thresholds and amounts were kept at a constant nominal lev-
el, following which the value of both (except for the maximum 
amount of the temporary allowance granted to the persons in 
single-person households) was increased during the verifica-
tion in 2012 (cf. Table IV.B4 in Appendix IV.2).
A designated benefit is also the form of social assistance 
in cash and it may be granted to satisfy a specific living need, for 
example to cover the costs of necessities, the costs of funeral, 
1  Non-cash benefits are not included in the set of instruments which are 
subject to quantitative analysis in this paper, however the nature of this kind of 
support has been presented in Appendix IV.2.
or health care costs. This benefit in the form of non-refundable 
support may be granted irrespective of income to persons that 
incurred losses as a result of unexpected accidents. Financial 
assistance from the local government may be granted also for 
the purpose of developing economic self-sufficiency or continu-
ation of education.
tax SyStem progreSSIon aS a tool 1.1.4 
for SupportIng the pooreSt 
houSeholdS
tax progression
Since 1 January 2009 in Poland there are two tax rates at 
18% and 32% (in the previous tax system the thresholds were 
19%, 30% and 40%). Individuals with taxable income not ex-
ceeding PLN 85 528 per annum are taxed according to a lower 
rate. The income threshold which determines the level of tax 
rate was last indexed in 2009. Because of continued increases 
in the level of wages the consequence of this policy has been the 
increase of the number of persons with earnings taxed accord-
ing to the higher rate.
revenue costs
Taxpayers may deduct from their revenue some of the 
costs incurred to obtain it. In case of persons with an employ-
ment contract the revenue costs have been determined by de-
cree in the Act in the amount of PLN 111.25 per month (max. 
PLN 1 335 per annum) in case of one employment relationship 
or PLN 2 002.05 per annum in case of more than one employ-
ment relationship.
tax free allowance (universal tax credit)
Each taxpayer has a possibility to deduct the so called 
universal tax credit amounting to PLN 556.02 from the annual 
amount of tax. Thus, annual tax free allowance which does not 
cause the arising of tax obligation amounts to PLN 3 091. The 
tax free allowance in the years 2008-2012 was not indexed and 
its value, calculated as a quotient of PLN 3 091 and the first tax 
rate, dropped nominally upon the reduction of the lowest tax 
rate from 19% to 18% in 2009. Due to lack of indexation its 
nominal value and relative value with respect to the changing 
wages distribution have dropped. After fulfilling specific con-
ditions is it possible to deduct from the taxable income other 
spending, e.g. purchase of medications prescribed by a special-
ist physician, maintenance and rehabilitation of the disabled, 
donations for public benefit organisations, Internet usage, 
acquiring new technologies, payments to the individual retire-
ment insurance account.
child tax credit
The child tax credit was introduced into the tax system in 
2007. Persons bringing up their own or adopted children, and 
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filing taxes according to general rules, obtained the possibility 
to deduct PLN 92.67 per child for each month of taking care 
of the child, from the amount of the tax due after deducting 
the universal credit and insurance contributions for the Na-
tional Health Fund. Maximum annual child tax credit amount 
corresponds to twice the amount of the universal tax credit 
(PLN 1 112.04 annually). Since January 2013 the amount 
of tax credit for the third child and subsequent children was 
raised but the introduced income eligibility threshold limited 
the use of this tax credit by families with only one child. Both 
parents jointly may use the tax credit – by deducting it from 
the tax of one of the parents, by sharing it or by deducting it 
from the joint tax of both of the parents if they are filing taxes 
together. The changes in its amount since 2007 corresponded 
to the changes in the amount of the universal tax credit, which 
is presented in Table IV.B6 in Appendix IV.2.
releaSe from the oblIgatIon 1.1.5 
to pay the SocIal and health 
InSurance contrIbutIonS
Apart from the benefits mentioned above, in the Polish 
social security system some of the citizens have the pos-
sibility to receive financial support in the form of releasing 
from the obligation to pay some of the social and health in-
surance contributions or transferring such obligation onto 
public administration.
Social assistance centre pays the health insurance con-
tributions for persons receiving permanent allowance from 
social assistance, persons covered by individual program of 
moving out of homelessness and the unemployed covered by 
the individual program of social employment or social con-
tract. For the persons that resign from work due to the ne-
cessity to take care of a severely ill member of the family, the 
social assistance centre finances both the health, retirement 
and disability contributions.
Retirement and disability insurance contributions and 
health insurance contributions for the unemployed are financed 
by the district employment agencies and retirement and dis-
ability insurance contributions for the persons on the child care 
leave or receiving the maternity allowance are paid from the 
state budget.
There is a possibility of remitting the outstanding social 
insurance contributions by means of administrative decision 
for the poor, the ill, the persons with an ill family member or af-
fected by the unexpected accidents, which are in arrears in the 
payment of contributions and in the case of which paying the 
outstanding amount would result in lack of sufficient means to 
satisfy basic living needs.
InSurance tranSferS: fInancIal 1.1.6 
Support for the unemployed
Unemployment benefit as an insurance transfer, granting 
of which is not directly connected with the material situation 
of an unemployed person, by definition has other purpose than 
the forms of support for poor households mentioned above. 
This is just like in the case of other social insurance system ben-
efits (e.g. disability pension in respect of incapacity for work, an-
ticipated old-age pensions). However, the scope and amount of 
those benefits influence the scope of poverty, and social insur-
ance benefits system partially unburdens certain elements of 
the benefits system supporting the poorest people. Due to the 
subject of the paper, in case of insurance benefits we concen-
trate exclusively on unemployment benefits and their potential 
role in limiting the poverty.
Unemployment benefit is granted by the district employ-
ment agencies generally for the period of 6 months and in cer-
tain circumstances described in Appendix IV.2 – for the period 
of 12 months. It is paid in the specific part of the basic amount 
depending on the seniority in service – 80% in case of seniority 
of up to 5 years, 100% in case of seniority from 5 to 20 years, 
and 120%, when the seniority exceeds 20 years. In 2012 the 
basic amount of the benefit paid to an unemployed person for 
the first 3 months was PLN 794.20 and in subsequent months 
of being entitled to receive the benefit it was reduced to 
PLN 623.60. The amount of benefit is indexed annually in ac-
cordance to changes of the consumer price index. Moreover, 
the unemployed referred by the agency for training aimed at 
improving professional skills or for a job placement, may also 
receive a scholarship in the amount of 120% of the unemploy-
ment benefit and financial support for further training.
Unemployment benefit is not included in the income taken 
into account when granting social assistance cash benefits, hence 
the persons eligible for this benefit may simultaneously apply 
for temporary allowance. Temporary allowance is also the basic 
form of financial support for the long-term unemployed who are 
no longer entitled to receive unemployment benefit. In the years 
2005-2011 ca. 82.3% of the total amount of the granted temporary 
allowances were paid precisely with respect to unemployment.
Impact of the unemployment benefit on the poverty 
rate depends on its amount, but also on the criteria of grant-
ing the benefit and the number of the unemployed entitled to 
receive it. The percentage of the unemployed eligible for the 
benefit have not exceeded 18% in the past years (changes in 
the number of the unemployed registered and receiving the 
benefit in the years 2005-2011 are presented in Table IV.B7 in 
Appendix IV.2), which is related to the high proportion of the 
long-term unemployed (for more than 6 months). In Chapter 3 
we present the analysis of sensitivity of poverty measures to 
simulated changes in the amount of unemployment benefit and 
its eligibility criteria, showing that the scope of unemployment 
and the percentage of the unemployed eligible for the benefit 
have a significant influence on the poverty rate.
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effectIveneSS of tax and benefIt 1.2 
SyStemS In reducIng poverty 
In europe
One of the purposes of tax and benefit systems is the re-
distribution of income and limiting its differentiation in the pop-
ulation. One of the measures of effectiveness of those systems 
is the degree of poverty reduction which they induce. The effec-
tiveness of tax and benefit systems in respect of reducing pov-
erty is most often assessed by comparing the actual household 
income situation with a hypothetical scenario assuming lack of 
public intervention. Defining the alternative to compare with 
the actual situation of households is not evident. It can be for 
example a system with no social benefits – then the comparison 
of hypothetical and actual poverty rate reveals the effective-
ness of this part of the system. The alternative system may then 
be extended by ‘withdrawing” the income tax, or even more - 
also social insurance contributions and benefits connected with 
it (retirement and disability pensions, unemployment benefit, 
maternity allowance, etc.). In the scenario where social ben-
efits, income tax as well as universal tax-benefit and social in-
surance system together with contributions are withdrawn, the 
alternative income in relation to the actual disposable income 
of households comprises of: total gross earnings, income from 
self-employment, capital gains and other income not connected 
with the payments received from public institutions. By com-
paring the actual income distribution with such hypothetical 
distribution, one can evaluate the joint impact (and the impact 
of respective elements) of the tax and transfer system on the 
distribution of income and poverty.
From this point of view the degree of effectiveness of tax 
and benefit systems in reducing the income inequality and the 
scope of poverty will depend on both the income distribution 
before taxation (e.g. on the gross earnings distribution) and 
on the degree of progressivity of the tax and contribution sys-
tem, and the scope of support through benefits for the poorest 
households. It should also be noted that the evaluation of ef-
fectiveness defined in such a way is based only on the income 
definition of poverty, and the indirect tax burden (VAT and ex-
cise duty), which constitutes a significant tax burden for house-
holds (by influencing the volume of consumption) and potential 
source of financing of social transfers and tax credits in the tax 
system, is not taken into consideration.
The manner of defining the relative poverty threshold is 
also an important issue. On one hand for each alternative and 
the resulting hypothetical income distribution one may calcu-
late a new relative threshold and the corresponding poverty 
rate. On the other hand, in order to identify the degree to which 
individual elements of the system influence income in the base 
system, the alternative poverty rates may be calculated with re-
spect to the poverty threshold defined for the base system. In 
international comparisons of effectiveness of the tax and ben-
efit systems, which are described in Chapter 1.2.2, the second 
approach is usually applied.
The analysis of the effectiveness of tax and benefit sys-
tems begins with the review of the potential impact on poverty 
of two important elements of the system – the income tax and 
the system of support for families with children – by presenting 
the differentiation of their influence for European countries the 
changes in these elements in time (Chapter 1.2.1). The analysis 
is based on the Eurostat data and results of international re-
search with the use of the EUROMOD model. Those are sup-
plemented by the estimates of the effectiveness of the Polish 
tax and benefit system using the Polish microsimulation model 
SIMPL, which is used in further chapters in the detailed analy-
ses of the selected elements of the Polish system.
the relatIon between Income 1.2.1 
taxeS, famIly benefItS and 
poverty In InternatIonal 
context
The risk of poverty usually varies in particular subgroups 
distinguished with respect to age, labour market status, place 
of residence. Those differences are common in European coun-
tries, although as depicted in Parts I-III, in each of the countries 
slightly different groups of people may be at the highest risk 
of poverty. Also, from the point of view of European countries 
one can notice the relation between the scale of the tax burden 
and benefit transfers that may have a significant impact on in-
come development, and poverty rate in general, and in specific 
age groups. On Figure IV.1 one can compare the poverty rate 
among children and the share of public spending spent on fam-
ily benefits in GDP (Figure IV.1a), and the poverty rate in gen-
eral and the revenue from PIT as a share of GDP (Figure IV.1b). 
In both cases one can notice a relatively strong negative corre-
lation between the two elements of the tax and transfer system 
and the poverty rate.
In the case of family benefits, what is noticeable is a very 
low level of spending of this system in Poland (at the level of 
0.75% GDP) accompanied by a high poverty rate among chil-
dren (23%). This state of affairs sharply contrasts for example 
with the situation in Denmark, where the high level of support 
for families with children within the framework of family ben-
efits (4.2% GDP) is observed concurrently with a very low pov-
erty rate among children (10.6%). On the other hand there are 
countries that sharply contrast with Poland and Denmark, such 
as for example the Czech Republic, where low public spending 
on support for the families with children (1.4% GDP) is associ-
ated with low poverty rate among children (13.3%), or Romania 
where more than twice as high a share of spending on family 
benefits in GDP than in Poland (1.7% GDP) may be observed 
at the same time as the highest poverty rate among children in 
Europe (33%), or Luxembourg where the risk of poverty among 
children comparable with the one observed in Poland (22.3%) 
occurs with the level of spending close to the one present in 
Denmark (4.0% GDP). Low (high) spending on family benefits 
may be the cause of high (low) poverty rate among children, but 
may also be the consequence of low (high) poverty rate among 
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children or of the differentiation of the effectiveness of the 
policy directed at reducing the poverty among children – cor-
relation is not sufficient to answer the question which of the 
relations dominates.
Income tax share in GDP in Poland is at the level of 4.6%, 
which constitutes almost twice as low a percentage as the aver-
age value for the European Union countries (9.3%). Just like in 
the case of relations between poverty among children and the 
level of spending on family benefits, even though there is a cor-
relation between revenues from PIT (as a fraction of GDP) and 
poverty rate, there are countries like Czech Republic and Slova-
kia, where the low share from income tax (3.6% and 2.4% GDP) 
is associated with low poverty rate (9% and 11%). However, as 
opposed to the relations between poverty among children and 
spending on family benefits, there are no countries in the Eu-
ropean Union, in which high share of the PIT revenues in GDP 
(so high taxation of earnings) co-exists with a high poverty rate.
Cross-sectional approach to the relation between the 
elements of the system and poverty may blur the actual role 
of the system elements also connected with the fact that the 
countries with a higher poverty rate are to some extent forced 
to spend more on transfers. Figures IV.2a and IV.2b provide fur-
ther explanations concerning the relations between analysed 
variables. They present the relations between changes of pov-
erty among children in time and changes in the relative level of 
spending on family benefits, and between changes in the risk of 
poverty in general and in the share of the revenue from PIT in 
GDP. It appears that in the case of changes in time in respec-
tive countries, there is no evident exchangeability observed be-
tween the scale of public intervention and the risk of poverty. 
In the case of family benefits in all the European Union countries 
except for Poland the spending rose in the years 2005-2009. 
However, the fall in poverty among children was associated with 
the increase in spending only in the following countries: Austria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal, Slo-
venia and Great Britain. In Bulgaria, Finland, France, Greece, 
Germany, Norway, Luxembourg, Latvia, Sweden, Italy and Hun-
gary the increase in spending on family benefits have proved to 
be insufficient to stop the increase in poverty among children. 
Particular difference can be observed between the changes in 
Bulgaria and in Poland. In the case of the first of the two coun-
tries a significant increase in the share of family benefits in GDP 
in the years 2005-2009 (by 1 pp) was associated with the in-
crease in the poverty rate among children by more than 7 pp. 
On the other hand in Poland, a great decrease in poverty among 
children (by 6.3 pp) occurred even though there was a drop in 
the share of family benefits in GDP by 0.1 pp.
In the case of changes in the general poverty rate and PIT 
revenues (Figure IV.2b), direct correlation between the func-
tioning of this element and reduction of the extent of poverty is 
also hard to identify, and differentiation of development is even 
bigger than in the case of spending on benefits and on counter-
acting poverty among children. In the years 2005-2009 in Po-
land the share of revenue from PIT in GDP increased by 0.7 pp 
which was accompanied by the decrease in poverty by 3.4 pp. 
Similar changes were present also in Portugal, Slovenia, Italy 
and Hungary. However at the same time in number of countries 
(e.g. Bulgaria, Denmark, Luxembourg and Germany) the poverty 
rate has increased with simultaneous increase in the share of PIT 
revenue in GDP.
a) poverty rate in population under the age of 18 
and the share of public spending on family benefits 
in gdp
b) poverty rate and share of revenues from pIt 
in gdp
figure Iv. 1 | Family benefits, income taxes and poverty in 2009.
Note: family benefits include all benefits in cash and in kind granted on account of pregnancy, child birth or adoption, upbringing of children or care of the other members of 
the family, except for health care spending. Revenue from PIT includes revenues from income tax from natural persons/households together with capital gains tax. Poverty 
threshold: 60% of the median of equivalised disposable income.
Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data.
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Presented data demonstrate that the links between the 
scale of public intervention and the risk of poverty are complex 
and that there is no direct correlation between the elements 
of the tax and benefit system and the poverty rate. On the one 
hand this is due to the diversification of processes which con-
tribute to the changes in household income, beginning with 
demographic changes, through changes in employment, level 
of wages, retirement pensions and other gross income. On 
the other hand, this may be the result of diverse allotment of 
particular benefits and varied tax burden of different types of 
households. From the inter-temporal point of view, in the case 
of relative poverty the changes of poverty threshold, which is 
calculated on the basis of income distribution in a given mo-
ment, may also be significant, in the same way as an effect of the 
changes in the amounts of tax and benefits. Finally, lack of direct 
correlation may result from the dynamic nature of the links be-
tween tax and benefit system and the socio-economic situation. 
For example the increase in spending on family benefits may be 
the reaction to deteriorating situation of families with children 
resulting from economic slowdown. In such situation we can 
observe the increase in the poverty rate simultaneously with 
the increase in spending on family benefits.
broader vIew of tax and 1.2.2 
benefIt SyStemS effectIveneSS In 
reducIng poverty
Below we present a more complex approach to interna-
tional analysis of the effectiveness of tax and benefit systems 
based on Eurostat data and using the microsimulation model 
EUROMOD2 which computes both the direct tax burden of 
households and social transfers they obtain. We supplement 
this analysis with calculations of the effectiveness of the Polish 
system using the microsimulation model SIMPL.
The relation between the extent of poverty calculated 
(on the basis of EU-SILC data) before and after granting so-
cial benefits in the EU countries3 is presented on the Figure 
IV.3. Social benefits include all benefits the receipt of which 
is not associated with paying contributions, so those are such 
transfers as family benefits (both universal and means-test-
ed benefits), housing benefits and social assistance. Figure 
IV.3a presents the scale of poverty rate reduction resulting 
from the payments of social benefits, and Figure IV.3b – the 
relation between the change of poverty rate before and after 
the payment of benefits, and the final poverty rate after the 
payment. The distance from the 45 degrees line on Figure 
IV.5a shows the effectiveness of these benefits in the reduc-
tion of poverty. In the case of such countries as Ireland, Den-
mark and Hungary, the extent of poverty is reduced by more 
than 50% as compared to the situation before the payment 
of social benefits. In this respect Poland is one of the coun-
tries where social benefits have minor influence on poverty 
rate – in 2010 as a result of payment of those benefits the 
poverty rate falls from 23.6% to 17.1%. In 2010, social ben-
efits affected the reduction of poverty to the smallest extent 
in Greece, where the poverty rate decreased due to such 
2  Methodology of calculations based on EUROMOD model is presented in 
Avram and Sutherland (2012). The results for the year 2010 used in this Report are 
taken from Avram and Sutherland (2012) and from unpublished EUROMOD reports 
based on F6.0 version of the model. We want to thank Xavier Jara for providing 
these results.
3  In both cases the poverty rate is calculated on the basis of the relative 
poverty threshold (60% of the median of equivalised disposable income) in the base 
system, that is the income distribution after granting of benefits.
a) changes of poverty rate in a population under aged 
18 vs. changes in the share of spending on family 
benefits in GDP
b) changes of poverty rate vs. changes in the share 
of revenue from pIt in gdp.
figure Iv. 2 | Changes in the share in GDP of revenues from PIT and spending on family benefits 
vs. the dynamics of poverty in European countries between 2005 and 2009.
Note: See Figure IV.1.
Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data.
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benefits by ca. 20%. Diverse effectiveness of the social ben-
efits system in reducing the extent of poverty significantly in-
fluenced the differences in the poverty rate observed in the 
EU. Figure IV.3 shows that in countries where the benefits 
system significantly contributes to the reduction of poverty, 
such as Denmark, Ireland and Hungary, the poverty rate is 
significantly lower than in the countries like Greece, Italy or 
Bulgaria, where the low impact of social benefits is associ-
ated with a large scale of poverty. In Poland, social benefits 
system reduces the poverty rate by ca. 6.4 pp, so by 2.5 pp 
less than in EU27 countries on average, and the poverty rate 
is almost equal to the European average.
In order to distinguish between the impact of social ben-
efits and the tax system, one may use the calculations on the ba-
sis of the European microsimulation level EUROMOD. Poverty 
rates calculated on the basis of the (simulated) income includ-
ing taxes and benefits (applicable in a given country in 2010) 
have been compared on Figures IV.4a and IV.4b using EURO-
MOD model („base system” on Figures), with rates calculated 
on the basis of simulated gross income („alternative system”), 
so before deducting insurance contributions, income taxes and 
before obtaining social benefits (similar to those presented 
on Figure IV.3).
The results obtained suggest that the joint impact of 
the tax system and social benefits on the extent of poverty 
is minor in the case of most of the countries, and in the case 
of Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Italy – even 
positive. In Poland, if households did not pay social insurance 
contributions and income taxes, and at the same time did not 
receive social benefits (so other than retirement pensions, 
disability pensions, employment benefits), the poverty rate ac-
cording to EUROMOD would fall by 3.6 pp (‘PL EM’). Because 
the very withdrawing of social benefits (Figure IV.3) increases 
the scope of poverty, this suggests relatively large tax burdens 
of the people at risk of poverty. In other words, in the coun-
tries where the poverty rate is lower in this alternative system 
than in the base system (just like in Poland), the value of so-
cial benefits directed at the households at risk of poverty does 
not compensate for the contributions and taxes paid by them. 
The situation seems completely different in such countries as 
France, Ireland or Great Britain, where by the joint effect of 
withdrawal of social benefits and ‘returning’ income taxes to 
households noticeably increases the scale of poverty. Thus, in 
those countries the operating tax and benefit system reduces 
the number of people at risk of poverty.
To better illustrate the nature of the impact of both ele-
ments of the system in Poland, the results based on EURO-
MOD model have been supplemented by calculations using 
SIMPL model run on HBS 2010 data (‘PL SL’).4 Table IV.1 pres-
ents the results of the simulation of poverty indicators for the 
year 2010 on the basis of SIMPL model for the base system 
(2010) and systems without benefits and insurance and tax 
burden (similarly to EUROMOD model, poverty threshold cal-
culated for the base system have been used in all simulations). 
Apart from total poverty, the results concerning poverty among 
children and among working people (‘working poor’) have also 
been presented. 
The difference in the poverty rate between the system 
with no tax burden an no social benefits and the base system ac-
cording to SIMPL model amounts to 4.8 pp, so it is slightly larger 
than in the case of EUROMOD model,5 but it leads to the same 
conclusions. Moreover, SIMPL model indicates that withdrawal 
4  Detailed description of the microsimulation approach is presented 
in Chapter 2.
5  Differences between EUROMOD and SIMPL result in the first place from the 
fact that they rely on different databases. In the case of EUROMOD it is an indexed 
EU-SILC database from 2007, and in the case of SIMPL – HBS 2010.
a) poverty rate before and after granting of social 
benefits. 
b) poverty rate and changes in its level as a result 
of impact of the social benefits system.
figure Iv. 3 | Impact of social benefits system on the poverty rate in 2010: SILC data.
Note: poverty threshold set at the level of 60% of the median of equivalised disposable income. Definitions of base and alternative system – see text.
Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data.
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of social benefits would significantly increase the poverty rate 
among children (from 20.2% to 27.7%). However, just like in the 
case of total poverty rate, withdrawal of the contribution and 
tax system has a definitely stronger opposite effect – poverty 
rate among children would amount to 15.6% (by 4.6 pp less 
than in base system), if households did not pay the income tax 
and insurance contributions, and at the same time did not re-
ceive social benefits. In the case of working poor, the impact of 
abolition of taxation is even bigger, since it would lower the pov-
erty rate by almost 50%, which is connected with the fact that 
social benefits are granted to the working population in a mod-
erate degree (without benefits the poverty rate among working 
people would increase by 2.4 pp), whereas the tax and contribu-
tion burden is more relevant for this group than the group of 
non-working people.
reductIon of poverty and 1.3 
fInancIal StImulI on the labour 
market
One of the main problems faced by social and economic 
policy reacting to poverty by supporting the poorest house-
holds is the impact of such support on the behaviour on the 
labour market. Higher benefits may discourage non-working 
people to search for work, and at the same time increase the 
financial attractiveness of the out-of-work options for working 
people. The problem of counterbalancing the policy of reduc-
ing income inequalities and efficiency policy on the labour mar-
ket (so called ‘equity-efficiency trade-off’) have been described 
in detail in the literature (see e.g. Blundell 2001; Immervoll 
et al. 2007). The problem not only relates to the tax and ben-
efit elements of the system, but also to the policy of labour 
market regulation.
table Iv. 1 | Effect of the group of elements of the tax and benefit system on the extent of relative poverty 
in poland.
base system No social benefits No tax burden, social insurance and social benefits 
60% of the median of equivalised disposable income– constant value of the poverty threshold
 - poverty threshold (pln) 931.77 931.77 931.77
 - poverty rate 16.0% 20.3% 11.2%
 - poverty rate – children 20.2% 27.7% 15.6%
 - poverty rate – working poor 10.9% 13.3% 6.1%
Note: Children are defined as people under the age of 18.
Source: own calculations based on SIMPL model on the basis of HBS 2010 data.
a) Poverty rate before and after the effect of the tax 
and benefit system.
b) poverty rate and changes in its amount before and 
after the effect of the tax and benefit system.
figure Iv. 4 | Impact of the tax and benefit system on the poverty rate in 2010: microsimulation.
Note: poverty threshold set at the level of 60% of the median of equivalised disposable income. Definitions of base and alternative system – see text.
Source: EUROMOD model on the basis of SILC 2007 data (Avram and Sutherland, 2012 and unpublished data) and authors’ calculations using SIMPL model for Poland based 
on HBS 2010 data; ‘PL SL’ – calculations for Poland based on SIMPL model, „PL EM” – result of EUROMOD model for Poland.
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Potential solutions for the ‘equity-efficiency trade-off’ are 
based on different manners of improving the financial attrac-
tiveness of work, particularly by:
increasing the minimum wage;a. 
reducing the tax burdens; b. 
introducing specific elements of the tax and ben efit sys-c. 
tem directed at households with low earnings (in-work 
benefits).
From the point of view of increasing the employment and 
fight against poverty, the attractiveness of the minimum wage 
is limited by its potential negative impact on the demand for la-
bour. Excessive values of the minimum wage may lead to unprof-
itability of employing people with a productivity below the val-
ue corresponding to the minimum wage and thus, to dismissals, 
limitation of working time and switching to the forms of cooper-
ation enabling to avoid the minimum wage requirement, such as 
civil law agreements or informal employment. Higher minimum 
wage may, however, encourage potential employees to inten-
sify their job searches which may revive the labour market in 
terms of labour supply. Poverty may be reduced with minimum 
wage, provided that its amount is properly determined, and if 
it is linked adequately with the elements of the tax and benefit 
system which are connected with employment (OECD, 1998). 
Empirical research indicates that the latter are definitely more 
efficient in meeting the objective (Burkhauser et al., 1997; 
Sutherland, 2001).
However, the possibilities of using the tax system to raise 
the attractiveness of work are often very limited, especially in 
the case of people with low earning potential. This is caused 
by progressivity present in most of the tax systems. Moreover, 
such solutions as tax rate reduction, increasing the value of the 
tax-free allowance or tax thresholds, are often expensive from 
the point of view of public finances. Improving the attractive-
ness of employment through changes in the tax system often 
leads to the increase in income for people with both low and 
high earnings, and also for people with taxed out-of-work in-
come. Thus, in practice this is often a relatively inefficient tool 
to fight poverty.
Thus, for several years the solutions directed towards 
poor households and conditioned by employment are sug-
gested as the tools of effective policy in the sphere of poverty 
alleviation. They are focused to a great degree on families with 
children, where fixed costs connected with starting work are 
significantly higher than in families without children.
According to many experts the solution to the „equity-effi-
ciency trade-off” is a careful combination of benefits connected 
with employment and out-of-work benefits (Blundell, 2001). 
The American Earned Income Tax Credit and the British solutions 
in the form of Working Families Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit are 
examples of such instruments. Their effects are on the one hand 
financial support for the poorest households, and on the other 
hand, the increase in employment by connecting the benefits 
or the so called refundable tax credits with the employment re-
quirement. It has been repeatedly proved that introducing such 
solutions, or increasing the values of those elements of the tax 
system, has caused significant changes in the incomes of house-
holds with low earnings, with simultaneous positive effects of 
the supply of labour (Blundell et al., 2000; Brewer et al., 2006; 
Haan and Myck, 2007; Bargain and Orsini, 2006). It should be 
noted that positive effects of employment in the case of most of 
the solutions concentrate on lowering the percentage of fami-
lies in which no one is employed. As a result of improving the 
generosity of the tax credits system, as well as other reforms 
increasing earnings, the income effect in the case of families 
where both partners are working, may weaken the motivation 
to work of one of them (e.g. Haan and Myck, 2010; Bargain 
and Orsini, 2006).
In the Polish tax and benefit system there are no elements 
supporting the households with low incomes conditional on 
having employment income. Even though the existing opportu-
nities to deduct the revenue costs and current tax credits are of 
proportionally biggest importance for low income families, they 
are still available for all working people who pay income tax. 
Moreover, these are non-refundable elements, i.e. elements 
with the features of a negative tax, raising net incomes above 
the value of gross earnings.
At the same time, the point withdrawal of the family ben-
efits is an important element of the Polish system of benefits, 
negative from the point of view of labour market incentives. In 
combination with the lack of clarity concerning the potential 
changes of the threshold levels, it introduces a high degree of 
uncertainty related to the future receipt of these benefits. In-
creasing the family income insignificantly may lead to complete 
withdrawal of the benefit in the following year. An easy solution 
to this problem would be to introduce the method of gradual 
withdrawal of benefits (see Myck et al., 2013b), portrayed on 
the Figure IV.5, which presents the examples of family benefits 
values in the present system and in the systems in which the 
family benefits are withdrawn in the 1:1 relation to the increase 
of net income (100% taper rate) and in ½:1 relation (50% taper 
rate). In the first case the increase of earnings (net value) in 
the family by PLN 1 causes the decrease of benefits by PLN 1, 
thus the disposable income remains unchanged. In the second 
option if earnings increase by PLN 1, the amount of benefit de-
creases by 50% of this value, which means that the disposable 
income increases by PLN 0.50. Figure IV.5b demonstrates that 
this would exclude the possibility of decrease of the disposable 
income of a family in the case of an increase in the net value of 
earnings, which can occur in the current system. In the example 
of the family with two children, the increase in the gross income 
from PLN 2 530 to PLN 2 535 leads to a reduction in disposable 
income by PLN 176.50. In Subchapter 3.2 we present the simu-
lations of such solutions together with the proposal to extend 
the family benefits system to include the elements supporting 
families, in which both spouses work and additionally motivat-
ing non-working spouses to take-up work.
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box
Iv.1 Effects of minimum wage
In scientific analyses, both theoretical and empirical, it is pointless to search for consensus concerning effects of the minimum wage, espe-
cially in the context of its relatively low level relative to the average wage.
Impact of minimum wage on employment
In the basic theoretical model based on perfect competition on the homogenous labour market, minimum wage established at the level ex-
ceeding the equilibrium wage leads to the decrease in employment (Brown, 1999). On the other hand the monopsonistic employer model 
is the simplest model specifying the conditions in which the minimum wage has positive influence on employment. It assumes the power of 
of enterprises in establishing the level of wages, thus shaping it below the level of the marginal product of labour. Then the minimum wage 
may lead to the increase in employment, but the maximisation of this effect will occur with the minimum wage established at the level cor-
responding to the equilibrium wage on the perfectly competitive market. 
Most of the models unanimously anticipate that the probability of negative impact of the minimum wage increases together with the raise 
of the level of minimum wage relative to the employees’ productivity. The reaction of the labour market to the introduction or increase of 
the minimum wage depends on the level of the minimum wage, features of the specific labor market, the possibility of getting round the 
provisions concerning minimum wage, regional differentiation, sectors of the economy or the groups of population covered by the regula-
tions. Neumark and Wachser (2007) state that empirical works documenting the negative impact of the minimum wage on employment 
among workers with the lowest qualifications definitely prevail in literature, and number of studies which provide convincing evidence for 
the positive effects of minimum wage is minimal.
Impact of minimum wage on the income of the population
Second significant aspect of the minimum wage is its impact on the income of the population and poverty. According to theoretical models 
the minimum wage reduces the inequality of gross wages in the population (Stigler, 1946). Furthermore, it causes the substitution of rela-
tively less qualified workers with those who are comparatively better qualified, earnings of which exceed the minimum wage, by increas-
ing the employment and wages for the latter group (Teulings, 1996). Both the concentration of the wage distribution at the level of the 
minimum wage and gradually fading spreading effect on wages in the higher parts of the distribution have been confirmed in the empirical 
literature (Card and Krueger, 1995; DiNardo et al., 1996; Machin and Manning, 1994). 
However, the relation between the minimum wage and the wage distribution does not clearly correspond to the distribution of the popula-
tion income. The minimum wage increases the income of the employees from low-paid sectors/professions and may influence the decision 
on entering the labour market among inactive individuals. However, at the same time the employers may lower the demand for labour 
through dismissals or by limiting the working hours among the employees the work of which is valued below the wage minimum. Then, 
such employees might require more government support in the form of means-tested benefits or granted to the unemployed, but they may 
lose the benefits conditioned by employment. The impact of the minimum wage on reducing income inequalities depends on two factors. 
Firstly, the higher concentration of employees from low-paid sectors/professions in the lower parts of the income distribution gives op-
portunity of higher incomes by poor families from the increase of the minimum wage. Secondly, the percentage of non-working low income 
families is also very important, because the families without earnings will not benefit from the raise of wages. Thus, the relation between 
the level of the minimum wage and household income differentiation is ambiguous.
Source: own elaboration.
a) Gross income and the level of family benefits b) gross income and disposable income
figure Iv. 5 | Reforming the point withdrawal of family benefits: family with two children.
Note: „taper rate” – benefit withdrawal taper.
Source: own calculations, SIMPL model.
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financial Support 2 
of familieS with 
children in poland 
in the context of 
changeS in the 
tax and benefit 
SyStem in the yearS 
2005-2012
Chapters 2 and 3 of this part are based on analyses using 
the method of tax and benefit system microsimulation. In this 
approach the parameters describing the tax and benefit system 
in detail is integrated with representative database of house-
holds containing information on demographics and income. The 
results presented below are based on the Polish microsimula-
tion model SIMPL, in which the Polish tax and benefit system is 
simulated on the database from the HBS from 2010.
Microsimulation models have been used for many years to an-
alyse the tax and benefit reforms in such countries as: Great Britain, 
Germany, the United States or France (examples of the use of such 
models are presented in Box IV.2). They are used both to evaluate 
the direct influence of the undertaken reforms and to analyse the 
processed and proposed changes in the tax and benefit system (e.g. 
Bargain and Callan, 2010; Brewer et al., 2001; Brewer et al. 2011; 
Clark et al., 2002; Dilnot and Webb, 1988; Duncan, 2001; Levy et 
al., 2009; Morawski et al., 2008; Morawski and Myck, 2011). 
The advantage of the microsimulation approach is a pos-
sibility to carry out the simulation of household income on the 
basis of the parameters of both existing and hypothetical sys-
tems. Thus, firstly household income may be analised against 
a number of alternative scenarios, and secondly the impact of 
the respective elements of the tax and benefit system on the 
income distribution and on the extent of poverty may be iso-
lated. This is related to the fact that in the simulations of such 
alternative systems the only elements subject to change are tax 
and benefit parameters, i.e. such elements as for example the 
structure of the population, the level of employment or the level 
of wages remain unchanged.
One of the main limitations in using microsimulation is the 
accuracy of the information contained in data sets on which the 
microsimulations are based. Even though in the case of HBS 
data the scope of information of this data enables the simulation 
box
Iv.2 Examples of the worldwide use of the microsimulation models
The possibility to use microsimulation in economics was first suggested almost 50 years ago by Guy Orcutt (Orcutt, 1957). Microsimu-
lation is used in analyses of effectiveness of the socio-economic policy by means of models created at the level of individual countries, 
e.g. in Great Britain, France, Spain, the United States. Moreover, there are some microsimulation models developed in a coordinated man-
ner in the countries which belong to international organisations – i.e. in this case the EUROMOD model developed in the European Union 
countries and the microsimulation model developed for OECD countries.
In Great Britain the Treasury uses the microsimulation model IGOTM. This model is based on UK Family Expenditure Survey and it is used 
for static analysis of the impact of different scenarios of the tax and benefit policy on income of the population and the work incentives 
(Duncan, 2001). The Treasury uses also another microsimulation model based on the data from Living Costs and Food Survey (HM Treas-
ury 2010, 2011), which helps in verifying the assumptions of budget execution. It is also used to evaluate the impact of the tax burden and 
benefits on household income, and to calculate the poverty rate and income inequality indicators. In Great Britain the microsimulation 
models are also owned by: the Department for Work and Pensions, the Bank of England and such research institutions as the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS) (Brewer et al., 2001; Clark et al., 2002) or the Institute of Socio-Economic Research (ISER). IFS regularly uses its 
microsimulation model TAXBEN to analyse the government policy and based on this model publishes pre-election analyses, which are used 
as models for the analyses at CenEA in Poland. ISER is an institute coordinating the works on the European microsimulation model EURO-
MOD. The Polish part of the EUROMOD model is developed in cooperation of ISER and CenEA. Currently in the microsimulation model 
EUROMOD there is a possibility to simulate the changes in tax and benefit system in all 27 countries of the European Union.
The French microsimulation model is SYSIFF model used in the Paris School of Economics. SYSIFF is based on the Family Budgets data and, 
similarly to the British models, serves mainly as a tool to carry out a comparative analysis of different tax systems, international compari-
sons and to study the effects of the reforms for household budgets.
In the United States, on a federal level in Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the microsimulation model CBOLT is used. The data from tax 
returns from the Internal Revenue Service are used for calculations in this model, and they are additionally supplemented by the informa-
tion from sources related to demography and income of the population (CBO, 2007).
The detailed list of microsimulation models used in European countries has been prepared in the report published by a group of scientists 
working on the development of the Belgian model MIMOSIS (Decoster et al., 2008). There are some microsimulation models mentioned 
in this report, and those are the models operated among others in: Spain (Gladhispania), Germany (e.g. FiFoSiM, STSM), Italy (AWARETAX, 
ITAXMOD) and Sweden (MICROHUS, SESIM).
Source: Myck et al. (2011).
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of most of the elements of the Polish system, the simulation of 
some important instruments is impossible due to lack of infor-
mation. This relates for example to appropriated benefits under 
social assistance or different non-cash benefits, such as train-
ing or non-cash material support that cannot be covered by 
the simulation due to significant diversification of the forms of 
support, individual rules of granting such support, and also their 
value which is hard to assess.
Chapter 2 presents the analyses of the impact of tax and 
benefit reforms introduced in the years 2005-2012 on the 
poverty rate in Poland with the use of the microsimulation ap-
proach. Chapter3 studies the potential effect of the examples 
of hypothetical changes in the tax and benefit system and their 
role in reducing poverty.
changeS In the tax and benefIt 2.1 
SySTEm IN ThE yEaRS 2005-2010 
Every reform directly influencing the level of households 
income, for example changes in the level of income tax or So-
cial Insurance contributions, changes in the amounts and prin-
ciples of granting family benefits or the decisions concerning 
the method of indexation of disability and retirement pensions, 
has two basic effects. On the one hand, it generates additional 
cost or revenue for public finances, and on the other hand, it 
influences the change in the household income distribution, be-
cause it affects the households in different ways depending on 
their demographic structure, the sources and levels of income. 
Microsimulation analysis allows to indicate which households, 
depending on their structure and income, benefit and which 
households lose in the case of considered or introduced tax and 
benefit solutions. In the years 2005-2010 there was a number 
of significant changes implemented in the tax and benefit sys-
tem, and those had a significant impact on the level of income of 
Polish households. The most important changes introduced at 
that time were as follows:
reforms of the social insurance system:I 
Reduction of the accident insurance contribution and • 
contribution to the Guaranteed Employee Benefits 
Fund (2006),
Reduction of the disability pension contribution (2007, • 
2008),
Reduction of the accident insurance contribution (2009),• 
Reform of the agricultural social insurance system – increase • 
of contributions, making their amount dependant on the 
value of the farm, increase of contribution for farmers con-
ducting also some non-agricultural activity (2010).
Tax reforms:II 
Increase in the value of revenue costs (2006, 2007, 2008),• 
Increase in the tax free allowance (2007, 2008),• 
Introduction of the child tax credit (2007),• 
Increase in NFZ [National Health Fund] health insurance • 
contribution (2006, 2007),
Increase in the tax threshold (2009); reduction in the • 
number of tax rates from three (19%, 30%, 40%) to two 
(18%, 32%).
At the same time for the analysed period subsequent gov-
ernments pursued the policy of freezing of nominal values of 
the system parameters, such as revenue costs (2009, 2010), tax 
free allowance and child tax credit (2006, 2010), tax thresholds 
(2006, 2008, 2010) and Internet tax deduction (2009-2010). 
In view of inflation, this caused the decrease in the real value of 
these amounts, and in view of growing gross wages it modified 
the scope of impact of the tax system in relation to the changing 
wages distribution.
Family benefits reforms:III 
Change of the system of calculating the family allowance • 
from the number of children to their age, change of the 
family allowance amounts (2006),
Increase in the amounts of some of the supplements to • 
family allowance (2006),
Increase in the family allowance amount granted in all the • 
child age categories (2009),
Increase in the amount of nursing allowance (2009),• 
Introduction of the universal child birth benefit (2006),• 
Making the nursing allowance independent of income • 
(2010).
At the same time since 2005 income eligibility thresholds 
deciding on granting of family benefits, and in most of the years 
also on the amounts of supplements to family allowance (see 
Appendix IV.2) and nursing allowance and benefit, were kept at 
the nominally constant level. Due to the fact that family benefits 
system is indexed every three years, the actual values of all ben-
efits decreased in the years 2007, 2008 and 2010.
Social assistance:Iv 
Increase in the income eligibility threshold for a perma-• 
nent and temporary social assistance allowance (2006),
Increase in the maximum amount of the permanent social • 
assistance allowance and of the share of the temporary 
social assistance allowance amount guaranteed by the 
state (2006). 
In the case of social assistance, just as in the case of family 
benefits, in most of the years of the analysed period of time, the 
amounts of the permanent and temporary allowances, and the 
amount of income eligibility threshold for granting of perma-
nent and temporary allowances, were frozen. This limited the 
number of people eligible to receive the support from the social 
assistance (see Appendix IV.2). 
SyStem reformS and the poverty 2.2 
RaTE 2005-2010 
The simulations of the impact of reforms introduced in the 
years 2005-2010 presented in this part of the Report include 
both, „the withdrawal” of the whole set of changes implemented 
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in the period, and the simulation of the additional element taking 
into account CPI indexation of income thresholds in the family 
benefits system.6 Thus, the following options are modelled:
Implementation of the indexed system from 2005: S1) 
In this simulation the base system is compared to the sys-
tem valid in the first half of 2005. This system was prop-
erly indexed to reflect the changes in the level of prices 
and actual changes of the level of wages.7 Thus, S1 system 
„withdraws” the whole set of tax and benefit reforms im-
plemented in the years 2005-2010 (see Subchapter 2.1). 
Increase in the values of income eligibility thresholds for family S2) 
benefits
In this simulation the system from 2010 is compared to 
the system, in which the whole set of reforms 2005-2010 
is implemented, excluding the freezing of income eligibility 
thresholds in the family benefits system. Comparison of 
S2 with the base system will allow the identification of the 
effect that would be triggered by the regular price index-
ing of the income eligibility thresholds in family benefits.
S3) Withdrawal of reforms of the family benefits system to its S3) 
actual values from 2005
This simulation covers both, the change of the real values 
of the income eligibility thresholds, and all of the changes 
concerning real amounts and methods of calculating the 
family allowance with supplements in the family benefits 
system. Thus, it presents the isolated impact of the whole 
set of reforms implemented in this system.
The detailed presentation of changes in the parameters of 
the respective elements of the system is contained in Table IV.A1 
in Appendix IV.1. The table presents the values of the parameters 
6  Additionally, in the appendix there are the results of simulations, in which 
the following options are modelled: liquidation of the child tax credit (S-Z1 system), 
increase in the values of the income eligibility thresholds in the family benefits 
system in connection with the liquidation of the child tax credit (S-Z2 system).
7  The details of the approach to systems indexation are presented in Myck et 
al., (2011) and Domitrz et al. (2013); the role of the indexation method on income 
distribution was described e.g. in Sutherland et al. (2008).
of the family benefits system in S1, S2 and S3 systems (together 
with the parameters of alternative scenarios S-Z1 and S-Z2). 
Table IV.2 presents the results of the simulation with the 
distinction of relative, quasi-absolute and absolute poverty. For 
each of the measures of poverty the total poverty rate and the 
median poverty gap, as well as the poverty rate among children 
(persons below the age of 18) and among working poor have 
been calculated. The total aggregate value of the changes of 
annual disposable income for households, resulting from the 
simulated solutions, is also presented.
The result of the simulation of a 2005 indexed system (S1) 
indicates that as a result of whole set of changes introduced in 
tax and benefit system in the years 2005-2010, the households 
gained PLN 25.2 billion. This is the sum by which the disposable 
income would decrease, if the system from 2005 was in force 
also five years later. As a result of these changes the extent of 
the quasi-absolute and absolute poverty have decreased signifi-
cantly (respectively from 7.7% to 6.4% and from 2.8 to 2.4%), 
and the relative poverty statistics in the case of children have 
improved (decrease from 21.6% to 20.2%). The general mea-
sure of relative poverty in the current system remains at prac-
tically the same level (16.0%) that would be observed if the 
indexed system from 2005 was in force in 2010 (15.9%). This 
is connected among others with the increase in the relative pov-
erty threshold by ca. 5% as a result of the implemented changes, 
from PLN 887.60 to PLN 931.77.
The transfer of actual threshold values in the family ben-
efit system from 2005 to the 2010 system (while other ele-
ments of the 2010 system remain unchanged), i.e. the S2 sim-
ulation, lowers the total poverty rate by ca. 0.3 pp (to 15.7%) 
and the poverty among children by 0.6 pp (to 19.6%) at the 
annual cost of ca. PLN 1 billion. It is worth noting that trans-
ferring the whole family benefits system from 2005 to 2010 
(S3 simulation) would lead to an increase in poverty accord-
ing to all three definitions. It results mainly from the fact that 
in the years 2005-2010 there was a real terms increase in the 
box
Iv.3 disposable income for households in the base system and alternative systems
Reference system for analyses conducted in this part of the Report is a tax and benefit system that was in force in 2010, so in the year from 
which the data used in simulation were taken. In 2010 system (the base system – S0) the disposable income for households is simulated 
from the HBS 2010 database ( ). To maintain consistency with the calculations of income distribution and the extent of poverty 
presented in Parts I-III and carefully isolate the effect of system changes on the basis of actual disposable income registered for a given 
household in the data ( ) and simulated income in the base system, we compute a residual – 𝜂 , defined as . It is treated 
as a fixed value at the level of a household and it is added to the simulated income in each of the alternative scenarios (e.g. Brewer et al., 
2011). In this approach, all the changes in disposable income and the distribution resulting from it, and the measures of poverty, result 
exclusively from the simulated changes of the tax and benefit parameters. For the base system the simulated disposable income adjusted 
by the residual –  , equals to the income registered in the data:
On the other hand the disposable income for the representative alternative system – S1, is calculated for each of the households as:
Source: own elaboration.
166
Employment in Poland 2011 
Poverty and jobs 
State and inequalities – public policy regarding the problem of poverty and exclusion4
value of family benefits, which – as compared to maintaining the 
2005 solutions – has led to the decrease in the quasi-absolute 
and absolute poverty measure both for the total population 
and among children. The households have gained in fact ca. 
PLN 1 billion annually on all of the changes in the family ben-
efit system, which means that those households that were still 
eligible to receive benefits (i.e. which satisfied the requirements 
of the lower income eligibility threshold), have gained annually 
more than 2 billion PLN in total.
chIld poverty and publIc polIcy 2.3 
– EFFECT oF ChaNGES IN ThE SySTEm 
IN 2011-2012
In the years 2011-2012 several important changes were 
introduced in the tax and benefit system in Poland. The changes 
related mainly to the social benefits system (family benefits and 
social assistance) that was implemented in November 2012. 
At the same time health insurance contributions for farmers 
has been introduced, and the values of the tax free allowance 
and the child tax credit connected with it, and amounts of tax 
thresholds, revenue costs and other tax credits in the tax sys-
tem remained at the nominally constant level.
table Iv. 2 | 2005-2010 reforms: the measures of poverty and benefits of households.
Simulated scenarios
base system
S0 scenario S1 scenario S2 scenario S3 scenario
I. relative poverty:
- poverty threshold (pln) 931.77 887.58 934.78 930.91
- poverty rate 16.0% 15.9% 15.7% 16.4%
- median poverty gap (pln) 469.13 468.73 482.3 494.42
- poverty rate – children 20.2% 21.6% 19.6% 21.2%
- poverty rate – working poor 10.9% 11.1% 10.7% 11.1%
II. Quasi-absolute poverty:
- poverty threshold (pln) 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27
- poverty rate 6.4% 7.7% 6.4% 7.0%
- median poverty gap (pln) 332.45 352.09 334.41 345.71
- poverty rate – children 8.3% 10.9% 8.2% 9.6%
- poverty rate – working poor 4.6% 5.4% 4.5% 4.9%
III. absolute poverty:
- poverty threshold (pln) 472.72 472.72 472.72 472.72
- poverty rate 2.4% 2.8% 2.4% 2.6%
- median poverty gap (pln) 366.72 400.25 371.64 369.35
- poverty rate – children 2.8% 3.9% 2.8% 3.4%
- poverty rate – working poor 2.0% 2.2% 2.0% 2.1%
Iv. benefit for households resulting from the 
introduction of the system (billion pln annually)
-25.169 1.037 -1.033
Note: Children are defined as people under the age of 18.
Source: own calculations based on the SIMPL model according to the HBS 2010 data.
In November 2012 the government introduced a series 
of changes in the family benefits system. The values of the in-
come eligibility thresholds increased nominally to the level of 
PLN 539 and PLN 623 monthly per capita (from PLN 504 and 
PLN 583 respectively), which however in real terms meant 
their small decrease in relation to the value from 2010. The 
amount of the family allowance depending on the child’s age 
increased nominally from 13.2% to 17.3% (cf. Table IV.B.1 in Ap-
pendix IV.2) and in any case it indicated the actual increase in 
the value of the allowance. The amounts of supplements to the 
family allowance were kept at nominally constant level, which 
meant the continuation of real decrease in their value. Thus, 
among the parameters of the family benefits system only the 
amounts of the family allowance have increased in real terms 
in relation to the amount from 2010. At the same time income 
eligibility thresholds in the case of social assistance system and 
the amounts of permanent allowances in the social assistance 
system have been increased (see Table IV.B4).
Table IV.3 presents the results of two simulations of chang-
es introduced in the years 2011-2012. In the S4 scenario – the 
simulation consisting in the introduction of changes in the real 
values appropriate for the family benefits system from Novem-
ber 2012 in 2010 system. In the S5 scenario – the simulation 
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consisting in transferring to the 2010 system the whole of 
changes in the tax and benefit system that occurred up to 2012 
(just like in Chapter 2.2 where the 2005 system was trans-
ferred to the year 2010). All the benefit elements of the system 
have been indexed by inflation, and the tax system elements – 
according to wage growth (the simulation does not include the 
changes in Social Insurance contributions from the employer in-
troduced in February 2011 due to lack of identification of direct 
payers of these contributions).
In real terms the total net effect of changes implemented 
in the family benefits system in 2012 did not bring any finan-
cial gains to the households in relation to the 2010 system. 
On the contrary, total aggregate household income decreased 
(by ca. PLN 60 million) as a result of the introduced solutions. 
At the same time the quasi-absolute poverty rates grow slightly 
both for the whole population (from 6.4% to 6.5%) and among 
children (from 8.3% to 8.4%). The changes in the family benefits 
system do not have any effect on the relative poverty which is 
determined by the considerably higher poverty threshold and 
relates to ca. 2.5 times bigger group of people.
A simulation leading to different conclusions is the simu-
lation presenting what would happen if the tax and benefits 
system from the end of the year 2012 was in force as early as 
in 2010, so in other words what is the estimated impact of the 
changes introduced during those two years. In the case of dis-
posable income of households, the effect of those changes was 
a decrease in income by ca. PLN 1.8 billion. It was associated 
mainly with freezing of nominal values of the tax system param-
eters (the value of which has dropped relative to the changing 
wages distribution), and with introducing health insurance for 
farmers. At the same time the changes introduced in November 
2012 in the family benefits system and social assistance have 
caused the increase in actual values of the benefits paid out, 
which had a positive impact on the income of the poorest house-
holds. This is reflected in the statistics of the quasi-absolute and 
absolute poverty, which are lower as a result of these changes, 
both for the whole population and for the poverty among chil-
dren. Moreover, tax changes (in the form of freezing of the 
system parameters) and introduction of the health insurance 
for farmers, have moved down the value of the poverty thresh-
old, which is reflected in a small decrease in the extent of to-
tal relative poverty (to 15.8%) and the relative poverty among 
children (to 19.8%).
table Iv. 3 | The simulations of reforms of support for families with children: poverty and the 2012 reforms.
Simulated scenarios
base system S4 scenario S5 scenario
I. relative poverty:
- poverty threshold (pln) 931.77 931.19 927.28
- poverty rate 16.0% 16.0% 15.8%
- median poverty gap (pln) 469.13 470.86 456.84
- poverty rate – children 20.2% 20.2% 19.8%
- poverty rate – working poor 10.9% 10.9% 10.9%
II. Quasi-absolute poverty:
- poverty threshold (pln) 675.27 675.27 675.27
- poverty rate 6.4% 6.5% 6.3%
- median poverty gap (pln) 332.45 330.77 318.07
- poverty rate – children 8.3% 8.4% 7.9%
- poverty rate – working poor 4.6% 4.6% 4.5%
III. absolute poverty:
- poverty threshold (pln) 472.72 472.72 472.72
- poverty rate 2.4% 2.4% 2.2%
- median poverty gap (pln) 366.72 371.97 396.48
- poverty rate – children 2.8% 2.8% 2.5%
- poverty rate – working poor 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Iv. benefit for households resulting from the 
introduction of the system (billion pln annually)
- -0.063 -1.783
Note: Children are defined as people under the age of 18.
Source: own calculations based on the SIMPL model according to the HBS 2010 data.
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potential impact 3 
of hypothetical 
changeS in the 
elementS of the tax 
and benefit SyStem 
on the poverty rate 
in poland
This Chapter presents the simulations of impact of 
hypothetical changes in the tax and benefit policy. We use 
the examples of the reforms discusses in the public debate 
and we present the scale of influence of potential system 
reforms by analysing the sensitivity of the poverty rate to 
the changes of the parameters of the tax system and family 
benefits system.
hypothetIcal changeS of the tax 3.1 
and benefIt SyStem and theIr Impact 
on the poverty rate
The subject of this Subchapter is the evaluation of the 
sensitivity of poverty rates to hypothetical changes of the 
system and an attempt to identify those elements of the tax 
and benefit policy, which may be most effectively used in the 
course of policy implementation aimed at reducing poverty. 
While interpreting the results one has to take into account 
that the presented analyses include only direct impact of the 
considered reforms on household incomes, and they do not 
take into consideration the potential consequences of such re-
forms in relation to household behavior on the labour market. 
For example, the simulations reveal that PLN 500 million spent 
on raising the value of the family allowance, causes the same 
implications in reducing the relative poverty among children, 
as PLN 1 billion spent on raising income eligibility thresholds. 
However, it should be noted that insofar as this first policy 
may lead to limiting the labor market activity of parents, the 
second policy may lead to higher participation. Full effect of 
these solutions on the extent of poverty shall be the combina-
tion of the direct effects and the indirect impact of policy on 
households’ incomes through decisions concerning employ-
ment. Static microsimulation analysis, including the analysis 
presented here, focuses specifically on short term effects as-
suming away any labor market reaction. 
coSt-neutral tax SyStem reformS3.1.1 
The first set of simulated reforms comprises five configu-
rations of tax system reforms, which were parameterised to be 
neutral for the public finance sector. The sets of reforms were 
selected so that they included different elements of the tax sys-
tem and resulted in changes of incomes among different groups 
of taxpayers. Simulated sets (S6-S10) include the following 
changes of the tax system parameters:
Withdrawal of the child tax credit with a simultaneous in-S6) 
crease in the value of the tax free allowance to the amount of 
PLN 4 644.
Withdrawal of the child tax credit with a simultaneous increase S7) 
in the revenue costs to the amount of PLN 4 595.
Increase in the basic PIT rate from 18% to 19% with a simul-S8) 
taneous increase in the maximum value of a child tax credit to 
PLN 2 124 per child.
Increase in the basic PIT rate from 18% to 19% with a simul-S9) 
taneous increase in the value of the tax free allowance to the 
amount of PLN 4 100.
Increase in the basic PIT rate from 18% to 19% with a si-S10) 
multaneous increase in the revenue costs to the amount of 
PLN 3 497.
Potential impact of these changes on the poverty rate is 
presented in Table IV.4, and it is again divided into three defi-
nitions of poverty. Distribution effect of the simulated hypo-
thetical reforms is shown on Figures IV.6 and IV.7. It appears 
that with such a selection of combinations of reforms and the 
boundary condition in the form of neutrality for the public fi-
nance sector, the potential of the tax system in reducing the 
poverty is relatively limited. The policy combinations that af-
fect poverty the most are the system S6 (withdrawal of the 
child tax credit and increase in the tax free allowance) and S9 
set (increase in the lower PIT rate to 19% and increase in the 
tax free allowance), which cause the decrease in the total ex-
tent of relative poverty by 0.4 pp and 0.2 pp respectively. The 
nature of these systems is definitely the most progressive one 
(see Figures IV.6 and IV.7). In the case of these reforms, the 
measures of quasi-absolute and absolute poverty decrease, 
which suggests that they lead to the increase in income of 
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people living in the poorest households, which is related to 
the strong progressive nature of these combinations. In the 
case of withdrawal of the child tax credit in S6 and S7 systems, 
and with the increase in the basic PIT rate to 19% in S8 sys-
tem, the relative measure of poverty among children, and also 
among working people slightly increases (relative poverty rate 
for working people increases to 11.1%). The marginal impact 
of the changes included in S10 scenario, in which the revenue 
costs are increased together with the tax rate from 18% to 
19%, on the risk of poverty among working people, is some-
how surprising. The relative poverty rate among working poor 
would decrease as a result of implementation of the S10 sys-
tem only by 0.1 pp.
The simulations also show the lack of effectiveness of 
increasing the child tax credit in the reduction of poverty. In-
crease in maximum value of this tax credit to PLN 2 124 annu-
ally per child is advantageous mainly to the families of middle 
income, and balancing this change by increasing the lower tax 
rate to 19% means losses in the lowest income groups (see 
Figures IV.6 and IV.7). As a result of introducing S8 system 
(increase in the lower PIT rate to 19% and increase in the 
child tax credit value) there is an increase in both the extent 
of the total relative poverty and poverty among children 
and working poor.
IncreaSe In the generoSIty of 3.1.2 
the famIly benefItS SyStem and 
the tax SyStem In relatIon to 
poverty among chIldren
Statistics concerning poverty among children place Poland 
at one of the last positions among European Union countries. In 
this Subchapter we present the results of simulating the influ-
ence of changes in the selected elements of the tax and benefit 
system, which are focused on decreasing the poverty among 
children. Main objective of these simulations is an evaluation 
of sensitivity of child poverty indicators to changes in different 
elements of the tax system, with a simultaneous possibility to 
estimate the costs that would have to be incurred, to bring such 
changes in the poverty rate.
To assess the effectiveness of different elements of the 
system in reducing poverty among children, six simulations 
were carried out for each of the following six parameters (or 
groups of parameters) of the system:
Under the family benefits system:1) 
The amounts of family allowances (without sup-a) 
plements) – S11a;
The value of income eligibility thresholds in the b) 
family benefits system – S11b;
table Iv. 4 | Simulations of fiscally neutral reforms of the tax system – impact on poverty.
Simulated scenarios
base system S6 scenario S7 scenario S8 scenario S9 scenario S10 scenario
I. relative poverty:
- poverty threshold (pln) 931.77 925.98 926.2 935.67 934.07 933.84
- poverty rate 16.0% 15.6% 15.9% 16.2% 15.8% 15.9%
- median poverty gap (pln) 469.13 457.87 456.11 469.43 470.82 468.12
- poverty rate – children 20.2% 20.3% 20.4% 20.4% 20.1% 20.2%
- poverty rate – working poor 10.9% 10.7% 10.7% 11.1% 10.8% 10.8%
II. Quasi-absolute poverty:
- poverty threshold (pln) 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27
- poverty rate 6.4% 6.2% 6.4% 6.5% 6.3% 6.4%
- median poverty gap (pln) 332.45 332.66 325.27 334.75 329.55 328.57
- poverty rate – children 8.3% 8.2% 8.2% 8.3% 8.1% 8.2%
- poverty rate – working poor 4.6% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 4.5% 4.5%
III. absolute poverty:
- poverty threshold (pln) 472.72 472.72 472.72 472.72 472.72 472.72
- poverty rate 2.4% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.3% 2.4%
- median poverty gap (pln) 366.72 367.72 362.96 362.96 370.67 362.96
- poverty rate – children 2.8% 2.8% 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.9%
- poverty rate – working poor 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Note: Children are defined as people under the age of 18.
Source: own calculations based on the SIMPL model according to the HBS 2010 data.
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The value of income eligibility thresholds in the c) 
family benefits system and of the family allow-
ances with supplements – S11c.
Under the income tax system:2) 
The amount of revenue costs– S12a;a) 
The amount of the tax free allowance – S12b;b) 
The amount of the tax free allowance and the c) 
child tax credit – S12c.
In the case of each of the six parameters (or groups of param-
eters) mentioned above, the simulations were carried out with an 
assumption of their increase by: 2.5%, 5%, 7.5%, 10%, 12.5% and 
figure Iv. 6 | Impact of the simulated reforms (S6-S10) by income deciles– changes in absolute values.
figure Iv. 7 | Impact of the simulated reforms (S6-S10) by income deciles – proportional changes.
Note: change of the disposable income (in PLN monthly) relative to the base system.
Source: own calculations based on the SIMPL model based on the HBS 2010 data.
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Source: own calculations based on the SIMPL model according to the HBS 2010 data.
15%. Figures IV.8 and IV.9 present the results of the simulations 
from the point of view of the extent of relative and quasi-absolute 
poverty among children. The changes in the poverty rate among 
children resulting from simulated solutions are marked on the fig-
ures, together with the information on total (annual) costs of each 
of the solutions for the public finance sector (in PLN billion).
In the case of implications of the changes in the values of the 
family benefits parameters for the relative poverty rate among 
children (Figure IV.8a), we can see a much higher effective-
ness of the changes in the amount of family allowance relative 
to the changes in the amounts of income eligibility thresholds. 
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Even though the increase in the parameters in simulations S11a 
and S11b reduces the poverty rate in a similar manner - from 
20.2% to 19.6% with an increase in parameters by 15%, the 
cost of of the increase in income eligibility thresholds is ca. two 
times higher. For example, the increase in the family allowance 
by 12.5% is connected with the costs equaling to ca. 400 mil-
lion annually, while the increase of 12,5% in the income eligibil-
ity thresholds is a cost of ca. 860 million annually. According to 
the simulations, both solutions would reduce the poverty among 
children by ca. 0.4 pp. At the same time increasing the income 
eligibility threshold has a negligible impact on the quasi-absolute 
poverty level (Figure IV.8b). This is far from surprising since such 
modification benefits mainly the slightly more well-off house-
holds on average. Increasing the amount of the family allowance 
by 12.5% reduces the quasi-absolute poverty rate among chil-
dren by ca. 0.3 pp. On the other hand, if all the parameters of the 
family benefits system were raised by 15%, then it would be pos-
sible to achieve the decrease of the relative poverty rate among 
children from 20.2% to 19.0% at the cost of PLN 1.7 billion annu-
ally. Impact of such changes on the quasi-absolute poverty level 
would be very similar to the changes brought by the increase in 
the amount of the family allowance only, while the costs of the 
latter option are significantly lower.
Figure IV.9 presents the influence of the changes in taxes 
on the poverty rate among children. It strengthens the con-
clusions drawn earlier from the historic simulations of the tax 
changes, presented in Subchapters 2.2 and 3.2. Such changes 
a) relative poverty rate b) Quasi-absolute poverty rate
figure Iv. 8 | Impact of changes in the family benefits system on the poverty rate among children.
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Figure IV. 9 | Impact of changes in the tax system on the poverty rate among children.
Note: data labels (series) inform about total costs of the given reform for public finance. Child is defined as person under the age of 18.
Source: own calculations based on the SIMPL model according to the HBS 2010 data.
Note: data labels (series) inform about total costs of the given reform for public finance. Child is defined as person under the age of 18.
Source: own calculations based on the SIMPL model according to the HBS 2010 data.
 
0.06
0.13 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.38
0.63 0.94
1.25
1.56
1.87
0.310.45
0.90
1.34
1.78
2.21
2.64
C
h
ild
 p
ov
er
ty
 r
at
e
20.0%
20.1%
20.2%
20.3%
20.4%
20.5%
0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0% 12.5% 15.0%
revenue costs UTC UTC + CTC
0.06 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.380.31 0.63 0.94
1.25 1.56 1.87
0.45 0.90 1.34
1.78 2.21
2.64
0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0% 12.5% 15.0%
8.5%
8.4%
8.3%
8.2%
8.1%
8.0%
C
h
ild
 p
ov
er
ty
 r
at
e
172
Employment in Poland 2011 
Poverty and jobs 
State and inequalities – public policy regarding the problem of poverty and exclusion4
have a very low impact on the level of quasi-absolute poverty 
due to the fact that they relate to the poorest households to a 
very limited extent (Figure IV.9b). Apart from that, the increase 
in the generosity of the tax system in the form of increases in the 
value of the universal tax credit (tax free allowance) or the child 
tax credit, strongly influences the households incomes, espe-
cially around the median income in the distribution. This in turn 
reflects in the level of the poverty threshold, which may result in 
the increase, and not a decrease in the relative poverty measure 
among children (Figure IV.9a). For example, the increase in the 
universal tax credit and the child tax credit by 15% translates 
into the increase in relative poverty among children by 0.2 pp, 
simultaneously generating the costs for the public finance sec-
tor in the amount of ca. PLN 2.6 billion annually.
the unemployed and poverty3.1.3 
Based on the previous Parts of this Report we can con-
clude that one of the main factors determining the scope of 
poverty in Poland and changes in the extent of poverty in the 
past years is the employment and the financial situation of the 
unemployed. The subject of this subchapter comprises three 
simulations of the effects of the hypothetical changes in the 
situation of the unemployed on poverty rates again based on 
the HBS 2010 data and SIMPL model. Two of those simulations 
present the changes in the social-economic policy in relation to 
the unemployed, and the third one is a simulation of the reduc-
tion of the scope of unemployment. In the case of hypothetical 
changes of policy in relation to the unemployed, we analyse two 
types of hypothetical reforms:
Increase in the amount of the unemployment benefit 1. 
for the persons already receiving it by 2.5% to 15% 
– S13a scenario,
Increase in the number of the unemployed receiving 2. 
the benefit among persons that are unemployed and 
do not receive the benefit (increase also from 2.5% 
to 15% in relation to the unemployed population not 
receiving the benefit; the number of which accord-
ing to HBS 2010 database is 1.36 million people) 
– S13b scenario.
Simulation of the increase in employment consists in the 
change of the status of unemployed individuals to employment 
(earning the minimum wage), in the proportion from 2.5% to 
15% in relation to the total number of the unemployed in the 
data (1.6 million people) (S13c scenario). The procedure of at-
tributing employment to the unemployed (S13c) and of unem-
ployment benefit to the unemployed who do not receive it in the 
data (S13b), is based on probability models, according to which 
we attribute the appropriate percentage of employment and 
receiving of benefit, to persons with highest expected values 
of the estimated probability. The results of all three simulations 
are presented on Figure IV.10 for the relative and quasi-abso-
lute poverty measure. The total annual changes in disposable 
income of households with unemployed members resulting 
from these simulations have been marked on the Figure. In the 
case of increase in the amount of employment benefits and in-
crease in the extent of granting of benefits, they are identical to 
the costs for public finance which would be generated by such 
changes in benefits. In the case of increase in employment driv-
en changes in disposable income of households these do not 
stem from a hypothetical increase in the state’s generosity, but 
from the increase in earnings (and thus are not equivalent to a 
cost to the public finance sector).
Increases in the amount of unemployment benefit have 
marginal effect on the poverty rate, both relative and quasi-
absolute. Even if paid benefits were 15% higher (which would 
Figure IV. 10 | Impact of changes in the system of unemployment benefits on the poverty rate.
Note: data labels (series)inform about total gains of households (in billion PLN annually, which in the case of increase in the value of unemployment benefits and increase in 
the number of people receiving the benefit corresponds to the total costs of such reform.
Source: own calculations based on the SIMPL model according to the HBS 2010 data.
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be associated with costs of ca. PLN 300 million annually), rela-
tive poverty would basically remain at the same level, and the 
quasi-absolute poverty rate would decline by merely 0.9 pp. 
Simulated expansion of availability of employment benefits has 
a much greater effect on reduction of poverty. If the number of 
the unemployed receiving the benefit rose by 5%, 10% or15% 
(increase in the number of people receiving the benefit by 
70 thousand, 140 thousand and 210 thousand respectively), the 
relative poverty rate would drop by 0.15 pp, 0.27 pp, and 0.3 pp 
respectively, and the quasi-absolute poverty rate by 0.16 pp, 
0.26 pp and 0.31 pp. These changes would cost public finance 
approximately 550 million, 1 080 million and 1 600 million 
respectively. It should also be noted that the increase in the 
generosity of the system of support for the unemployed could 
have an impact on the decrease in the job search intensity and 
the probability of a person getting employed. Thus, the total 
long-term impact of such changes on the poverty rate is much 
more complex.
In the case of the simulation of increasing the employment 
of the unemployed, the extent of poverty changes is very similar 
to the case of expansion of availability of unemployment ben-
efits, although the simulated changes do not have to apply to 
the same individuals. In the case of increases in employment 
by 5%, 10% and 15%, the simulated numbers of people getting 
employed are 80 thousand, 160 thousand and 240 thousand 
respectively. Assuming that all these people would earn the 
minimum wage after getting employed, the relative poverty 
rate would drop by 0.11 pp, 0.22 pp and 0.33 pp respectively, 
and the quasi-absolute poverty rate by 0.10 pp, 0.19 pp and 
0.33 pp. The increase in employment of the unemployed would 
raise households’ income by PLN 700 million, 1 370 million and 
2 030 million respectively.
tax and benefIt SyStem and the 3.2 
labour market: IS It poSSIble to ‘kIll 
two bIrdS wIth one Stone”?
In the work titled „In-Work Policies in Europe: Killing Two 
Birds with One Stone” Bargain and Orsini (2006) compare the 
solutions connecting financial aid with the requirement con-
cerning employment with a hunting „double” emphasising the 
possibility to use in-work benefits to simultaneously promote 
employment and to fight poverty, both directly (by increasing 
income) and indirectly (by improving incentives to work). The 
simulations of a simple extension of the Polish family benefits 
system is presented below. On the one hand it is extended by 
the element of gradual withdrawal of benefits mentioned in 
Subchapter 1.3, and on the other hand by the introduction of 
additional financial incentives for non-working spouses in fami-
lies, where only one person is working. Myck et al. (2013b) sug-
gest a solution in which if in the case of a married couple with 
children two persons are working, the work of the other person 
is promoted by raising the value of the income eligibility thresh-
old in family benefits. The consequences of introducing such a 
system where the income eligibility threshold is raised by 50% 
have been presented on the Figure IV.11 for the example of a 
married couple with two children. As in the case of Figure IV.5 
in Subchapter 1.3, this extension was used in the case of the 
double earner threshold increases and the gradual withdrawal 
of benefits (benefit withdrawal taper at the level of 100% and 
50%). In the latter case monthly level of gross income in the 
amount of PLN 1 2758 have been set as the employment re-
quirement to qualify to increase the income eligibility threshold 
for the family.
Table IV.5 presents the results of the simulation of five hy-
pothetical changes in the family benefits system:
Introduction of gradual withdrawal of family benefits with S14) 
100% benefit withdrawal taper;
Introduction of gradual withdrawal of family benefits with S15) 
50% benefit withdrawal taper;
Increase of 50% in the income eligibility threshold for families S16) 
in which both parents work;
Combination of S14 and S16 systems: increase of 50% in the S17) 
income eligibility threshold for families in which both parents 
work, together with gradual 100% withdrawal of benefits;
Combination of S15 and S16 systems: increase of 50% in the S18) 
income eligibility threshold for families in which both parents 
work, together with gradual 50% withdrawal of benefits.
Introduction of the solutions in the family benefits system, 
which would eliminate the point withdrawal of benefits would 
cost from ca. PLN 600 million annually in the case of 100% with-
drawal taper (S14) to PLN 1.1 billion annually in the case of 50% 
taper (S15). Increase in the income eligibility thresholds for fam-
ilies in which both parents work, would also be associated with 
the costs of ca. PLN 600 million annually, and the combination 
of this solutions with a gradual withdrawal of the benefits would 
translate into a cost of ca. PLN 1.2 to 1.8 billion per year.
The solutions concerning the changes in benefit withdraw-
al in static terms, i.e. ignoring the potential effects of employ-
ment of second persons in couples, would affect the poverty in 
the same way as the solutions concerning moving the income 
eligibility thresholds in the current system. In static terms the 
poverty rate does not change after the introduction of addition-
al incentives to work for non-working second earners, which 
relates to the low probability of risk of poverty in the current 
system in families where both parents work. 
Direct effectiveness of the impact of considered solutions 
on the poverty among children is lower than of the changes ana-
lysed in point 3.1.2, because achieving similar effects in decreas-
ing the risk of poverty is associated with higher fiscal cost. For 
example, increase in all the parameters of the family benefits 
system by 15% causes the decrease in poverty among children 
from 20.2% to 19.0%, with the cost of PLN 1.7 billion annually. 
The most expensive system among the ones presented in Table 
IV.5, reforming the family benefits, which cost PLN 1.8 billion, 
reduces the relative poverty among children only to 19.9%. 
8  This value corresponds to the income with which in the case of both parents 
being employed, one complete value of the child tax credit is used in full.
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This effect is related to the concentration of additional spend-
ing in systems S14-S18 on the group of families, whose incomes 
exceed the value of the income eligibility threshold in the base 
system, which often implies the disposable income exceeding 
also the poverty threshold. For the full evaluation of effective-
ness of the proposed reforms and their impact on poverty, one 
should refer to the scenarios including the potential impact of 
such solutions on the decisions of parents on the labour mar-
ket. The reforms proposed in S14-S18 systems should result in 
greater supply for labour among parents, which in effect may 
lead to, on one hand greater reduction of poverty among chil-
dren as compared to static simulations, and on the other hand, 
to lower net costs of the proposed solutions due to additional 
tax inflows from the work of the newly employed people.
From the point of view of the complex approach to policy 
in respect of poverty, the solutions suggested above should be 
considered as part of parallel changes in the amounts of paid 
family benefits in such a way as to search for an optimal solu-
tion, which on one hand increases the income of the poorest 
families by increasing the amounts of benefits, and simulta-
neously improves the attractiveness of employment through 
gradual benefits withdrawal and additional incentives to work 
for both parents.
a) gross income of the second person and the amount 
of family benefits
b) gross income of the second person and disposable 
income
figure Iv. 11 | Change of financial incentives to work for the second parent: family with two children
Note: 'taper rate’ – benefit withdrawal taper; see explanations to the Figure IV.5 in the text.
Source: own calculations, SIMPL model; see also: Myck et al. (2013b).
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table Iv. 5 | Family benefits and stimuli on the labour market: examples of reforms of the system.
Simulated scenarios
base system S14 scenario S15 scenario S16 scenario S17 scenario S18 scenario
I. relative poverty 
 - poverty threshold (pln) 931.77 933.60 936.00 935.01 937.38 939.27
 - poverty rate 16.0% 15.9% 15.9% 16.0% 15.9% 15.9%
 - poverty rate – children 20.2% 19.9% 19.9% 20.2% 20.0% 19.9%
- poverty rate – working poor 10.9% 10.8% 10.8% 10.9% 10.9% 10.8%
II. Ubóstwo quasi-absolutne:
 - poverty threshold (pln) 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27
 - poverty rate 6.4% 6.4% 6.4% 6.4% 6.4% 6.4%
 - poverty rate – children 8.3% 8.2% 8.2% 8.3% 8.2% 8.2%
- poverty rate – working poor 4.6% 4.6% 4.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.5%
Iv. benefit for households resulting 
from the introduction of the system 
(billion pln annually)
- 0.590 1.128 0.582 1.197 1.766
Note: Children are defined as people under the age of 18.
Source: own calculations based on SIMPL model using HBS 2010 data.
175
Employment in Poland 2011 
Poverty and jobs 
State and inequalities – public policy regarding the problem of poverty and exclusion 4
Summary
If the public policy concerning reduction of poverty is to have a long-term, and not only temporary effect, then the financial 
support for the poorest households should be associated with the policy of promoting employment, both by helping the persons 
searching for work, and by means of solutions improving the financial attractiveness of employment. On the one hand, as shown in 
Parts II-III and in the simulations in Chapter 3, increases in employment may significantly affect the reduction of poverty. On the 
other hand, improvement of financial attractiveness of work may make room for increasing the benefits for the poorest households 
without negative consequences for the decisions concerning supply of work and thus, may effectively address the so called ‘equity-
efficiency trade-off”, and thus to balancing the policy of lowering income inequalities and the policy of effectiveness on the labour 
market (Blundell, 2001; Immervoll et al., 2007).
The social group at highest risk of poverty in Poland, is families with children. According to HBS data, the poverty rate among 
children in 2010 in Poland amounted to 20.2% (23% in 2009 according to EUROSTAT on the basis of EU-SILC data) and it is one 
of the highest in the European Union. Even though, as it is shown by the analyses presented in this Part, the government tax and 
benefit policy in the years 2005-2010 contributed to the decrease in the poverty among children (by 1.4 pp), the level of support for 
families with children in Poland as part of social benefits is still one of the lowest in Europe. The child tax credit introduced in 2007 
significantly increased the income of families and contributed to the reduction of poverty among children (by ca. 0.3 pp).9 However, 
the results presented in Chapter 3 revealed the limited capabilities of the tax system in reducing poverty. Considering the effective-
ness of different policies in reducing poverty levels among families with children the values of family allowance were identified as 
most cost efficient. While PLN 500 million spent on the increase in the amount of family allowance reduces the relative poverty rate 
among children by 0.6 pp, this same amount spent on increasing the values of the income eligibility thresholds in family benefits is 
reflected in the decrease in poverty by ca. 0.3 pp.
However it should be noted that increases in the amounts of family benefits would have negative effects on the motivation to 
work (Blundell, 2001). The consequences of such changes are even more pronounced if access to benefits for working parents is be-
ing simultaneously limited, by lowering the real values of eligibility thresholds entitling to receive the benefits (e.g. Myck et al., 2013a), 
which happened in Poland in the years 2005-2011. Nominal increase in the income eligibility thresholds in 2012 do not keep up 
with inflation from 2010 and even though it will limit the further reduction in the number of children entitled to receive the benefit, 
the whole set of changes introduced in 2012 shall not contribute to the reduction of poverty among children.
The results presented in Part III and simulations from Chapter 3 simultaneously reveal the great impact of employment on the 
probability of being at risk of poverty, including child poverty. To effectively reduce it, the policy of supporting the poorest families 
as part of the family benefits system should combine the elements efficient in direct fight against poverty, i.e. the amount of the 
benefits, with the instruments improving the attractiveness of employment. Examples of gradual, rather than point withdrawal of 
benefits and the expansion of accessibility of benefits in the case of families, in which both parents work presented in this Part of the 
Report, do not directly lead to significant decrease in poverty among children, but they may result in greater labour market activity 
of parents and in effect lead to systematic and stable improvement of the financial conditions of families with children.
9  See simulation S-Z1 in the Appendix IV.1.
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Recommendations foR public policy
In 2011 in Poland the number of people at risk of poverty varied, depending on the definition and measurement, between 900 
thousand and 8 million, so 2.8% and 19.3% of the population. It was definitely less than in the years 2002-2004 (from 6% to 40% 
respectively), however despite a significant improvement, we cannot say that poverty in modern Poland is an isolated or marginal 
phenomenon. Moreover, the way the society and government deal with poverty constitutes an important marker of the level of 
civilisational development – as a political community we feel responsible for those who are in worse situation; we would also like to 
mitigate the potential effects of poverty, also in case we become poor one day. Investing in economic growth is one of the important 
instruments contributing to the reduction of poverty, however provided that this growth is of inclusive nature, which requires a 
proper incorporation of the social policy into wider framework of public policy and state intervention.
Data on the extent of poverty are very diverse. There are numerous measures of poverty, and all of them should be treated 
similarly to the situation where income in a household does not allow to satisfy the most basic scope of needs. The diversity of 
poverty measures in a sense results from the fact that different spectrum of needs (social minimum versus absolute minimum) 
can be embraced and various methods of their measurement (cut-off point of relative poverty) can be used. In Part I we draw at-
tention to the fact that poverty is not a phenomenon separated from material deprivation or social exclusion. However, insofar as 
the first phenomenon occurs with different severity and in the long term is in a way a natural consequence of insufficient income, 
the relations with social exclusion are more complicated. They depend in a large extent on the environment of an individual – 
including the cumulation of risks and the functioning of safety net. These relations, however, are still very individualised, and 
thus difficult to measure. The research on social cohesion does not confirm though, that the scale of social exclusion caused by 
poverty is significant.
The high economic growth of past few years was crucial for shift in Poles’ perception of their own financial situation. Currently, 
the average income of the non-poor enables acquiring a social minimum basket of goods and services and therefore not only satisfy-
ing the basic biological neets, but also a relatively active participation in social life. Nevertheless, many Polish people with average 
and above-average incomes still do think they are poor, which to some extent presumably is a derivative of a reference group being 
formed by the citizens of Western European countries. Rapid economic growth over the next two, three decades is thus not only 
a sin equa non condition of the objective levelling of the standard of life between Poland and Western Europe, but it is also a neces-
sary factor for convergence of Poles’ attitudes and strategies to their counterparts in more wealthy countries. Ambitious reforms, 
necessary to uphold the upward trend, must also be directed more on transforming Poland into an innovative economy, institution-
ally competitive, resistant to the effects of ageing of the population and fast technological changes worldwide. It will surely have an 
impact on the construction of social policy in the future. Due to these challenges, the following steps will be essential: improvement 
of policy aimed at increasing participation and employment rates, counteracting the rising risk of structural unemployment, as well 
as supporting the social and economic inclusion of immigrants.
The stake is high. Poles, despite the continuous development of their country, still feel like an impoverished nation, especially 
when the aspirations are set by the leaders of Europe. In the subjective perception poverty is far worse than the actual state, which 
to some extent is attributed to the scale of the phenomenon in the past, partly to the external groups of reference, and partly to the 
current limitations of households’ budgets. Their possession of durable goods, even though improving, is achieved at the expense 
of every day consumption which naturally requires the ability to manage household budgets. It seems that the poorest households 
exhibit certain lack of such abilities, especially when taking into consideration their disproportionately high expectations and irra-
tional financing of the consumption with debt, instead of searching for additional work to finance the growing needs. Thus, promot-
ing the knowledge of methods of income management seems to be a desirable direction.
In the I Part of the Report the different aspects of poverty are presented. In view of the conducted analyses, the persons who 
are at risk of absolute poverty distinguish themselves rather by a standard of their housing than its floor area per capita. Moreover, 
they are often affected by a lack of certain amenities considered in our times a minimum comfort, e.g. lack of hot running water or 
a toilet. The poor are much more likely to suffer from shortfall of some durable goods or their relative obsolescence. There is how-
ever a significant set of goods that is present in almost all household, which was not the case even a few years ago. What is more, 
due to increasing affluence of the society and increasing availability of the technologically modern appliances, even relatively poor 
persons may afford a fast advancement in the comfort of life, which would not occur only recently. It is one of certain successes of 
the transition period of 1990-2010.
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As compared to other European countries, Poland is one of the last countries in terms of the characteristics of poverty. Thus, 
not only it is behind most of the EU-15 countries, but also behind Czech Republic or Hungary, so the countries at similar develop-
ment level. The statistics concerning the extent of poverty, its depth or the diversification of the poor, are not very promising. It is 
an evidence for shortfalls of our social policy, especially for the method of addressing social transfers. The leader countries with 
lowest poverty rates are characterised by low inflows, and low or average outflows from poverty. In Poland inflows to poverty are 
high, similarly to the relative duration of the state of being poor. Thus, there is a huge potential to reduce the extent and depth of 
poverty in our country, so to follow the steps of e.g. Czech Republic, in increasing the effectiveness of tax and benefit system impact 
on poverty.
Despite the unfavourable view of poor households on commencing additional work, all conducted analyses lead to the ascer-
tainment that work constitutes a basic way to reduce the risk of poverty, especially in the case of relative poverty. Incomes from 
sources (except for retirement pensions) influence the reduction of absolute poverty, which shows in e.g. frozen statutory poverty 
threshold and low levels of transfers. Their countercyclical nature enables them to temporarily defuse the symptoms of poverty, but 
in their current form they will not become the remedy for poverty. It should be noted that there is also an opposite relation: poor 
households are those with an average low intensive labour supply, which results in low income and living standards.
However, sometimes it happens that despite receiving earnings, a household is still classified as poor (working poor) – as a re-
sult of low income as well as unfavourable household structure. Admittedly this phenomenon in Poland is not marginal, but poverty 
occurs definitely less often among workers than in total population on average, and when it occurs it is relatively less severe. Part 
III provides arguments for the statement that in-work poverty is related to microeconomic factors, such as employee’s character-
istics, the work performed or attributes of a household. The following elements are also disadvantageous: young age, low level of 
education, employment in simple jobs or in agriculture. Employment for a definite period exerts a limited impact on the reduction 
of risk of poverty, which is characteristic of low-paid jobs. This is another time when the hypothesis of high importance of intensity 
of labour supply is confirmed – women (usually providing second highest income in the household), even considering a wage gap, 
may significantly raise the standard of living in a household if they work. However, in many cases one working person is enough for 
the household to avoid or exit poverty.
Relatively high incidence of working poor in Poland results mainly from the high risk of poverty among agricultural house-
holds. Reallocation of workers from agriculture to other sectors of economy is the most important structural change in the popu-
lation that has been impacting on the decrease in the risk of poverty in Poland now and may have exert similar influence in the 
future. Thus, public policy should support swift reallocation from agriculture to other sectors of economy, also because it leads to 
higher standards of living of particular households taking part in this reallocation. Despite the transfers carried out within Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, the rate of relative poverty in agriculture has increased in recent years, so the income gap between those 
working in agriculture and outside of it is getting bigger. The inflows of young people to agriculture have also increased recently, 
which is a disturbing phenomenon. Dispersed structure of agriculture and low productivity imply that many agricultural households 
earn incomes enabling merely a basic existence or even subsistence, and transfers constituting the part of Common Agricultural 
Policy help in supplementing their income, somehow substituting social policy. Lack of modernisation of economic structure of 
rural areas and stifled growth of rural households’ incomes constitute lost opportunity costs. Agricultural policy should favour 
restructuring and modernisation of agriculture and not constitute the substitute of social policy, which is the right policy to address 
the problem of poverty.
Analyses carried out in the III Part indicate that temporary poverty, though uncomfortable, is basically not dangerous. Despite 
the significance of the poverty spell, the situations when poverty lasts a decade are relatively rare. However, considerably higher 
probability of permanence occurs in case of the relative poverty than the absolute one. There are two policy responses to mitigate 
the consequences of poverty. In case of individuals with minor social capital, public policy should focus more on incomes than on 
transfers. In groups in which transfers may create a risk of discouragement or stigmatisation, temporary transfers may be valuable. 
However, the observation that income mobility is rather low and low (or high incomes) tend to persist, works to the disadvantage 
of intervention. Young age, high education, work (especially on permanent contracts) and relatively high initial income, all favour 
the income mobility.
The poverty concentrates in selected social groups, mostly in the group of unemployed and families with children. As opposed 
to what is commonly believed, the pensioners are significantly less exposed to poverty in Poland. The persons in post-working age 
(pensioners) are characterised by low risk of poverty, similar to the one among working people. Despite that, in Polish social policy 
the emphasis is put on the support of the elderly population. The highest risk of poverty affects households in which the head of this 
household is between 45 and 54 years old, and it is also high among people in working age living on social benefits. Considering the 
following: (i) large differentiation of risk of poverty between working people (especially outside of agriculture) and the unemployed 
in a working age, and (ii) low professional activity in Poland, linking of social policy with employment support program is crucial.
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The presence of children and other dependent persons decreases the probability of exiting poverty, which indicates a severe 
shortfall of the Polish system of support for families with children, especially in its tax dimension. Multi-children households are at 
much higher risk of poverty than those with number of dependent children is up to two. In 2011 the percentage of people at risk 
of relative poverty in households with three or more children amounted to 36%, but it was much higher in rural areas than in the 
cities (39% compared to 32%). If the income of multi-children households was used only by adults and two children, the poverty 
rate among members of these household would by 15 percentage points and would amount to 21% (25% in rural areas and 17% in 
the cities). In this group of households the head of a household usually works, and often both parents do. As a consequence, such 
households would benefit largely from changes in the tax system which would allow them to reduce their income tax liabilities on 
account of having many children. It is worth noting that the child tax credit introduced in 2007 raised the income of families and 
contributed to reduction of poverty among children (by ca. 0.3 pp), however, as it is proved in Part IV, the tax system is still rather 
not successful in reducing poverty.
The fact that in noticeable part of households with 3 children and more, the poverty appears only after the third or subse-
quent child is born indicates that the support for economic activity of mothers of three children or more is desirable (pre-schools, 
nurseries, maybe financial preference for part-time work as compared to staying at home). Linking of these solutions with smart 
tax-benefit policy which takes into account the costs of having the third (or subsequent) child would be particularly helpful in fight-
ing against poverty among children. It should be emphasised that in practice only the families with earnings closer rather to the 
national average than to minimum wage, may take advantage of the recently modified tax credit for families with three children or 
more. Meanwhile the tax credit should be constructed in such a way that the poorest households could also effectively benefit from 
such preference. It should be noted that more than half of the poor households with three children or more would be poor even if 
they had only two children (assuming that their economic activity did not change). Thus, in ca. 20% of households with at least two 
children, the second child is already born poor. Therefore possessing many children in part of the population is rather the function 
of poverty, and not the opposite - the policy directed at improving the awareness of the advantages of planning the family in this 
group of poor households, would be particularly justified.
Also the extent of support for families with children via social benefits in Poland is still one of the lowest in Europe. The solu-
tion particularly effective cost-wise concerning the fight against poverty among children would be the increase in the value of 
family allowance. While PLN 500 million spent on the increase in family allowance would decrease the relative poverty rate among 
children by 0.6 pp, the same amount spent on increasing the eligibility thresholds would correspond to the reduction of poverty rate 
only by half of the above impact. At the same time, increasing the amounts of family benefits would discourage market labour supply, 
so using this instrument should be conditioned by appropriate improvements of institutional nature.
The results and simulations unambiguously show an enormous role of working for the probability of being at risk of poverty. 
This relates also to the poverty among children. To effectively reduce it, the policy of support for the poorest families should merge 
the elements efficient in direct fight against poverty, i.e. the amount of paid benefits (and family allowances), with instruments im-
proving the attractiveness of employment. The examples of gradual (not threshold based) withdrawal of benefits and expansion of 
availability of benefits in the case of families in which both parents work, do not directly cause the significant drop in poverty among 
children, though they may result in higher economic activity of parents and finally lead to improvement of financial condition of 
families with children.
To sum up, we may say that, if the public policy aimed at reduction of poverty is to have a long-term, and not only temporary 
effect, then the financial support of the poorest households should be associated with the policy of promoting employment, both 
through support to the people searching for work, and through solutions improving financial attractiveness of economic activity. 
The increase in employment may significantly contribute to the reduction of poverty, especially in absolute terms. The improvement 
of financial attractiveness of employment should create a space for increasing the benefits addressed to the poorest households 
without negative consequences for the decisions concerning employment, contributing to fulfilling of two important objectives in 
the context of reducing poverty in Poland: balancing the policy of lowering income inequalities with the policy of effectiveness on 
the labour market.
Methodological annex
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annex to paRt iii
appendix iii. 1 | estimations of the probit model parameters for the risk of in-work poverty in poland.
explanatory variables parameter estimations average marginal effect (pp)
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sex (reference: man)
woman 0.03** 0.35**
education (ref. secondary)
tertiary -0.26*** -2.16***
basic vocational 0.23*** 2.59***
lower secondary and below 0.42*** 5.23***
age group (ref. 45-54)
15-24 0.04** 0.52**
25-34 -0.14*** -1.53***
35-44 -0.04** -0.42**
55 and more -0.26*** -2.65***
population of place of residence (ref. village)
500 thousand inhabitants and more -0.49*** -4.95***
200 - 499 thousand inhabitants -0.31*** -3.48***
100 - 199 thousand inhabitants -0.33*** -3.64***
20 - 99 thousand inhabitants -0.26*** -2.95***
below 20 thousand inhabitants -0.15*** -1.80***
region (ref. Mazowieckie)
dolnośląskie 0.11*** 1.16***
kujawsko-pomorskie 0.17*** 1.77***
lubelskie 0.29*** 3.19***
lubuskie -0.04 -0.38
łódzkie 0.13*** 1.30***
małopolskie 0.06** 0.58**
opolskie 0.16*** 1.65***
podkarpackie 0.25*** 2.74***
podlaskie 0.25*** 2.73***
pomorskie 0.28*** 3.14***
śląskie 0.16*** 1.70***
świętokrzyskie 0.19*** 1.95***
warmińsko-mazurskie 0.13*** 1.29***
wielkopolskie 0.09*** 0.85***
zachodniopomorskie 0.00 0.01
type of work (ref. work for an indefinite period)
work for a definite period 0.22*** 2.54***
self-employment -0.01 -0.12
occupation (ref. elementary occupation)
highly skilled non-manual -0.60*** -6.60***
lower skilled non-manual -0.24*** -3.19***
skilled manual -0.19*** -2.66***
working time (ref. full-time work)
part-time work 0.38*** 4.93***
ownership of the company (ref. private)
public 0.04*** 0.44***
sector 
services 0.02* 0.25*
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appendix iii. 1 | estimations of the probit model parameters for the risk of in-work poverty in poland.
explanatory variables parameter estimations average marginal effect (pp)
 h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
main source of income (ref. labour)
agriculture 0.27*** 3.41***
old-age pension -0.32*** -2.96***
disability pension 0.04* 0.50
social benefits 0.19*** 2.25***
unearned sources of income 0.42*** 5.75***
number of children 0.15*** 1.66***
number of agricultural workers 0.18*** 2.02***
number of non-agricultural workers employed for an indefinite period -0.50*** -5.50***
number of non-agricultural workers employed for a definite period -0.06*** -0.69***
number of self-employed -0.36*** -3.91***
number of the unemployed 0.53*** 5.83***
number of old-age pensioners -0.27*** -2.93***
number of disability pensioners -0.14*** -1.55***
co
n
tr
o
l v
ar
ia
b
le
s
years (ref. 2005)
2006 0.09*** 0.98***
2007 0.12*** 1.22***
2008 0.08*** 0.83***
2010 0.11*** 1.16***
2011 0.11*** 1.20***
Constant -0.85***
Number of observations 186215
Likelihood ratio test 25558.98***
Note: The dependent variable assumes the value 1 when the working is poor, i.e. earns below 60% of the median equalized household income in a given year, 
and 0 if otherwise. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at a level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Source: Own calculations based on HBS, 2005-2011.
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appendix iii. 2 | Estimations of logit model parameters for the risk of inflow to and outflow from poverty 
in poland.
explanatory variables
estimations of parameters in 
the model of probability of 
inflow to poverty 
estimations of parameters in 
the model of probability of 
outflow from poverty
h
ead
 o
f h
o
u
seh
o
ld
 ch
aracteristics
sex (ref. man) 0.24*** -0.03
woman 0.00 0.00
age group (ref. 35-44)
below 24 0.12 0.24**
25-34 -0.08* 0.35***
35-44 0.04 -0.08*
55-64 -0.46*** -0.02
55 and more -0.87*** -0.03
education (ref. secondary)
tertiary -1.25*** 0.42***
basic vocational 0.62*** -0.29***
lower secondary and lower 0.94*** -0.61***
place of residence (ref. village) 0.00 0.00
city -0.46*** 0.22***
h
o
u
seh
o
ld
 ch
aracteristics
number of children 0.33*** -0.14***
square of the number of children -0.03*** 0.00
number of agricultural workers 0.43*** 0.30***
square of the number of agricultural workers -0.08*** -0.04***
number of non-agricultural workers employed for an indefinite period -0.57*** 0.74***
square of the number of non-agricultural workers employed for an indefinite period 0.00 -0.12***
number of non-agricultural workers employed for a definite period 0.67*** 0.29**
square of the number of non-agricultural workers employed for a definite period -0.25** -0.05
number of self-employed -0.59*** 0.67***
square of the number of self-employed 0.07 -0.14
number of the unemployed 0.75*** 0.06
square of the number of the unemployed -0.16*** -0.05**
number of old-age pensioners -0.26*** 0.41***
square of the number of old-age pensioners -0.17*** -0.04
number of disability pensioners -0.18*** 0.12*
square of the number of disability pensioners 0.04 0.04
co
n
tro
l variab
les
year (ref. 2002) 0.00 0.00
2003 0.15** -0.18**
2004 0.07 -0.08
2005 0.23*** -0.11
2006 0.28*** -0.03
2007 0.48*** -0.23***
2008 0.37*** -0.24***
2009 0.40*** -0.26***
2010 0.33*** -0.41***
Constant -2.63*** -0.28***
Number of observations 106066 19132
Likelihood ratio test 6751.79*** 995.67***
Note: inflows and outflows are based on the relative poverty threshold in a given year. The dependent variable in the model of probability of inflow to poverty is 1 when the 
household was non-poor in the first period and is poor in the next one, and 0 when the household was remained non-poor (analagous values for the model of probability of 
outflow from poverty). Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at a level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Source: Own calculations based on HBS, 2002-2011.
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appendix iii. 3 | estimations of logit model parameters describing persistent and total poverty based on 
social diagnosis data.
explanatory variables
estimations of parameters in the model of 
probability of persistent poverty
estimations of parameters in the model of 
probability of total poverty
h
ead
 o
f h
o
u
seh
o
ld
 ch
aracteristics
sex (ref. woman)
man -0.12 -0.71***
age group (ref. 35-44)
below 24 -1.17 -0.31
25-34 -0.66* 0.14
45-54 0.02 -0.79***
55-64 -0.61** -1.60***
65 and more -0.85*** -0.71***
main source of income (ref. unearned sources)
hired labour -0.64* -0.92***
self-employment -1.96*** -1.44***
agricultural labour 0.82** 0.68*
old-age or disability pension -0.46 -0.57*
population of place of residence (ref. 100-200 thousand inhabitants)
village 1.08*** 0.90***
below 20 thousand inhabitants 1.05** 0.48*
20-100 thousand inhabitants 0.71 0.37
200-500 thousand inhabitants 0.43 0.28
more than 500 thousand inhabitants 0.34 0.22
number of friends -0.05** -0.01
involvement in the life of the local community -1.08*** -1.09***
h
o
u
seh
o
ld
 ch
aracteristics
number of people with tertiary and post-secondary education -0.53** -0.79***
number of people with secondary education -0.25 -0.35**
number of people with vocational and lower secondary education 0.27 0.00
number of people with primary and incomplete education 0.30* 0.14
number of children 0.53*** 0.47***
number of adults 0.71*** 1.04***
number of workers -1.86*** -1.49***
number of ill and disabled persons 0.00 0.02
Constant -1.59 0.98
Number of observations 2011 2011
Likelihood ratio test 550.45*** 861.67***
Note: poverty refers to the situation where a given household has equivalised income below the relative poverty threshold for one or more periods of study. In persistent 
poverty, the number of poverty spells must be at least three. In both models the samples were limited to households that in the period 2000-2011 participated in the study 
at least four times. Involvement in the life of local community was mesaured based on the share of studies in which the head of household declared activity for the local 
community, in all surveys in the household participated. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at a level of 1%, 5% and 10% .
Source: Own calculations based on Social Diagnosis data, 2000-2011.
appendix iii. 4 | estimations of poverty persistence based on social diagnosis.
Nonparametric Kaplan-Meier estimator determines the chance of duration of a given state to a certain point, without the 
occurrence of an analyzed event. In the context of poverty, this event is defined as an entry to or exit from poverty. For example, 
in the case of exit from poverty, the Kaplan-Meier estimator shows the probability of remaining in poverty in relation to the duration 
of poverty spell.
The estimation is based on micro-data from the Social Diagnosis Survey from years 2000 and 2011, and hence time periods 
used here reflect the time between the successive waves of the study. For all examined cases, except for one three-year long period 
between studies in 2000 and 2003, all periods were two years long. In the context of estimation, time is defined as the number 
of periods since the emergence of the observation in the panel sample. 
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appendix iii. 5 | estimations of random effect probit models of poverty for selected european countries.
explanatory variables AT BE BG CY CZ DK EE ES FI FR GR
lagged poverty state: poor 0.89*** 0.32* 0.74*** 1.86*** 1.31*** 0.93*** 0.58*** 0.7*** 0.63*** 0.62*** 1.03***
poverty-initial state: poor 1.28*** 1.91*** 0.89*** 0.53*** 0.9*** 2.52*** 1.5*** 1.48*** 2.18*** 1.86 1.5***
number of persons  aged less than 15 
years
0.23 0.24 -0.34 0.14 0.41 0.87* 0.59** 0.64*** 0.21 0.17 0.1 
number of persons aged 15-24 -0.51* 0.39 0.28 -0.05 0.4 1.24*** 0.38* 0.37* 0.22 0.48*** 0.6**
number of persons aged 25-54 -0.2 0.07 -0.2 -0.3*** -0.14 -0.44 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 -0.12 -0.03 
number of persons aged 65+ -0.09 -0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.2 -0.73 -0.74* -0.79*** -0.46 -0.49** -0.17 
education: elementary and lower 1.07 0.49*** 0.72** 0.73*** 0.68 . 0.29 1.06*** . 0.85*** 1.36***
education: lower secondary 0.44** 0.23 0.38* 0.64*** 0.79*** 0.55** 0.67*** 0.84*** 1*** 0.71*** 1.01***
education: upper secondary 0.32** 0.18 0.08 0.14 0.48*** 0.57** 0.36** 0.45*** 0.98*** 0.49*** 0.68***
education: postgraduate -0.18 0.27 -4.73 -4.89 0.12 . 0.38 0.21 -3.68 -4.13 0.52 
woman 0.07 -0.04 0.4** -0.03 0.29*** 0.66*** 0.28* -0.12 0.39** 0.02 -0.08 
unemployed 0.49* 0.82*** 0.64* 0.54 1.05*** 0.26 0.21 0.66*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.48 
inactive 0.25 -0.29 1.01** 0.78*** 0.87*** -0.4 0.67** -0.38 0.45* -0.04 0.01 
age of household head: 15-24 0.08 0.32 -0.06 -6.34 -0.34 -0.16 -0.62 -1.95*** 0.09 -0.23 0.35 
age of household head: 25-34 0.19 0.07 0.19 -0.34 -0.14 -0.41 -0.71** -0.42** -0.07 0.12 0.21 
age of household head: 45-54 0.06 -0.22 -0.25 0.11 -0.09 0.04 0.1 -0.22* 0.22 0.06 0 
age of household head: 55-64 -0.11 -0.71** -0.53 -0.89*** -0.25 -0.15 -0.2 -0.36* 0.47 -0.18 -0.29 
age of household head: 65-79 -0.03 -0.71* 0.22 -0.69** 0.58** 0.97 0.77* -0.03 0.7 0.21 -0.26 
age of household head: 80+ -0.43 -0.7 0.38 -0.63* 0.67** 0.66 0.4 -0.12 1.02* 0.26 -0.07 
health status: very good -0.17 0.27 -0.4 -0.61*** 0.05 -0.47 -0.05 -0.14 -0.19 -0.13 -0.53**
health status: good -0.14 0.05 -0.2 -0.25** -0.05 -0.52* -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 -0.19*** -0.28*
health status: bad -0.31* 0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.16 -0.76 0.26 0.17 0.22 -0.04 0.02 
health status: very bad -0.64** 0.46 -0.21 0.16 -0.35* 0.4 -0.14 -0.4* 0.58 0.31 -0.03 
marital status: single -0.38 -0.33 0.78 - 0.28 -0.22 -0.31 0.35 -0.24 0.27 -1.49**
marital status: separation -0.45 0.37 0.21 - . . -0.76* 0.39 . . -1.19 
marital status: widow/widower -0.53 -0.62** 0.35 - -0.44* -0.5 -0.65** 0.18 -0.88** -0.18 -1.14 
marital status: divorced -0.43 -0.05 0.55 - 0.26 -1.33*** -0.02 -0.18 -0.26 0.11 -0.76 
average number of persons aged 25-54 0.29 -0.36 0.06 - 0.29 0.18 0.21 -0.2 0.26 0.08 0.05 
average number of persons aged 65+ 0.01 -0.01 -0.47 - -0.57** 0.54 -0.45 0.51** 0.28 0.09 -0.09 
average number of persons aged <15 -0.02 -0.24 0.48 - -0.23 -0.58 -0.48* -0.11 0.04 0.03 0.02 
average number of persons aged 15-24 0.46 -0.12 -0.06 - -0.21 -1.1** -0.3 -0.16 -0.14 -0.26** -0.52*
average labour market status 0.19 0.37** -0.06 - 0.03 0.35* 0.47*** 0.31*** 0.24** 0.15** 0.05 
average health status 0.22** 0.35*** 0.11 - 0.19** -0.3 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.06 -0.04 
constant -3.9*** -3.61*** -1.52*** -1.45*** -4.21*** -3.63*** -4.13*** -2.97*** -5.41*** -3.33 -3.1***
rho 0.32*** 0.41*** 0.2* 0 0.21** 0.35* 0.39*** 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.32*** 0.39***
number of observations 2583 2835 1149 1764 7101 1977 2302 4929 2775 12345 2850
lR (chi2) 408*** 333*** 229*** 439*** 925*** 134*** 339*** 730*** 278*** 1391*** 490***
Note: references – non-poor in the previous period, non-poor in the first period, tertiary education, man, worker, household head aged 35-44, average health status, married. 
Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significance at a level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Dots denote deficiencies in the levels of variables for some countries. For Cyprus and Lithuania, 
the estimations do not take into account all variables (marked as -) due to problems with numerical convergence. No models for Iceland, Malta, Slovakia and Hungary is due to 
small sample sizes and the problems with convergence. The rho significance was calculated using the likelihood ratio test. The sample was balanced by removing observations 
for which data were available for all periods.
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC 2009, for the period 2005-2008.
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appendix iii. 5 | estimations of random effect probit models of poverty for selected european countries.
zmienne objaśniające IT LT LU LV NL NO PL PT SE SI UK
lagged poverty state: poor 0.62*** 0.68*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.84*** 0.57*** 1.06*** 0.94*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.73***
poverty-initial state: poor 2.89*** 0.84*** 2.12*** 1.05*** 2.26*** 2.37*** 1.35*** 1.37*** 2.77*** 2.32*** 1.06***
number of persons  aged less than 15 
years
0.54*** -0.09 0.21* 0.31*** 1.3*** 0.08 0.13 0.23* 1.1** 0.14 0.46**
number of persons aged 15-24 0.6*** 0.16 0.27** -0.04 1.34*** 0.64*** 0.38*** 0.33** 1.17*** 0.32 0.25 
number of persons aged 25-54 0.19 -0.3** 0.29** -0.41*** 0.49 0.51** 0.02 -0.13 0.08 0.18 0.25 
number of persons aged 65+ -0.28 -0.64*** -0.02 -0.33** -0.13 0.06 0.28 -0.26 -0.05 -0.38 -0.9***
education: elementary and lower 1.25*** 1.01*** 0.61*** 1.04*** 1.05*** 1.89 1.24*** 1.44*** 1.51*** 1.59*** .
education: lower secondary 0.74*** 0.96*** 0.26* 0.6*** 1.03*** 0.45*** 1.19 0.87*** 1.42*** 1.53*** 0.53***
education: upper secondary 0.18 0.95*** 0.28*** 0.57*** 0.61** 0.29** 0.76*** 0.38 0.84*** 1.21*** 0.28**
education: postgraduate 0.36 0.7*** 0.02 0.43* 0.25 -1.57 0.18 -3.23 1.01* . 0.33**
woman 0.11 0.21** 0.19* 0.16 -0.19 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.83*** 0.21 0.01 
unemployed 0.37* 0.34* 0.67*** 0.78*** 1.6*** 0.24 0.37 0.6** 1.26*** 1.12*** 2.91***
inactive 0.45** 0.22 0 1.39*** 0.3 0.69*** 0.01 0.03 1.03** 0.46 0.67***
age of household head: 15-24 0.47 -0.53 0.06 0.23 -0.88 0.29 -0.16 0.32 -0.2 0.39 -0.22 
age of household head: 25-34 0.21 -0.09 0.03 -0.18 0.14 0 -0.09 -0.13 0.27 -0.23 -0.21 
age of household head: 45-54 -0.11 -0.23* -0.14 0 -0.05 0.08 0.02 -0.11 -0.01 0.27 0.07 
age of household head: 55-64 -0.73*** -0.45** -0.38* -0.78*** -0.26 -0.58* -0.34* 0.03 -0.4 -0.2 -0.14 
age of household head: 65-79 -0.25 -0.11 -0.76*** -0.12 -0.98 -0.57 0 0.44 -0.85 0.14 0 
age of household head: 80+ -0.54* -0.27 -1.3*** 0.22 -0.58 0.04 -0.32 0.42 -0.08 0.12 -0.24 
health status: very good -0.04 -0.11 0.37*** -1.17** 0.19 0.25 0.08 0.03 -0.21 -0.36 0.14 
health status: good 0.02 -0.07 0.14 -0.31** -0.09 0.09 -0.07 -0.17 0.14 -0.24 0.04 
health status: bad 0 0.09 0 0.2 0.21 0.19 0 0.02 0.52 0.24 -0.24 
health status: very bad 0.08 -0.46*** -0.14 0.42 0.46 -0.52 -0.07 0.03 0.56 0.33 0.17 
marital status: single -0.15 0.08 -0.43 - -0.48 0.08 0.35 0.54* 0.26 -0.14 -0.65 
marital status: separation -0.1 -0.28 -0.73* - . 0.27 0.38 0.68 0.23 . -0.63 
marital status: widow/widower -0.29 -0.14 -1.13*** - -1.34** 0.66 0.24 -0.03 -0.3 -0.62* -0.79*
marital status: divorced -0.1 0.15 -0.74** - -0.46 -0.1 0.25 0.36 0.69 -0.36 -0.52 
average number of persons aged 25-54 -0.31* 0.27* -0.3** - -1.05** -0.6** -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.14 -0.48*
average number of persons aged 65+ -0.19 -0.05 -0.02 - 0 -0.76* -0.9*** -0.19 0.1 0.11 0.77***
average number of persons aged <15 -0.17 0.28* -0.04 - -0.7* 0.15 0.09 0.07 -0.78 0.05 -0.26 
average number of persons aged 15-24 -0.21 0.05 -0.15 - -1.13** -0.77*** -0.24 -0.21 -1.04** -0.3 -0.2 
average labour market status 0.17* 0.34*** 0.14 - 0.3 0.35*** 0.18* -0.01 0.43* 0.22 0 
average health status -0.1 0.19** 0.34*** - 0.19 -0.13 0.12 0.14 0.05 -0.15 0.07 
constant -3.62*** -3.65*** -4.05*** -1.58*** -5.02*** -3.75*** -3.24*** -3.47*** -6.45*** -4.63*** -2.8***
rho 0.67*** 0.23*** 0.33*** 0.26** 0.54*** 0.35*** 0.4*** 0.3*** 0.69*** 0.43*** 0.25***
number of observations 9372 3439 7584 1648 3470 6877 5831 3092 2623 3108 3258
lR (chi2) 877*** 637*** 1016*** 381*** 176*** 376*** 857*** 534*** 143*** 293*** 525***
Note: references – non-poor in the previous period, non-poor in the first period, tertiary education, man, worker, household head aged 35-44, average health status, married. 
Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate the significance at a level of 1%, 5% and 10%. Dots denote deficiencies in the levels of variables for some countries. For Cyprus and Lithuania, 
the estimations do not take into account all variables (marked as -) due to problems with numerical convergence. No models for Iceland, Malta, Slovakia and Hungary is due to 
small sample sizes and the problems with convergence. The rho significance was calculated using the likelihood ratio test. The sample was balanced by removing observations 
for which data were available for all periods.
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC 2009, for the period 2005-2008.
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annex to paRt iV
appendix iV. 1 | Modelled elements of tax and benefit reforms in the years 2005-2010.
S-Z1) Withdrawal of the child tax credit
In this simulation the introduction of the child tax credit have been excluded from the 2005-2010 set of reforms – thus, the 
simulated reforms show an isolated impact of the tax credit on household incomes.
S-Z2) Increase in the value of the income eligibility thresholds in the family benefits system in connection with the withdrawal of the child 
tax credit
This simulation presents a cumulated effect of the S2 and S-Z1 simulations, so the effect of increase in the value of the income 
eligibility threshold in the family benefits system together with the withdrawal of the child tax credit.
table iV.a.1 | elements of the family support system in s1, s2, s3, s-Z1, s-Z2 scenarios (pln per month).
simulated scenario
2005-10 set of reforms
(s1)
s2 scenario s3 scenario s-Z1 scenario s-Z2 scenario
Family allowance with supplements
income eligibility threshold 580.84 580.84 580.84 504.00 580.84
income eligibility threshold, if there is a 
disabled child in a family
671.88 671.88 671.88 583.00 671.88
amounts of allowance per child:
- first and second child
/ child aged 0-4 years
49.561) 68.00 49.561) 68.00 68.00
- third child
/ child aged 5-17 years
61.081) 91.00 61.081) 91.00 91.00
- fourth and subsequent child
 child aged 18 years and more
76.061) 98.00 76.061) 98.00 98.00
supplements:
- lone parent supplement
 a) amount per child 195.92 170.00 195.92 170.00 170.00
 b) amount per child, if the child is disabled 92.20 80.00 92.20 80.00 80.00
- child care supplement granted for the 
duration of the parental leave
460.98 400.00 460.98 400.00 400.00
- for large families 57.62 80.00 57.62 80.00 80.00
- for starting the school year 103.72 100.00 103.72 100.00 100.00
- for education and rehabilitation of a disabled child
 a) child aged 0-4 years 57.62 60.00 57.62 60.00 60.00
 b) child aged 5 years or more 80.67 80.00 80.67 80.00 80.00
- child birth grant 576.23 1000.00 576.23 1000.00 1000.00
Nursing benefits
nursing allowance
 a) income eligibility threshold 671.88 - 671.88 - -
 b) the amount of benefit 484.03 520.00 484.03 520.00 520.00
nursing benefit 165.95 153.00 165.95 153.00 153.00
Child birth benefit
“becikowe” - 1 000.00 0.00 1 000.00 1 000.00
Child tax credit
maximum deductible amount per child - 92.67 92.67 0.00 0.00
Note: in S1 and S3 scenarios the amount of the family allowance dependant on the number of children in the family, in other scenarios – dependant on the age of a child.
Source: own calculations on the basis of the SIMPL model.
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The parameters of the family benefits system assumed in the simulations (together with S0, S1, S2 and S3 systems) are pre-
sented in Table IV.A1. Impact of the simulated solutions on the poverty rate is shown in Table IV.A2, and their effect on the number 
of family benefits paid and the costs of the family benefits system are shown in Table IV.A3. S-Z1 and S-Z2 scenarios show the im-
pact of the child tax credit on household incomes and the poverty rate. Simulated gain from introducing the child tax credit amounts 
to ca. PLN 7 billion annually. 1 As could be expected the effect of the tax credit on the measures of quasi-absolute and absolute pov-
erty is relatively low (the tax credit reduces the poverty by ca. 0.1 pp). In the case of relative poverty due to the impact of the child 
tax credit on the level of the poverty threshold, which as a result of introduction of the tax credit increases from PLN 910.20 to PLN 
931.77, despite the increase in household income, the total extent of poverty increases from 15.8% to 16.0%. However, the child 
tax credit improves the income situation of households with children by reducing the relative poverty among children from 20.5% 
to 20.2%. Curiously enough, if the withdrawal of the child tax credit was linked with increase in the income eligibility thresholds in 
the family benefits system (S-Z2 system), relative poverty would decrease even further (to 15.5%), and relative poverty among chil-
dren would be at the lower level than in 2010 system. Such effect is a result of redirecting some of the funds from the tax credit for 
households of middle income with children. However, as opposed to the increase in the values of family benefits, it has no significant 
impact on quasi-absolute and absolute poverty values.
table iV.a.2 | 2005-2010 reforms: measures of poverty and households’ gains.
Simulated scenarios
Base system (S0)
2005-10 set of 
reforms (S1)
S2 scenario S-3 scenario S-Z1 scenario S-Z2 scenario
I. Relative poverty:
 - poverty threshold (PLN) 931.77 887.58 934.78 930.91 910.20 913.33
 - poverty rate 16.0% 15.9% 15.7% 16.4% 15.8% 15.5%
 - poverty gap median (PLN) 469.13 468.73 482.3 494.42 451.1 468.21
 - poverty rate – children 20.2% 21.6% 19.6% 21.2% 20.5% 19.8%
 - poverty rate – working poor 10.9% 11.1% 10.7% 11.1% 10.9% 10.6%
I. Quasi-absolute poverty:
 - poverty threshold (PLN) 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27 675.27
 - poverty rate 6.4% 7.7% 6.4% 7.0% 6.8% 6.7%
 - poverty gap median (PLN) 332.45 352.09 334.41 345.71 322.52 325.77
 - poverty rate – children 8.3% 10.9% 8.2% 9.6% 8.8% 8.7%
 - poverty rate – working poor 4.6% 5.4% 4.5% 4.9% 4.8% 4.7%
I. Absolute poverty:
 - poverty threshold (PLN) 472.72 472.72 472.72 472.72 472.72 472.72
 - poverty rate 2.4% 2.8% 2.4% 2.6% 2.4% 2.4%
 - poverty gap median (PLN) 366.72 400.25 371.64 369.35 362.96 364.08
 - poverty rate – children 2.8% 3.9% 2.8% 3.4% 2.9% 2.9%
 - poverty rate – working poor 2.0% 2.2% 2.0% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0%
I. Benefit for households resulting from 
the introduction of the system (billion 
PLN annually))
 -25.169 1.037 -1.033 -7.044 -5.921
Note: Children are defined as people under the age of 18.
Source: own calculations on the basis of SIMPL model based on HBS 2010 data.
table iV.a.3 | total cost and number of persons eligible for family allowance in s0, s1, s2, s3, s-Z1 and s-Z2 
scenarios.
Simulated scenarios
Base system (S0)
2005-10 set of 
reforms (S1)
S2 scenario S-3 scenario S-Z1 scenario S-Z2 scenario
Family allowance:
 - number of recipients (families) in thousands 1 544 2 096 1 881 1 914 1 623 1 988
 - number of recipients (children) in thousands 3 305 4 428 3 934 4 046 3 480 4 157 
 - aggregate amount (PLN million) 3 420.4 2 832.4 4 072.7 2 592.4 3 604.4 4 305.3
Source: own calculations on the basis of SIMPL model based on HBS 2010 data.
1 Simulated value of the child tax credit exceeds the administrative data concerning the use of this tax credit (see Table IV.B6), which is connected with overrepresentation of 
households with children in HBS data and with the necessity to consider all earnings to be legal taxable income.
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appendix iV. 2 | Supplement to the description of the tax and benefit system (Chapter 1.1 of Part IV).
Family benefits
Income of the family used for the income eligibility threshold for the family allowance is defined in the Family Benefits Act as 
a sum of average monthly income of all family members, gained in a calendar year preceding the allowance period. It refers to net 
income, i.e. income after deducting the income tax and health and social insurance contributions.
table iV.b.1 | Family benefits in the years 2005-2012 (PLN per month).
Benefits system Eligibility period during the year for which the benefit is granted
From: 09.05 01.06 09.06 09.07 09.08 11.09 01.10 11.10 11.11 11.12
To: 12.05 08.06 08.07 08.08 10.09 12.09 10.10 10.11 10.12 10.13
Family allowance with supplements
income eligibility threshold 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 539
income eligibility threshold for a family with a disabled 
child
583 583 583 583 583 583 583 583 583 623
amounts of allowance per child:
- first and second child
/ child aged 0-4 years
43 43 481) 48 48 68 68 68 68 77
- third child 
/child aged 5-17 years
53 53 641) 64 64 91 91 91 91 106
- fourth and subsequent child
/ child aged 18 years or more
66 66 681) 68 68 98 98 98 98 115
supplements:
- lone parent supplement
 a) amount per child 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
 b) amount per child, if the child is disabled 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250
- child care supplement granted for the duration of the 
parental leave
400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
- for large families 50 50 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
- for starting the school year 90 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
- for education and rehabilitation of a disabled child
 a) child aged 0-4 years 50 50 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
 b) child aged 5 years or more 70 70 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
- for starting education outside the place of residence
a) for dormitory/lodgings 80 80 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
b) for transport to school 40 40 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
- child birth grant 500 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Nursing benefits 2)
nursing allowance
 a) income eligibility threshold 583 583 583 583 583 583 - - - -
 b) amount of the benefit 420 420 420 420 420 520 520 520 520 520
nursing benefit 144 144 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
Child birth benefit3)
“becikowe” - 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Note: 
1) family allowance dependant on the age of a child instead of the number of children since 01.09.2006.
2) as at 12.2012 – there are works conducted on the government draft amendment to the Social Benefits Act, which assumes the introduction of changes in the scope of 
amounts, form and persons eligible for nursing benefits from 01.07.2013.
3) there is an income eligibility threshold for this grant from 01.2013
Source: own elaboration based on the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy data.
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Persons eligible for family allowance are parents or legal guardians (or actual guardians) of the child, until the child reaches the 
age of 18 years or 21 years provided that the child continues its education or 24 years provided that the child continues its educa-
tion and holds a moderate or severe degree of disability certificate.
Nursing benefit is granted to a disabled child, an adult holding a severe degree of disability certificate (or moderate if the dis-
ability appeared before reaching the age of 21) or to a person aged 75 years and older that is not eligible for nursing supplement 
paid together with retirement or disability pension. This benefit is granted for the validity period of a disability certificate.
Nursing allowance may be granted to parents or other persons obligated to pay maintenance, or the actual guardian of the 
child, if they are not employed or resign from work to provide care for the disabled person requiring special care. Retirement and 
disability pension contributions as well as health insurance contributions are paid for the persons eligible for nursing allowance.
According to the principle of subsidiarity, the lone parent supplement is granted only in the situation of objective lack of possi-
bility to award maintenance from the other parent (due to their death or if father of the child is unknown, or if the child maintenance 
application have been dismissed by the court).
table iV.b.2 | Family benefits in the years 2005-2011: number of recipients and total spending.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
total family benefits:
- number of recipients (families in thousands) No data 2 531 2 674 2 590 2 304 2 219 2 175
- total amount of benefits (PLN billion) 7.797 7.478 7.916 7.394 7.161 7.938 7.952
family allowance
- number of recipients (children in thousands) 5 192.8 4 595.4 4 266.4 3 768.3 3 314.9 3 003.3 2 767.7
- total amount of benefits (PLN billion) 2.853 2.807 3.112 2.746 2.553 3.091 2.843
supplements to the family allowance:
- aggregate amount (PLN billion) 3.229 2.627 2.656 2.420 2.246 2.057 1.876
number of recipients of the selected supplements to the family allowance (children in thousands):
- lone parent supplement 714.9 179.4 173.3 161.6 149.3 139.4 130.2
- for large families 767.4 775.3 706.8 629.7 558.9 504.7 462.1
nursing allowance
- number of recipients (children in thousands) 71.2 71.5 70.4 69.9 67.9 108.4 168.4
- total amount of benefits (PLN billion) 0.354 0.357 0.349 0.336 0.349 0.667 1.031
nursing benefit
- number of recipients (children in thousands) 642.9 676.1 727.8 771.3 836.0 873.0 898.0
- total amount of benefits (PLN billion) 1.112 1.209 1.336 1.416 1.535 1.603 1.649
Note: number of recipients is given as a monthly average. Aggregate amounts are the annual spending in PLN.
Source: Information on providing family benefits in the period from 1 May 2004 to 31 March 2006. Information on providing family benefits in 2006 (2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011), Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.
The most important changes in the family benefits system in the years 2005-2012
The Family Benefits Act governs the principles of verification at three years intervals of both the amount of income eligibil-
ity thresholds for the family allowance and its supplements, and the amounts of each of the benefits. After 2005 such verification 
was made three times – in September 2006, in November 2009 and in November 2012. As a result of verifications from 2006 and 
2009 the income eligibility threshold entitling to receive the family allowance remained at the same nominal level, which caused a 
significant reduction in the number of people with real disposable income which used to qualify a person to the group of persons 
eligible for allowance. According to estimates in Myck et al. (2011), the nominal freezing of income eligibility threshold values in the 
years 2005-2011 reduced the number of children receiving the family allowance by ca. 820 thousand.
From September 2006 the rules for calculating the family allowance have changed. Its value has been made dependant on 
the age of children instead of their number. The actual value of the family allowance amounts have increased as a result of changes 
introduced in 2006 as well as during the verification of the family benefits system in 2009 and 2012, but during the first verification 
in 2006 the amounts of most of the supplements to this allowance, and the nursing benefit, were increased, whereas during two 
subsequent verifications the amounts of supplements remained at unchanged levels. The consequence of these verifications was 
directing the benefits of greater value (in real terms) to a smaller number of families.
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In the years 2005-2011 the main reforms covered also other elements of the benefit system. Implementation of the principle 
of subsidiarity in September 2009, which disabled the possibility to receive the lone parent allowance irrespective of the awarded 
maintenance from the other parent and effectiveness of its execution, have caused a drastic reduction in the number of persons 
receiving this allowance (by ca. 75%). Although additional means for the single parent supplement in the amount of PLN 50 per child 
(maximum PLN 100 per family), were introduced simultaneously with the implementation of the above principle, only lone parents 
with particularly low income – below 50% of the income eligibility threshold – were entitled to receive the additional money and 
is was withdrawn on 1 September 2006. In 2005 the supplement for lone parents of children aged 7 years and less, who were no 
longer entitled to receive the unemployment benefit (amounting to PLN 400 per family), was withdrawn, and the supplement for 
large families was added to the group of available supplements.
From January 2009 the group of people entitled to receive the nursing allowance has been expanded, and from 2010 the 
income eligibility threshold was no longer taken into consideration when granting this allowance (which lead to a 40% increase in 
the number of people entitled to receive it), and from 2011 the limitation in the form of a possibility to grant only one benefit to 
a person or a family has been introduced.
The changes in the values of individual elements of the family benefits system may be examined in Table IV.B1 and the number 
of people receiving the selected benefits and the amount of spending from the state budget assigned for these benefits is presented 
in Table IV.B2. 
There is no doubt that the family benefits system during past years has been modified significantly. On the one hand the 
amounts of family allowances have increased in real terms, on the other hand due to keeping the values at nominally unchanged 
level, the real value of most of the supplements has decreased. Freezing the value of the income eligibility threshold at a nominal 
level and the actual increase in the income of families with children have led to a significant decrease in the number of children en-
titled to receive the allowance, even though the access to nursing benefits has been made more widespread and the universal child 
birth benefit has been introduced. As shown in Chapter 2, these changes had a significant impact on the income level of families with 
children and contributed to the reduction of the absolute poverty level among children. At the same time however, their impact on 
the relative poverty level was minimal. Chapter 3 presents the results of the simulations of 2012 verification effects. Even though 
due to these changes the real values of family benefits increased, their impact on the extent of poverty appears to be minor.
Housing benefit
table iV.b.3 | Housing benefit 2005-2010: total cost and number of paid benefits.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of paid benefits (in thousands) 9 174,6 8 472.7 7 113.2 5 568.3 4 979.6 5 058.7
Total amount of benefits (in PLN billion) 1.240 1.168 1.047 0.818 0.807 0.866
Source: Housing in 2005. (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), Central Statistical Office.
Social assistance
Full list of reasons to provide social assistance is included in Article 7 of the Social Assistance Act.
Full list of cash and non-cash benefits from social assistance can be found in Article 36 of this Act.
The amount of the granted permanent allowance is established as a difference between the amount of the appropriate in-
come eligibility threshold and income of a person or income per capita in a family, but it cannot be lower than PLN 30 monthly and 
simultaneously it cannot exceed PLN 529 in the case of a person in a single-person household and PLN 456 per capita in the case 
of larger households.
The amount of the granted temporary allowance is established with reference to the amount of the difference between the 
relevant income eligibility threshold and income of the person in a single-person household or income per capita in a family, but it 
cannot be lower than half of the value of the above differences.2 At the same time the paid amount has to be within a range of PLN 
20 per month to the maximum of PLN 418 in the case of persons in single-person households, and PLN 456 in the case of families.
2 Guaranteed part of temporary allowances paid by communes is subsidised from the central budget.
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table iV.b.4 | Social assistance benefits in the years 2005-2012 (PLN per month).
Examined period during the year for which the benefit is granted
From: 10.05 10.06 10.07 10.08 10.09 10.10 10.11 10.12
To: 09.06 09.07 09.08 09.09 09.10 09.11 09.12 09.13
income eligibility threshold for a permanent and temporary allowance (pln monthly):
- person in a single-person household 461 477 477 477 477 477 477 542
- person in a family household 316 351 351 351 351 351 351 456
amount of allowance (pln monthly per capita): 
Permanent allowance (min.-max.):
- person in a single-person household 30-418 30-444 30-444 30-444 30-444 30-444 30-444 30-529
- person in a family household 30-316 30-351 30-351 30-351 30-351 30-351 30-351 30-456
Temporary allowance (min.-max.)
- person in a single-person household 20-418 20-418 20-418 20-418 20-418 20-418 20-418 20-418
- person in a family household 20-316 20-351 20-351 20-351 20-351 20-351 20-351 20-456
Source: own elaboration on the basis of www.premier.gov.pl.
table iV.b.5 | Total social assistance benefits provided by central and local government administration in the 
years 2005-2011: number of recipients and total spending.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Financial assistance 1:
Number of recipients (thousands) 2 201.05 2 623.63 1 941.41 1 685.73 1 732.29 1 760.32 1 700.70
Total amount of benefits (PLN million) 2 176.73 2 953.49 2 493.34 2 647.14 2 686.85 2 714.88 2 694.68
including: 
- permanent allowance
Number of recipients (thousands) 171.34 182.16 184.30 182.62 184.25 189.11 192.64
Total amount of benefits (PLN million) 516.71 561.46 602.83 605.13 622.21 648.30 663.21
- temporary allowance
Number of recipients (thousands) 669.47 645.01 552.60 444.68 459.55 464.40 455.61
Total amount of benefits (PLN million) 543.02 611.71 541.10 647.87 645.40 636.86 643.47
- designated benefit 2
Number of recipients (thousands)  1 272.42 1 702.82 1 108.89 962.72 991.55 1010.84 956.53
Total amount of benefits (PLN million) 562.79 1 196.73 736.69 768.09 775.72 789.76 745.35
Non-financial assistance 3:
Number of recipients (thousands) 1 289.70 1 327.82 1 243.72 1 122.01 1 053.74 1 015.92 992.88
Total amount of benefits (PLN million) 708.88 784.03 832.67 871.73 902.01 932.75 950.25
Note: the benefits included the ones provided as part of the tasks commissioned to communes, commune’s own tasks, own task of district family support centres, tasks in the 
scope of government administration performed by district family support centres.
1 Includes permanent and temporary allowances, designated benefits, financial aid for emancipation and continuation of education, for foster families, and for foreigners.
2 Includes „other designated benefits and benefits in kind”
3 Includes non-cash aid in the form of shelter, meal, clothing, organising a funeral, care-related benefits in kind, assistance in obtaining appropriate housing conditions, 
settlement, obtaining work and social work.
Source: Annual report on the granted social assistance benefits – financial, in kind and services for January – December 2005 (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), 
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy-03.
Financial social assistance may be granted to persons with income exceeding the income eligibility threshold in specifically 
justified cases in the form of special designated benefit or in the form of one of the remaining benefits, provided that the whole or 
part of the support granted will be later reimbursed by the recipient.
As part of the non-cash support the following elements may be distinguished: social work, specialist counselling and crisis in-
tervention, These are provided irrespective of the income of a person or a family, and their main premise is support in non-financial 
aspects of existence, e.g. in the case of psycho-social problems. In-kind assistance is granted to the persons and families in need 
according to the type of need, in the form of providing the shelter, accommodation for the night, a meal or necessary clothing.
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Persons who due to age, disease or disability require partial care and assistance in satisfying basic living needs receive care-
related benefits in kind or specialist care-related benefits in kind provided in the place of residence or in the support centre. Using 
the services of support centres may be paid or gratuitous, depending mainly on the type of services.
Child tax credit 
A person is entitled to receive the tax credit if a child is less than 18 years old or less than 25 years old and continues education 
and did not obtain the income exceeding the tax free allowance in the respective fiscal year, or irrespective of the child’s age, if the 
child received the nursing allowance or social pension.
table iV.b.6 | child tax credit: 2007-2013.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Maximum deductible amount per child (PLN per month) - - 95.42 97.81 92.67 92.67 92.67 92.67 92.671
Total amount of deducted child tax credit (PLN billion per annum): - - 5.432 6.044 5.633 5.684 5.740 No data No data
Number of taxpayers eligible for the tax credit (in millions) - - 3.974 4.206 4.337 4.303 4.364 No data No data
Average value of the tax credit per taxpayer (PLN per annum) - - 1 367 1 437 1 299 1 321 1 315 No data No data
Note: 1 While settling the tax for the year 2013, the tax credits will amount to: PLN 92.67 for the first and second child; PLN 139 for the third child; PLN 185.34 for the fourth 
child and subsequent children.
Source: Information concerning settling the personal income tax for the year 2007 (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), Ministry of Finance.
Unemployment benefit
Unemployment benefit is granted for the period of 12 months to the unemployed residing in districts, in which the unemploy-
ment rate exceeds 150% of the average unemployment rate for the whole country, or to the persons aged 50 years or older who 
have at least 20 years of social security contributions history, or to the persons taking care of the child aged 15 years or younger, 
and whose unemployed spouse is no longer entitled to receive the unemployment benefit.
table iV.b.7 | Unemployment and unemployment benefit: 2005-2011.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of registered unemployed persons (as at 31.12; in thousands) 2 773.0 2 309.4 1 746.6 1 473.8 1 892.7 1 954.7 1 982.7
Number of unemployed persons receiving the unemployment benefit (in 
thousands)
371.1 331.2 264.3 224.9 334.1 345.7 309.0
Percentage of unemployed persons receiving the benefit: 13.4% 14.3% 15.1% 15.3% 17.7% 17.7% 15.6%
Gross value of the paid benefits 
(PLN million per annum):
2 258.5 2080.4 1 688.6 1 465.2 2 280.6 2 622.9 2 435.8
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Poland (2006-2011), Central Statistical Office; Statistical Bulletin 2006-2011, Central Statistical Office.

